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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation presents an interpretation of Plato's political philosophy, particularly as 
articulated in the dialogues Gorgias, Statesman, and Laws, in light of the neglected theme 
of natural law. The introduction situates Plato's thought within the contemporary 
debate over the antithesis between nature (phusis) and law I convention (nomos), and 
argues that, given his general commitments, it should be expected that Plato's response 
to these issues would be in the form of a natural law theory. Chapter One develops the 
concept of natural law organically from a reading of the Gorgias. The apparently 
immoral antinomianism of Callicles is shown to be itself a moral position presenting the 
form of natural law. Furthermore, Socrates accepts this form of argumentation while 
rejecting Callicles' premises in favor of a conception of human nature as orderly and part 
of a larger natural order. Chapter Two examines this conception of natural order further 
through the myth in Plato's Statesman, which presents schematically the various ends of 
human life as responding to the human being's place in, and imitation of, the order of 
nature. In light of the tension articulated in the Gorgias between the demands of security 
or mere living, and those of living virtuously, Chapter Three presents the Statesman's 
account of the rule of law as the imperfect but most secure form of rule according to 
Socrates' standard of natural law. Most importantly the cause of law's imperfection, but 
also of its necessityL is shown to be most fundamentally the gap between philosophical 
iv 
knowledge and popular opinion. Finally, Chapter Four argues that the Laws, in 
presenting the concrete realization of a comprehensive legal code written in light of 
natural law, attempts to partially overcome the failings of law by reconciling knowledge 
and opinion. The Laws presents the philosophical understanding of natural law in a way 
that is accessible to a non-philosophical audience. Thus Plato attempts to show 
concretely that nomos and phusis, while distinct, are not antithetical, for human law must 
be framed and evaluated in light of the standard of human nature. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ta f.lEV OVQlXVL(X KCtl 8eia ayanWf.lEV Kai. O"f.lLKQWc; 
Ell(O'ta A£y6f.lEVa, TCt bi:: 8VT]TCt Kai. av8QWnLVa 
aKQL~wc; £~e-ral:of.lev. 1 
1 
In this dissertation, I propose to study, through an examination of the Gorgias, Statesman, 
and Laws, a network of themes in Plato's political philosophy and how they might be 
understood as developing an account of natural law or a law of nature.2 I do not seek to 
defend a Platonic doctrine of natural law, but to present a reading of the dialogues as 
approaching the idea of a law of nature first of all as pointing to a problem. The phrase, 
"law of nature," is itself a problem: it is almost oxymoronic in the Greek of Plato's time.3 
And Plato, who appears to have coined it himself (though it appears only twice in the 
dialogues4), never explicitly thematizes the problem of natural law. It has been remarked, 
however, that given other philosophical commitments expressed in the dialogues, the 
absence of such an explicit thematization is itself unexpected.5 Further, a number of 
scholars have noted Platonic parallels to more canonical natural law theories and 
considered how close his position might come to theirs, and most general surveys of 
natural law, while paying little attention to Plato, do consider him as a source of, or at 
1 Critias 107d7f.: "We take delight in celestial and divine matters even when they are spoken of 
with little plausibility, but mortal and human affairs we examine with precision." 
2 In this dissertation I will use these two locutions interchangeably. Long (2005, 413) distinguishes 
between moral theories of "natural law" and physical theories of "laws of nature" as the 
"principles governing physical reality" that are "exceptionless." He admits, however, that this 
distinction-not to say the concept of exceptionless laws of nature-is post-classical; and, since 
Plato uses "law of nature" in Long's sense of "natural law," I see no reason to observe Long's 
distinction at the expense of Platonic usage. 
3 Cf. Morrow (1948, 19). 
4 Gorgias 483e3; Timaeus 84e4-5. 
5 Long (2005, 421). 
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least a precursor to, natural law thinking.6 Thus, while "the questions that the theory of 
natural law addresses are the ones that [Plato] sought to answer, and the terms of the 
questions are not far apart,"7 and while he "exhibits nearly all of the possible forms of 
the [natural law] theory ... ,his importance in its history has often been denied and still 
more often ignored."8 As Long writes, Plato (and Aristotle) "took human nature to be 
naturally social; [they] were ethical objectivists, opposed to relativism; and ... had 
powerful ideas about the rationality and order of the physical world. Could they not, 
indeed should they not have endorsed the ideas of natural law and laws of nature?"9 
There has been, however, no full-length study of the question of natural law in Plato, 
nor any attempt to show at length how the question of natural law might arise 
organically out of the more evident concerns of the Platonic dialogues.10 To begin, then, 
to understand the scholarly need for such a study-that is, to understand the 
philosophical importance of the question and its place in Plato's thinking-it is 
necessary to explain provisionally what is meant by the phrase law of nature, especially 
as found in the Gorgias, and what broader philosophical concerns it pointed to. The clue 
is in the phrase itself, a juxtaposition of law and nature, nomos and phusis, a classical 
opposition in Greek thinking that neatly picks out several central and interconnected 
themes in Plato's philosophy, especially his political philosophy. Baldly stated, the 
discovery by the Greeks of the plurality and mutability of nomoi, in contrast to the 
apparent universality and permanence of nature, put into question the validity of any 
particular set of human nomoi and so cast grave doubt for some on the authority of law 
6 Maguire (1947), Morrow (1948), Stailey (1983), Irwin (2010). For the general studies, cf. Eterovich 
(1972), Rommen (1998) and Weinreb (1987). Unfortunately, the space they devote to Plato is too 
brief for them to give anything more than a potted version of Platonism. 
7 Weinreb (1987, 32). 
8 Maguire (1947, 152). 
9 Long (2005, 421). 
10 Ibid., fn. 10. 
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as such. 11 Thus the sophist Antiphon stated most forcefully that "the things of the laws 
are adventitious (epitheta), while the things of nature are necessary; and the things of the 
laws are accepted on agreement (homologeta), but do not grow naturally (au phunt' estin), 
while the things of nature do grow naturally, but are not accepted on agreement," 12 and 
that "most of what is just according to law (kata nomon) is laid down in conflict 
(polemikos) with nature."13 For Plato, such a position could not be philosophically or 
morally satisfying, for reasons explained below. 
The moral problems with such a position should be obvious enough, for while a 
thoroughgoing moral relativism may be consistent with a tolerant "live and let live" 
attitude, it is just as consistent with its opposite. Besides the challenge of relativism, 
however, there was the perhaps more dangerous challenge of antinomianism, suggested 
by Antiphon's statement that nomos and phusis are at war. The challenge of a new 
standard of human conduct based on nature and hostile to convention will be posed by 
Callides in the Gorgias. But more generally, and perhaps even more importantly for 
Plato, the radical disjunction of nomos and phusis not only separated the human and non-
human realms for the understanding, but also threatened to irreconcilably divide our 
understanding of the human being itself, who belongs just as much to nature as to nomos 
(or what we are tempted to call"culture")Y Thus the nomos-phusis antithesis is not in the 
11 Cf. Heinimann (1945, 9). Not every Greek thinker necessarily drew wholly skeptical 
conclusions from this. Consider Herodotus ill.38; Heraclitus Fr. 114; and on Fr. 144, Kahn's (1979, 
15) statement that it "marks the birth of political philosophy proper and the beginnings of the 
theory of natural law." But the skeptical conclusion is most common. Cf. Long (2005, 417-419). 
12 Antiphon Soph. fr. 4.5-7. All citations from the pre-socratics are according to the numbering in 
Diels-Kranz. 
13 Antiphon, Fr. 4.15f. 
14 Where Plato's moral and theoretical worries about conventionality come closest together is the 
sustained encounter with the thought of Protagoras and Heraclitus, which moves from the 
relativity of perception to the relativity of political definitions of justice, in the Theaetetus, 167c-
172a. 
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first place a problem of ethics, but an epistemological problem. 15 It is in this 
epistemological sense that Democritus said of things in general: "by convention (nomo(i)) 
sweet, by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold; but in reality 
(etee(i)), 16 atoms and void."17 The same disconnect Democritus introduces between our 
experience of body and its true nature is the same one that Plato feared might drive 
apart human experience from human "nature," where, for instance, our ordinary 
understanding of justice as an object of inquiry and deliberation is replaced by contests 
of power. Justice (and injustice) would stand to Democritus' 'sweet' and 'bitter' as 
power stands to his atoms and void. Thus, since, on the one hand, human beings are 
recognized to be a part of the natural world like any other animal (so that Antiphon 
again will speak of what is naturally advantageous for them 18), but on the other, live 
according to nomoi that are apparently "contrary to nature," the temptation arises of 
simply explaining away as illusory everything that is not considered to be natural in the 
limited sense. For the human being cannot be a natural and anti-natural being at the 
same time. Thus the nomos-phusis dichotomy threatens to cut the human being in two, 
while an adequate account of justice in terms of natural law would not only satisfy our 
15 Following what Heinimann (1945, 10£.) calls the "Erkenntnistheoretische" formulation of the 
antithesis, citing Reinhardt's (1916, 82-88) argument that the nomos-phusis opposition should be 
traced back to Parmenides' dichotomy of Aletheia and Doxa, and that its ethico-political 
expression of this antithesis is but a special form of the more general epistemological sense. The 
connection between doxa, "opinion/belief," and nomos is most evident in nomizein, "to believe, 
accept as nomos." For some discussion of these connections in Parmenides, cf. Mourelatos (1970 
[2007], 199f.) Heinimann (ibid., 43-56). traces the origins of this antithesis further back to the early 
Greek opposition between word or name, on the one hand, and deed or reality, on the other. The 
Cratylus shows Plato's awareness of the connection between law (nomos) and name (onoma) and 
of the question of their relation to reality. 
16 Democritus' own coinage from Ep. eteos, "true, genuine." Its contrast to nomos in Democritus' 
usage is enough to show that it is equivalent to the more standard phusis. 
17 Democritus, Fr. B9. For discussion cf. Reinhardt (ibid.) and Taylor (2007). It is well known that 
Plato makes no specific reference to Democritus or the other atomists, but we will see in Chapter 
Four that he responds to similar concerns about the status of the perceptible world as a general 
attack that would also challenge the validity of the human experience of the "everyday world." 
The fundamental problem Plato sees, then, in the nomos-phusis dichotomy, is the problem of 
reductionism, which is also discussed briefly in Chapter Four. 
18 Antiphon, Fr. 4.10f. 
5 
ethical concerns but, more importantly from the speculative point of view, save the 
unity of human experience. This aspect of the question will arise most clearly in our 
discussion of the Laws, but it is in the background of all of Plato's discussions of nature, 
law, and justice. 
Considered from this point of view, the prospect of a kind of reconciliation of 
nomos and phusis in the guise of a law of nature would, for Plato, fulfill a function 
similar, while not necessarily being equivalent, to Aristotle's thesis that "the human 
being is by nature a political animal."19 Whether under the rubric of nomos or the polis, 
both Plato and Aristotle set out to demonstrate the naturalness of human sociability, not 
primarily as a defense of this or that political order, but in order to establish the realm of 
human experience as something stable and intelligible on its own terms. The problem of 
the opposition of nomos and phusis, then, connects to general concerns that spring from 
the central themes of the dialogues: the nature of the good life and how we come to 
know it, life in the city and the problem of justice, and the nature of the human. The 
solution Plato entertains to this problem, as this dissertation shall argue, is their 
integration in a law of nature. While natural law does not become a doctrine in Plato, or 
even a frequently appealed to argument, such as the account of learning by recollection 
or the naming of one form over many particulars, which we are tempted to call the 
theory of recollection or the theory of form s, it is nevertheless an understated but recurring 
theme in many dialogues, which can be seen as developing a complex but unified and 
coherent argument about it. The aim of this dissertation is to trace the outlines of this 
19 Politics 1253a2f. There is another possible solution to the problematic opposition of nomos and 
phusis, which could be labelled naturalism and argues that everything that appears to be 
according to nomos is in fact just an expression of nature, which is understood in the same way as 
it is when it is opposed to nomos. Thus nomos is reduced to phusis instead of being accepted on its 
own terms as a datum for a more complex account of (human) nature. A marked tendency 
towards this reductive naturalism can be seen in Thucydides and is examined in Chapter One 
(III.b) below. Thucydides does come very close to speaking in the language of natural law, but his 
meaning is quite far from Plato's. 
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argument, one of whose main results is, in Plato's thinking, that natural law, though it is 
not empty, can never be reduced to a simple formula. 
At this point, even though Plato was apparently the first to use the phrase 'law of 
nature,' which would answer to a central problem posed by his philosophical 
predecessors and in the dialogues themselves, it might still be objected that 'natural law' 
belongs to a distinct philosophical tradition that is not, in the first place, Platonic, so that 
it would bring more confusion than clarity to speak of it in a Platonic context. For most, 
talk of natural law brings to mind the teaching of Thomas Aquinas and the tradition that 
follows him, and Aquinas' theory of natural law is not developed out of a reading of 
Plato.20 To this it might be said, first, that Aquinas did base much of his natural law 
teaching on his understanding of Aristotle,21 and that Aristotle certainly did not arise 
from a vacuum. Second, later Thomists, who had access to Platonic texts, did appeal to 
Plato as one of the sources of their tradition.22 Third, while Thomism is perhaps the most 
well-known tradition of natural law thinking, it has no monopoly on the concept. 
Modern political philosophers from Hobbes and Locke to Grotius and Pufendorf all 
speak of natural law in a way that is not directly indebted to the Thomistic tradition}3 
and, in Hellenistic times, the Stoics and Cicero are considered to have espoused theories 
of naturallaw.24 If such a broad range of thinkers are acknowledged to have had a kind 
20 It could not have been, since only fragments of Plato were available at that time in the Christian 
West. 
21 For discussion of Aristotle's influence on this aspect of Aquinas' thought, cf. Jaffa (1952). 
22 For instance, Francisco Suarez (1856) cites Plato several times in his preliminary discussion of 
law and natural law (e.g., I.i.2, I.iii.S-7, 15, 19, I.iv.2, I.v.6). In the first passage cited, Suarez 
mentions the Timaeus and Gorgias in particular as a source for natural law, and, while he does not 
quote specific passages, it is only natural to assume that he has in mind Plato's specific use of the 
Ehrase. 
3 For an account of the complex filiation among these thinkers, with connections to the broader 
Thomistic tradition, cf. Tuck (1979). 
24 Cf. e.g., Weinreb (1987, 33-42); also Morrow (1948, 17): "It is plausible to suppose that Plato's 
philosophy was an important factor in the formulation of the Stoic doctrine of the Law of Nature. 
The Stoics were notoriously dependent upon their predecessors, and it is in fact generally 
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of natural law theory, it is unreasona~le, in light of the evidence, to exclude Plato from 
consideration because he does not belong to one particularly prominent tradition of 
natural law thinking. It is much more plausible to consider him as one of its indirect 
sources. 
More substantially and positively, a consideration of the problem of natural law 
in Plato, far from introducing a confusing eclecticism of philosophical traditions or 
outright anachronisms, actually reveals many surprising-though not exact-parallels 
with Aquinas. Again, there can be no question of direct influence, but these parallels 
.give some suggestion of the extent to which Aquinas was indebted to Aristotle, and also 
the extent to which Aristotle's thinking remains very close to Plato's, suggesting even 
that a comprehensive understanding of the Thomistic natural law tradition might 
require an examination of the problem in Plato. It would be too long an endeavor to 
consider these connections here in detail, and the larger historical claim will not be 
argued for, but it is perhaps helpful-anticipating some of the results of our 
investigation of the theme in Plato-to outline briefly some of the similarities between 
Plato's conception of natural law and Aquinas' presentation. 
For Aquinas, the "first precept of the natural law is that we should do and seek 
good, and shun evil." 'Good' is defined as "all the things for which human beings have a 
natural inclination," so that "inclinations of any part of human nature ... , insofar as 
reason rules them, belong to the natural law and are traced to one first precept."25 
Practical reason is concemed with "the ultimate end of human life," which is 
"happiness."26 But that we should all seek good and avoid evil, that good is obtained 
through the rational guidance of desire, and that the ultimate end of human life is 
believed that the Law of Nature, like so many other parts of their philosophical system, was 
developed by the appropriation and adaptation of ideas that had originated earlier." 
25 ST i-II 94.2. I cite from Regan (2000). 
26 Ibid. 90.2. 
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happiness, are all positions recognizable from the Platonic dialogues, and our 
examination of the Gorgias in Chapter One will show that Socrates organizes these 
premises in a manner almost identical to Aquinas' first precept, in order to characterize 
them as expressing a law of nature. Thus on the primitive content of natural law Plato 
and Aquinas are in surprisingly close accord. 
Second, for Aquinas the relationship between the first precept of natural law (or 
natural law simply) and human laws is not one of simple derivation or logical 
implication. "[R]egarding practical reason, human beings by nature partake of the 
eternal law [of which natural law is a part] as to general principles, but not as to 
particular specifications of particular matters, although such specifications belong to the 
eternal law. And so human reason needs to proceed further to determine the particular 
prescriptions of human law." Therefore, while the natural law is "the rule and measure" 
of "everything related to human conduct," "human laws cannot have the absolute 
certainty of demonstrated scientific conclusions. Nor need every measure be unerring 
and certain in every respect."27 Indeed, highlighting the non-deductive relation of 
natural law to human law, Aquinas writes that "human laws add to natural law many 
things beneficial to human life."28 This understanding of natural law as a standard by 
which to measure imperfect human laws, not as a rule for generating particular 
imperatives, will tum out to be one of the central themes of the Statesman, examined 
especially in Chapter Three. Chapter Four will consider the Laws as exhibiting the kind 
of non-deductive reasoning about human laws measured against the standard of natural 
law in the way Aquinas suggests. 
It might be thought, in the third place, that there could not be a truly Platonic 
natural law theory because Aquinas, the paradigmatic exponent of natural law, as a 
27 Ibid., 91.4. 
28 Ibid., 94.5. My emphasis. 
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Christian, ultimately grounded the authority of natural law in the revelation of god. 
Again, while the flexible meaning of nomos can include the sense of tacit custom, where 
no specific act of legislation is implied (as the agraphoi nomoi or patria nomima), Aquinas 
believes that all law must be explicitly imposed or "promulgated." But we must 
understand what promulgation meant for Aquinas. "The natural law is promulgated by 
God when he implants it in the minds of human beings so that they know it by nature."29 The 
promulgation of natural law, then, is not a theory of Divine Command, but the 
endowment of reason that is common to all human beings, even unbelievers. "The 
natural law partakes of the eternal law in proportion to the capacity of human nature. 
But human beings need to be directed in a higher way to their ultimate supernatural 
end" of eternal blessedness, which necessitates a divine law brought by the prophets of 
God.30 Natural law, then, in contrast to the divine law that is promulgated not by reason 
but by prophetic revelation, is available to human reason without further assistance and, 
therefore, is not a specifically Christian theory with Christian content, as Aquinas' 
constant appeals to Aristotle should already make clear. But still it might be said that the 
natural law is part of the eternal law, which is the same as God's providence,31 and 
therefore that any natural law theorist must be, if not a Christian, then at least a robust 
theist. One is tempted to say to this that, while the Newtonian system is indisputably the 
paradigm of classical physics, one does not need to subscribe to Newton's theology to be 
considered a believer in gravity.32 Just so one might admit the immanent rationality of 
the universe without adducing a theistic god as guarantor of that rationality. One might, 
29 Ibid., 90.4. My emphasis. 
30 Ibid., 91.3. 
31 Ibid., 91.1. 
32 Consider the definition of Maguire (1947, 151£.): "But, strictly, the criterion [of natural law] is 
nature, whether nature is interpreted as the Reason or the Will of God, as a real-ideal universe, as 
the totality of phenomena which constitute the physical universe, as a restricted part of the 
physical universe, such as the stars and planets, as the animate beings which inhabit the physical 
universe, or as specifically human nature." 
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however, choose the more temperate response of noting the importance attached in Laws 
X to establishing belief in the gods and in divine providence in order to strengthen the 
conviction that the just will tum out happier than the wicked (i.e., that human law aims 
at the good). If, then, the Laws can be understood as developing the outline of a legal 
code in accordance with a Platonic conception of natural law, then that conception will 
not be free of theology. While we are dealing, then, with two very different 
philosophical and religious contexts and two thinkers with radically different 
philosophical approaches it does not betray either to connect them by the bond of 
natural law. 
To briefly survey those few scholars who have considered the theme of natural 
law in Plato, it seems that the first modem scholar to address the theme directly was 
Maguire (1947), who distinguishes Plato's "proximate theory" of natural law, which 
treats "of the moral criterion on the level of ethics and politics," from his "ultimate 
theory of Natural Law," which examines its "metaphysical base."33 The transition from 
the first to the second kind of theory is made "via the concepts of animal and human 
cpuau:;," of which human nature is by far the more important concept. Human nature is 
understood both "in its indeterminate sense of natural capacity; i.e., the innate ability of 
every man to do one particular job better than another," and, more importantly, as the 
"constitution of the human soul," where the soul is meant to be brought into a certain 
virtuous ordering.34 Maguire believes that the argument of the Gorgias is pivotal to the 
development of this transitional aspect of Plato's "theory,"35 while the "ultimate theory" 
itself is found in the metaphysical discussions of the Republic.36 The problem of 
legislation, then, as a particular "imitation" of the ideal Form, and the theme of imitation 
33 Maguire (1947) 153. 
34 Ibid., 156£. 
35 Ibid., 157-163. 
36 Ibid., 163-166. 
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in relation to legislation, are all central to the Statesman as well as the Republic.37 While 
the Laws might seem to abandon the transcendent forms for the motions of the physical 
universe, Maguire argues that this is not in fact the case.38 Even in the Laws, Plato denies 
that "the physical universe [by itself] is a criterion of anything. It is no more (but also no 
less) than a stimulant to the mind," understood on the level of dianoia, not noesis.39 
Maguire's treatment is schematic and assertoric in tone, attempting to cover a 
great deal of terrain in a short time. His analysis of the structure of natural law in Plato, 
however, is very helpful, and justifies my choice of the Gorgias, Statesman, and Laws as 
pivotal texts for the examination of natural law in Plato. While Maguire covers much 
terrain in a short time and consequently leaves many questions unanswered or even 
unraised, he remains the most suggestive guide for a more thorough examination of 
natural law in Plato. 
Nearly contemporaneous to Maguire, Morrow (1948) considered the immediate 
context and aftermath of Plato's theory and suggested that it had a historical influence 
on Cicero and the Stoics.40 Morrow identifies the first stage of Plato's development of a 
natural law theory as the investigation of justice itself, which required the examination 
of current theories "that denied the reality of justice" and were "dramatically presented 
by Callicles in the Gorgias."41 For Plato, "'justice itself' and 'natural justice' (<j:>uan 
blKmov) mean the same thing; natural justice is the Idea of Justice, the paradigm to be 
followed by the legislator and the statesman." Nature, then, was for Plato not primarily 
the visible cosmos, but the "order of Ideas."42 Contrasting the critiques of law in the 
Republic and Statesman with the Laws' "painstaking task of formulating the details of 
37 Ibid., 166f. 
38 Ibid., 169-173. 
39 Ibid., 173£. As I will argue in Chapter Four, however, the cosmology of the Laws, or at least its 
theology, should be located on the level of doxa, not dianoia. 
40 Morrow (1948, 17-28). 
41 Ibid., 29£. 
42 lbid., 31£. 
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legislation," Morrow argues that Plato experienced a "change of attitude" towards 
nomos,43 but here he fails to recognize that the distinction between natural law and 
particular written law, which he does find in the Laws, can be traced back to the 
Statesman (where it is argued for in more detail).44 The attitude of the Laws, then, is not a 
radical break from previous treatments of law in the dialogues, but emerges out of their 
very concerns. In general, while Morrow's treatment is more detailed and specific than 
Maguire's, it is less philosophically penetrating. Nevertheless, it is valuable especially 
for establishing a likely historical influence that Plato had on Hellenistic and Roman 
natural law. 
Stailey (1983) and Irwin (2010) consider the theme more briefly still. Stailey notes 
a number of specific parallels between the treatment of the aim of law in the Laws and 
the writings of Aquinas, and argues that the whole of the Laws can be taken as an 
argument against the nomos-phusis distinction.45 He surprisingly claims, however, that 
"nowhere does [Plato] make any really serious attempt to show that the particular 
provisions he recommends follow from his general conception of law."46 This 
dissertation, I hope, will go some way to showing the misunderstanding of natural law 
from which this criticism arises.47 Irwin asks whether Plato's moral theory can be 
considered to be a natural law theory, but surprisingly seems to take Kant, instead of 
Aquinas, as the paradigm case against which to measure other contenders. Thus, 
responding to a possible objection that laws must be thought of as "unconditionally 
prescriptive" and "express a deontological outlook," and so that natural law could not 
43 Ibid., 37f. 
44 1bid., 40f. For my take on this problem, cf. Chapter Three below. 
45 Stailey (1983, 33-35, 29). 
46 1bid., 35. 
47 To note here only the most salient reply, neither in Plato nor Aquinas is natural law meant to be 
a primarily deductive rule for producing specific provisions. Human law, rather, is measured 
against natural law, and is developed in order to meets its ends in accord with our experience-
based understanding of human nature. 
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be "fit into Plato's teleological conception of morality," Irwin writes that "[i]t is not clear 
that the Stoics, Augustine, and Aquinas accept a purely deontological account of ... 
natural law; but it seems pointlessly restrictive to exclude them from the natural law 
tradition."48 Irwin, then, generously includes both Aquinas and Plato in the natural law 
tradition, the latter "in so far as he believes in rational moral principles that are correct 
because they fit the nature of human beings."49 Moreover, Plato "assumes ... that we 
have such a reason [sc. an overriding reason to be just] if and only if justice is best for the 
promotion of one's own happiness." 5° It is a conception of human happiness, then, that 
as the ground of natural law gives us an account of justice. Irwin, then, is also of the 
opinion that natural law is a category appropriate to Plato's thinking, not an 
anachronistic imposition on it.51 My approach to the question, then, while it is informed 
by the insights of these scholars, is not fundamentally indebted to them. Maguire went 
furthest toward understanding what a law of nature would look like in Plato but still 
leaves many gaps to be filled in and distinctions to be made. 
A few remarks on the approach to the dialogues taken in this dissertation. In 
handling any theme in Plato, it is essential to stay as close as possible to what Plato 
actually wrote and the way he wrote it, which requires taking seriously his use of the 
dialogue form and of different dramatis personae.52 Since the theme of natural law 
requires, however, a careful look at several dialogues, at least, this dissertation cannot be 
48 Irwin (2010, 105£.). My emphasis. "[P]ointlessly restrictive to ... " seems to be Irwin's 
understated way of saying "would eliminate the entire tradition of natural law thinking." 
49 Ibid., 104. 
50 Ibid., 101. 
51 In his commentary on the Gorgias (1979), Irwin lays out Callicles' thesis of right following the 
law of nature in very similar terms to my own presentation. He chooses, however, to translate the 
phrase as "rule of nature" and does not seem to recognize the formal similarities between 
Callicles' formulation and the classic one. 
52 This approach should not be controversial today, though there is still much disagreement over 
the extent to which the view of Socrates in the dialogues-or for that matter, the views of the 
Eleatic and Athenian Strangers-should be taken simply as those of Plato. It should be noted as 
well that this dissertation makes no attempt to distinguish the "historical Socrates" from Socrates 
as he is found in the dialogues, though no doubt there were differences. 
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limited to an exhaustive analysis of any single dialogue. Instead, it considers what I take 
to be the central arguments of several dialogues (the Gorgias, Statesman, and Laws) in 
sequence as raising and attempting to answer a series of questions which can be 
considered together as addressing the problem of natural law. In doing so, however, this 
dissertation attempts to be as mindful as possible of the different contexts of each 
dialogue in which those sections most relevant to natural law are situated. Far from 
hampering the exposition of a Platonic account of natural law, the more general 
argumentative and dramatic context of each dialogue aids our understanding of the 
problems that Plato thought prompted the question of natural law. It is because the idea 
of natural law responds to more recognizable Platonic issues (such as the problem of the 
proper use of rhetoric in the Gorgias or the investigation of statesmanship in the 
Statesman) that a study such as this can be considered plausible in the first place, and 
hope to be of general relevance for understanding Plato. 
The Gorgias, Statesman, and Laws, do not form an obvious sequence; the Gorgias, 
in particular, might seem to be an odd fit. The Statesman and Laws are generally accepted 
as being "late" (that is, written late in Plato's life) dialogues and share many similarities 
in theme, but the Gorgias is generally considered somewhere between "early" and 
"middle." However, while there is little dispute about the rough order of composition of 
the dialogues, strong inferences about a development or change in Plato's thinking 
between these periods is now viewed more skeptically/3 and there should be no 
objection from the outset to attempting to read these dialogues together as approaching 
a common theme in a common way. Also, since these dialogues are not read here against 
the generally accepted order of composition, no issue is taken with that ordering, which 
53 Cf. e.g., Schofield's (2003) and Rowe's (2010) approach to the Laws as presupposeing arguments 
made in earlier, at least "middle" -period dialogues. 
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is plausible enough.54 The three dialogues, moreover, are a better fit than might at first 
be expected. While the act of legislation (nomothesia) is mentioned in several other 
dialogues besides these three, 55 they are the only ones to consider legislati<:>11-., ti;S .~"br 
. ~: . ~ :. ~-~-:~~:.:J~ -~: 
science (nomothetike) practiced by an expert (nomothetikos).56 They are uriified, .. lRen, by 
the theme of legislation and the question of a natural standard of legislation as the other 
arts are grounded in the understanding of nature. Furthermore, the three dialogues each 
tell a myth of the reign of Cronus, which occurs in no other dialogue and in each case is 
connected to the themes of law and human nature.57 They are thus united by a striking 
mythological motif that suggests a close connection in general themes. I do not argue 
that these dialogues might not be just as fruitfully considered in relation to other 
dialogues or in light of other themes (for instance the Gorgias in relation to the Phaedrus 
on rhetoric, and obviously the Statesman in relation to the Sophist and Theaetetus), only 
that taken together they are especially illuminating on the theme of natural law that is 
54 Another possible objection to my reading the Gorgias, Statesman, and Laws in that order could 
be based on a theory of the order in which dialogues are to be read, such as the Thrasyllan Canon. 
For instance, quite recently, Zuckert (2009) has proposed a reading of the dialogues based on 
their relative "dramatic dates," so that not only should be read the Crito before the Phaedo, which 
is unobjectionable enough, but the Parmenides before the Phaedo-and in fact before almost 
anything else. Zuckert then dates the Laws c. 460-450 because of the absence of any reference to 
the Peloponnesian War and thus characterizes it as a work of "pre-Socratic philosophy" (11, 31, 
51). Now, while there is a small mountain of evidence against such a dramatic dating, I limit 
myself to one point, which I take to be definitive due to its historical importance and the 
consequent unlikelihood that Plato simply "nodded" in writing it. Discussing the decadence of 
the Persian monarchy, the Athenian Stranger argues that Xerxes was raised in too much luxury 
and so failed to live up to the standard of his father Darius, Kai. ax~::Mv EK y~:: maoumu ~amA ~::uc; 
f.v I1EQGaLc; oubd~ nw f-1 Eyac; f.yyf.yov£v aAT]9Wc;, ni\.r'jv Y£ OVOf-laH (Laws 695e4f.). Now 
Zuckert (79) takes this as a reference to the reign of Xerxes' successor Artaxerxes (r. 465-424) and 
so as further evidence in support of her dating, but under any ordinary reading of the passage 
quoted, it is clear that multiple kings must have reigned since Xerxes: "since that time hardly a 
single king has yet arisen among the Persians who was truly great, except in name." The dramatic 
date of the Laws, then, (if Plato even intends us to think of one) must be at least some time after 
424 BC, and the philosophy of the Laws will not be "pre-Socratic." 
55 Republic 247bl, 502c5, Theaetetus 179a5. 
56 VOf-109 £'nKr'j, Gorgias 464b8, c3, 465c2, 520b3; Statesman 294a7; VOf-1o9enKov, Laws 657a4. 
VOJ-109£aLa occurs some thirty times in the Laws, but never in the Gorgias or Statesman. The 
replacement of VOf-109 £nKr'J by VOf-1o9 w (a in the Laws would be explained by the dialogue's turn 
from the theoretical consideration of the standard or ideal of good legislation to its concrete 
enactment. 
57 See the beginning of Chapter Four for a consideration of the significance of this shared motif. 
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first raised in the Gorgias. The real test of the appropriateness of examining these three 
dialogues in sequence will be the argument of the dissertation itself. 
To summarize briefly, then, the argument of the dissertation itself, it begins by 
considering how Plato responds to the challenge posed by the sophistic distinction 
between nomos and phusis in its most radical formulation in the dialogues, which is 
Callicles' denial of conventional (kata n.omon.) justice and assertion of the natural right (to 
tes phuseos dikaion.) of the stronger in the Gorgias. Surprisingly, it is Callicles himself who 
describes his natural right as, so to speak, a law of nature (n.omon. ge ton. tes phuseos).58 The 
internal logic of Callicles' position will be carefully examined and contrasted to other 
anti-conventionalist positions-specifically that of the Athenian ambassadors in 
Thucydides' presentation of the debate at Melos and that of Thrasymachus in the 
Republic-in order to show that Callicles, unlike the others, does make a kind of 
universal moral claim; specifically, he founds a notion of universal justice based on his 
conception of human happiness as the satisfaction of natural human desires. Next, 
Socrates' response to Callicles is shown to be not an attack on the logic or form of his 
argument, but to argue that Callicles has misunderstood human nature and the true 
conditions of human happiness .. Socrates, then, adapts the structure of Callicles' natural 
law claim for his own, but substitutes his own content, that is, a truer understanding of 
human nature. Natural law becomes the implicit standard of Socrates' true art of politike, 
the chief part of which is n.omothetike. Callicles, however, refuses to cooperate with 
Socrates' dialectical refutation of his position, and Socrates' attempt to persuade him by 
appeal to the natural order of the cosmos (expressed on the human level in the quasi-
mathematical doctrine of proportional equality, according to which each should do and 
receive what is fitting to his nature), while suggestive, raises more questions than it 
58 Gorgias 483d-484a. 
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brings answers. The Gorgias, then, contains both the essential kernel of a Platonic natural 
law position and points to the themes of non-dialectical persuasion and the order of 
nature as a whole. But it does not develop those themes in any detail. Natural law is still 
very much a problem or matter of inquiry. 
After this preliminary investigation, the next two chapters are devoted to the 
Statesman and will show that the dialogue answers the two questions suggested above, 
namely, how one is to conceive the relation of natural law as the principle of ethico-
political right to the natural order, and how, in the properly political sphere, this 
standard can be embodied in the form of written law and so provide a secure basis for 
political rule. Chapter Two considers at length the Eleatic Stranger's myth of the 
reversed cosmos, and shows that, by its complex web of imitative relations between the 
human being and the cosmos, the myth explains the way that the practitioner of the 
political art must account for human nature both as a standard of political activity and 
as the obstacle to the realization of that standard. This is the case because human nature 
is divided and at variance with itself, so that the statesman's chief task becomes the 
weaving of disparate human natures into a cohesive political whole in accordance with 
the same notion of what is fitting to each nature that Socrates had appealed to in the 
Gorgias. This leaves the real statesman, however, with the impossible demand of 
grasping with perfect understanding the particularities of human natures and 
circumstances, and acting in such a way as to turn their diversity towards political 
thriving. The Eleatic Stranger recognizes that this demand can only be met imperfectly. 
Thus the law of nature that would give to each exactly what is fitting when it is fitting is, 
practically speaking, an impossible ideal. It remains valid, however, as a regulative 
standard of political conduct. 
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Chapter Three turns to the Statesman's argument for the rule of (human) law as a 
second-best to the rule of the perfectly wise statesman. While the problem of the extreme 
scarcity of political knowledge might suggest that even such a statesman, pressed for 
time, should use laws only as rules of thumb, the Statesman develops a much more 
robust account of the rule of law, which is grounded in a recognition of what I call the 
problem of political persuasion. In bald terms, even a perfectly wise statesman could not 
rule stably a political community, because, assuming that perfect wisdom is exceedingly 
rare, his knowledge will never be communicated to his subjects as easily as his 
command. To his non-knowing subjects, then, the wise statesman would sometimes-
perhaps often-appear a tyrant ruling against their will. He could only maintain his 
rule, then, by force, but the problem of persuasion would repeat itself between the wise 
statesman and his non-wise police force or bodyguards. The practical impossibility of 
the stable rule of wisdom, then, forces on us the flawed but stable rule of law as a strict 
and impartial arbiter of partisan interest. This, one might say, is Plato's natural law 
defense of positive law. In addition, this chapter will argue that the Stranger's argument 
against the revision of law is meant to serve a primarily methodological purpose, to 
show that even in the most uncompromising form, the rule of law would still be 
justified. Tacitly, his argument leaves room for the cautious approach to legal reform 
that is described in the Laws. 
Last, Chapter Four examines the Laws as developing and adding nuance to the 
Statesman 's account of the rule of law under the standard of natural law. In particular, 
the Laws seeks to show how the gap between knower and non-knower can be narrowed 
through an understanding of law as compromise and reconciliation. I consider in 
particular how the Laws conceives law as a dynamic and persuasive force that can 
partially overcome the divergence of human natures that, according to the Statesman, is 
19 
the source of political conflict. While the Statesman presents schematically the problem of 
political persuasion, the Laws considers in detail how assent to the laws can be fostered 
on different levels of intellectual comprehension. In this way, the Laws comes full circle 
to the question of rhetoric in the Gorgias, developing a new account of the appropriate 
means of communicating the lessons of Socrates' politike as widely as possible. 
Introduction 
CHAPTER ONE: 
THE LAW OF NATURE IN THE GORGIAS 
Est enim vera lex recta ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in 
omnes constans, sempitema, quae vocet ad officium 
iubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat; . . . cui qui non 
parebit, ipse se fugiet ac naturam hominis aspematus hoc 
ipso luet maximas poenas, etiamsi cetera supplicia, quae 
putantur, effugerit.- Cicero1 
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The Gorgias is a dialogue about rhetoric and about justice, where Socrates opposes his 
own practice of dialectic, or question and answer, to Gorgias' speechmaking, and his 
own understanding of justice and political practice to that of Callicles and Athenian 
politicians in general. What is less obvious, however, is how Socrates implicitly unites 
these two themes from the very beginning of the dialogue with his object lesson to 
Gorgias and Polus in what might be called the justice of conversation, or the appropriate 
way to investigate by question and answer the nature of things. Socrates will in turn 
derive his conception of dialectical justice from an understanding of the human good as 
the deliverance from error.2 Only later, in Socrates' engagement with Callicles, will the 
question of justice in its most general form be taken up explicitly and emerge as 
connected to the question of law. The early themes of the Gorgias, however, can be seen 
as anticipating that later conversation. From Socrates' admonitions to Gorgias and Polus 
1 De Re Publica iii. 22. "For true law is reason in accord with nature, which, though diffused 
throughout all things, is stable and eternal, and calls one to duty by commanding, and deters 
from crime by forbidding, ... Whoever does not obey it flees himself and, spurning human nature, 
by this venJ fact suffers the greatest punishments, even if he escapes other things that are believed to 
be penalties." 
2 Gorgias 458a. See section V below for a development of this point. 
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on the proper conduct of question and answer, one can reconstruct in_ miniature the 
same form of argument that Callicles will later employ in his statement of natural law 
and that Socrates will turn to his own purposes. The central aim of this chapter, then, 
will be to expound Callicles' initial criticism of Socrates and his statement of natural law, 
revealing the argument that lies behind it. In order to see what is truly unique in 
Callicles' position-and what makes it a genuine (if unorthodox) natural law position-
it will be compared to similar but crucially distinct arguments about nature, law and 
justice in Greek thinking, specifically, the position of the Athenian ambassadors in 
Thucydides' Melian dialogue and that of Thrasymachus in the first book of the Republic. 
Unlike both of these positions, Callicles' position makes an argument for the universal 
scope of justice, and so is a properly moral position. Second, since his position grounds 
justice in the happiness or good of the human being (or, for Callicles, the man-the aner), 
and so a particular understanding of human (in this case, clearly male) nature, it is fair to 
take Callicles' phrase seriously and characterize his position as a kind of natural law. The 
last part of the argument of this chapter will be that Socrates, while fundamentally 
disagreeing with Callicles' understanding of human happiness and human nature, 
accepts the form of his argument in which justice is grounded in an account of the 
human good as a satisfaction of human nature.3 Socrates' art of politics, then, can itself 
be understood as an attempt to act in accord with his own understanding of, or search 
for, natural law. 
I - Callicles and Socrates: The Two Courts and Two Laws 
3 Irwin (1979, 176£.) recognizes this crucial point, but does not develop its clear suggestion that 
Socrates' position in the Gorgias should also be considered a kind of natural law position. 
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The dramatic frame of the discussion between Socrates and Callicles itself foreshadows 
and points to the prominent position of law. The ag6n between the two speakers, which 
Callicles compares to that between Zethus and Amphion from Euripides' lost Antiope/ 
begins with Callicles warning Socrates that the latter's excessive devotion to philosophy 
past the proper time of youth will leave him a helpless laughingstock if he were 
slandered before the Athenian courts, reduced to stammering and mute gaping in his 
ignorance of the laws of the city and the characters of men (486a-b, 484d).5 Socrates' 
response will take a similar course, stating in mythic terms that Callicles will, in the end, 
experience the same ridicule before the tribunal of Minos in the judgment of souls.6 
Being called before a tribunal suggests a breach of law, and Callicles specifically 
mentions that it is Socrates' ignorance of the laws that will be his undoing, along with 
his inexperience of the "human pleasures and desires, and their characters in general" 
. (484d2-6). Since, in Callicles' understanding, such human behavior is simply an 
expression of the law of nature he has stated just before the passage quoted, his warning 
to Socrates can be quite accurately described as saying that he will be brought up on the 
charge of ignoring that very law.7 
Corresponding to this, Socrates speaks of the "law concerning human beings in 
the time of Cronos, and that still is among the gods: [namely, that] whoever has passed 
his life justly and piously dies will depart for the isles of the blessed to dwell in all 
4 485e ff. See Dodds ad Zoe. for the basic facts of the lost play. 
5 Cf. Euthydemus 305a-c for the disgraceful figure a philosopher might cut in public, and the 
greater "respectability" of those who are "between [being] a philosophical man and a statesman." 
· _From the context it seems that Plato is here taking an ironic swipe at !socrates, but the description 
also suits Callicles as someone with political ambition as well as a predilection for "political 
theory." For the practice of philosophy without excess as befitting a "free man" and not going too 
far into precision, cf. Erastae 136a. 
6 For the myth, see 524d-527a, and esp. 526e4-527a4 for Socrates' explicit matching of the two 
scenarios. Note especially the repetition of "stammering and mutely gaping." 
7 It is not clear precisely how Callicles conceives of Socrates' behavior in terms of the law of 
nature. Does he think of Socrates' philosophizing as itself a kind of pleonexia, as Nietzsche might 
· cliaracterizeitas·another manifestation ofthe will to power? Or does Callicles think that Socrates 
is actually violating the law of nature by genuinely not desiring limitless acquisition? 
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happiness free of evils" (523a5-7). But this connection of justice and happiness, even 
though it is stated in the mythical terms of rewards and punishments after death, speaks 
in essentially the same terms as Callicles. Just as the agon of Zethus and Amphion was a 
dispute over the question, what kind of life ought to be lived?, which is the fundamental 
question to which natural law is supposed to give an answer, so the agon of Socrates and 
Callicles disputes the very same question.8 Just as Callicles' evocation of law courts and 
prisons follows immediately upon his statement of a new and paradoxical form of law, 
so does Socrates' myth follow immediately upon his statement of his own conception of 
justice as taking one's proper place as part of the order of nature (507c-508b). A close 
analysis of Socrates' extended statement will show that for internal reasons it must be 
considered in terms of law and as expressing a conception of natural law/ but the 
circumstantial elements in the dialogue already make clear that law is always in the 
background. Ultimately the dispute between Callides and Socrates cannot be settled 
either in the court of Athens or before the court of Minos. If it can be settled at all it is 
· before their audience and the philosophical audience of the dialogue itself. Socrates and 
Callicles often seem to be speaking past each other, but if that is the case it is not because 
they are speaking about two different questions, or even trying to answer their question 
in different ways. An analysis first of Callicles' statement on justice, happiness, and their 
connection in a law of nature, and then of Socrates' response, will show that they are 
approaching the same question in the same terms, while their differences come down 
primarily to a difference of temperament. It is to that analysis that we now turn. 
II. Callicles on law and nature 
a - Callicles' critique of Socrates: nomos, phusis, and dialectic 
8 Gorgias 500d4, 512a7. Cf. Republic 618c. 
9 Cf. section V below. 
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Although Callicles has the first utterance of the dialogue (which fittingly enough is 
"war"), there is little indication that he will tum out to be Socrates' chief antagonist. We 
see him politely mocking Socrates for arriving late to Gorgias' public display, but 
inviting him into his home, where the visitor is residing during his stay in Athens (447b). 
In the next thirty-three Stephanus pages, he has nothing substantive to say, only 
expressing his exceptional delight in the conversation and backing Chaerephon' s 
attempts to keep the discussion going (458d). It is only when Socrates has apparently 
refuted Polus that Callicles rejoins the conversation. The incredulous sarcasm of his 
asking Chaerephon whether Socrates is serious or merely playing when he says that 
doing injustice is worse than suffering it, is quite startling (481b).10 He says that Socrates 
"can't be serious" because, if he were correct, then it would be the case that "the life of 
human beings would be wrong-side up and all our actions are contrary to what it seems 
they should be" (48lcl-4). Polus had asserted that having political power was an 
unmitigated good (468c), and was then led to praise injustice and tyranny as the way to 
happiness (473b3f.). Socrates, however, was eventually able to force Polus to agree that 
justice was good because "the just things are surely agreed to be beautiful (kala)" and all 
beautiful things are good (476e-477a). Polus is thus eventually won over, at least 
apparently, by this verbal argument, but Callicles will not let the thesis that happiness is 
the result of the unchecked assertion of power go so easily. But instead of proceeding to 
straightforwardly restore Polus' praise of injustice, Callicles will do something 
unexpected, arguing that the nature of justice itself has been misunderstood or 
concealed even from Polus. He and Polus agree what the best life is, but will go the extra 
10 His question must be sarcastic, for he seems to be otherwise familiar with Socrates' habits of 
questioning, or at least the habits of typical "philosophers," among whose number he classes 
Socrates (484c-d). 
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step of reconceiving justice with the demands of his conception of the good life as its 
standard. Polus had thought that justice was bad for the individual, while Callicles 
claims that what we commonly believe to be justice is not true justice at all. 
Before stating his own position, Callicles criticizes Socrates' dialectical practice in 
the harshest terms. In this respect, his entry into the conversation is reminiscent of 
Thrasymachus' own irruption into the discussion of the Republic. He is just as dismissive 
as Thrasymachus was of Socrates' dialectical methods-and both men accuse him of 
ironizing11-but Callicles' particular objection to these methods is quite different from 
the former's, who merely mocks Socrates' verbal definitions of justice.12 Callicles will 
also accuse Socrates of unserious wordplay, 13 but he develops his critique of Socrates in 
more detail, and gives it a specific point, where Thrasymachus appears to merely bluster 
and states his accusation in such a way that would seem at first to preclude any answer 
at all to the question "what is justice?"14 Callicles' specific charge is that Socrates has 
tricked Gorgias and Polus into agreeing with him by illicitly shifting the terms of the 
debate back and forth between two frames of reference, speaking now in terms of nomos, 
now according to phusis: 
You lead the discussion to such lowly and demagogic subjects-you who 
purport to pursue truth!-subjects that are not beautiful by phusis, but by nomos. 
But for the most part they are opposed to each other, phusis and nomos. So if 
someone is ashamed and doesn't dare to say what he thinks, he is forced to 
contradict himself (enantia legein). And with the understanding of this wise trick 
of yours you get up to mischief in argument: if someone speaks according to 
nomos, you ask according to phusis, and if someone speaks about the facts of 
phusis, you speak of the facts of nomos.15 
11 Republic 337a6, Gorgias 489el. Callicles will also, like Thrasymachus, accuse Socrates of phluaria 
or "talking nonsense" (489d7). 
12 Republic 336c-d. 
13 Callicles first interrupts to ask if Socrates is speaking in earnest or playing around at 481b6f.; at 
482c4 he accuses him of "insolent puerility in argument" (boKE"ic; v EavLEuw8m t v 'rOLe; AoyOLc;); 
later at 489b8 he will fault Socrates' shameless harping on words (auK ai.axuVlJ 'lllAlKot)'[oc; wv 
ovo!l-a'ra 8TJQEuwv). 
14 Republic 337b. 
15 Gorgias 482e2-483a7. 
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Callicles here tums the common sophistic opposition of nomos and phusis, clearly 
recognizable from the fragment of Antiphon discussed in the introquction, 16 into a 
sophisticated critique of Socrates' dialectical practice that seems to get at something at 
least partially true, even if it must be considered unfair to the spirit of Socratic inquiry. 
Socrates is accused of illicitly shifting from one referential framework to another in the 
middle of philosophical discussion, thereby catching his interlocutors in specious 
contradictions and inconsistencies that they would otherwise avoid if they were as adept 
as he was. Thus Socrates can catch Polus in contradiction because Polus knows, on the 
one hand, that, conventionally (kata nomon), justice is held to be beautiful or noble, and 
that injustice is ugly and shameful, but on the other, that, in fact or truly (kata phusin), it 
is worst of all to suffer injustice and not at all bad to commit injustice. It is not entirely 
clear from Callicles' statement whether he thinks it is merely out of shame that Polus, 
Gorgias, and other such interlocutors are caught in these inconsistencies or that it is 
Socrates' argumentative dexterity that confuses them-or whether it is a combination of 
both, With the shame of conventionally unjust actions keeping the individual from even 
conceptualizing them clearly. The central thrust of Callicles' critique, however, is clear. 
He argues that what is generally taken to be a single ethico-political vocabulary is in fact 
double, with one true, honest, and natural understanding, and another that is false, 
dissimulating, and contrary to nature, though accepted by convention. 
This critique of Socrates' mode of questioning is in itself neutral as to whether 
nature or convention is the superior frame of reference for ethical judgment. By 
suggesting that every apparent Socratic elenchus is based on a confusion of phusis and 
nomos, Callicles assumes that both of these systems of moral evaluation are self-
consistent. He takes nature and convention as mutually opposed but each as monolithic 
16 Antiphon Fr. 4. Cf. above pp. 4£. 
27 
and coherent in itself. He has to assume this because otherwise moral contradiction 
could arise just as well from a confused understanding of conventional moral evaluations, 
leaving the appeal to a separate, natural moral system superfluous. One might think that 
Polus, for instance, is not confusing conventional and natural standards of evaluation, 
but displaying the contradiction within Greek nomos between the self-assertion and fair 
play.17 This will turn out to be of the utmost importance, then, for if it_ can be shown that 
even Callicles' statement of what is truly just according to nature cannot be expressed 
coherently, then the chief motivation for his original distinction between the standards 
of nomos and phusis would be deflated. If Socrates could show that even the unashamed 
spokesman of so-called nature cannot coherently articulate his premises, then his own 
contention that nature and convention are not radically distinct would be proven much 
more plausible than the opposite position. 
Socrates, we shall see, does not share Callicles' assumptions. While it may well 
be the case that he will play on the ambiguity of a term of moral praise or blame to make 
a point or trip up his interlocutor, the latter always has the chance to point out the 
confusion and suggest his revision. More importantly, Socrates' practice does not 
presuppose the existence of two competing and internally consistent moral systems. 
Before stating his own natural law position, Socrates had already suggested that he did 
not think law and nature were so radically opposed as Callicles thought (489b). His 
procedure, then, is not to identify genetically the cause or source of the contradictory 
elements of an interlocutor's position (saying that one opinion is 'natural' and another 
'conventional') but simply to disentangle them and attempt to put the interlocutor on 
the path to consistency or at least knowledge of ignorance. Because Socrates does not 
share Callicles' conception of a self-coherent but mistaken conventional morality, he is in 
17 For something like this point, cf. Kahn (1979, 14). 
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fact in a better position to criticize its failings. Because he does not conceive of nature 
and convention as always and necessarily in conflict, he can be open to the actual reform 
of conventional moral thinking (that is, opinions about the beautiful and the good) 
according to the standard of nature. It is the interpenetration of the natural and 
conventional in any collection of moral opinions that makes possible the sifting of 
opinions for the truth and insight they might contain.18 
II.b - Callicles' Statement on Natural Law 
The manner of Socrates' response to Callicles' initial charge will be discussed further 
below. But, for now, to return to Callicles' argument, it is not justice as such that 
Callicles finds fault with, but what he takes to be Socrates' dissimulating trickery in the 
inquiry into justice. He locates this dissimulation in an intentional confusion of nature 
and law or convention. Yet Callicles almost immediately turns around and offers his 
own confounding of phusis and nomos, one that is admittedly explicit where Socrates' 
alleged confusion was not (483c6-e4): 
Nature itself, I think, reveals that it is right (dikaion) for the better (ton ameino) to 
have more than the worse (tou kheironos) and the more powerful than the less 
powerful. It makes clear in many places that this is the state things, both among 
the other animals and in all the cities and nations of human beings-that Right 
(to dikaion) has been so determined, for the mightier (ton kreitto) to rule and have 
more than the weaker (tou hettonos ). What right was it that Xerxes enjoyed when 
he invaded Bellas, or his father against the Scythians? ... But I think that they do 
these things in keeping with the nature of right (kata phusin ten tou dikaiou), and-
by Zeus!-in keeping with nature's law (kata nomon ge ton tes phuse6s), though 
perhaps not with the one that we set down. 
18 The clearest example of internal disagreement about moral categories in the Gorgias concerns 
justice. Socrates argues that Polus could provide many witnesses for his view of justice, but that 
they would be false witnesses, and that only Socrates would be in agreement with himself (472a-
b) and later that Polus himself and all other human beings in fact would agree with his own view 
that doing injustice is always bad for the wrongdoer (474b2-5). Later (492d2-5) he will admit 
again to Callicles that everyone else thinks what he (and to some extent Polus) was willing to say. 
On this point see Stauffer (2002, 629f.) 
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Calli des' striking declaration of natural right and nature's law adduces several kinds of 
evidence, pointing to the cities and nations of men as well as to the animal kingdom. 
Since he will return to the animal metaphor later, it is most illuminating to consider in 
some detail what he could mean by his appeal to animal nature.19 From his later 
comments he seems to have in mind not so much the observation of Aristophanes' 
Pheidippides-or (looking forward) that of Spinoza-that strong, young cocks will 
attack the old and enfeebled or that the big fish will eat the little.20 Instead he seems to 
have in mind the behavior of entirely different sorts of animals towards each other. His 
model for the strong and dominating animal is the lion, to which he later compares the 
strong and passionate natures that are seduced and enslaved by the Athenian demos, 
which is understood as a tame herd.21 In this choice of imagery, as in much else, Callicles 
19 It has regularly been noted that Callicles' appeals to history are deeply, if not intentionally, 
ironic, since the campaigns of Xerxes against the Greeks and Darius against the Scythians both 
ended in defeat. If anything, this would be supporting evidence for the validity of Socrates' 
admonition that the wicked do not go unpunished and that we should believe "god and the 
womenfolk that no one can escape fate" (512e2ff.). As shown below, however, this appeal 
becomes less paradoxical when we understand Callicles' unique conception of power. Xerxes 
failed to conquer Athens, but had he succeeded he would have been an exceptionally happy 
tyrant, while the Athenians, victorious as a city, would still be weak as individuals, their own 
tyrannical desires unfulfilled. Themistocles, whose tyrarlnical ambitions the Athenians feared, 
was ostracized. 
2° Cf. Aristophanes, Clouds 1427-29: 
mc£\(lcu bE. mvc; MEKTQOVac; Kai. TaMa '[lX f3oTa TaUTL, 
we; 'rOUe; TiaTEQac; Ct~UVETCU· KaLTOL Tl bta<j:H~QOUO"LV 
T]~wv EKEivot. 7Li\i]v y'onl/Jll<P(a~aT ou yqacpoumv; 
Callicles would say that roosters are quite right not to draft conventional decrees. For Spinoza's 
definition of natural right, d . TTP ch. 16: "By the right and established order of Nature I mean 
simply the rules governing the nature of every individual thing, according to which we conceive 
of it as naturally determined to exist and act in a certain way. For example, fish are determined 
by nature to swim, and the big ones to eat the little ones. Thus is it by sovereign natural right that 
fish inhabit water, and the big ones eat the smaller ones." 
21 The image of lions amidst the flock was not uncommon in Athenian debate. Again, in 
Aristophanes' Frogs (1431£.), Aeschylus, asked by Dionysus to advise the city what to do about 
Alcibiades, says: 
~aihma ~tv MovTa ~i] 'v Tioi\n TQ£cpnv· 
ijv b' EKTQacpt:J nc;, mic; TQOTIOLc; U7LllQETEiv. 
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turns out to betray the typical evaluations of the Greek aristocrat, but his mode of 
argumentation is as much revolutionary as it is conservative.22 
Callicles must conceive of the natural relation of lions to their prey more or less 
as follows. On account of their strength, lions run rampant amongst the weaker animals 
that are their prey. Their only sustenance is the flesh of their prey, and their strength is 
directed chiefly towards this end. The prey, in their turn, cannot individually face down 
their predators. They collect themselves into large groups or herds to ward off their 
predators with the threat of sheer overpowering number, or they escape by their 
cunning.23 They are not as such directed towards the death of the predator as the 
predator is of the prey. In themselves, they are not prey but, say, grazing herd animals. 
Their behavior, surely, is adapted to avoid as much as possible the risk of predation but, 
just like lions, they are directed primarily to obtaining sustenance, in their case by 
grazing. It is only in consideration of the lion that the lamb becomes helpless prey. 
Successfully being a lion, then, requires the presence and accessibility of 
appropriate prey animals, just as these animals in turn require their own appropriate 
sustenance. To force the lion not to overpower, kill, and eat his prey would be to force it 
to cease to be a lion; it would amount to killing it.24 But if the lion, in order to remain a 
lion, must use its strength to overpower, kill, and consume its prey, then, under any 
possible moral framework that would take into account the interests of lions, it would 
This advice, to cater to the character of a leading citizen or tyrant, matches what Socrates will say 
is the necessary tactic of the flatterer, either of a single tyrant or of the Athenian people (Gorgias 
510b7ff., 513a9-b5). 
22 For a concise summary of the logic of Callicles' claim, cf. Irwin (1979, 174ff.). I have briefly 
discussed Irwin's approach to the Gorgias and the theme of natural law in my Introduction. 
23 Cf. Statesman 291a8-b2, where the Eleatic Stranger likens the class of false statesman to lions, 
centaurs, satyrs, and "the weak and cunning (polutropois) beasts. The Stranger uses this metaphor 
just before his division of the different regimes and so is clearly using these animals as political 
metaphors, like Callicles. 
24 Or to turn it into something that is not truly a lion. This is the mythical possibility considered in 
the age of Cronus in the Statesman. Just as human beings under the control of the daemon have 
their nature suppressed to the point of not being truly human, so a lion that did not eat the flesh 
of its prey would not truly be a lion. See chapter two below. 
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have to be considered right for the lion to act as it does. Or perhaps more conservatively, 
there could be no ground for morally censuring the lion's behavior. From the point of 
view of the lion's prey, however, there is every reason to ignore the lion's interests in 
favor of its own. Even if we are to grant that the lion's predatory nature is right, 
therefore, and thus that the lion has the right to act as it does, then only an arbitrary 
partiality to lions would lead us to impose the corresponding duty on its prey not to 
resist its depredations. But it is exactly this that Callicles seems to be arguing. His 
partiality for lions seems to blind him to the fact that if the lion has the right to prey, 
then the lamb has, for exactly the same reasons, its own right to defend itself by any 
means available to it. It would be no more or less valid for the lion to turn the needs of 
his existence into a universal morality than for the lamb to do the same. Nietzsche, more 
consistently than Callicles, made just this point: "It is nothing strange that the lambs 
hate the great birds of prey. Only that is no reason to hold it against the great birds of 
prey that they carry off little lambs." 25 
In converting this analogy back into its political context, then, Callicles 
champions the right of the lion, or the naturally aristocratic aner, over against the 
competing claim of the herd or Athenian demos. He conceives of 'stronger' and 'weaker' 
in strictly individual terms and considers the collective control of the "lions" among 
men by their natural prey to be a kind of illicit trickery and enslavement by deception, 
which teaches them that equality, not unrestricted acquisitiveness, is right (483e4-484a2). 
Against the posture of the weak and the many, who desire to have more but are led to 
preach equality because it is the best they can hope for, Callicles rhetorically champions 
25 Zur Genealogie der Moral (I 13): "Dass die Uimmer den grossen Raubvogeln gram sind, das 
befremdet nicht: nur liegt darin kein Grund, es den grossen Raubvogeln zu verargen, dass sie 
sich kleine Liimmer holen." Callicles, however, seems to be set on convincing the lambs that the 
beast of prey is right to do what it does. This again is evidence of the moral nature of his thesis, 
or, as Nietzsche might say, his failure to go "beyond good and evil." 
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the more honest _ _9-esire for mastery of the aner of sufficient nature, who would throw off 
all such democratic nonsense and rule with his naked power and ambition, and thereby 
"make the right of nature shine forth" (exelampsen totes phuseos dikaion, 484a2-b1).26 
Callicles' stirring rhetoric might lead one to think that he is praising self-
assertion for its own sake, and in a way such a judgment would be correct. He praises 
self-assertion, however, because he believes it to be constitutive of human happiness. 
Self-assertion is the assertion of desire and the expenditure of every effort to satisfy it. 
The tyrant is happy because he can get whatever he wants. Callicles' fullest and most 
explicit statement about the place of happiness in the structure of his argument about 
natural law comes somewhat later. When Socrates asks whether the man Callicles has 
described as best by nature will be moderate, in the sense that he is a ruler of his 
pleasures and desires, Callicles retorts that the moderate are naive fools: 
Since how could a human being become happy when he is a slave to anything at 
all? On the contrary, this is what is beautiful and just according to nature-as I 
am now candidly saying to you-that he who would live correctly must let his 
desires be as great as possible and not check (kolazein) them, and when they are 
as great as possible to be able to serve them with manly courage and intelligence, 
and always satiate whatever the desire should come to him for. (491e5-492a2). 
With a digression on the motivations of the weak and their insincere praise of justice 
and moderation, he recapitulates: "In truth, Socrates-which you claim to pursue-it's 
like this: wantonness and license and freedom, if they have support, are virtue and 
happiness" (492c3-6).27 Callicles takes happiness as the self-evident and natural end of 
26 For a similar summary, cf. Klosko (1984, 127). Klosko errs, however, in calling Callicles' 
doctrine one of "immoralism" instead of my preferred "inverted moralism," and this error keeps 
him from seeing the "logical structure" of Callicles' argument, which he believes it is impossible 
to reconstruct (129). This chapter attempts just such a reconstruction. 
27 Klosko (1984, 130ff.) thinks that Callicles' position would be strengthened if he avoided the 
("rhetorical") excess of these statements, so that happiness would be the cultivation only of those 
desires that one wants to fulfill, not every desire. Thus Callicles could avoid all of Socrates' easy 
objections to pure hedonism. But such a solution is unsatisfactory, for Socrates' point in bringing 
up triv ial desires like the scratching of an itch, or the submission to sexual acts supposed to be 
degrading, is not that Callicles actually desires to spend his life scratching itches or as a catamite, 
and so would be forced by his position to satisfy those (as well as ell other) desires, but that he 
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human life, and therefore as the standard against which a correct life is judged. He 
defines happiness as the cultivation of the greatest desires and pleasures and their 
satisfaction, which is conventionally condemned as "wantonness and license," but is in 
fact the natural virtue or excellence of the human being. The satisfaction of such desires 
will be a great task requiring great strength, so that the virtues of courage and 
intelligence become necessary. Happiness demands such virtues and activities-in the 
language of his previous statement, it lays them down as law-and they are therefore 
just. Callicles as much as says that to be weak-to be unable to follow the demands of 
happiness-is already a violation of natural justice. The weak must be unhappy, on his 
account, because, in order to avoid becoming slaves to the natural stronger, they make 
conventional nomos their master, but to be a slave to any master, even law, makes 
happiness impossible. But the weak would be unhappy in any case, for they do not have 
the power to satisfy their every desire. The contracts and compromises of the weak, and 
their praise of justice and moderation, are thus "pretense" and "contrary to nature," 
because they do not provide for their own true happiness. The weak would choose to 
live the life of the strong if they could (492b5-7). Callicles' conception of happiness, then, 
while it can in fact be attained only by the strong, is meant to be a universal ideal. He 
assumes that all human beings desire happiness and understand it in the same way.Z8 
Therefore it is for him a universal, and so natural, standard of justice that applies not 
only to the strong but to all human beings. The strong are right to do what they do 
because they alone are capable of satisfying the high demands of human happiness, 
while the weak do injustice to the strong by hindering their attainment of happiness 
·would have no ground for not calling happy those who did devote their lives to such desires. On 
Klosko's proposed reading, the scratcher of itches and the passive homosexual would be happy 
so long as they wanted to be what they are, but Callicles clearly does not want to admit that such 
men could be happy. Klosko's modification (or moderation) of Callicles' statements in the 
dialogue, then, misses the point of Socrates' objection and the true nature of Callicles' position in 
the first place. 
28 Plato seems to be at least in half agreement with Callicles. Cf. Laws 687cl-7. 
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with their contractual and unnatural justice and unnatural law. Blinded by their own 
desire, the weak can never be made to recognize their "obligation" to the strong. It is up 
to the strong, then, to right this wrong by any means necessary. 
It becomes possible to see now how Callicles understands power and how he 
measures the relative strength and weakness of human beings. He had rejected Socrates' 
counterexample to his individualist definition of power by arguing that a group of 
individually weak men could not be truly stronger than the one strong man, but he had 
in effect admitted that the "strong" can be physically overpowered or deluded by the 
weak.29 It was unclear, then, how exactly Callicles understood power. Only with this 
second statement on natural right and its relation to happiness does Callicles make clear 
that he understands power fundamentally in terms of the ability to satisfy one's own 
desires: the more and greater desires that can be sated, the greater the measure of power 
and strength.30 Political; power, then, would only be secondary and supplemental to the 
true power of satisfying one's own desires. It would only be true power if it contributed 
to the happiness of its possessor. Thus the collective power of the demos, even if it can 
minimally protect them and hold back the depredations of the strong, cannot satisfy the 
desires of any individual member of the demos, and so is not true power. It is only when 
political power is wielded by the "man of sufficient nature" that it can serve its proper 
29 Cf. Gorgias 488d, 483e6. . 
30 Thus, contra Klosko (1984, 128), Callicles' rejection of moderation and praise of infinite desire is 
not a "gratuitous overstatement" as long as Callicles is understood as proposing a moral position,. 
not merely describing the way things are. 
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function of sating his desires and so providing for his happiness.31 This is Callicles' 
vindication of Polus' praise of tyranny.32 
Callicles, admittedly, is not entirely clear on all these points. He had been led to 
the restatement just discussed by Socrates' pressing on the meaning of 'stronger.' 
Initially he had assented to the literal sense, which would have made the many stronger 
than the one and, therefore, their laws just and according to nature (488d-489b). This slip 
leads him to chastise Socrates for shamelessly exploiting a merely verbal mistake 
(489cl). But even if Callicles is not always able to formulate his position with perfect 
clarity, it is easy enough to see how it must hang together. It is a conception of justice 
rooted in the nature of the human being as infinitely desiring, a nature driven by 
pleonexia or the desire always to have more. The satisfaction, or happiness, of the human 
being in accordance with his nature is the standard of its justice, laid down, so to speak, 
as law. The right of the stronger, as Callicles calls it, however perverse, is a kind of moral 
right, and Socrates will later criticize it on the assumption that it is such. This 
understanding of Callicles' position can be confirmed and deepened by comparing it to 
discussions of nature, power, and justice in Plato and elsewhere. In the following section 
we will examine Thucydides' Melian Dialogue as well as Thrasymachus' (and 
Glaucon's) critique of justice in the Republic. Doing so will also bring into still greater 
contrast the structural details of Callicles' argument and demonstrate the uniqueness of 
his position both in the Platonic corpus and, apparently, in Greek thought up to his time. 
31 Thus Calli des' understanding of political power turns out to be the same as Polus'. Where he 
differs from Polus is in his transvaluation of justice in accordance with this understanding of 
power. Polus did not dispute that such power was unjust, only that it was good for the one who 
had it. Callicles argues both that it is good and that it is just. Cf. Dodds (11): "Polus' fatal error, as 
Callicles will point out (482d), lies in divorcing the 'right' from the 'good', morality from the true 
interest of the individual." 
32 Irwin (1979, 193) again has a good discussion of the passage, but he does not seem to notice 
how it implicitly answers Socrates' objections about the nature of power by redefining the 
concept in terms of the capacity to obtain the specific end of happiness. 
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III - Isolating Callicles 
a - Callicles and Thucydides' Melian Dialogue: Naturalism vs . Natural Law 
It should already be clear that Callicles' statement of his law of nature is a moral theory 
in the full sense and not merely a realist statement of "the way things are." It is 
nevertheless instructive to compare his position with a nearly contemporary statement 
of the realist position that often comes very close to, and can be easily confounded with 
it, namely that of the Athenians in Thucydides "Mehan Dialogue." This comparison is 
particularly important in establishing the specifically normative or moral signification 
that Callicles attributes to his conception of nature, This is in contradistinction to the 
Athenians of Thucydides' account, who speak of a nomos that is merely the way of 
things and so, while natural, does not propose a counter-morality to the delusions of 
conventional moralism but banishes moral speech of any kind from practical 
deliberation as a mere delusion. 
Before comparing the two positions, it is necessary to summarize briefly the 
leading contours of the position taken by the Athenians in their meeting with the 
Melians.33 What follows is not an attempt at a global interpretation of the Mehan 
Dialogue-which would require that as much attention be given to the Melians' part in 
the debate as to the Athenians' -or its place in Thucydides' Riston; as a whole (though it 
is very suggestive that the debate is followed immediately by the commencement of 
Athenian preparations for the ultimately disastrous and immoderate Sicilian 
expedition).34 Nor is it claimed that Thucydides endorses completely the views about 
33 Thucydides V. 84-114. All references in the footnotes of this section, unless otherwise indicated, 
are to book and chapter of Thucydides' History. 
34 Thucydides uses the Melians to ironically foreshadow the disaster at V.90. 
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power and justice that he attributes to the Athenians.35 Only those statements of the 
Athenians that have an immediate affinity to Callicles, or can shed light on his claims, 
will be discussed. The argument of the Athenians tracks very closely that of Callicles, 
but also contains crucial differences. To anticipate, the Athenians will make no 
connection between human happiness and justice. Instead, they will make justice 
relative to a certam.power reratlJh~~i';;"~~~trast to Callicles' universalism. The Athenians 
will appeal to a nomos grounded in the facts of natural necessity, but not a normative 
law. Considering how Thucydides' Athenians build up their own statement on nature, 
power, and justice will help to underline what is unique-and uniquely moral-in 
Callicles' own position. 
The Athenians begin their parlay by warning that they will only speak on 
condition that the sole topic of discussion be the question of the Melians' self-
preservation, "based on the facts at hand and what you see."36 They will not employ the 
specious pretext that they rule the Melians by right as defeaters of the Mede or that they 
are coming to redress a wrong the Melians have done them. They will not speak at all 
about what is just or right, but merely of the facts of power or what can be done (ta 
dunata), for "in human discourse what is right (dikaia) is judged from a position of equal 
necessity, but the more powerful do what they can and the weak yield."37 The Melians 
must give no thought to justice, nor to their own reputation for courage or cowardice, 
35 An argument to that effect would have to begin by comparing Thucydides' account (I.9) of the 
cause of the Trojan war as the natural result of Agamemnon's superior naval power and desire 
for imperial expansion, with Herodotus' account (I.l-4), where it is the result of a series of tit-for-
tat abductions of women, and so a kind of perverse dispute over justice. It would then move to 
consider his opinion as to the causes of the Peloponnesian War itself (!.23), comparing the 
"explanation that is truest, though least evident in speech" (aAYJ8Eo'rl'i'IT]V 71Q6<j:>aOLv, 
a<j:>avwni'IT]V b£ A6yctJ), that the Spartans feared the growing power of the Athenians, with the 
"causes spoken of publically" (£c; 'rO <j:>av£QOV AEyowvaL ahun) that each city accused the other 
of violating their previous treaty. 
36 V.87: d flEV 'ro(vuv unovo(ac; 'rWV flEAA6v'rWV AoyLOUflEVOL f) MAo n ~uvijKac: f) EK 'rWV 
naQOV'rWV Kal. dJv OQli'rE 71EQL OW'rT]Qlac; pouAEUOOV'rEc; 'OJ n6An, 71aUOlflE8' av· db' E71l 'rOU'rO, 
MyOLflEV av. Cf. V.91. 
37 V.90. 
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because "the contest is not on equal terms."38 Neither must they turn to "obscure hopes, 
soothsaying and oracles, and all such things that with hope bring ruin."39 When the 
Melians persist in their hope that divine providence will favor the pious against the 
unrighteous, and that the Spartans will remember the ties of kinship and reputation, the 
Athenians respond with the most general statement of their position: 
Regarding goodwill toward the divine we do not believe that we will have fallen 
short. For we make no claim of right (ouden. dikaioumen.), nor perform any action, 
that is beyond customary human belief about divine matters or human will 
concerning their own [sc. human] matters. For we believe of the divine following 
opinion (doxe(i)), and of the human, clearly, that they rule, because of a necessary 
nature, wherever they are stronger. And we have not set down this law (nomos) 
nor were we the first to use it when it was established, but we use it having 
received it when it existed already, and will pass down what will forever be, 
knowing that you, too, and others if they were to come into the same power as us, 
would do the same. So, regarding the divine, we have no plausible fear of being 
defeated and, as for the reputation of the Lacedaemonians, your belief that they 
will help you on account of shame, while we bless your inexperience of evil we do 
not envy your lack of sense. For among themselves the Lacedaemonians use the 
most of their native customs with virtue, but there is much that one could say 
about their conduct towards others; in a word, one could state that they most 
manifestly of all those we know believe the pleasant to be noble, and the 
advantageous, just.40 
The result and aftermath of the Melian dialogue is well known. After a few further 
exchanges the Melians remain obstinate in their resistance to the ineluctable logic of the 
Athenians and are later obliterated. What is of interest to us here, however, is the 
38 V.lOl: OuK, Tjv yc awcpQ6vwc; ~ovi\EVT]U8E· ou yaQ nEQL avbQaya8iac; 6 aywv ana -rov taou 
U!-lLV, !-lTJ aiaXVVT]V ocpi\El:v, nEQL bf. UW'rT]QLac; !-liMAOV i] ~oui\.r'], nQoc; wuc; KQELUaovac; noi\i\cj) 
~TJ av8(ama8aL. . 
9 V.l03. The Athenians refer specifically to. the unlikely hope of a military upset and, as the 
Melians will make clear in the following paragraph, the hope of a just providence from the gods. 
40 V.lOS: Tijc; !-!EV 'I:OLVUV nQOc; 'I:O 8£LOV EV!-lEVELac; ovb' TJ!-!ELc; OLO!-l£8a i\Ei\.£L¢w8m· oubf.v yaQ 
n ;,w 'rijc; av8QWnEiac; 'I:WV !-!EV £c; 'I:O 8£LOV VO!-lLGEWc;, 'I:WV b' Ec; acpac; avwvc; ~ovi\r']aEwc; 
bLKaLOV!-iEV TJ nQaUUO!-iEV. TJYOV!-lf8a yaQ 'I:O 'rE 8£Lov bOt,lJ 'I:O av8QC~J71HOV 'I:£ aacpwc; bill 
nav-roc; uno cpvaEwc; avayKaiac;, oii av KQav], lXQXHV· Kai. TJ!-lflc; OU'r£ 8EV'r£c; 'I:OV VO!-lOV OU'r£ 
KEL!-1EV<fl nQW'rOL XQT]Gli!-!EVOL, 6v-ra bf. naQai\a~ov-rEc; Kai. £a6!-!Evov £c; aid Ka-rai\.d.¢ov-r£c; 
XQW!-1E8a av-rcj), Eib6Hc; Kai. VI-lac; av Kai. ai\.i\.ouc; EV vJ avv] buvli!-lH TJ!-llV ycVO!-!EVOUc; 
bQWV-rac; av -rau-r6. Kai. nQOc; !-!EV 'I:O 8£LOV oihwc; EK 'I:OV £LKO'I:Oc; ou cpo~ovwea £i\aaawa£a8m· 
'rijc; bf. £c; AaK£baL!-10VLOUc; M~Tjc;, f]v bill 'ro ai.axQOV bi] ~OT]8r']aav Ufl.LV 71LU'r£U£'r£ avwvc;, 
!-laKaQ(aav-r£c; 0!-!WV 'I:O an£LQOKaKOV ou i:T]i\.OU!-!EV 'I:O acpQOV. AaK£baL!-10VlOL yaQ nQOc; acpac; 
!-!EV au-roue; Kai. 'rlX E71LXWQLa VO!-lL!-la ni\£LU'ra lXQEv:J XQWV'raL· nQOc; bf. wuc; aMove; noMa av 
nc; £xwv Ein£LV we; nQOUcpEQOV'raL, ~uvci\.wv !-llii\.La-r' av bTji\WaEL£V on £mcpav£a-ra-ra <llv LU!-1£V 
-ra !-!EV i]b£a Kai\a vo!-ll.l:oum, -ra bf. ~u!-!cpEQOV'I:a bl.Kma. The passage is quite difficult to 
construe, and I have consulted a variety of translations in formulating my own. 
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Athenians' statement on the nature of power and its relation to justice. First, the 
Athenians, like Callicles, argue that conventional moral speech is a veil or obfuscation of 
the facts of power, which can be plainly seen if one pays attention to actions and not 
merely to words. Then they give their doctrine of power itself, their true statement of the 
facts that the language of morality can only obscure. Their argument in its two parts 
corresponds, first, to Callicles' critique of Athenian democratic nomos and, second, to his 
law of nature teaching. Last, the Athenians go so far as to describe the way of power 
itself as a kind of nomos grounded in natural necessity. In both parts of their argument, 
however, the Athenians' claims are different than those of Callicles. Their critique of 
conventional justice apo tou isou is not as absolute as Callicles', and they do not seek to 
replace it with a new conception of justice. Rather they specifically abjure the claim that 
they are right to do what they do. Far from offering a doctrine of "might makes right," 
then, the Athenians have right make way for might and turn justice into a merely local or 
relative matter, relevant only to relations of equal power. The Athenians come very close 
to speaking the language of natural law, but they do not attempt to do so in a properly 
normative way. Comparing the two positions will show that, while the Athenians, at 
least in Thucydides' account, espouse an amoral naturalism, Callicles proposes a 
morally normative theory in terms of naturallawY 
To begin with the Athenians' conception of justice, on one point they are in 
fundamental agreement with Callicles. Justice, for them, is necessarily related to a notion 
of equality. For Callicles, as we saw above, justice was the imposition of equality as a 
second-best strategy of the weak (483c). For the Athenians, justice is determined "from a 
position of equal necessity," and considerations of "manly courage" and moral 
excellence in general are valid only in cases where "the contest is on equal terms (apo tou 
41 As Gomez-Lobo (1991, 257) recognizes. His article as a whole is an excellent summary of the 
philosophical points of the Melian Dialogue. 
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isou)."42 In contrast, where there is an inequality of power, "the stronger do what they 
can, and the weaker yield." Both positions, then, relate justice to equality in a 
fundamental way, but they conceive of the relation quite differently. The Athenians 
seem to think that justice is valid only within a particular and circumscribed condition. 
Wherever there is an approximate equality of power, so that the "necessity" is equally 
balanced between two or more parties, then talk of justice (and moral praise and blame 
in general) is valid and perhaps even able to influence real action. At any rate, it would 
not contradict present and manifest factsY The clearest example of this is the Athenians' 
understanding of Spartan behavior. Amongst themselves-that is, the body of free and 
equal Spartiates, certainly not towards their subject helots-the Lacedaemonians act in 
keeping with their talk of justice and virtue; towards everyone else their policy is based 
solely on calculations of relative power and what can be done.44 They are just at home 
and tyrants abroad. The Athenians attack not the validity of conventional justice as such, 
but seek to radically limit its scope. As the stronger party, their actions towards the 
Melians are, strictly speaking, neither right nor wrong, but rather beyond any 
consideration of right and wrong in the first place. 
For the Athenians, then, talk of justice as a kind of relation among equals is not 
as such inaccurate or deceitful, as it is for Callicles. On Callicles' telling, the naturally 
strong can be deceived and compelled to deny their nature by the rhetoric of the weak 
about justice, but the Athenians deny that these "fine words" have any such efficacy. 
The strong will do what they do regardless of what they are told. While Callicles, the 
enthusiast of Gorgias' teaching, somewhat ironically exults the powers of rhetorical 
speech, the Athenians disavow any but the plainest of speaking, and wish to be heard 
42 Thucydides V.89, 100; cf. V.l05.4. 
43 Cf. V.86 
44 V.lOS, 109. 
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only by a small audience, not the assembly of the Melians.45 If the rhetoric of justice has 
any power at all to deceive, the Athenians suggest that it is only the weaker-those who 
need to employ such rhetoric in the first place-who are taken in by their own tricks. 
Hence their repeated warnings to the Melians to consider their security first of all and to 
leave aside all considerations of justice and other fine words. Even more pointedly, the 
Athenians advise the Melians not to cherish the obscure hope of rescue at the hands of 
the Spartans or for an unexpected reversal, perhaps due to the intervention of a just and 
provident deity.46 The Athenians go so far as to bless their innocence, while faulting their 
naivety for entertaining such hopes.47 Their final words to the Melians tell how "so-
called disgrace, with the power of a seductive name," has brought many to willingly 
pursue a dangerous and foolish policy.48 For Callicles, in contrast, it is the weak who are 
cunning, while the naturally strong are the ones prone to naive thinking, and must 
therefore be liberated by listening to the sophists' critique of convention. For the strong, 
moreover, the neutral and cynical position of the sophists must eventually be 
abandoned for his new, positive, valuation of justice understood in a radically different 
form. 
The Athenians, then, are at once less critical and more dismissive of conventional 
justice than Callicles. In their understanding of power, too, they disagree with Callicles 
in crucial ways, even if they speak in language very similar to his. It is already clear that 
for the Athenians the inequality of power does not redefine conventional notions of 
justice so much as push them to the side. Power is the manifestly visible driving force of 
the actions of men. The Athenians' statement that the powerful do what they can comes 
45 V.89. 
46 V.l03, 109. 
47 V.l05.3. 
48 V.ll1.3: 'TO alaxqov KMOlJf-L£vov ov6f-Lawc;; braywyou buvil:f-L£L. 
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very close to being tautologous, 49 for it is by doing what one can do that one is shown to 
be more powerful, and if on~ eventually fails to do what one previously could, then one 
is no longer powerful. If that were the extent of the Athenians' claim, then it would be as 
empty as it is irrefutable . . However, what might remain non-tautologous in the 
Athenians' account of power is their understanding of ta dunata, what can be done, in 
relation to the just. If we urtderstand the Athenians to be claiming that a surplus of 
power is meant not only always to be operative but always to displace justice then the set 
'ta dunata' would have to .exclude the set 'ta dikaia.' And this would be a non-tautologous 
claim, namely that there is no overlap between the "just" actions performed between 
equals _and what the powerful do to the weak. It would say that everything the powerful 
do would be called unjust katanomon. It is not entirely clear whether the.Atl:tenians make 
this more radical claim. They may simply mean to say that the set 'ta dunata' is more 
extensive than 'ta dikaia,' so that the mightier may occasionally do what is "just," not 
because it is just but because wha,t is just belongs to that particular subset of ta dunata 
which the stronger party happens to perform at the time. This reading would in fact 
make the Athenians' central point more clearly, since what they mean emphatically to 
deny is that considerations of justice have any influence on the decisions and actions of 
the more powerful, not that the· predicate 'just' picks out no object in the world. - - . 
Justice, then, does not enter into the deliberations o£ the more powerful. In this 
case, if ta dunata are to be defined as something more than the negation of ta dikaia (in 
which case llie Athenians' position would not displace but negate justice, which they do 
not intend), they I!lUSt be connected to another" ennciple of del~beration that is itself 
different than, without being a: negation of, justi~e. For the Athenians, this principle 
turns out to be advantage or interest, in the · sense of 'the national interest.' It is the 
49 Cf. Gomez-Lobo (1991, 263). 
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Melians who first note explicitly that the Athenians premise their argument on 
considerations of advantage (to xumpheron).50 The Melians infer this from the Athenians' 
insistence that the only consideration of the debate be the Melians' preservation or 
security,51 and the Athenians later make this identification explicit. To the Melians' 
assurance that the considerations of goodwill will bring the Spartans to their aid, the 
Athenians answer reproachfully: "You do not, then, believe that the advantageous lies 
with security, while the just and noble thing is done with risk?"52 It might naturally be 
thought that the Athenians only propose the principle of interest as security in order to 
render the Melians more amenable to their own ends, but they reveal that their own 
interest is conceived in almost identical terms. They argue that "besides increasing our 
rule, you would provide security to us by your defeat."53 They are concerned about their 
own security as much as (in fact, much more than) that of the Melians, adding the 
admonishment that "we wish to rule you without labor, and for you to be preserved in 
a way beneficial to us both."54 
It is the interest of self-preservation, then, that replaces the principles of justice 
for the more powerful as well as for the weaker. Certainly the same interest recommends 
different policies for the two parties. In the case of the stronger, it is not merely self-
preservation but preservation of their very superiority of strength that is at issue. In 
some cases they must expand in order to remain secure. It may seem that the Athenians 
advocate an, in principle, limitless expansion of power or empire, but examination 
shows that this is not the case. At least in their explicitly stated position, this is the only 
reference that the Athenians make the aim of imperial expansion as such, and they are 
50 V.89. 
51 V.87: mQL aWTllQLac; f3ou.Ac:uaovn:c; TI] n6.An; cf. V.88, 91.2, 101; 111.2, 98; 111.4 ampa.Ac:tac;. 
52 V.107. 
53 V.97. 
54 V. 91.2. 
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quick to set careful limits to it. When the Melians pose the problem of limitless 
expansion-that, if the Athenians must subdue them, that same policy would force them 
to declare war on all neutral cities-the Athenians respond that the cause of their power 
also sets the limit of its expansion. They are masters of the sea and "the necessity of 
empire" requires them to maintain that mastery, but they have no need of expanding 
their power without limit by attempting to conquer the mainland dties.55 Similarly, the 
Athenians would prefer to exercise their power within measure: they would rather have 
the Melians yield willingly than to violently subdue them. 56 
The Athenians, then, advocate neither the limitless increase, nor the unchecked 
use, of power.57 Unlike Callicles, they do not seem to consider the tendency towards 
unchecked pleonexia to be an unavoidable fact of human conduct, and still less to be an 
ideal of conduct. It is here, then, that the fundamental difference between their two 
positions can be found. The Athenian position does not make any robust claim about 
human happiness or the good human life, which Callicles took to be fulfilled only by the 
pursuit of pleonexia. Therefore the Athenians could not make a subsequent claim about 
justice as grounded in a conception of the good human life as Callicles attempts to do. 
To speak in Socratic language, the Athenians present their case exclusively in terms of to 
zen, preserving one's life or security, not of to eu zen, the pursuit of the good life. We 
shall see below that Callicles, for his part, cannot consistently speak in terms of to eu zen 
55 V.99: ou yaQ vof1-Ll:of1-£V TJfl-LV 'Col.vrouc; bnvo'CEQovc; oam i}rrELQCi:)'[ai. rrou ov'C£c; '[0 £Aw8£Q<f.l 
rroMi]v 'rTJV btaf1-EMT]ULV 'rllc; 71QOc; TJf1-lic; <j:>uAaKilc; 710LTJUOV'raL, aMa 'COVe; VT]Ulc{)'[ac; 'CE rrou 
avaQK'COVc;, WU71£Q Uf1-lic;, Kai. 'COVe; i]bT] -rile; liQxilc; 'rcfJ avayKa~ 11aQO~VVOf1-EVOVc;. OU'COL yaQ 
MELQ"'[ 0 av 'rcfJ aAoyLan:p E71l'CQE\jJav'C£c; a<j:>ac; '[£ av'COvc; Kai. TJf1-lic; £c; 71QOlJ71'[QV KLvbuvov 
Ka'raa'rija£ tav. 
56 Cf. again V. 91.2. For Athenian appeals to measure, cf. 111.4 flE'rQLOl , and for moderation 
(aw<j:>Q6vwc; and related), 101, 105.4, and 111.3. 
57 For this, as well as several other points from the Melian dialogue, one should compare the -
speech of the Athenian ambassador at the debate at Corcyra (1.76.1), which suggests a consistent 
Thucydidean portrayal of Athenian policy at least until the point of the Sicilian expedition. The 
Athenian notes the universal rule of the strong over the weak but does not advocate pleonexia, 
making special note of Athenian moderation. 
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without having to give in to the terms of Socrates' elen.chus, and ultimately falls into the 
language of to zen.58 This again is not the consequence of the faulty logic of Callicles' 
argument, but the internal contradictions of his premises. The amoral consistency of the 
Athenian position underlines all the more Callicles' curious moralism. This difference in 
their conceptions of justice and power result in a different kind of appeal to law or nomos 
than that of Callicles, and sets out in greater relief the precise nature of Callicles' claim 
itself. 
If the Athenians, then, do not make a natural law argument for a new conception 
of justice, as Callicles does, they do come quite close to it in language and even in intent. 
They speak of the "necessary nature" that causes the strong to do all they can and to 
prevail over the weak-what another unnamed Athenian had called "human 
nature"59-and they call that a nomos, one they have not set down themselves, but which 
"is and will always be."60 Thucydides' Athenians do not speak in terms of a strong 
disjunction of nomos and phusis (though their critique of justice would go hand in hand 
with it), but of a nomos founded in the necessity of nature-a law of nature. But it must 
be made clear what the Athenians mean here by nomos. First of all, it clearly does not 
have the restrictive or limiting force found when it is contrasted to phusis. The Athenians 
are not speaking of a mere convention, but a universal way of things, their accustomed 
way. Their nomos does not have any normative aspect: it is not, strictly speaking, a law 
or command, though it may suggest a warning or admonition. It is not tied to any 
conventional or revisionist understanding of the content of justice or right. Their law of 
nature is merely a description of the necessary features of nature and is not connected to 
58 Cf. Gorgias 511d-512e, where Socrates speaks of the justly despised arts of swimming, 
navigation, and engineering, which aim only at safety or the preservation of life. For further 
discussion of this point, d. section IV below. 
59 Thucydides !.76.1. 
60 Thucydides V.l05.2. 
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an idea of the good, except insofar as it might circumscribe the range of the possible 
good. The nomos the Athenians describe resembles more the regularities described by 
the natural laws of physical science than the teleologically oriented law of Callicles.61 
III.b - Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and the Good of Injustice 
Thucydides' presentation of the Athenian position on power and justice, then, is 
substantively different from Plato's presentation of Callicles' position. The two 
fundamental differences are, first, that the Athenians say nothing about happiness or the 
good life, but speak only of preservation and, second, that they make no positive claim 
about justice. The inequality of power, for them, displaces justice but does not redefine 
it, as it does for Callicles. A closer analogue to Callicles is Thrasymachus as portrayed in 
the Republic. It has been often noted, however, that the two do not share an identical 
position.62 Exploring the difference between the two will further isolate what is truly 
unique in Callicles' position. It is in fact Glaucon's restatement of Thrasymachus' thesis 
that comes the closest to Callicles' without, however, going all the way. Thrasymachus 
(and Glaucon) go one step farther than the Athenians by appealing to happiness as the 
ultimate criterion of the good or how one ought to live. They introduce the question of 
the good life, but they do not seek to bring justice in line with happiness. That last step is 
taken by Callicles alone, and qualifies his position as a natural law position properly 
speaking. 
Thrasymachus' initial definition of justice actually gives the impression of a 
closer agreement with Callicles than is in fact the case. He asserts that "the just is 
61 Compare again the passage from Spinoza quoted above, which seems to correspond exactly to 
the Athenians' position 
62 Cf., for instance, Dodds (14£.). 
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nothing other than the advantage of the stronger." 63 His later explanations of this baldly 
stated thesis, however, demonstrate that he has something rather different in mind than 
does Callicles. Noting that different cities are governed according to different 
constitutions-as tyrannies, democracies, or aristocracies-he claims that the governing 
body of each city establishes as law that which is advantageous to itself, and thereby 
"declare that this is just for the ruled, the advantage [of the rulers], and the one who 
transgresses this they punish as a lawbreaker and doer of injustice."64 What is just, then, 
is what the rulers of a city set down in law as their own advantage, and what must be 
done by their subjects.65 Justice is always a matter of convention, and Thrasymachus never 
describes a justice "according to nature" or makes any appeal to nature at all. Justice, 
furthermore, does not, strictly speaking, apply to the strong at all, but only to the weak, 
that is, to the ruled. It is just for the weak to do what is to the advantage of the strong, 
while justice is no concern to the strong themselves. These statements, then, reveal an 
opinion about justice distinct both from Thucydides' Athenians and from Callicles.66 
Justice, at least in the first instance, is not simply whatever is to the advantage of the 
stronger; it is when the weaker-the ruled-act according to the advantage of the 
stronger, who are defined as the governing body of a city. Justice or injustice, strictly 
speaking, does not apply at all to what the stronger do themselves.67 
63 Republic, 338clf. 
64 Ibid., 338d-e, esp. 338e3-6: chr£<PTJvav 1:otn:o biKmov 'tOte:; tXQXO~£vou; dvaL, 1:0 aq>(aL 
OUJ.l<!>EQOV, Kal'I:OV 1:0U1:0U EK[3a(vovnx Koi\ai;;ovaLV we:; 7TaQaVOJ.lOUV1:lX n : Kai. abLKOUV1:a. 
65 Ibid., 339c10f. 
66 The literature on Thrasymachus has expressed disagreement about whether his primary 
definition of justice really is" the advantage of the stronger" and not mere "obedience to the law" 
(for a resume of the debate cf. Maguire (1971) and Hadgopoulos (1973). But nowhere in the 
literature, so far as I can tell, has it been recognized that Thrasymachus applies justice (at least 
initially) only to the ruled. But this misses the crucial role that power plays in Thrasymachus' 
account, just as it did in Thucydides. 
67 This strangely neglected point is made clear by Adeimantus' later restatement of 
Thrasymachus' opinion (Republic 367cl-4): "the just is another's good, the advantage of the 
stronger, and the unjust what is advantageous and profitable to himself." For a restatement of 
this whole definition as "what the many say," cf. Laws 714b-d. 
48 
Thrasyrnachus' position resembles more that of the Athenians than Callicles', 
insofar as he takes justice as something not universal but relative to a particular power 
relationship. Only where the Athenians had located justice in the precarious balance of 
equal powers, Thrasymachus sees it as an imposition of the strong upon the weak. This 
appears to be diametrically opposed to Callicles' understanding of conventional justice, 
which he believes to be the imposition of the weak upon the naturally strong. But the 
difference comes down again to their different understandings of power, and becomes 
somewhat less radical when their different conceptions of power are understood. 
Thrasymachus, like the Athenians, treats power not as something latent and always 
waiting to be expressed, but as something manifest and straightforwardly factual. For 
Callicles, on the other hand, true power is the essentially individual ability to satisfy 
one's desires by any means, and can be controlled by the persuasion of the "weak." For 
Thrasymachus the powerful are simply whoever happens to rule, be it one Calliclean 
man, a group, or the democratic assembly.68 Since power is constituted within different 
groups, whatever is called justice will be relative to each particular one, with none 
having any claim to be called more or less "natural." But Thrasyrnachus also differs 
from the Athenians in considering justice to be the imposition of the strong upon the 
weak, not a matter between equals. In doing so he is not trying to uphold the kind of 
pretense that the Athenians explicitly abjured-that there is a justification for their 
treatment of the weak-but seems rather to suggest, even more radically than the 
Athenians, that justice is in all cases an epiphenomenon, a polite name that obscures the 
true workings of power. Thrasymachus never explicitly considers the situation where 
two parties share a balance of equal power, but he must believe that there can be no 
justice among equals. For if justice does not apply to the rulers of a city in the first place, 
68 Ibid. 338d7f. Cf. Gorgias 488d5-10, 489dl-8. 
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then the presumptively self-equal oligoi, or the members of a sovereign demos cannot be 
bound to each other by any conception of justice.69 Thrasymachus possesses no concept 
of democratic self-rule or self-rule in general?0 
It should be clear at this point that the novelty of Thrasymachus' definition of 
justice is merely formal. He does not at all modify the content of conventional 
conceptions of justice and injustice, but is an uncompromising conventionalist. His 
originality can only lie in identifying the beneficiaries of justice.71 Unlike the Athenians, 
Thrasymachus does establish a relation between justice and the good, that is, between 
justice and happiness, but it is a negative one. The life of justice will be a life of 
unhappiness, while perfect injustice will bring the greatest happiness.72 By calling those 
"who truly rule" unjust, instead of being beyond justice and injustice, Thrasymachus, 
seems to have suddenly fallen for the universalizing tendency of all talk of justice, or to 
have shifted silently to the perspective of the weaker, who will have accepted justice at 
face value.73 But this, again, is not surprising in the context of democratic Athens, where 
the distinction between sovereign and subject barely applies and every citizen could 
69 This more comprehensive dismissal of justice even between equals might in fact be the position 
of Thucydides' Athenians, whose only other statement about the behavior of equals is that "those 
who do not yield to equals ... most often come out aright'' (V.lll.4). "Justice" between equals, 
then, will be nothing but the careful maintenance of one's own position, and so reducible to 
considerations of interest and security. Should one of the equal parties suffer a decrease of power, 
'Justice" would cease to be a consideration at all. 
7 Cf. Gorgias 491d8-el. For the democratic citizen as simultaneously ruler and ruled, cf. Rousseau, 
Social Contract {I.vi) where members of the founding sovereign body are considered collectively 
as citizens and individually as subjects to the laws made by that same sovereign body. 
71 Maguire (1971, 147f.), considers it a "problem" that Thrasymachus puts rulers above their own 
laws, and so prefers to read his claim differently, but it is not at all clear why this would be a 
problem for the clearly cynical Thrasymachus of Plato's Republic. It would be a problem only if 
we assume that Plato intends to portray Thrasymachus as maintaining an internally consistent 
and universal position on justice, but that is clearly not what Plato intends. The similarity with 
Thucydides' equally non-universal account of justice should be enough to show that such ideas 
were timely. As Maguire admits {148f., 151), the meaning of justice undergoes a dialectical 
transformation at exactly the point indicated in this paragraph. 
72 Republic 344a4f. 
73 Ibid. 343c. 
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count on holding a magistracy at least once in his lifetime.74 By the end, any reference to 
rulers will tum out to be merely incidental to his claim about the goodness of injustice. 
The precise reasons for this modification of his position, however, need not concern us 
here. What is important is that Thrasymachus shows by his examples that the scope of 
power and injustice is no longer necessarily limited to political rule. "The just man has 
less than the unjust in every situation."75 The man cheating on his private contract with 
another, or falsifying his tax returns, or the magistrate abusing his prerogatives, will 
always come out better than those who acted justly in accordance with law. Justice here 
is still the advantage of the stronger, precisely because it is the just and honest man who 
can be taken advantage of by the strong, unjust man and therefore reveals himself as 
weak. But Thrasymachus does not take the step of advocating a natural justice opposed 
to the merely conventional.76 In fact nowhere in his speech is there any appeal to the 
distinction between nomos and phusis at all. Many scholars have maintained77 that 
Thrasymachus holds some kind of natural right doctrine, but he gives no direct evidence 
of it, or even of an awareness of nature as that in light of which convention is disclosed 
as mere convention. Carefully considered, the Republic at least offers no evidence for 
considering Thrasymachus as advocating a theory of natural right of the right of the 
stronger in a moral sense. 
It is in fact Glaucon who reframes Thrasymachus' thesis in the more familiar 
terms of the nomos-phusis dichotomy, and so comes closest to Callicles' position 
regarding nature, justice and human happiness, though he still shies away from making 
a true natural right or natural law claim. What is most interesting to us is Glaucon' s 
74 The demos can only be considered a ruling faction if it singles out a part of itself as the subject, 
rival, or political enemy. Thus the rule of the demos becomes the rule of the many over the few 
(the rich). Cf. Statesman 298e6: d-n: fK TWV nAoua(wv dn: EK Tou brnwu nav1:6c;. 
75 Republic 344d2f. 
76 Cf. Maguire (1971, 159) 
77 For a roundup cf. again Maguire (197) 
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demand that Socrates praise justice following the same pattern that he will use himself 
to praise injustice?8 Glaucon instructs Socrates to take the form of an argument for the 
goodness of what is generally considered to be injustice and turn it around to praise 
justice. He thus orders Socrates to do the very thing he does in the Gorgias, to turn the 
structure of Callicles' praise of conventional injustice into a defense of a justice that is 
natural without standing in polar opposition to conventional justice. However, since 
Glaucon does not himself propose a theory of natural right or natural law, it is not as 
easy to see that that is in effect what he is demanding of Socrates. Glaucon does not 
advocate a natural right of the stronger, but he expects from Socrates a defense of the 
natural goodness of justice, and Glaucon believes that the just and the lawful are 
identical.79 Glaucon, apparently without knowing it, as much as asks Socrates to present 
a defense of a more or less conventional notion of justice in terms of natural law. 
Glaucon' s account, 80 which he has heard from "Thrasymachus and countless 
others," is that it is by nature good to do injustice, but on balance even worse to have it 
done to oneself. Therefore, once men have had a taste of both and seen that they are 
unable to avoid the one and have only the other, they consider it advantageous to agree 
to a pact not to do injustice to each other. This is the beginning of laws and contracts, 
which "name what is commanded by the law both 'lawful' and 'just."' This, then, is 
justice, a second-best accepted not as something good in itself but "honored out of a lack 
of strength to do wrong." The desire for pleonexia, "which every nature naturally 
pursues as good," would lead everyone to commit injustice were they not "by law led 
forcefully to the honoring of equality." But a true man who was capable of getting away 
with injustice would be mad to submit to the terms of such an agreement. If he could get 
78 Republic 358d3-6. 
79 Republic 359a4. 
80 Republic 358d-359c. His account is straightforward and expressed consecutively, so that I have 
not seen fit to cite each individual quotation or paraphrase. 
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away with it, there would be no comparing the good of pleonexia with the compromise of 
justice. 
Even in this brief statement, Glaucon touches on several elements in Callicles' 
own understanding of conventional and natural justice. Both consider conventional 
justice to be a product of the weak and to consist in a legally enforced equality-the 
equality of not being harmed. Both claim-Callicles apparently sincerely and Glaucon 
apparently just for the sake of argument-that the natural human good is pleonexia or 
limitless acquisition. Here, in fact, Glaucon is even more explicit than Callicles in 
claiming that all of nature pursues this good.81 Both, then, stake their claim in an 
understanding of human nature. Furthermore, both argue that, given the opportunity, 
even the putatively just would give in to that desire for limitless acquisition. Both make 
the case that such a life is the happiest life for the man who is capable of it.82 There 
remain, however, important differences. Callicles believes that conventional justice is an 
imposition of the weak upon the strong, whereas Glaucon does not seem to be sure that 
there actually exists a man of such strength and does not give historical examples of 
tyrants, but the mythical account of a man who found a ring that would make him 
invisible and thus able to avoid detection. Nor does Glaucon oppose conventional justice 
to natural justice. Instead he contrasts convention to a natural state that is, strictly 
speaking, prior to justice and injustice.83 His praise of injustice does not carry with it the 
moral indignation and contempt of conventional justice that Callicles displays. Glaucon 
wishes Socrates to show that the right and the good are united, while Callicles claims 
81 As argued above, Callicles must believe this implicitly on the basis of his appeal to animal 
nature. Socrates at least seems to take him as believing such a proposition when he retorts with 
the claim that all nature follows an established order and harmony (Gorgias 507e6-508a4). 
82 Cf. Republic 361dl-3. 
83 Glaucon begins by saying that human beings did each other injustice before their contract, but 
he must be applying the category anachronistically since he is quite clear in saying that justice 
and law only came into being with the making of the contract not to harm each other. It must be 
the harm done to each other out of their conflicting pleonexia that Glaucon has in mind when 
- speaks of their doing injustice. 
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that they are actually never apart, only that they can be understood in different ways. 
Glaucon is a potential philosopher instead of the mirror image and touchstone, 84 against 
which a philosopher might be measured. 
III.c - Callicles' Unique Moralism 
What distinguishes Callicles position, then, from similar naturalist analyses of justice 
presented in Plato or by his near contemporaries is that, in his case, justice is not 
something relative, but universal. In their different ways, Thucydides' Athenians and 
Plato's Thrasymachus and Glaucon restrict justice to a certain power relationship or 
compact between human beings. For all of them, justice is always something emergent, 
whereas for Callicles it is fundamental.85 Callicles is not the first to oppose nomos and 
phusis, nor is he the only one to appeal to this distinction in criticizing common opinions 
about justice, but he does appear to be the first, in rejecting what is commonly called 
nomos, to appeal to nature as the standard of a new nomos and a new conception of right. 
Callicles-in every important aspect a Platonic creation-appears to be the first explicit 
natural right and natural law theorist on record. 
To recapitulate once more, like Thucydides' Athenians and Thrasymachus, 
Callicles insists that justice be considered in light of what actually happens, in light of 
the facts. Like the Athenians, at least, he .explicitly ties his understanding of justice to an 
84 For Callicles as touchstone, cf. Gorgias 486d and section IV.c below. 
85 Cf. Maguire (1947, 164): "Unlike Callicles, neither Thrasymachus nor Glauco [sic] admits the 
existence of a natural right at all." 
understanding of human nature and nature as a whole.86 Unlike the Athenians, 
however, he believes that justice must be understood not only in light of security and 
brute power relations, but as immediately connected to the question of the human good 
and human happiness. That is, he considers human nature from a teleological point of 
view. Furthermore, unlike Thrasymachus (and also unlike Polus),87 he establishes a 
positive relation between human happiness and justice. Justice is meaningless if it is not 
viewed as contributing to the human good, and so it must be conceived of and evaluated 
in terms of the highest human good. The obligations of justice are at bottom determined 
by an understanding of the good. This is the structure of Callicles' argument about 
natural right and the law of nature. 
Thus Callicles, at least initially, offers Socrates the most comprehensive challenge 
to the latter's conception of justice and the good life but at the same time the opportunity 
to conduct their conversation on the basis of a fundamental agreement as to the kind of 
question being asked and the form any answer to it would take.88 Callicles recognizes 
that it is impossible to consistently avoid the language of morality and justice even in 
debate, and instead of trying to relativize-and so implicitly take a position beyond-
justice, he attempts to reform its meaning in light of his own intuitions. Thus, at least 
initially, Callicles presents himself as a more promising interlocutor than a 
Thrasymachus or a Polus. After Callicles' long statement on the law of nature, Socrates 
will exclaim what a piece of luck it is to find in Callicles a touchstone for his own soul 
(487d-e). It will be the task of the next section to explain exactly what Socrates means by 
this, but at first blush it seems to be exactly Callicles' concern with justice, as opposed to 
86 Cf. Thucydides V.lOS. The Athenians do not make the last assertion quite so categorically, but 
they do claim that "opinion" at least suggests that the law of the stronger prevails amongst the 
~ods as well. It is not merely a human phenomenon. 
Polus raises the question of happiness at Gorgias 472c5-dl, but identifies it with the life of 
injustice, like Thrasymachus. 
88 Cf. Crito 49d for the importance of fundamental agreement for the possibility of any common 
deliberation or investigation. 
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Polus' dismissal and Gorgias' lack of interest, that draws Socrates. What Socrates can 
gain from Callicles, and why Callicles himself will ultimately fall short of fulfilling the 
promise of his initial statement of natural law, can begin to be understood from Socrates' 
analysis of Callicles' character, which we turn to now. 
N - Socrates' Rebuttal 
a - Callicles' rhetorical incoherence: eros tou demou 
Socrates' response to Callicles' initial critique of his manner of questioning is not to 
defend himself directly, but to offer a diagnosis of Callicles' character. He suggests that 
the latter's opposition of nomos and phusis is more a result of feeling than of insight. 
Socrates, in fact, seems to be quite familiar with Callicles and his habits.89 He puts this 
knowledge to use in drawing a complex comparison between the aspiring politician and 
himself, alluding to a point he also makes in the Republic about the difficulty of 
describing an experience or condition (pathos) peculiar to oneself. In the Republic it is the 
political predicament of philosophers that he attempts to represent with the image of the 
ship of state and its rightful pilot.90 Here, it is a very similar point that Socrates makes, 
but evidently Callicles possesses something in common with Socrates that no one in the 
Republic had, which allows Socrates to forego fictive analogies and, instead, compare 
himself directly to Callicles. Much as he ha.'~rpreviously produced the double analogy 
that sophistic is to rhetoric as legislation is to justice, and again that sophistic is to 
89 Gorgias 481c8-482c2. 
9° Cf. Republic 489c. 
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rhetoric as cuisine is to cosmetics (where the latter are the spurious complements to 
medicine and gymnastic),91 he draws a complex proportion between himself and 
Callicles. Each one of the two is in love with two things: Socrates with "Alcibiades the 
son of Clinias and philosophy," Callicles with "the Athenian demos and [Demos] the son 
of Pyrilampes." Clearly we are supposed to understand the following proportion: 
Socrates' love of philosophy is to his love for Alcibiades as Callicles' love of the 
Athenian demos is to his love for the boy Demos, where the third object of love is to 
stand for political ambition in general.92 Callicles, though a clever (deinos) speaker, still 
cannot contradict what either of his beloveds say; and they both are fickle, saying now 
one thing, now another, and leading Callicles into all sorts of contrary assertions in an 
attempt to please them. On the other hand, Socrates' "boyfriend" (ta ema paidika) is 
philosophy, which always says the same thing.93 Socrates does not explain how his 
second love for Alcibiades, who is like both of Callicles' loves, might complicate his 
relationship to philosophy. We might be able to explain it by mapping the relation of the 
sham-arts, sophistic and rhetoric, to the loves of Callicles, and the component arts of the 
true politike, legislation and justice, to Socrates'. This juxtaposition is supported by 
Socrates' later claim to be the only true practitioner of politikein all of Athens.94 Callicles, 
then, would practice rhetoric with the Athenian demos and, despite his avowed distaste 
for professional sophistry (520al), a kind of private sophistic with the son of Pyrilampes. 
In both respects, he practices a kind of flattery, as Socrates had explained before, because 
he caters in the end to whatever his beloveds say. Socrates' double love, on the other 
91 Gorgias 464c-465d. 
92 But, interestingly, the chiastic structure of Socrates' statement (Alcibiades, philosophy, 
Athenian demos, Demos) suggests a differ~nt parallelism, where Demos would correspond 
somehow to philosophy, and Alcibiades to the Athenian demos. Whatever the case may be, 
Socrates intends this analogy between him and Callicles to indicated as much or more constrast 
as similarity. 
93 Or, at the very least, always says the same thing about justice, that "to do wrong and doing 
wrong, not to be punished is [to suffer] the extremity of evil," cf. Gorgias 509a. 
94 Gorgias 521d6-8; also 500a, 517b-d, 520b. 
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hand, would tum out to be, first, legislation via philosophy and, second, the practice of 
the art of justice on Alcibiades, presumably as a kind of remedial punishment.95 The 
Symposium gives us a hint as to what art of justice might have looked like, at least from 
the perspective of Alcibiades, and, given the outcome, we are left to question Socrates' 
competence in the latter art. That aside, however, this interpretation would allow us to 
see how Socrates' love of the fickle Alcibiades need not compromise his agreement with 
himself and with the ever constant sayings of philosophy. His practice of justice with 
Alcibiades would be the attempt to bring the latter into agreement with himself, which 
would amount to inducing him to become himself a lover of philosophy. Socrates' love 
seeks to improve rather than to flatter, as the physician suggests not the most pleasant 
diet but the most wholesome (which need not be unpleasant for that). Socrates addresses 
Callicles: "if you leave this [sc. my position that it is always bad to do wrong] untested 
(anelenkton), then Callicles will never agree with you, o Callicles, but will disagree for 
your whole life." Socrates is eager to punish Callicles by elenchus and bring him into 
agreement with himself. He as much as says that he is falling in love.96 
Where does Socrates find Callicles' disagreement with himself? A verbal 
peculiarity in Callicles' statement on the law of nature and natural right suggests a 
solution. It is all too easy to assume that Callicles has himself in mind when he speaks of 
95 In at least this case, then, Socrates' claim that it is better for the wrongdoer to be punished is 
much more plausible, though it still must be borne in mind that, as the dialogues amply show, 
facing Socratic elenctic was an acquired taste. For btKaanKij and btKaLOaUVTJ as the art of proper 
corrective punishment, cf. Gorgias 476a-477e, also Erastae 137d10-e2. If that dialogue is not 
genuine, then its author apparently wrote it to illustrate some points of the Gorgias. For the 
general idea that, for people like Callicles, what is needed is not argument but punishment, cf. 
Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1214b28-33.: ruiam; flEV ouv 'l:Ct£; b6l;a<; E7HOKOTCELV, oaa<; £xova( 
nVEc; 7T£Qi. a-lrrijc; [sc. n)batflOVLac;], 7T£QL£Qyov (noMa yix.Q cpa(v£'l:aL Kai. mi<; natbaQ(OL<; Kai. 
ml<; KliflVOUOl Kai. naQacpQOVOVOL, 7T£Ql c:Jv av ou8d<; VOUV £xwv bLa7TOQTJOEL£V· btov'tal yix.Q 
ov ..\6ywv, aA,\' o'i flEV T)AtKLa<; l':v 1J flEmf3aAoumv, o'l b£ Ko..\am:wc; La'tQLKl)c; ft rro..\tnKl)c;· 
96 For a summary of 19th century attempts to take Callicles as a dramatic mask for Alcibiades, and 
a partial defense of that interpretative strategy, cf. Vickers (1994). There are clear parallels 
between the two figures, but there is no need here to assume that Plato was authoring a roman a 
clef 
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the "lions among men"-and his political sympathies certainly do lean toward the 
aristocratic party in Athens-but it is not entirely clear that he actually identifies himself 
as one of the naturally stronger. The naturally strong, says Callicles, act according to 
the law that is of nature, but perhaps not according to the one that we set down. 
Molding the best and strongest from among us, taking them when they're young, 
charming and bewitching them like lions, we enslave them, saying that we must 
have equality and that this is the noble and just. But if a man were bom having a 
sufficient nature, as I think, bucking off and wrecking and escaping all this, and 
trampling down our writings, spells, charms and laws-contrary to nature the 
lot of them-he would rise up and our slave would be revealed our master.97 
What are we to make of Callicles' apparent identification with the side of the weak 
masses? He may simply be speaking casually, as a "regular Athenian," or ironically, 
pronouncing the words with a sneer, so to speak. But that would be quite out of 
character and out of keeping with his promise to speak with unblushing parrhesia.98 This 
curious use of 'we' becomes more significant when we note that Callicles never once 
identifies himself as one of the strong.99 Indeed, the strange moral of his story, as he 
reports it, is that Socrates should give up his puerile and deluded philosophizing, so that 
he might not be considered a naive fool among true politicians because he would be 
"ignorant (apeiroi) of the laws of the city" (484d2f.)- Socrates' ignorance of the law of 
nature (which is apparently so well suppressed in Athens) will make him a 
laughingstock in the Athenian agora! 100 This deeply paradoxical aspect of Callicles' 
critique of Socrates, his simultaneous contempt and fear of the so-called "weak," points 
to a fundamental inconsistency in his account of natural law, a confusion of the ends and 
means of living, or what Socrates calls the difference between mere living and living 
well. 
97 Gorgias, 483e5-484a6. My italics. 
98 Socrates repeatedly notes and praises Callicles' parrhesia and lack of shame (487a-b, 487d) and 
Calli des acknowledges this at 491e8 as he had criticized the shame of Gorgias and Polus at 481. 
99 He would have had the opportunity to do so when he excoriates the weakness and cowardice 
of the many and the happiness of the strong at 492d. 
100 Gorgias 485d5. 
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Callicles' contrast between the individually stronger aner, who possesses the 
power to satisfy his unchecked desires as long as he is free of democratic illusions, and 
the collectively strong demos, that can often trick and tame these men, rested on a 
distinction of two kinds of power.101 The demos collectively has the power of numbers, 
both in matters of opinion and in crude physical terms, but that power gives no 
individual member of the demos the power to satisfy his own desires. Callicles is 
contemptuous of the common people because they settle for less than the best, choosing 
mere survival over the pursuit of power and happiness. But in his inability to maintain a 
coherent account of the good life in the face of Socrates' questioning, Callicles slips into 
adopting the same perspective as the object of his contempt, worrying more about 
survival than excellence. Callicles says that even the weak secretly acknowledge the 
right of the stronger-for they, too, dream of living the life of a tyrant-but they are 
afraid because they could not safely live out that dream themselves. His first concern for 
Socrates, however, is not whether perhaps the latter is a potential aner, but whether in 
his persistent philosophical questioning he might run afoul of the political class and 
thereby put his life at risk. It is for this reason that Callicles practices rhetoric, so that he 
will be able to defend himself from the hostility of the demos. Callicles' concern for not 
appearing a political laughingstock, then, shows that Socrates was right in calling him a 
lover and flatterer of the demos. Callicles' seemingly anti-democratic rhetoric of nature is 
itself a kind of democratic flattery (though one that can only be practiced in private) 
precisely because it appeals to the tyrant lurking in the breast of each man in the 
assembly who indulges the fancy that, if only he were given the opportunity, everything 
would be put right, the other know-nothings would be given their comeuppance, and he 
101 See section II.b above. 
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would do everything as he pleased.102 Callicles' rhetoric of natural law does not 
prophesy of the coming of a superman, but is an exercise in bourgeois wish-fulfillment. 
He may (like other men) hope one day to become the kind of tyrant he describes, but his 
present concern is with maintaining the security of his position. Publicly, the members 
of the demos can only indulge their tyrannical passions imperfectly in the pursuit of 
expansionist foreign policy and imperial politics.103 It must be in this context that 
Callicles believes that his law of nature is common knowledge in the assembly (cf. 484d). 
But if frank discussion of natural justice is so common in the assembly and agora that 
anyone ignorant of it would be considered a laughingstock, what is so special about 
Callicles' frankness? What, in other words, does Socrates really see in Callicles? 
N.b- How is Callicles a touchstone for Socrates (486d-e)? 
Callicles' criticism of Socrates was strongly worded to the point of rudeness, though he 
would later profess concern for Socrates' well-being. While the tone of Callicles' 
criticism might be expected to elicit an angry response from Socrates, he is instead calm 
102 For a very similar point, cf. Miller (1980, 46). Consider the choice of lives in the Republic's myth 
of Er, where the first man to choose, "who had lived his previous life in an ordered city, and by 
habit possessed virtue without philosophy," picked the greatest tyranny when given the chance 
(619c). Socrates seems to agree with this diagnosis, saying that Callicles says only "what the 
others think but don't want to say" (492d2f.). Cf. Stauffer (2002, 629f.). For the universal desire to 
become a tyrant, cf. Theages 125e8-126a4. 
103 Melos is Thucydides' paradigmatic example of the practice of Athenian empire, but a better 
example of the deliberative rhetoric that could lead to something like a Melos is his portrayal of 
the Mytilenian Debate. After suppressing the revolt of the city of Mytilene on Lesbos, the 
Athenians decided to execute not only the leaders of the rebellion but the entire adult male 
population. The next day they repent of their rash decision despite the argument of Cleon, who 
hadadvocated the bloody policy. He argues (III, 37) that he had often realized that democracies 
cannot properly rule other cities because they do not understand the grudges and plots that non-
democratic rule brings. "You don't keep in mind," he declaims, "that you possess a ttpannical 
empire over those who have plotted against you." (My emphasis.) That this statement is as much 
flattery as admonition is clear when we remember that only the day before the Athenians had 
been quite willing to follow Clean's policy. Cleon will refer to the decrees of the previous day as 
nomoi. Cf. also Thucydides VL24.3 for the eros that fell upon the men of Athens to capture Sicily 
after Alcibiades' proposal of an expedition. of conquest. 
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and cheerful.104 In Callicles, he says, he has actually made a lucky find (486d3), 
explaining that if he had a golden soul, Callicles would be the best touchstone for 
assaying its value. But his explanation of this image seems to go against its evident logic. 
Callicles will be the best test of what Socrates' "soul opines" for three reasons: he is a 
knower, he is good-willed toward Socrates, and he is candid, saying exactly what he 
thinks. If Callicles, being such a man, were to come to agree with Socrates' opinion about 
justice, then that opinion would already be "the truth itself" (486e6). Socrates' praise of 
Callicles has often been considered ironic, 105 and with some reason, but even ironic 
praise needs to be explained. Callicles' candor or frankness has already been noted, and 
while we shall see that it does not always save him from inconsistency, it seems too 
ungenerous to Callicles to consider this part of Socrates' praise entirely ironic.106 
Callicles' frankness is important because it allows him to say what he really thinks, 
shrinking as little as possible from the perhaps unpalatable consequences of his 
assumptions. Frankness would be a precondition of following through an argument 
104 This in contrast even to the mock fear Socrates describes at Thrasymachus' hot-tempered 
irruption into the discussion of justice in the Republic. 
105 Dodds ad Zoe. considers ironic the statement that Callicles is a knower; Stauffer (2002, 636) 
considers Callicles' goodwill to be questionable, though on shaky grounds; Benardete (1991, 62) 
notes the tension between Socrates' image and the explanation he gives of it. 
106 McKim (1988) argues that Callicles is in fact not frank at all, but denies his own true moral 
beliefs out of shame of losing the argument. There is certainly something to this, in that Callicles' 
moral opinions are clearly inconsistent. But that Callicles holds contrary moral beliefs does not 
prove that some of them are his true beliefs, and that he "doesn't really believe" the others. 
McKim thinks that Callicles' real opinion is his hedonism, while his antinomian thesis is 
ungenuine and the result of a kind of shame (37f.). This error on McKim's part comes about from 
his belief that Socrates' diagnosis of ordinary moral confusion is simply the reverse of Callicles'. 
As alluded to above, Callicles thinks that people are ashamed to admit their "true" belief in the 
nullity of conventional justice. McKim (39f.) takes Socrates to think that all people really believe 
that virtue is good but that "society" shames them into thinking or speaking otherwise. This 
claim is open to two serious objections. First, it is a claim found countless times in the dialogues 
that most individuals, left to themselves, would commit injustice (e.g., the ring of Gyges in the 
Republic, Laws 687cl-7): neither Socrates nor Plato accept the Rousseauian claim that society 
corrupts an originally pristine nature. Second, the term 'society' is itself vague, and McKim gives 
no explanation how it could exercise such influence on the individual or how such a "social" 
morality could have emerged contrary to the true and original beliefs of every individual 
member of such a society. 
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wherever it leads107 and the minimal requirement for accepting what Socrates will later 
call the iron and adamantine chains of logos (508e7.:.509a2). 
Callicles' goodwill toward Socrates appears genuine but its source is obscure. He 
speaks unprompted of his friendly criticism of what he considers Socrates' childish and 
dangerous attachmentto philosophy, and Socrates takes this advice as genuinely meant, 
noting that he has observed Callicles giving the same advice to other young men who 
had been his associates in the pursuit of wisdom (485e3, 487b7-d2). There seems to be no 
reason to doubt Callicles' goodwill towards Socrates, though he is also contemptuous 
and condescending towards him. It is more difficult to discern why Callicles is as well 
disposed to Socrates as he is. In the opening scene of the dialogue he appears as the 
urbane host welcoming his late guests, · and he avers after Socrates' discussion with 
Gorgias that he has "never taken such pleasure in speeches as now~' and that he would 
be willing to listen all day to such discussions (458dl-4). Perhaps Callicles sees Socratic 
elenchus as a possible weapon to add to his rhetorical arsenal, or perhaps he is simply 
attracted to, or envious of, Socrates' apparent indifference to conventional standards of 
shame. Socrates' parrhesia is the genuine openness that the flatterer can..only dream of. 
It is easiest to see through Socrates' praise of Calli des as a knower. The evidence 
he gives of Callides' 'knowledge or wisdom seems to damn with faint praise. "You've 
been educated suffiCiently, as many Athenians would call it."108 But even if Socrates is 
not being ironic, the very condition that someone be a know'er to be a good touchstone 
would run inconsistent with the very purpose Socrates says C~licles will serve. For if 
convincing Callicles is to be the final proof of the truth of Socrates' opinion about justice, 
then Callicles' diametrically .opposed conception of justice ·cannot have the status of 
knowledge, for it could not be true. One might argue that Socrates is using knowledge 
107 Cf. Gorgias 527e2: i]yq.tovL n+J AoyCj.J XQTIO'C~Jf..LE8a. 
108 Gorgias 487b6f. Dodds ad lac. takes this statement is proof positive of Socrates' irony. 
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loosely, and in fact he exchanges knowledge for the perhaps more general qualification 
of wisdom when listing the three qualifications of a good touchstone of soul. But even 
this does not entirely evade the difficulty. Callicles is wise and "willing to speak the 
truth" because he cares for Socrates (487a). But unless we take this as a rather un-
Socratic understanding of truth as "the truth as one sees it," we are still left with the 
impossible situation of Socrates convincing a man who already knows the truth of the 
matter to recognize that Socrates himself is actually in possession of a different truth of 
the matter. If he is going to be corrected by elenchus, than Callicles cannot really be a 
knower. Dodds offers the reasonable enough suggestion that Socrates values Callicles as 
offering the only consistent alternative to Socrates' opinion on justice.109 But this solution 
is perhaps both too easy and too unsatisfying. Too easy because if that was what 
Socrates meant, why did he not say it plainly? Unsatisfying because, while Callicles' 
initial statement of his position is clearly and forcefully stated, Socrates' interrogation of 
him shows that the position is open to simple objections and that Callicles himself is 
confused and inconsistent on a number of points. He is perhaps less inconsistent than 
were Gorgias and Polus; certainly if Socrates were able to refute Callicles' position he 
would have gone very far, at least rhetorically, towards establishing his own: that it is 
always good to do what is just. But Callicles agrees that justice is good; his real 
disagreement is about the nature of the good itself, and Socrates cannot have it in mind 
to call Callicles a knower of the good. 
Another possibility is that we are meant to understand that Callicles is a partial 
knower. In fact, this line of interpretation would fit neatly with the thesis of this chapter 
as a whole-that Callicles' law of nature doctrine is in fact appropriated, with due 
changes, by Socrates, and that it can be taken as a guiding thread in interpreting Plato's 
109 Dodds (1959, 280). 
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political philosophy. But if we follow this reading, what partial knowledge is Callicles 
supposed to have? Socrates will agree with him that the question of justice depends on 
answering the prior and more fundamental question of how one is to live one's life, or 
the question of happiness.U0 Both Callicles and Socrates maintain that the standard of 
justice is in some way determined by our understanding of what kind of human being 
and life is best, which as we saw in the introduction becomes the canonical principle of 
natural law theory. On this reading, the agreement that Socrates repeatedly insists on as 
the condition of his and Callicles' attainment of the truth would consist in the realization 
that they both were already in agreement about the fundamental questions-and at least 
some of the fundamental premises involved in the answering of those questions-whose 
answer amounts to solving the problem of justice.111 Again, however, even if we take 
Callicles to admit to agreeing with Socrates that this is how the question of justice is to 
be answered, this hardly seems to bring him any closer to agreeing with Socrates' answer 
to that question-that justice, more or less as conventionally understood, is always 
better than injustice. At the end of the dialogue Callicles is no closer to agreeing with 
Socrates on that point than he was at the beginning.112 On this reading then, Socrates' 
discussion with Callicles would have to be a failure on its own terms. 
There remains another interpretative possibility113 for understanding Socrates' 
estimation of Callicles as a good touchstone, which also squares well with my reading of 
110 As Socrates had already asserted in conversation with Polus at 472c9f. 
111 Socrates had already asserted that, often unbeknownst to themselves, everyone in fact shares 
his opinion on justice ( 47 4b ). 
112 Callicles' last contributions to the discussion are an ironic or resigned questioning of the "fine 
condition" (kal6s ekhein) of a man unable to defend himself in court, and a resigned or impatient 
germission for Socrates to wrap up his discourse (522c, e). 
13 McKim (1988, 43) suggests that Callicles is a good touchstone because "if Socrates can show 
that even Callicles believes in the Axiom [that virtue is good for the agent himself] at heart, then 
he feels that he has shown a fortiori that all men do and that it must therefore be true." This 
displays McKim's overly dialectical reading (a la Vlastos) that Socrates is looking for consensus 
instead of truth, and fails to deal with Socrates' own explanations of why Callicles is a good 
interlocutor. 
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Socrates as co-opting the form of Callicles' argument while changing the premises. It 
would be to take the logic of the image itself before turning to his explanation of it. One 
rubs the gold in question against the touchstone, leaving a streak that can be compared 
to the streaks left from other gold of known purity. The touchstone itself does not 
"agree" with the gold; instead, its texture and color provide the background against 
which gold of unknown purity can be shown to "agree" or "disagree" with gold of 
established purity-or, if no comparison is possible, to simply shine forth in its own 
natural qualityY4 Now, what allows Socrates to put his opinion about justice and the 
good to the test in his discussion with Callicles-as opposed to Gorgias or Polus-is 
precisely their shared agreement about the fundamental insight that justice must be 
understood in light of the question how ought one to live? and about the kind of answer 
that must be given to it. Callicles is the perfect touchstone for Socrates because his own 
incoherent answer to that question leaves behind the prospect of a more coherent 
answer along the provocative lines he suggested in his daring assertion of a law and 
justice according to nature at odds with the conventional law and justice. To modify the 
metaphor, Callicles presents Socrates with the matrix for formulating his own position 
about justice. Socrates has only to clean out the unsuitable contents that Callicles tried to 
fill into his mold and supply his own premises, based on a correct appreciation of 
human nature and the good life, in order to present his own account of justice and 
natural law. 
V. Socrates' Natural Law 
114 Cf. Benardete (1991, 62). 
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Socrates had divides the art of politics into legislation and corrective justice, the true arts 
of which sophistic and rhetoric are the respectively spurious counterparts (463d-464b, cf. 
520a5-b3). Later, he claims that he alone of the Athenians tries to be a true practitioner of 
the art of politics (521d6-9). Socrates' practice of justice is evident in his conversation 
with Callicles, who "does not put up with being benefited and experiencing that very 
thing that the logos is about, being punished" (505c3f.). Where, then, is Socrates' 
legislation? The benefit of punishment that Socrates has in mind seems to be the same 
one he spoke of in his conversation with Gorgias, when he says that being refuted is a 
greater good than refuting another "just as much as it is a greater good to be freed of the 
greatest evil than it is to free another," and that he knows of no evil so great as a false 
opinion about justice (458a4-bl). Socrates' legislation, then, would have to seek to 
establish a true opinion about justice, in light of which alone his punishment of Callicles 
could find its validity. 
At the very beginning of the dialogue, Socrates had already suggested a 
conception of justice based on the good of true opinion, which could be characterized as 
a "natural law of dialogue." In what is the first allusion to justice in the dialogue, 
Chaerophon had asked Polus what, if Gorgias practiced the same art as his brother, they 
would "justly name him" (448b6). He continues that in calling him 'doctor' they would 
be "speaking beautifully," and subsequently asks twice what they would "correctly call" 
him, first, if he practiced the art of Aglaophon the painter and, second, when he 
practices his own art. Justly, beautifully, correctly seem here to be as synonymous as 
naming, saying, calling, and all are idiomatic ways of denoting correct speech, thought, or 
understanding, and Chaerephon is surely only practicing the art of urbane conversation 
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by using these variations.115 This innocuous turn of phrase, however, points to a partially 
intuited connection between justice and correctness, which Socrates develops into an 
understanding not only of the justice of nru;ning but of justice in the procedure of 
investigation that results in the assignment of a "just" or appropriate name.116 His 
interruption of Chaerephon's and Polus' short conversation is actually to reproach Polus 
for a kind of injustice. Polus had not answered as he promised to, because he had 
described the supposed attributes of rhetoric without even giving its name (448c4-d3). 
Socrates will later rebuke Polus again for the same error. "I will not give ... an answer 
whether I believe rhetoric to be a beautiful or ugly thing before I first answer what it is. 
For that would not be just, Polus" (463c3-6). Socrates here turns his often-made117 point 
about the priority of the question "what is it?" to "what is it like?" into a matter of 
justice. If it would be, in a manner of speaking, unjust not to give each thing its 
appropriate name,118 then it would also be unjust, when so asked, not to give a name at 
all but a description or evaluation instead. 
Socrates continues in this vein when he asks Gorgias to explain his definition of 
rhetoric as the power to persuade. He suspects he knows what Gorgias means, but 
prefers to ask the man himself. "On what account will I ask you when I do suspect it, 
and not speak myself? Not for your sake but for that of the logos, so that it can proceed in 
a way that would make what is spoken about most manifest to us. See, then, if you think 
I'm asking you justly" (453cl-5).119 Socrates will repeat this same point again after 
Gorgias has, unprovoked, leaped to the defense of rhetoric against the charge of 
115 Consider Gorgias' later, apparently redundant, statement: "you suppose correctly, Socrates, 
and understand justly" (451alf.) 
116 Consider Socrates' later statement to Callicles (503d5); "If you seek beautifully, you will find." 
117 For instance, Meno 71b, Protagoras 360e. Cf. Dodds ad lac. for discussion. 
118 Cf. Gorgias 521bl-3 for Socrates' insistence on "calling a spade a spade." 
119 Socrates continues with the idiom of bu<aiwc; at 453c7 and 454a7. At 466a2 he will say that it is 
"just" or fair for him to resort to flaKQoi\.oyl.a since Polus had not cooperated with his 
questioning and had already used flaKQOAoyl.a himself. 
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injustice~ saying that he did not intend to offend the man, only to make the argument 
clear (457el-5). He then explains why these seemingly tedious procedural points are so 
important to him. Socrates says that he is one of those people, 
who are refuted with pleasure if I say something untrue, and who would with 
pleasure refute if someone [else] says something untrue-though who are 
refuted with no less pleasure than they refute [others].12° For I consider it [sc. 
being refuted] a greater good by as much as it is a greater good to be freed 
oneself from the greatest evil than it is to free another of it. For I think nothing is 
so evil for a human being as false opinion about the things our logos is about 
(458a2-b1).121 
Socrates is concerned not to offend Gorgias so that the latter will answer as best he can 
the questions posed to him. But it is important also that Gorgias answer appropriately so 
that the logos will proceed as it should and eventually bring clarity to the topic of 
inquiry, in this case the nature of rhetoric. All this, Socrates explains, is for the sake of 
some good. It is good to be freed by refutation of false opinion because false opinion-
at least on this subject-is the greatest evil for a human being. The aim, then, of 
conversation ought to be refutation, either of oneself or of the other: to be refuted if one 
is ignorant and to refute if one is aware of the other's ignorance. But the aim of true 
refutation sets certain constraints upon conversation. One must suppress the desire to 
come out on top in debate, on the one hand, but also avoid causing resentment by giving 
the appearance of insulting the other or holding the other in contempt.122 Everything 
said must be concerned with the logos and not the individual who is speaking it. The 
120 The vacillation between singular and plural is reproduced from the somewhat anaculothic 
Greek. 
121 From the very beginning, then, this should be enough to dismiss those accounts of Socratic or 
Platonic ethics that search for an "other-directed" motive for just action (e.g., Irwin (1995) though 
he seems to have realized his error in (2010)). It might seem from passages like Gorgias 470c that 
Socrates affirms that an action's justice or injustice is the reason for its being good or bad, but his 
later account of justice at Gorgias 506c-507c clearly defines justice in terms of the good. This is in 
keeping with Plato's general manner of argument, where justice is always conceived in light of 
the good, and the good is always, at least in the first instance, also the good of the agent. The 
argument that Plato again and again tries to defend is that the good of the agent, properly 
understood, coincides with the common good or the good as such. 
122 Consider Gorgias 457c4-e1. 
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logos must be pursued in a certain way so that it proceeds clearly and without 
ambiguity. There is a justice to logos because there is an end or good to logos. 123 It would 
be just of Polus to set Socrates aright if he has slipped up in the development of the 
argumene24 because it would be doing Socrates good. Similarly, it would be unjust of 
Gorgias or Polus to take offense at Socrates when he is only trying to do them a good 
turn. From the very beginning of the dialogue Socrates is already practicing his art of 
politics.125 He is already laying down the law. 
This argument of Socrates, deriving the justice of dialectic from the good of being 
freed of false opinion, already contains the kernel of his later account of natural law. 
Socrates expands this specific argument about deriving a conception of justice (correct 
speaking) from a conception of the good (knowing truth or freedom from error) into a 
more general account of good action, by employing the analogy of the arts. He grounds 
the purposive or teleologically-driven activity of the arts in the craftsman's knowledge 
of the natures of his materials (464d-465a), suggesting that the true rhetorician, for 
instance, would have to possess knowledge of human nature if he is to effectively 
persuade human beings. If the rhetorician were also to do what is right, he would have 
to know what is good for human nature. The arts, as responding to basic human needs, 
deal with human nature in both the factual and normative dimensions. 
Socrates' legislation, then, is developed in analogy to the ordered work of the 
craftsman, "who each, looking to his task, applies what he applies not from a random 
selection but so that what he is producing will take on a certain form .... Each one sets 
down what he sets down in a certain arrangement (taxis), and compels the one part to be 
123 Cf. Critias 106b3f.: blKTJ bE. OQ8i] T<'lv nATJI.ll.l£/\ouvra ~'vl.lc:/\ij noLc:iv. Here blKT) takes primarily 
the sense of punishment and so suggests already Socrates' practice of the art of punitive rhetoric 
in the Gorgias. 
124 Gorgias 461d2, also 470c6-8. 
125 Cf. Gorgias 464b-c. 
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appropriate (prepon) to the other and to fit (harrnottein), until the whole thing is 
composed in arrangement and order" (tetagmenon te kai kekosmenon, 503el-504a2). Thus 
they produce a good product, and the same goes for bodies, Socrates says, where "the 
name for the proper arrangement (taxis) and order (kosmos) of the body is 'healthy,' from 
which health and the rest of the virtue of the body comes to be in it" (504c7-9). Finally, 
concerning the soul, the name for "the arrangements and orderings (kosmeseis) of the 
soul are 'lawful' and 'law,' whence they become lawful and orderly. And these [sc. 
arrangements and orderings] are justice126 and moderation" (504dl-3).127 They are what 
the good and knowledgeable rhetorician looks to in the way that the craftsman looks to 
the projected whole of his production in its proper order and arrangement (cf. 504-dSf.). 
Law and lawfulness are the soul's equivalent of the body's health.128 
Socrates' response to Callicles, then, begins with a fairly abstract identification of 
the virtues, the just, and the good. His basic thesis is that everything good is good by the 
possession of some excellence or virtue (506d2-4), and that the "virtue of each thing, 
instrument and body and soul and every animal, does not attach to it most beautifully at 
random (eikei) but by an orderly arrangement, correctness and art that is assigned to 
each of them" (506d5-9). This arrangement results in "a certain order that has come to be 
in each one of the beings and is proper (oikeios) to each thing, and renders each thing 
good" (506e3-4). Socrates' emphasis on the particularity of each thing and the order 
appropriate to it and, secondarily, to the art and manner of preparation appropriate to it, 
126 Socrates here speaks of the usual virtue of diko.iosune, not the art of (corrective) diko.iosune 
mentioned in his division and analogy of politike and sophistike, and which he elsewhere calls 
dikanike (520b3). 
127 The switch from speaking of a singular taxis and kosmos of body to multiple taxeis and kosmeseis 
of soul is interesting. It might suggest the differenf .orderings that would constitute the different 
virtues of soul, or that there are essentially different constitutions of soul that can be called 
lawful. But there does not seem to be enough evidence to insist on a possible interpretation. 
128 Note that by calling the right ordering of the soul'law,' Socrates is not loading the dice against 
Callicles, for he too would call the soul's proper ordering (toward maximum desire) a kind of 
law. Their disagreement is not one of vocabulary, but what about this lawful ordering consists in. 
• • 
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points to the fundamental importance of knowing the nature of each thing and 
understanding its good in terms of its nature. From this basis, it is easy to define the 
actions of sophrosune as doing ta prosekonta, the befitting (507a8), which amounts to a 
demonstration that the virtue of moderation is just. And if courage is in the performance 
of the fitting in the face of danger or temptation, then courage, too, is just. What is good 
in terms of the fitting to oneself is "good and fair action" (eu te kai kalos prattein), and the 
one who acts in such a way (eu prattonta) will become blessed and happy (eudaimona) 
(507b5-c5), while the one who does that which is not fitting and unjust becomes 
miserable and base. 
It is easy to see, then, how Socrates' counterposition to Callicles follows the same 
argumentative structure as his original statement of natural law. He proceeds from an 
empirical account of human action (in this case, technical production) and extracts from 
it a certain law of human conduct, namely that everything is done in order to produce a 
fitting product in keeping with the nature of its parts. Then he generalizes from human 
activity to the facts of nature, only where Callicles generalized from human political 
history to the predatory activity of animals, Socrates moves from the ordered whole of 
artistic production to the natural ordering of human bodies. There is a certain state of 
body that is called health, and it is achieved and maintained by nourishing and 
exercising the .body in a manner appropriate to its nature. Socrates, again like Callicles, 
then applies this analogy to the question of happiness or the good life. The good life, he 
asserts, is a matter of doing what is proper for one's soul, and what is proper for one's 
soul is called lawful. Here it should be noted again that Socrates does not explicitly 
identify this lawfulness with conventional lawfulness. His only characterization of it for 
the moment is that it is based on an understanding of what is naturally appropriate for 
the human soul. Socrates' standard of law, in the observance of which a human being 
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will become happy, is human nature, which, in contrast to Callicles, he views as 
something fixed and definite. Just as the understancfu:lg of the definite order of the 
body's health is based on experience, so Socrates believes that the definite ordering of 
the soul that is conducive to human happiness would be discovered by careful 
observation.129 
In his following rebuke to Callicles, Socrates makes it even clearer that he is 
appealing to his own version of natural law in contrast to Callicles' (507c8-508b3): 
Now I set these things down for myself (tithemai) as so and assert that they are 
true. And if they are true, that he who wishes, as it seems, to be happy must 
pursue and practice moderation and avoid license (akolasia)--as each of us has 
power to stand!-and must prepare most of all to have no need of punishment 
(tau kolazesthai); and that if he does come to need it, either himself or one of his 
family, or a private man or a city, justice must be applied and they must be 
punished if they are going to be happy. This, in my opinion, is the target (skopos) 
to which one must look in his life, and with all one's own affairs and those of the 
city tending towards this, one must act such that justice and moderation will be 
with the one who would be blessed, not allowing desires to go unchecked 
(akolastoi) and attempting to satiate them-a harm without end!-and living the 
life of a brigand. For such a one would not be welcome as a friend (prosphiles) to 
another human being or to a god. For he is impossible to live in common with; 
and with whom there is no community, there is no friendship. And the wise say, 
Callicles, that heaven and earth and gods and men are held together by 
community and friendship and orderliness and moderation and justice, and 
that's why, my comrade, the wise call this whole an ordered whole (kosmos), not 
disorder or license. But you don't seem to me to give heed to these things, 
though you are wise in them, but it has escaped your notice that geometrical 
equality has great power both among the gods and among human beings, and 
you think you ought to practice pleonexia-because you've neglected geometry! 
Anyhow, this argument must be refuted (exelenkteos) by us, that the happy are 
happy by acquisition of justice and moderation, and the unhappy, unhappy by 
the possession of what is bad or harmful (kakon). Or, if this argument is true, we 
must examine what the consequences are. 
Although Socrates does not explicitly adopt Callicles' language of a law of nature, his 
language and the structure of his argument clearly indicate that that is exactly what he 
intends to do. His choice of tithemai, "set down for myself," mimics the language of 
lawgiving (nomo-thesia). He speaks of punishment and the application of corrective 
129 The proper observation of the human soul is the main theme of the myth Socrates tells at the 
conclusion of the Gorgias, on which see the beginning of Chapter Five. 
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justice for those that need it, but adds that we must cultivate moderation as much as 
possible to avoid the need for just punishment. In his analysis of the political art, justice 
was subordinate to legislation, so it is proper legislation that would minimize the need 
for corrective punishment. Socrates will later make mythical appeal to judges as arbiters 
of the justice and injustice of human souls, but for the moment he more strictly insists 
that justice is its own reward, and the misery of injustice its own punishment (in the 
retributive sense). Law is everywhere in the background of Socrates' statement on 
justice. 
If this statement, then, must be taken as a piece of Socratic lawgiving, then it is just 
as clear that it follows the general Calli clean pattern. The aim or target (skopos) of living 
that must be followed in all private and public affairs is happiness. Callicles is wrong 
about justice, Socrates argues, because he is wrong about happiness. And he is wrong 
about happiness because he is wrong about human nature. Callicles maintains that 
happiness is attained through unchecked pleonexia, a thesis not even the pettiness of 
itching or the conventional shame attached to passive homosexuality could quite force 
him to withdraw (cf. 494d-e). Socrates' counter-assertion is that the life of pleonexia in 
any form does not in fact bring happiness, but the opposite, not because of the shame or 
pettiness attached to it, but because it does not actually match up to the kind of 
satisfaction commensurate to human nature. He presents happiness as the participation 
I 
in a certain order of things, first of all in the ordering of one's desires through s6phrosune, 
but also a participation in a social and even cosmic order.130 Socrates' ordered kosmos is 
130 Socrates makes the same basic point at Republic 349cll-dl: 6 blKaLoc; 'rOD f.lEV 6J.1o(ou ou 
nAc:ovcK'[cl, '[QU b£ cXVOf.lOLOU, 6 b£ abLKO£; '[QU '[c 6J.10LOU Kal '[QU cXVOJ.lOLOU. Cf. Gorgias 490a6-8. 
The idea that similar people receive similar treatment is not based on the self-grounding value of 
equality, but on the idea that for each kind of person there is a fitting station which is satisfying 
to them. 
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the counterpoint to Callicles' conception of nature as universal striving and conflict.131 
For the moment, Socrates does not give any argument for believing in this order, but 
merely posits it, offering the suggestive analogy of geometry. The healthy ordering of 
bodies (and if nature and art are not radically distinguished, the purposive order of 
human technical production) would be evidence-if not conclusive evidence-for the 
existence of a universal cosmic order.132 But Socrates is not trying to convince Callicles 
that there is a natural order. Rather he adduces the consensus of the wise in the attempt 
to further convince Callicles of the particular order of the human soul. He uses the 
putative world-order to convince Callicles of a human moral order, though Callicles' 
silence makes us doubt how effective this argument was. Needless to say, Socrates' 
appeal to the natural order of things raises more questions than it answers, but, for now, 
all that we are trying to show is that Socrates makes his claim about justice into a claim 
about natural law, grounded in a natural order of which the human being is a part.133 
Socrates appeals to the nature of things just as much as Callicles does, only he notices 
aspects of nature that Callicles ignores. 
V.b- Geometrical Equality 
While Socrates' appeal to kosmos, then, is vague and goes unelaborated in the Gorgias, he 
does make a specific point about his conception of natural law. He claims that Callicles' 
neglect of geometry has caused him to misunderstand the nature of justice. Certainly his 
mention of "geometrical" or proportional equality itself is not especially surprising. It is 
131 This is the same account of nature that the Athenian Stranger will elicit from the Cretan Clinias 
in the first pages of the Laws (for which, cf. chapter 4 below). 
132 This aspect of Socrates' argument to Callicles is approached in Roochnik (1994, 557f.). 
133 We will come back to the question of how such appeal to natural order is supposed to ground 
natural law in our consideration of the theology of Laws X in the last section of Chapter Four. 
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found in the maxim "equals to equals" stated in the Laws.134 It is the principle of 
proportional equality that is standardly invoked as a criticism of the ideal of arithmetical 
or abstract equality that is championed in democracies. It is employed to such effect not 
only in Plato but also in ~stotle and Isocrates. 135 Here, however, Socrates appeals to it 
against Callicles' assertion of unlimited pleonexia. The same conception of proportional 
equality can oppose both abstract egalitarianism and Callicles' radically anti-egalitarian 
position because it stands as a mean between the two. The egalitarian argues that 
everyone should be treated equally, either because everyone truly is equal or because 
whatever differences there are between them are irrelevant. Callicles argues that the 
strong are right to get whatever they desire at the expense of everyone else because only 
they have the opportunity to become truly happy, and that there is no limit at all on 
what they should obtain. Plato, straddling these positions, argues that for each person 
there is an appropriate, finite allotment, and that the natural differences between people 
imply a scale of different allotments. 
Geometrical equality only works as a criticism of radical democracy if it is granted 
that there are natural differences among human beings. If all the citizens of a democratic 
polis were, in fact, relevantly equal, then geometrical and arithmetical equality would 
yield the same result. A passage from the Menexenus demonstrates how an intelligent 
democrat could turn this point to at least a rhetorically convincing defense of Athens. 
Socrates repeats there the words he learned (he says) from Aspasia: 
Other cities are composed of human beings who are of all different kinds and 
irregular (anomaloi), with the result that their constitutions-tyrannies and 
oligarchies-are also irregular. And they dwell together, some believing that the 
other are their slaves, others that they are their masters. But we [Athenians] and 
our fellows, born brothers from the same mother, do not think it right for one of 
us to be the master or slave of another, but our natural equality of birth compels 
134 757b1-c5. 
135 Aristotle, EN 1131b13, Politics 1301b29; !socrates, Areop. 21.1-6. C£. Plato, Republic 558c. 
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us to seek isonomia in our law, and for no one of us to yield to any other except by 
reason of a reputation for virtue or wisdom.136 
The natural equality of birth among the Athenians-Plato's improved restatement of the 
typical Athenian boast of autochthony-protects them against the threat of tyranny and 
oligarchy137 and compels them to seek the isonomia of law.138 Here it is not an abstract 
equality of law that is imposed on the naturally dissimilar and uneven or anomalous 
(anomaloi). 139 Rather, such equality of law would be the only suitable distribution of rank 
and political power for citizens who are "natural born brothers." It would be manifestly 
unjust to divide arbitrarily a group of equals into masters and slaves, and it would just 
as clearly contradict the principle of proportional equality. They should not, then, call 
each other masters and slaves, but they should recognize superiority m virtue or 
wisdom.140 Socrates' invocation of this principle in the Gorgias, then, is not anti-
democratic as such, but neither is it radically egalitarian. If all Athenian citizens really 
were equal in every respect, then abstract and geometrical equality would coincide and 
there would be no conflict. On the other hand, if Callicles were right and it really were 
the case that there were certain individuals of exceptionally strong desire and power, 
such that they alone had any chance of becoming happy, then perhaps Socrates' 
136 Menexenus 239a3ff. 
137 This insight, that conflict always emerges from a kind of difference, will turn out be be one of 
the chief insights of the Statesman (cf. Chapter Two below), though it is also suggested at Gorgias 
404e3-5 OUKOUV EKEL fl EV axoAaaiav i] 7IOLKLALa EVE'UK'l:EV, EV'rau8a b£ voaov, i] b£ anA6U]c;; 
Ka'ra flEV flOUULKTJV EV ¢uxaic; aW<f>QOcnJVT)V, Ka'ra b£ YVflVaanKi]v EV UWflaULv uyl.Et.av; To 
explain how Socrates' doctrine of geometrical equality can help to overcome the dangers of 
difference is one of the chief problems of the Statesman and Laws. 
138 Isonomia is practically a synonym for democracy. It is the word used in Herodotus' famous 
account of the Persian debate over regimes (cf. esp. ill.80.26: nAfi8oc; bE cXQXOV nQ~na flEV 
ouvofla nav'rwv KciAALawv fxEL, iaoVOflLTJV). Thucydides (III.82.8) describes it as the 
euphemism of choice for the popular party in the Corcyran stasis: oi. yaQ EV 'raic; noAEUL 
nQOa'ravuc;; flE'ra ov6fla'roc; EKa'rEQOL EVnQEnovc;;, nAr18ouc; 'rE iaovofltac; noALnKi)c; xal. 
cXQLU'rOKQa'rtac;; aw<f>QOVoc;; 7IQO'rLflrlUEt. 'rCt flEV KOLVCt Aoy<tJ 8 EQa1IEVOV'rEc;; a8Aa E7IOLOUV'r0. For 
the importance of shared ethical character, consider the Athenian's satisfaction on hearing that 
most of the colonists of Clinias new colony will be Dorians (Laws 708a). 
139 For the suggestivenes of the implied pun on nomos and anomaly, cf. Chapter Four below. 
14° Cf. Protagoras 337a. 
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proportional equality would also coincide with the pursuit of infinite pleonexia. 
Proportional equality, then, only stands between abstract equality and infinite pleonexia 
if we grant the assumption, based on the empirical observation, that human beings are 
not in fact perfectly equal in their capacities and in what is appropriate for them, and 
also that the pursuit of the infinite satisfaction of desire cannot make even the strongest 
man happy.141 Socrates' geometrical equality, then, is not some abstract principle of 
justice but a call to carefully consider individual natures in order to understand what is 
appropriate to them and what can be expected from them. This, combined with the 
Gorgias' techne metaphor, looks forward to the Statesman 's account of measure in accord 
with the prepon and the superiority of art to universal rules.142 While Socrates' arguments 
about the identity of the good, the beautiful, and the just can often seem frustratingly 
verbal and non-empirical, his account of natural law in response to Callicles is not the 
assertion of an abstract formula, but a call to look at particular cases with the greatest 
care. It is why Socrates loves not only philosophy but also Alcibiades. 
Transition to the followings chapters 
This chapter began with a detailed analysis of the structure and content of Callicles' 
paradoxical assertion of a law of nature and considered it in light of the nomos-phusis 
dichotomy so prevalent at the time, and to which Callicles himself subscribes. Callicles' 
substantive position, though often considered to be a non-moral or anti-moral position, 
turned out to be better understood as a kind of inverted moralism. More importantly, by 
141 Irwin (1979, 226) understands Socrates' invocation of geometrical equality as a critique of 
egalitarianism, but does not see how it also opposes Callicles' position. This misunderstanding 
stems from his previously noted failure to recognize the implications of Callicles' redefinition of 
eower as the ability to make oneself happy by the satisfaction of infinite pleonexia. 
42 Cf. Griswold's (1989, 159) description of the statesman's activity in the Statesman, which fits 
well my account of the Gorgias: "Ruling with justice would seem at least to mean giving each his 
due (a standard attained best by the wise rule without law)." 
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laying out the argumentative structure of Callicles' natural law claim, we become able to 
see how Socrates can at once criticize its content in the strongest terms while agreeing 
that it poses the fundamental question of justice and the best human life and gives the 
structure that a correct answer to that question must take. Socrates' answer to Callicles 
follows the same argumentative pattern, and is cloaked in the language of law and 
legislation. It is thus fair to characterize Socrates' position itself as a kind of natural law 
claim, though different in content and grounded in a different understanding of human 
nature and the nature of things. 
Socrates' argument in the Gorgias, however, is very brief and leaves many 
questions unasked. The subordination of justice to the good is formally asserted but not 
examined in detail, and no detailed account is given of the virtues or the kind of action 
that is in accord with them. Socrates claims to be convinced that one must always do 
what is just, but he does not attempt to give substantive account of the content of 
justice.143 He suggests that while justice can be defined, just action cannot be reduced to 
a formula. The standard of what is appropriate to one's nature and of proportional 
equality give us a general idea of how justice is to be measured, but suggests that each 
measurement must be based on a specific knowledge of particular facts and individual 
natures. The analogy between the order of the soul and the cosmic order is alluded to, 
but its specific nature is unexplained and its significance uncertain. Socrates himself 
seems to be aware of this when, after stating his own position, he repeats "the same 
logos, that I don't know how these things stand, but that, just like now, no one that I have 
143 This admission matches the charge laid against Socrates in the Clitophon (409b), that while he is 
second-to-none at exhorting his interlocutors to pursue justice, but cannot or will not tell them 
what the ergon of justice is, that is, how one is actually supposed to act in a just way. As we have 
argued here, however, the Gorgias already presents at least a suggestion as to what the ergon of 
justice is to be discerned. 
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come across has been able to say otherwise without being a laughingstock" (509a4-7).144 
What the Gorgias provides us with, then, is the suggestion that the ever-vexing Socratic 
question of justice and the good life is necessarily connected to the nomos-phusis 
problem, and that his proposed answer to that question should be understood as ari 
overcoming of that distinction by appeal to a law of nature. 145 The appeal to a cosmic 
order, it appears, comes out of Socratic ignorance, though for now one cannot say 
whether an account of the cosmos is meant to replace that ignorance with knowledge, or 
to be the kind of reassuring myth such as Socrates tells about recollection in the Meno. 146 
The subsequent chapters of this dissertation will explore the themes raised here as they 
are treated more fully in other Platonic dialogues, in order to show both how they 
develop the sketch provided by Socrates in the Gorgias into a more fully worked out 
conception of natural law and also that these other texts themselves become more 
comprehensible when considered as addressing in various ways the question of natural 
law. 
144 There is also his disclaimer after the apparently dogmatically stated myth: "it wouldn't be 
surprising to have contempt for them if in some manner of investigation we were able to find 
something better and truer than them" (527a6f.). 
145 This is Dodds' understanding of Socrates' invocation of the cosmic parallel, as showing that 
nomos is grounded in phusis (337). But Dodds does not go so far is to speak of this solution in the 
language of natural law. 
146 Meno 86b-c. 
CHAPTER TWO: 
NATURE AND POUTICS IN THE MYTH OF THE STATESMAN 
Introduction 
Now as the nature of the human species requires that there 
be those differences [of character] among the individuals 
belonging to it and as in addition society is a necessity for 
this nature, it is by no means possible that his society 
should be perfect except ... through a ruler who gauges 
the actions of the individuals, perfecting that which is 
deficient and reducing that which is excessive ... so that 
the natural diversity is hidden through the multiple points 
of conventional accord.- Maimonides1 
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The Gorgias and Statesman. are not obviously connected in theme or style, but upon 
consideration certain continuities do come to light. The Gorgias began with an 
examination of rhetoric as an expression of sophistry and proceeded to Socrates' 
description of his true art of politics. The Statesman., the sequel to the Sophist, seems to 
offer something like the same movement. In the Gorgias, Socrates' dispute with Callicles 
was about the kind of standard that nature supplied to the evaluation of human life and 
human actions, and the Eleatic Stranger will characterize the political knowledge he 
describes as "truly kata phusin." (308d1).2 This same political knowledge or technical 
expertise he earlier characterizes as the only "law" (nomos) that the true statesman 
would follow (294e9). This knowledge is in part a true science of measurement based not 
on relative number or magnitude, but on the appropriate or fitting (prepon., 308e8). 
Furthermore, the statesman's art is the weaving together of disparate human natures 
1 Guide of the Perplexed, tr. Shlomo Pines (Chicago, 1963) vol. II, ch. 40. 382. 
2 All Stephanus page references in this chapter, unless otherwise specified, are to the latest OCT 
edition of Plato's Statesman. Dixsaut (1995, 268f.) connects the Statesman to the themes of the 
Gorgias, noting the similar standard of those fit to rule according to the standard of nature. 
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(308c). He must first, then, understand these natures in order to properly mold them 
into the appropriate form within their limitations. In these two senses, then, for both the 
Gorgias and the Statesman, "the object of [political] science is man."3 If the Eleatic 
Stranger's political science, then, can be expressed as a quasi-mathematical system of 
measurement based on an understanding of nature, and in particular human nature, as a 
standard, and expressed as a kind of law, then it is fair to say that the Statesman, in 
effect, elaborates and develops the Gorgias' rough sketch of a Socratic account of natural 
law. 
The Statesman advances this project in two ways, first by exploring by means of a 
cosmic myth the manner in which (human) nature can be understood as a standard for 
value and political activity, and second by examining the nature of law itself as a 
particular mode of political life. The present considers the first theme through a detailed 
examination of the Statesman's myth and its ramifications. Unlike the myth in the 
Gorgias, whose purpose is primarily admonitory, the purpose of the myth told by the 
Eleatic Stranger is meant to contribute to the primary aim of the dialogue, the definition 
of the statesman (268d4-e2). It will do much more than this, however. The myth will 
present a double account of nature explaining both the neediness of human nature that 
can only be supplied for in political life, and also the way in which statesmanship, as a 
kind of imitation of a natural standard, guides political action to meet these ends. The 
myth accomplishes this by giving two accounts of human imitation of cosmic order 
under two contrary periods of cosmic revolution. These two accounts will turn out to 
correspond to the two aims of living and living well, whose connection and conflict 
came to light in Socrates' cross-examination of Calli des in the Gorgias. The Stranger's 
position will be that, since philosophy alone is the guarantee of living well, politics in 
3 Griswold (1989, 147). 
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the proper sense (that is, the governing of the polis or political community) cannot fully 
achieve the end of natural law; it can at best guarantee the safety of the community so 
that its citizens may then pursue the aim of living well with as little hindrance as 
possible. In general terms, then, the Stranger shows that, even though natural law is 
unattainable as a political ideal, it can still be a reliable measure of real political action 
and can be approximated in real political life. 
Finally, in addition to sketching an ideal of statesmanship based on an 
understanding of human nature, the myth provides a framework for the Eleatic 
Stranger's later argument about the place and function of law~that is, of positive law-
in political life. The myth, then, prepares the way for the Eleatic Stranger's discussion of 
the rule of law, which will be the subject of the third chapter of this dissertation. 
Approaching the Myth 
The Eleatic Stranger introduces the myth in order to escape ''by another road" the 
impasse at which his initial attempt to define the statesman by diaeresis hadleft him and 
Young Socrates (268d5f. ). It will tum out to set the scene for all the following discussions 
of the Statesman, and especially for the later dis~ssion of statesmanship that had 
apparently started from a new beginning.4 The initial division had established that 
statesmanship was the caretaking of the human herd. As one member of the class of 
herd-care, statesmanship would have been, in principle, as easy_ to understand as t0e 
4 This approach agrees with Griswold (1989, 147): "the myth is ultimately the controlling 
discourse of the dialogue"; and Ferrari (1995, 391): the myth "conveys .the dialogue's most 
general view of human nature." The myth is the "foundation" on which the "edifice" of the rest 
of the dialogue is constructed. Lane (1998, 9), shares a similar approach: "the story [muthos] has 
tended to monopolise [sic] a literature of its own, often with some reference to the politics . 
preceding it in the dialogue, but with none to the politics which follow .... I interpret the story as 
the fulcrum of the dialogue." Lane, as others, notes that the myth is the occasion of introducing 
the discussion of paradigm (120) as well as the theme of the proper measure (125). 
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care of any other herd. Homer's epithet for kings, "shepherd of peoples,''5 would be 
literally true. But the human experience shows that there is no simple correspondence 
between shepherd and statesman. The shepherd is everything to his flock,: doctor, 
matchmaker, midwife, charmer and entertainer (268a6-b7).6 The statesman, in contrast, 
can be none of these, or, if he claims to be, he will come up against the counterclaims of 
specialists in matchmaking or grazing who could reasonably claim to do each particular 
job better. The statesman, so understood, would violate the Platonic principle of "one 
man, one job."7 If the statesman were nothing but Gorgias' perfect rhetorician then he 
would not be practically threatened by any of the real experts because he could always 
convince the herd that he was the true farmer or merchant or doctor (267e, cf. Gorgias 
456a-b). But in that case, those whom the Stranger will later call the "sophists of 
sophists" (303c) would not be caretakers at all, but would match Thrasymachus' version 
of the shepherd who lives to exploit his flock. This sham-statesman could only keep his 
flock intact if he managed to convince the other expert caretakers to serve him, but their 
expertise would seem to inoculate against this kind of rhetoric, since they know that 
even so-called statesmen need to be fed (268al-4). The true statesman, then, must have a 
specialty knowledge that is not the knowledge of persuasion if he is to have any chance 
of persuading the human herd and its other caretakers that he is their true caretaker. In 
order to isolate the statesman as the true caretaker of the human herd and reproduce a 
precise image of him (268c), the Stranger will tum from diaeresis to myth. 
The Stranger emphasizes the difference between diaeresis and his new beginning 
5 Cf. iliad !.263. II,85, etc., often of Agamemnon. The epithet was traditional, and always in the 
ace. or dat. cases, which produce a tidy dactyl-spondee line ending (noq.J.£va/ noq .. !EvL Aawv). It 
is typical of the Stranger's approach that he should take such an ossified metaphor and treat it as 
a true candidate for the definition of the king or statesman. For the Stranger's apparent failure to 
recognize metaphor for what it is, cf. Benardete (1967, 200) . 
. 
6 The Stranger surprisingly fails to mention defense from predators as the primary activity of the 
shepherd, and nowhere mentions shepherd dogs (though he had before at Sophist 231a6). 
7 Cf. Republic 370b, Laws 846d7L 
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in myth. Young Socrates has heard of the god's reversal of sunrise and sunset for Atreus, 
the reign of Cronus, and of men born asexually from the earth, but he did not know that 
they and many other such stories all referred to the same cosmic experience (pathos), 
because "in time some of them came to extinction while others are scattered, each of 
them spoken separately apart from each other" (269b ). The separation and dispersion of 
the elements of this single experience have caused it to be forgotten and for the separate 
elements themselves to be misunderstood. In order to make an exhibition of the 
statesman, the Stranger must put these elements together again in a myth. Separation by 
diaeresis has been proven insufficient for his purposes, and requires the correction of an 
account that recombines that which has been separated into a new unity.8 The myth is 
supposed to present the statesman as a unity and in so doing distinguish him from the 
other pretenders to the title of nurturer of the human herd. 
The Function of the Myth according to the Stranger (274e-276e) 
Before we consider the myth itself, it is helpful to consider the lesson that the Eleatic 
Stranger explicitly draws from it. It will be seen that his summary misses much of 
importance in the myth, but that he tacitly draws on the resources of the myth in his 
later exposition. Nevertheless, his initial reflections give us a place to start and questions 
to ask when we begin our examination of the myth on its own terms. The Stranger had 
introduced the myth because the first diaeresis of the statesman had failed to sufficiently 
distinguish him from other providers of human nurture, who could justly dispute his 
claim to exclusive nurture of the human herd. At the end of the myth the Stranger can 
say that the error was in one sense lesser than previously stated, but in another "quite 
8 Lane (1998, 115) makes a similar point: "narrative and myth does what division cannot: deal 
with temporality and history." 
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grand and much bigger and greater in scope than [we said] then" (274e). On the one 
hand, they were taken very far astray in comparing the king and statesman from the 
current revolution of the cosmos to the shepherd of the human herd from the previous 
revolution, who must be a god or daemon instead of mortaL On the other, they spoke the 
truth when they said that the statesman ruled the whole city but merely failed to specify 
the manner in which he ruled. In this way the error is smaller than "in the former way" 
(274e9-275a6). 
It is clear how confusing human statesmen, "who are much more similar in their 
natures to the ruled and have shared more closely in education and nurture," with a 
divine shepherd would constitute a great error (275b9-c4). It is also clear how failing to 
specify the manner of the statesman's rule over the human community would result in 
the dispute about the title to true nurturer of the human herd. In fact it seems that the 
simple correction of this error would have rendered unnecessary the fantastic resources 
employed by the myth to produce a reductio ad absurdum of the shepherd metaphor 
taken as a literal truth. The myth might then seem to be even more excessive in bulk 
than the Stranger will soon claim (277b ). At any rate, the Stranger proposes a correction 
of the first diaeresis based on this understanding of its errors. The original category of 
herd-nurture (agelaiotrophike) will be replaced by the higher and so more general 
category of herd-grooming or tending or care (agelaiokomike, therapeutike, epimeletike). In 
doing so, however, he renders the statesman's activity still more vague than it was 
before, and it is presumably this defect that the Stranger alludes to when he says that the 
myth "has its external outline adequately, [but} has not yet received the vividness, as it 
were, that's in pigments and colors" (277c). It is not immediately clear how the 
replacement of the more specific category of nurture (feeding) with the more general 
category of care can do what the Stranger says it does. If nurture became a subclass of 
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care, then those who dispute the statesman's original title would be banished to another 
branch of the diaeretic tree, but the statesman would be left in the undefined branch of 
care-that-is-not-nurture. The statesman, in that case, would appear to have been isolated 
from his competitors at the cost of eliminating all positive descriptions of his activity. 
The Stranger, however, does not seem to have this solution in mind, for he says 
that the new category of care is better precisely because it is common to shepherds and 
statesman and all other nurturers (275e). With that clarification, the previous divisions of 
care according to the species of animals are repeated until we arrive again at the care of 
the human herd (276a). Further, in light of the myth, care for the human herd must be 
further divided in two according to "the present kingship and that in the time of 
Cronus," or according to that of the divine shepherd, on the one hand, and that of the 
human caretaker on the other (276a, 276d). Here the Stranger finally explains how the 
more general designation of care is supposed to actually isolate the statesman from his 
rivals. No other art would be willing to claim that it was simply care for the entire 
human community. Care is more general than nurture and therefore grander than 
nurture, a greater claim that the possessors of particular technai, who would compete for 
the title of nurturer of the human herd, would not dare to claim. The myth is sufficient to 
distinguish the statesman from the artisans, precisely because it uses so grand a 
paradigm. 
But the Stranger will soon retract the claim that the statesman has now been 
isolated from all of his competitors. The myth had been an error, the cost of using so 
grand a paradigm too great for the benefit. He and Young Socrates must resume the 
a.:rgument from the point where it was assumed that there were countless disputants to 
the statesman's title to human caretaking (279a). Who else could claim to care for the 
entire human community? It turns out that the most important division for the 
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definition of the statesman will not be· a distinction from the class of artisans, but from 
the genus of those who now in the current revolution actually call themselves statesmen, 
but who are really sophists and flattering imitators (303cl-6). The truest understanding 
of statesmanship comes not from the separation from the nearest class 'non-statesman' 
but from the class 'false statesman.' This is perhaps the clearest example of how the 
Statesman continues to share the concerns of the Sophist about the nature of otherness, 
false speech, and images. Distinguishing the true statesman from his imitators requires 
more than the general reflection on imitation that the Sophist provided. It requires an 
account of the place of imitation (true and false) in politics. It will tum out that true 
statesmanship is also a kind of imitation, but of a divine paradigm. This lacuna can be 
provided for through a consideration of those aspects of the myth that the Stranger first 
dismisses as unnecessary bulk, only to silently return to them in the later parts of his 
discussion. We turn to the myth, then, in order to see how it provides an account of the 
true and false imitation of a natural standard for political practice, or how it tries to 
explain the relation between human being and cosmos that is implied by natural law. 
The myth's two revolutions 
The myth begins with a double account of cosmic order couched in terms of extreme 
polarities.9 In this respect it seems to always remain under the shadow of diaeresis. 10 
Somehow the description of a natural order and its reversal is meant to make clear the 
unique activity of statesmanship, just as Socrates' appeal in the Gorgias to the order and 
9 Cf. Ferrari (1995, 395). 
10 There is a reading of the Statesman, apparently gaining some traction among scholars, that 
posits not two but three distinct periods of cosmic revolution. I have included my arguments 
against this ingenious buy mistaken reading, which would be digressive to the argument of this 
chapter, in an Appendix. 
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harmony of nature described by the wise was supposed to reveal to Callicles the true 
nature of justice. The Eleatic Stranger's second revision to the diaeresis after his myth is to 
divide care for the whole human community into that in the revolution of Cronus and 
that of the present revolution (276a), or the care of the divine shepherd, on the one hand, 
and the human caretaker on the other (276d). Care in the present revolution of the 
cosmos is meant to be politike, and the statesman the true caretaker of human beings. The 
human herd is first called a community and polis after the narrative of the myth, and the 
divine shepherd's lingering association with nurture point to the political life as 
belonging exclusively to the present revolution or to the age of ZeusY To understand 
what is entailed by the distinction the Stranger draws it is necessary to look at the 
myth's account of the two ages in detail. It will turn out that the myth often brings to 
mind elements of Callicles' argument of natural law, so that comparison with the 
argument of the Gorgias will often be instructive. 
The previous age, or age of Cronus, is never explicitly called the first age, and the 
Stranger begins his account of it by narrating the effects of the divine steersman taking 
hold again of the cosmos as it is about to spin into complete disorder. The Stranger 
makes no claim as to which age came first and so leaves the question of ultimate origins 
unanswered.12 At any rate, the Stranger narrates the beginning of the age of Cronus with 
11 Only named as such at 272b2. It is telling that neither Zeus nor Cronus is given any clear role in 
their eponymous ages. The divine craftsman and steersman is never identified with Cronus, and 
the only Olympians explicitly mentioned are limited to their representation of the technai 
necessary for human life (274c), while Zeus, who in the Protagoras' myth is the sole possessor of 
eolitike, is passed over in silence. 
2 Cf. 27ld. The Stranger says that in the previous time, when "all things came spontaneously to 
human beings," the god "first ruled the circling itself as a whole," but that does not rule out a 
previous age of divine neglect. 273b4-c2 might suggest that the cosmos was in fact an original 
disorder (ataxia) until its composer brought it into order (kosmos), but it only speaks explicitly of 
the previous and older disorder, not an original disorder. This interpretation is strengthened by 
the "first" of the previous passage, in which case the Stranger must believe that there has been 
only one full revolution of Cronus after an indeterminate time of primitive disorder. (At 269d9 
the Stranger speaks of the "begetter" (mu ycvvr']aavmc;) of what we name heaven and cosmos, 
but even there he does not seem to have in mind literal begetting, so that the cosmos is not 
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the assumption that there already exist human beings and other animals as they are in 
the present rotation (271d-e). When the god reverses the rotation of the whole, the age of 
every animal is stopped and then reversed. The old grow young and the young become 
younger still, their hair darkening and skin softening until they attain the appearance of 
newborns. Their psychic development suffers the same reversal, and eventually they 
vanish utterly into the earth, presumably passing through prenatal stages of 
development (270e). The bodies of those who have died a violent death just before the 
reversal are affected in the same way, shrinking away and vanishing in a few days 
(271a). In the age of Cronus, therefore, where even embryonic development is reversed, 
there can be no sexual reproduction, and Young Socrates' question about the manner of 
animal generation is quite appropriate (271a3f.). All animals were born spontaneously 
and asexually from the earth, being recomposed from the dead who lay in the earth 
(271b). There is then no heredity in the age of Cronus, and the weaving together of 
different natures through intermarriage, which is later identified as one of the central 
activities of the statesman, would be impossible (cf. 310a-b). 
The Stranger goes on to describe the rule of the cosmos in the age of Cronus: 
At that time, the god ruled the circling itself as a whole, caring for it, and again 
likewise, region by region, all the parts of the cosmos were distributed under 
ruling gods. And in particular, daemones, like divine shepherds, had distributed 
the animals according to kinds and herds, each one being sufficient for 
everything for each of the groups which he himself grazed, so that there was 
nothing savage and no feeding on one another, and there was no war or 
sedition (stasis) at all.13 
The parts of the cosmos are ruled in the same way as the whole in its revolution. The 
god rules the whole while daemones, "like divine shepherds," rule and care for the 
created ex nihilo.) However at 273el he speaks of the steersman taking up the rudder "again," 
which opens the possibility that the previous disorder was simply the decaying order following a 
previous letting-go of the cosmos and a potentially infinite sequence of previous ages of Cronus 
and Zeus. 
13 271d3-e3, accepting Burnet's emendation of 271d4 of we; b 'au for we; vvv. 
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several parts of the cosmos, most importantly the kinds and herds of animals. There is 
an analogy, then, between the rule of the whole and the rule of the parts, and the 
daemones imitate the all-sufficient care of the divine shepherd. The Eleatic Stranger 
conceives of the cosmos under the care of the divine steersman in almost Parmenidean 
terms as without lack or need of any generation.14 In the age of Cronus, the little kosmoi 
of the animal herds also have a Parmenidean character. They have no need to look 
beyond themselves for sustenance. They do not feed on each other, have no fear of each 
other, and animals of the same herd will not come together for sexual generation. There 
is no such thing as wild in the age of Cronus. Even though many beasts had innately 
harsh natures, they were kept under control (cf. 274b6f.). Lions either make do with the 
fruits of the earth or meat grows on trees. 
It is the same for the human herd. Their livelihood (bios) is spontaneous, 
provided by fruit growing from trees that experience no change of season and have no 
need of cultivation. The ever-temperate climate leaves them in no need of clothing, 
bedding or any built shelter. Without need for generation there is no possession of 
women and children in families and no regimes or political orders (politeiai). There is not 
even the memory of past generations, or anything else of the kind (271e-272a). Since 
human beings are born from the earth at the point of senility, it is appropriate that they 
have no memory of anything before them. They will have no received opinions of any 
kind. While they may tell each other stories it is unclear what they would be about (cf. 
272c6£.). In the age of Cronus, history is as absent as is the change of seasons. There is no 
stimulus to developing the arts or to any kind of work or activity at all. Human life is 
paradigmatically apolitical. There would be no differences according to rank or honor, 
and there is no war or civil strife (stasis), because there is nothing over which there can 
14 Cf. Parmenides fr. 8.30-35; also Sophist 244el. 
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be dispute or conflict. Eros is either absent or almost completely suppressed.15 All of its · 
lower manifestations, at least, could not find their proper object in the age of Cronus.16 
Only the love of knowledge, wisdom, and idle storytelling are not ruled out from the 
beginning, though the Stranger cannot say for sure whether they are present or not 
(272c). It is impossible to say definitively what the Stranger thinks, 17 but philosophy in 
the age of Cronus would seem to be impossible, at least on Socrates' account, for if 
philosophy is an ascent beginning with the love of a beautiful body or a beautiful 
beloved, then it could never get off the ground, since there is no sexual eros in the age of 
Cronus. From another angle, if human souls experience the same reversal of aging as 
human bodies in the reverse revolution (270e), then philosophy as the practice of 
separating soul from body in dying and being dead would also be impossible, 18 for as 
the soul approached death it would become more and more childish. While senility is 
common, it is quite possible to live to the end of one's life in full possession of one's 
wits, but no newborn can understand the fact of its birth or, in the age of Cronus, its 
imminent evanescence. Further, the fear of death could hardly arise in the first place, for 
with the forgetfulness of previous generations no accounts of an afterlife would have the 
opportunity to develop and even the concept of death itself would be scarcely grasped. 
Violent death was unknown. There was no need for philosophy's consolation.19 
If philosophy-at least on the Socratic understanding-must be absent in the age 
of Cronus, then human beings are left to fill themselves to satiety with food and drink. 
In that case, the Stranger avers that the judgment of their happiness compared to human 
15 At 272e the Stranger says that, when the divine steersman lets go, the cosmos an innate desire 
(epithumia) takes over, which must then have been suppressed during his rule. For most of these 
Eoints, cf. Rosen {1979, 79). 
6 Cf. Symposium 208c-209c. 
17 As Dillon (1995, 371), remarks, the view of the age of Cronus as one of easy and constant 
feasting "was the more common view" in antiquity. 
18 Cf. Phaedo 64a4-6. 
19 Cf. Brague (1981, 92); Griswold {1989, 151), who pithily concludes: "In the age of Cronus, man 
lived by bread alone." 
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beings of the present rotation would be easily made (272c5-dl). The Stranger leaves it to 
Young Socrates to figure out for himself what this easy judgment would be. If the 
Stranger is as much a partisan of philosophy as his repeated assertions of the paramount 
importance of dialectic make him out to be, then he would have to prefer the age of 
Zeus, for while the myth never mentions philosophy in that age, the presence of himself 
and the elder Socrates is presumably sufficient to demonstrate its possibility. Further, 
albeit vague, textual evidence supports this interpretation of the Stranger's view. In his 
description of the beginning of the reverse revolution of the age of Cronus, the Stranger 
had described the reversal of human aging and their switch from sexual generation to 
birth from the earth. This happened to all human beings except those "whom a god 
carried off into a another fate" (moiran., 271clf.). Based on the Stranger's account, it is 
safe to say that the only human beings worthy of such special divine attention would be 
philosophers. Their removal into another fate or allotment during the age of Cronus 
would correspond to the god's own withdrawal to his lookout during the age of Zeus.20 
God and the philosophers, we may fancifully imagine, take turns admiring each other's 
handiwork. This reading goes well with Rosen's suggestion that the god fashions the 
cosmos in order to observe it, and thus that the age of Zeus is its telos, while the age of 
Cronus is merely restorative, given the necessary frailty of the corporeal.21 God makes 
the world for philosophers, and philosophers can thrive only in "decadence."22 While for 
the purposes of my argument there is no need to insist on this reading, it has the 
advantage of proposing a purpose for the god's activity that is more than a mere 
compromise with the limitations of corporeality. It would extract further teleological 
20 Rosen (1979, 80) takes philosophy to be an imitation of the god's withdrawal, and connects (78) 
this aspect of the myth to the passage at 271c, for which cf. Campbell ad Zoe. 




sense from the myth, though in a form not palatable to all tastes.23 It goes well also with 
the suggestion of the Republic that philosophy might fare well in democracies, where 
each man "has in himself the most examples of regimes and characters," and where 
alone of the faulty regimes philosophy is said to have a place.24 
Regardless of this more speculative interpretation of the global significance of the 
myth, the Stranger does leave the immediate question of the preferability of one or the 
other epoch open to Young Socrates. The latter, however, is a very docile interlocutor5 
and does not take the opportunity to voice his opinion. It is instructive, then, to imagine 
how Callicles, a much more forward character, would answer. In fact it is not clear at 
first what he would say. He is certainly no partisan of philosophy and so would make 
his choice on different grounds. From the perspective of the pure and non-thumotic 
hedonism that Socrates eventually forces him into, Callicles would have to praise the 
happiness of the Cronian age, for with or without philosophy all of our desires are met 
sufficiently by the provision of food and drink. From his original position, however, he 
would no doubt choose the age of Zeus. Desire in the age of Cronus is finite if it is 
present at all, and there is no room for tyrannical eros or infinite ambition. There are no 
"strong men" to make manifest the law of nature and natural right. Under the rule of the 
daemon, human strength and weakness has no significance, for all can effortlessly attain 
exactly as much as they want or need. Callicles' understanding of justice might formally 
apply, but in this context his unchecked satisfaction of desires would coincide more or 
less with Socrates' standard of the limit appropriate to oneself-unless human beings ate 
23 White (2007, 40, 46) has this issue in mind when he says that "[t]he latent wisdom within the 
cosmos seeks a certain kind of motion presumably because it is wise for the cosmos, a living 
thing without divine guidance, to do exactly the opposite of what it had been doing [in the age of 
Cronus]." His vague but suggestive statement (47) that "the wisdom of the cosmos answers to a 
rational awareness on a part of of the cosmos, itself a living being, crt the need for matter to attain 
a certain possibility" could be construed as suggesting that same reading entertained here. 
24 Cf. Republic 561d-e. · 
25 McCabe (1997, 94) calls him "hopelessly complaisant." Miller (1980, 7f.) mentions his "repeated, 
hasty agreements" and characterizes him as "uncritical and thoughtlessly receptive of authority." 
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well past the point of satiety, in which case Callicles' "real man" would become a 
champion of eating competitions. The logic, then, of Callicles' position would tend 
toward judging human beings in the age of Cronus happier, but only because their 
nature is different and their eros suppressed. If he were to maintain his preferences, 
Callicles would have to consider the divine shepherd to be a tyrant over humanity, 
taming the lions among the human herd just as the daemones keep real lions and other 
predators from eating the other animals. And insofar as philosophy is made impossible, 
Socrates, too, would have to agree with him. If the daemon makes human natures as 
homogeneous as a flock and limits their desires, the geometrical equality Socrates spoke 
of in the Gorgias as the standard of justice would come out to the same as Callicles' 
pleonexia. There might then be a formal justice in the age of Cronus, but no virtue of 
justice. 
It must be this specter of tyranny in the rule of the divine shepherd that 
motivates the Stranger's later division of human rule into willing and forceful or into 
kingship and tyranny, which has no obvious grounding in the myth and which he does 
not himself explain (276e).26 The rule of the daemon is an affront to the pride of human 
beings, who are reduced to the status of a herd, ruled by "another animal that is more 
divine" (271e5f.).27 Insofar as human beings are themselves masters of lower animals, 
they believe themselves to have a share of divinity. In their pride they might reject the 
rule of the daemon if they were given the choice. The way the divine steersman resumes 
his periodic rule of the cosmos is violent after the manner of a tyrannical usurpation, 
even if it is followed by a paradigmatically nonviolent age. Upon his taking back the 
26 Cf. Miller (1980, 48). 
27 I take l;,<f>ov OV £n:qov 8ELOTC:qov to refer back to 8ioc;, not to the aV8QW11:oL of the immediately 
preceding clause, to which it might be taken in apposition. Benardete (1984 ad Zoe.) seems to take 
the second position, but cf. Laws 713dlf.: OUK av8qwnouc; cVV\a yivouc; 8ELOTEQOU n : Kai. 
tXflEl.vovoc;, bal.flovac;. Even on this reading, human beings would still be "more divine" than the 
brutes. 
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rudder of the cosmos, "destructions that are of necessity the greatest result for the other 
animals, and in particular of the race of human beings [only] a small remnant is left 
over" (270cll-dl). The age of Cronus presents a picture of human beings living even 
more simply than in the Republic's city of necessity, which Glaucon called a city of pigs 
because it had no beds and tables.28 The divine shepherd as perfect tyrant actually 
changes the natures of human beings in order to suit his ends, so that his violence can 
only be recognized as such by human beings of the next revolution once he has let go the 
cosmos. From the perspective of the human beings of the age of Cronus, there can be no 
distinction between willing and forceful rule precisely because their natures have been 
so thoroughly suppressed. The daemon.29 compels them by force, but not against their 
interest because it is exactly their interests that are changed. When the divine steersman 
takes back the rudder of the cosmos to save it from falling into the infinite sea of 
dissimilarity, he is acting in the interest of the cosmos, but not according to its inborn 
desire (273d-e, d. 272e6). His rule and bringing of order is against the will but for the 
good-or at least the preservation-of the all. It must be for this reason that the Stranger 
applies the distinction of voluntary and forceful or involuntary rule only to human care. 
The paradigm of the divine shepherd suggests the problem of tyranny, but is beyond or 
above the human distinction between tyranny and legitimate kingship. Thus we have an 
example of a political lesson being drawn from the apolitical portion of the myth, and of 
the great bulk of the myth explaining a seemingly correct but arbitrary addition to the 
initial diaeresis. The method of division as the Stranger practices it can lead to 
28 Republic 372d. 
29 I follow Brague (1981; 87-89), who mentions Laws 713a9-714a2, in distinguishing the daemon 
who shepherds humanity in the age of Cronus, and the divine steersman, the god who steers the 
whole cosmos. Since, however, the activity of the daernonic shepherd imitates that of the divine 
steersman, a rigorous observance of this distinction does not significantly improve our 
understanding of the political significance of the myth, which continues to appeal to both 
paradigms, just as a failure to observe this distinction would not of itself vitiate an interpretation 
of the myth. 
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significant results, but it cannot explain the significance of the results. Whether the 
Stranger acknowledges the fact or not, only the myth, or a narrative similar in kind to 
the myth, could make sense of his diaeresis. 
About the period of Zeus, the period we live in now, the Stranger has somewhat 
less to say, and none of his revisions to the diaeresis seem directly inspired by it. His 
isolation of statesmanship as the care of the whole human community or polis seem 
connected to the age of Zeus, but at least at this point the Stranger is explicit only in 
defining human rule negatively, in contradistinction to the rule of the divine shepherd-
or where the rulers are of similar nature and education to the ruled, instead of being a 
"more divine animal" than their subjects (c£. 271e6). This similarity of natures could 
suggest the appropriateness of what Aristotle calls politeia, where citizens rule and are 
ruled in tum, and which might correspond to the Stranger's distinction of willing and 
unwilling rule. But he never makes that connection explicit. Perhaps he thinks the 
lessons are obvious, but diaeresis is supposed to make every step explicit, no matter 
how trivial (262c). If there is any significance to this part of the myth, then we must 
again find it ourselves. 
When the divine steersman releases it, "fated and inborn desire rotates the 
cosmos once again" (272e5f.). After the initial shocks and convulsions, which are 
responsible for the destruction of many animals and human beings, the cosmos "goes 
into its own accustomed course, being set down in order, having by itself care and 
authority (kratos) over the things in itself and also over itself, recalling as far as is in its 
power the teaching of the craftsman and father" (273a-b ). This teaching must be the 
same as the "intelligence it has a share of from the one who composed it in the 
beginning" (269dlf.). At first it will remember this instruction more precisely, but 
eventually it grows duller and duller in its recollection as the disorder inherent to its 
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corporeal form grows greater and greater until eventually, were it not for the 
intercession of the steersman, it would be "overcome by a storm of disturbance and, 
dissolved, sink into the sea of dissimilarity, which is infinite" (273c-d). 
In its accustomed revolution, driven by its own innate desire, the cosmos at first 
does very well. "From its composer it has acquired all beautiful things, but from its 
previous condition [sc. previous to its composition into an ordered cosmos] whatever is 
harsh and unjust under heaven" (273b7-cl}. Whenever the steersman lets go, "during 
the time always nearest to his release, [the cosmos] directs everything most beautifully" 
(273c4f.). The reversal of the cosmos' revolutions is matched by the reversal of animal 
growth: 
Those animals who, on account of their smallness were just short of vanishing 
away, began to grow, while the bodies that were newborn from the earth 
sprouting grew hairs died again and descended into the earth. And all other 
things changed, imitating and following the experience (pathos) of the all. And 
in particular the imitation of conception, begetting, and nurture followed them 
all by necessity. For it was no longer possible for an animal to grow in the earth 
through the composition from [the parts of] others, but just as it has been 
ordered for the cosmos to be self-ruling (autokratora} of its own movement, so in 
the same way too the same conduct was ordered for the parts themselves 
through themselves, to the extent they could, to grow and beget and nurture 
(273e9-274bl}. 
Just as in the previous revolution, where the care of the daemones for their several herds 
was in imitation of the divine shepherd's care for the whole cosmos, so here the self-rule 
and self-care of the cosmos is matched by the animals' self-care through begetting and 
nurturing. There is a paradigmatic relation between the cosmos and its parts. But this 
paradigmatic relation is complicated. The parts of the cosmos are responsible for 
themselves, but the cosmos itself has care and control both over itself and over all things 
within it (cf. 273blf.). 'The all,' which seems to be the Stranger's neutral designation for 
the whole that is sometimes and sometimes not in a state of ordered structure (kosmos ), 
becomes a cosmos ':Yhen all its parts hang together properly and behave as they should. 
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But the whole has control over its parts only insofar as the parts have control over 
themselves. In the self-ruling cosmos, then, order seems to emerge from the ground up. 
If the cosmos is truly an animal, then it would display a certain organic structure where 
its parts were related to each other in a purposive way. In that case, its parts could be 
distinguished as causes or co-causes of its activity as a whole and capable of being cut 
apart "at the joints like a sacrificial victim" (287c3). In the age of Cronus, on the other 
hand, this cosmic ordering would be impossible because the innate nature of the cosmos 
is thoroughly suppressed by the divine steersman, while each of its parts are kept apart 
from each other, so that there is no interaction between the parts as parts. Furthermore, 
the complete suppression of difference between the different animals (of which the most 
obvious example is the suppression of carnivorism) and the elimination of the diversity 
of regions and seasons, means that the parts of the cosmos lose the distinctness from 
each other that makes a complex, purposive organization possible.30 The age of Cronus, 
then, is a mythical representation of abstract unity, which is inconsistent with the 
presence of complex structures.31 The Stranger does not give much suggestion as to what 
exactly the cosmic order of parts relating to parts, which works very well at least in the 
beginning of the age of Zeus, is like. That some animals would serve as food for others is 
the only concrete example of this suggested purposive ordering, but the Stranger would 
presumably class this fact as one of those "harsh and unjust things" due to the 
primordially corporeal nature of the cosmos. As Socrates said in the Republic, the good of 
the whole may not coincide with what the individual considers best for himsel£.32 The 
age of Zeus, at least initially, is an age of order, but not the order that appears beautiful 
30 In the Republic (369d), the first city is formed when human beings come together, each 
Eerforming different tasks. Politics requires specialization, and a natural order requires species . . 
1 Cf. Sophist 245blf. 
32 Republic 420b; cf. Aristotle, Politics 1261a22ff. 
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from the human perspective.33 
The same is the case for human beings in this age. "Our first ancestors, who as 
the previous revolution came to an end bordered the following time and grew at its 
beginning," were the bearers of the fragmented reports of the age of Cronus to which 
the Stranger had alluded before (271a-b ). Their reports are scattered and fragmentary, 
presumably because so many of them were killed in the initial shock of cosmic reversal 
(cf. 270cll-dl). When the cosmos resumed its accustomed course, led by its own innate 
desire, the natures of the animals that were harsh lost the tameness imposed on them by 
their daemon.es and became wild. They began to prey on one another. Human beings 
were left weak and unguarded (asthen.eis, aphulaktoi, 274b). They were no longer under 
the tutelage of their daemon and had no recourse to the defense that horns or hooves 
might provide, nor any wings to fly away to safety. Just as importantly, they could no 
longer count on the spontaneous growth of food for themselves from the earth, and had 
to contend with the rigors of the changing seasons. In short, they were left to face all the 
challenges of daily survival that we would meet if we were removed from civilization 
and confronted directly with a natural world indifferent to our purposes. Here the myth 
again explains the significance latent in the initial diaeresis but which could not be 
expressed within the strictures of that method. Almost all of the cuts according to 
animal species are into a positively and negatively defined class (horned, hornless, 
winged, wingless, etc.) and in every case human beings are set in the negatively defined 
class. The diaeresis, without knowing it, reveals the causes of human weakness, but only 
the narrative of the myth could explain the context in which these attributes can be 
understood as weaknesses. Even cuts like four-footed, two-footed suggest the slower 
pace of the two-footed and so another weakness in man as compared to many predators. 
33 Zuckert {2009, 718): "the eleatic stranger's is a non-mathematical cosmology, without beauty, 
and emphasis on the earth instead of the heavens." 
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It is only with the arts that human beings can make up for these deficiencies and the 
weakness and defenselessness they engender.34 
The myth's account of the age of Zeus, then, presents a straightforward case for 
the human need of the arts, but it does not quite do the same for the art or science of 
politics. At least it does not do so clearly. For all the reasons listed in the paragraph 
above, human beings 
were in great resourceless perplexities.35 Whence those things said of old to be 
gifts from the gods have been bestowed upon us with necessary teaching and 
education, fire from Prometheus, and the arts from Hephaestus and his co-
artisane [sc. Athena], and again seeds and growing things from others. 
Everything that has together made human life possible has come to be from 
these things, since the gods' portion--as was just said-of care gave out for 
human beings, and it was necessary through themselves to have their own 
subsistence and care of themselves just like the whole cosmos, which we imitate 
and follow for all time, now in this way, and then in that way, living and 
growing {274c4-d8). 
The arts fill in for humanity's natural resourcelessness and defenselessness. Fire and 
agriculture make easier the acquisition of nourishment, while the various arts protect 
from the elements and from predators. The arts produce the houses, beds, blankets, and 
clothing that human beings must now cover and protect themselves with (cf. 272a). The 
development of the arts saved human beings from almost certain death and, perhaps 
with a thought to the daemones of old, were called "gifts from the gods" even though the 
gods' care had given out and human beings were left entirely up to themselves. Among 
these arts must be included the art of shepherding, whose control of tame animal herds 
would first give human beings the intuition that they are an "animal more divine" than 
others (cf. 271e6). The arts would be the beginning of human pride that would 
eventually lead to the tendency of someone like Young Socrates to divide animals 
34 This point is especially clear when the myth is compared with the one told in the Protagoras 
(321a-d), where Epimetheus distributes all the positive natural attributes to the other animals and 
leaves man weak and defenseless, which requires Prometheus' theft of fire and the arts. 
35 Using Benardete's (1984) double rendering of aporiai. 
-..,.._._• --
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simply into human and beast (cf. 262a3-5). It was the artisans who proudly disputed the 
statesman's title to rule,36 and who must be distinguished from him as the arts ancillary 
to weaving are distinguished from weaving proper (268c, 281e). Interestingly, the 
supposedly divine gift of the arts is not followed with the divine gift of the art of politics 
or legislation. In Protagoras' telling of the Prometheus story, the arts were insufficient 
for mankind because they did not protect man from himself, which lead Zeus to further 
bestow upon them modest reverence and Right (aida and dike), which correspond to the 
art of politics.37 The absence of such a gift in the Statesman further underlines the idea of 
human autonomy in the age of Zeus. The arts will tum out to be sufficient to protect 
human beings from wilds beasts and the elements, but not from themselves. The gods, 
the Stranger suggests, cannot save man from himself.38 
This description of the age of Zeus would be recognizable to Callicles, for it is an 
age in which the struggle for survival is central, and while Callicles speaks of an ideal of 
eudaemonia or the good life based on pleonexia, he turned out to be as much or more 
concerned with mere survival. Unlike the age of Cronus, then, in the current revolution 
of the cosmos there are meaningful distinctions of weaker and stronger based on the 
minimal criterion of fitness for survival. Human beings, the Stranger states, are as a 
whole weak and defenseless. Where Callicles spoke metaphorically of the lions among 
men, the Stranger is concerned with the threat posed to human beings by real lions. Yet 
the defense against a hostile external nature seems to be supplied with relative ease by 
the arts. And it is only by progress in the arts that this defense could be further 
improved and human life made more and more secure. Certainly if the progress in the 
36 As Lane (1998, 119) notes. 
37 Protagoras 322c. Prometheus was unable to steal the art of politics for humanity because it was 
kept in the palace of Zeus himself. 
38 Cf. Zuckert (2009, 717): "[The Eleatic Stranger] had to use such a big, cosmic myth to show 
young Socrates (and the assembled auditors) that human beings do not acquire political 
knowledge as a result of their god-given or natural advantages." 
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arts carne to stagnation, life would become unlivable (299e6-10). The defense against 
nature and natural predators, then, cannot in the Stranger's mind be the primary task of 
statesmanship, for it is already the task of the arts, from which statesmanship is to be 
distinguished. Politics could at most expedite and facilitate the employment of the 
technical arts. It would be a sunaitios and not a directive art itself (281e, c£. autepitaktike, 
260e6f.). If politics is to have any purpose at all as a commanding art, that purpose must 
not look merely outwards to nature but into the midst of the human community itself. 
The Stranger had said that the cause of all unjust things in the cosmos was its 
original corporeal nature (273b-c). Talk of justice between human beings and lions is 
absurd unless lions are open to the rational force of arguments about justice, and the 
Stranger entertains no possibility of discourse between human and animal in the age of 
Zeus. It is harsh, then, but not unjust that human beings were vulnerable to animal 
depredations before the development of the arts. Injustice, then, though it is caused by 
the corporeality of the cosmos, arises only within one part of the cosmos, the human 
community. The Stranger had said that those animals with originally harsh natures lost 
their daemonically induced tameness and grew wild in the current revolution, and if he 
means not only that other animals but also some human natures became wild and harsh, 
then the origin of injustice would be clear. In the Sophist, the Stranger had been strangely 
ambivalent about the question whether human beings were wild or tame. When, in the 
course of the first attempt to define the sophist by diaeresis, Theaetetus asked whether 
there was a hunting of tame land animals, the Stranger replied: "Certainly if the human 
being is a tame animal. But set it down however you like, whether you set down nothing 
as tame, or something else as tame, but the human being as wild, or whether again you 
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say the human being is tame, but believe there is no hunting of human beings .... " 39 It 
might be very difficult to say whether human beings as a species are tame or wild. The 
Stranger comments elsewhere in the Sophist that "wolf [resembles] dog, the most wild, 
the most tame."40 Later in the Statesman he will speak of the different natures of human 
beings: the faster and 1nore intense in · thought and body, which we often praise as 
courageous and manly, and the tame, which we call moderate, slow, soft, and orderly 
(306e-307b ). These different natures among human beings will tend to keep to 
themselves, praising their own kind and blaming their opposite (307c). It is clear that the 
tame natures would call the intense and bold natures wild and savage, and the Stranger 
agrees that, taken too far, these natures do become "bestial" (309e3)Y 
It is not the split between tame and wild in animal nature in general, then, but 
the split within human nature itself, that is the cause of injustice in the age of ZeusY It is 
this split that Callicles would consider to be precisely the precondition for true justice, 
but the Stranger is evidently not of the same mind. He does not, however, take the side 
gf the tame. He knows that brave and manly natures cannot be eliminated and are often 
necessary. He proposes, then, a blending or weaving together of the two natures in 
accordance with the fitting or the timely (to prepon, 308e8} The political art will become 
for him the proper management of dissimilar human natures or characters (308c5f, 310e-
311a)Y The Stranger's conception of politics, then, resembles Socrates' understanding of 
39 Sophist 222b-c. Theaetetus answers that he believes human beings are tame. At Euthydemus 
290b5, strategy is defined as "the art of hunting human beings." 
40 Sophist 231a6. Cf. Republic 416a. .. 
41 Cf. Dixsaut (1995) 270: "le conflit politique entre deux parties de la vertu reproduit a un autre 
niveau 1' opposition naturelle entre animaux sauvage et apprivoises." 
42 For the . analogy between unjust human beings and wild animals, cf Republic 620dff.: xai. EK 
TWV a.A/\wv bi] 8TJQLWV waavTwc; de; av8Qc{mouc; LEVaL xai. de; aAAT)Aa, TCt fl i:V abLKa d e; '[Ct 
ay~na, '[Ct bi: bi.KaLa de; TCt iJflEQa f.l Eml3aMovTa. Cf. Griswold (1989, 152): "the lawgiver's 
Eurpose is to keep the citizens safe ... from themselves (human nature tends to destroy itself)." 
3 The thought that difference or unreconciled variety was the cause of badness was already 
present in the Gorgias (404e3-5): OUKOUV EKEL f1 i:V aKoAaai.av T] 7lOLKLALa EVEUKTEV, EVTau8a bi: 
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natural law in the Gorgias as a kind of "geometrical equality," or the allotment of what is 
proper to each nature in accordance with a common measure. Only here the scope is 
more explicitly raised beyond the level of individuals to the structure of the whole polis 
as a composition of individuals.44 The Eleatic Stranger is turning Socrates' conception of 
natural law into a framework for properly evaluating political action. 
What the Stranger will later identify as the primary task of the political art, then, 
sterns from the variety and potential discord within human nature, which is first hinted 
at in the myth.45 Just as no animal in the age of Cronus ate another, "there was no war or 
any stasis at all" in that time (271e2). War and civil discord are to human beings what 
carnivorism is to animals.46 The Stranger, who had objected to the hasty division of 
anirrtal into man and beast (262a), preserves the parallel between human beings and the 
other animals that Callicles had asserted and to which Socrates had also appealed, 
though in a different wayY The Stranger sees the art of politics as the bringing into 
harmony of what Callicles would call the strong and real men, on the one hand, and the 
weak, on the other. He does not, however, suggest that one or the other nature must be 
suppressed, as Callicles cla:ims the nomos of Athenian democracy seeks to enslave the 
sh·ong. This, in outline, is the Stranger's account of human nature as the obstacle that 
statesmanship must overcome. We have next to see how the Stranger views this aspect 
of human nature in light of its cosmic parallels, and how an appeal to nature of a 
-~~------~--
VOCJOV, Tj bE ani\6'IT]c; Ka'Ia f-l-EV f-l-OUCHKTJV EV l)!vxal:c; aWcj:>QOaUVT]V, Ka'Ia b£ YUiJ-VaU'IlKTJV EV 
UWf-LaULV uy(nav; 
44 Cf. chapter one, V.b above. 
45 Lane (1998, 11) is simply wrong to assert that "[t]he Statesman provides ... none of the 
meditation on human weaknesses and their possibly calamitous effects, that we have come to 
expect of a political theory .... " If anything, such a meditation on human weakness is the primary 
contribution of the Statesman to political thinking. Again, Griswold (1989, 152) expresses the . 
correct view. 
46 As Lane (1998, 191) says, "in the Statesman, political conflict is the function of clashing 
temperaments." But is not the clashing of temperaments a kind of human weakness? 
47 Gm·gias 483d3, 506d6. Socrates appeals in the first place to the organic structure of animals that 
is suited to meeting their needs in the context of their habitat. 
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different kind suggests the way in which the statesman can act in order to overcome that 
obstacle. Human nature, the Stranger suggests, both poses the problem of statesmanship 
and provides its potential solution. 
Varieties of Cosmic Imitation in the Myth 
It is dear throughout the exposition of the myth how much emphasis the Stranger lays 
on the parallelism of microcosm and macrocosm, or how the parts of the cosmos imitate 
the whole.48 In the age of Cronus, the divine shepherd cares for the cosmos as a whole, 
and the daemones, in imitation of the divine shepherd, care for the regions of the cosmos 
allotted to them. Similarly. in the age of Zeus, the cosmos is left to rule itself as best it 
can with its own inborn intelligence, and the different parts of the cosmos, too, must 
ta..~e care of themselves. Imitation, the Stranger suggests, is how the parts of the cosmos 
participate in the order of the cosmos. To participate in a natural orderc-to act according 
to the law of nature, as Callicles put it-is to imitate that natural order. The obedience to 
natural law would have to be the imitation of the order expressed in natural law. 
Callicles imitates the unchecked pleonexia that he believes is everywhere in nature, while 
Socrates imitates the order of fittingness. The Stranger, however, cannot have a simple 
notion of imitation in mind. His exposition, rather, suggests two kinds of cosmic 
imitation, which Lane identifies as "first order" and "second order" imitation. 49 Taking 
the example of one person imitating another person's choice to do something, one' s 
imitation of another's choice could take one of two forms. Either one chooses to do the 
same thing, imitating slavishly, so to speak, the actions of the other, or one could imitate 
the other's choice by choosing to do something of one's own. I can imitate my friehd's 
48 Carone (2005, 153) notes what she calls the "exaggerated" paralielism of the myth. 
49 Lane (1998, 109). 
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decision to buy a coffee by buying my own coffee or by choosing tea. Lane notes 
coiTectly that the second kind of imitation (she calls it "second-order")50 must be 
primary in the age of Zeus, for just as the cosmos is meant to rule itself (autokratora), so 
the parts of the cosmos, most notably the species of animals, must fend for themselves, 
and they clearly do not all do so in the same way, either as each other or as the cosmos 
as a whole. Some animals will imitate the cosmos' self- caring by grazing, others by 
preying on the grazers, but the cosmos neither grazes nor preys. Most clearly from the 
text, human beings protect and care for themselves through the inventions of the arts, 
which have no dlrcct parallel at the cosmic level. The very conditions of human 
autonomy thus demand this looser sei1se of imitation. The human imitation of cosmic 
autonomy demands a "partial detachment" from the cosmic order.51 This partial 
detachment might allay the fears, which motivate Carone/2 that the strong parallelism 
between macrocosm and microcosm is a threat to human freedom, or that the pichrre of 
cosmic decline in the age of Zeus is an invitation to political pessimism. Cosmic and 
human entropy need not proceed at the same pace, nor need cosmic entropy rule out 
periods of relatively stable human order. 
This distinction, then, between these two kinds of imitation is essential to 
understanding the full significance of the myth for understanding the human place in 
the cosmos and the role of politics, but it is unable by itself to account for the full 
complexity and significance of imitative relations of the myth-hence Lane's relative 
neglect of the teleological aspects of the myth, or her failure to consider the myth as 
50 'Second order' is an unfortunate designation in Lane's case, because it suggests a kind of 
"imitation of imitation" (as Harry Frankfurt's "second-order desires" arc desires about what first-
order desires to have). It is unintentionally appropriate, however, since (as any reader of the 
Republic knows) imitation of imitation is hardly foreign to Platonic thinking. We shall consider 
below how a kind of second-order imitation in this sense might be present in the Eleatic 
Stranger's account of politics. 
51 To use Rosen's phrase (1979, 81, 84). 
52 As Lane (1998, 110) notes. Carone (2005, 127). 
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having important things to say about "natural philosophy."53 Thus, for instance, the 
second kind of imitation does not completely supplant the first in the age of Zeus.54 In 
our cycles of birth and death "in the accustomed course" we imitate the cosmic 
revolution as it is now. This point should be expanded to say that in all physical 
characteristics we imitate the cosmos in the first sense. As the cosmos tends to entropy, 
so do we, if not at the same rate; as the cosmos is gripped by dissimilarity, so it is the 
dissimilarity of human natures that is the cause of war and injustice. 55 
To consider, then, the question of imitation in the myth, in the age of Cronus 
there appears at first to be merely the first kind, since human autonomy is all but 
extinguished. The particularities of human nature are suppressed along with the 
appetites of at least the carnivorous animals.56 Daemones tend to the particular animal 
flocks and to the regions of the cosmos in direct imitation of the divine steersman, who 
tends to the whole. Human beings, for their part, in their spontaneous, asexual, and a-
historical life, imitate the undisturbed order of the cosmos. This imitation is not 
accomplished through action, but merely through what one might call their biological 
condition, most evident in the example of their reversed aging, which imitates the 
reversed rotation of the cosmos. Since human beings in that age do nothing else of 
consequence, it appears that their imitation of the cosmos in the age of Cronus was only 
of the first order and passive. They are taken care of, just like the cosmos as a whole. If, 
in the age of Zeus, we engage in imitation of a second order, ruling ourselves as the 
cosmos tends to itself, and if autonomy is a precondition of action properly speaking, 
53 In this respect, the approach of Carone, while fundamentally mistaken on the details of the 
myth, is still truer to its general significance. 
54 Lane (1998, 109) is thus too quick to turn the myth into apolitical allegory, thereby missing some 
of the actual political lessons that can be learned from thinking through the myth more "naively." 
55 Rosen (1995, 157) draws attention to this parallel, though he does not take the point as far as I 
have here. 
56 Cf. Brague (1981) 92: "[L'homme] n'est pas encore homme a proprement parler. ll n'est encore 
qu'un animal parmi d 'autres." 
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then it would seem that in the age of Cronus there was, properly speaking, no action at 
all. Human beings did not do anything. As the Stranger had said, they were at leisure, 
though he is unsure what they did in their leisure. TI1e pos~ibilities he mentions are 
eating and drinking to satiety, telling the kinds of tales now told of them, and engaging 
in philosophy by talking with each other and the other animals. But we have seen that 
he most likely means for us to understand that it was absent. But given the Stranger's 
insistence elsewhere on maintaining the parallel between macrocosm and microcosm, it 
is important to consider how any of these three possibilities would constitutes an 
imitation of the cosmos. Their eating and drinking seem nothing more than an extension 
of the basic biological imitation, their passive participation in daemonic tending. But 
whether they engaged in philosophy or the telling of tales, it is hard to tell how this 
activity of theirs could be considered a kind of direct imitation, or what they could be 
imitating. Neither case, in fact, seems to be an imitation of any cosmic activity on either 
the first or second order. The only parallel that suggests itself for human speech of any 
kind is the communication we can presume took place between the divine shepherd and 
his subordinate daemones. If this hypothesis is correct, then the cosmic imitation to which 
the Stranger explicitly alludes would have to be supplemented by an account of divine, 
not cosmic, imitation, about which he appears to be silent. 57 
As the Stranger says, there is no sufficient informant about the age of Cronus, 
and it would be fruitless to speculate too much about the details mentioned above. But it 
has already suggested a line of interpretation that will be bome out if we reconsider the 
complex web of imitations present in the age of Zeus. To summarize what has been 
57 The Stranger does imply that the human race is "more divine" (271e6). Later he will say that 
the human race participate f.v .baq.1ovl<y y£vn insofar as they are amenable to the divine bond of 
true opinion (309c8). Socrates had raised the question of imitation or assimilation to god in the 
Theaetetus {176a-b). Theodorus seems to have this on his mind when he replies to Socrates' jest at 
the beginning of the Sophist by saying of the Stranger Kal f.lOl boKd 8coc; f.!EV avi]Q ovbaf.!i..Jc; 
dvat, 8cioc; f.lrlV" rrav'rac; yt:XQ f.yw woe; <f>u\oao<f>ovc; 'rOLOVWVt; 1LQOaayoQEVW. (Sophist 216b9f.). 
We will return to the theme of divine imitation below. 
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determined so far, human beings in the present rotation of the cosmos imitate the cosmic 
order directly in the cycle of their lives and-more importantly for the understanding of 
politics-in the dissimilarities of their various natures. They also imitate the cosmos in 
their autonomy, but the manner in which they practi~e their autonomy can only be 
jndirect or second order imitation of the same. If the cosmos manifests a natural law, in 
participation of which human beings become happy, then it seems that their 
participation would have to be along the lines of this second, indirect kind of imitation. 
Smoothing out the imitative web: more on indirect imitation 
Our question as we approached the Statesman was how to conceive of a natural order 
and a human being's following it or living in accord with it, i.e., how natural law can set 
a concrete standard of action. It is important to avoid the easy enough tendency to think 
of this as a question that falls clearly into two separate parts: first, what is the natural 
order? Second, how do we follow it? It is important because, as we already saw in the 
Gorgias, to think of the natural order from the beginning as something separate from 
human beings, an object that they can look at and study from the outside, would create 
an unbridgeable gap between the human being and nature. It is that sort of supposition 
that leads to the strict opposition between nomos and phusis. But the human being, as an 
animal, is from the beginning part of nature and so already belongs to whatever order 
might be found in nature. The inquiry into the natural order, then, must always keep in 
consideration the place of human beings in that order, even before the question is raised, 
how we ought to follow this order or conform to it more fully. These two aspects of the 
single question could be thought of as referring to the factual and the normative aspects 
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of the natural order, the human relation to which is one of partial detachment. 58 In the 
Gorgias, it was relatively easy to distinguish these elements in CaJJicles' natural law 
position. The condition of human beings being one of infinite desire and finite resources 
for the satisfaction of that desire, where happiness for all is an impossibility, the result is 
a struggle between the weak and the strong that begins out of concern ~or the good life, 
but descends to a struggle for mere survival. This struggle among human beings mirrors 
the more general struggle that can be noted in animal nature in general. This situation, 
where not all can survive and only a few have any chance at true happiness (understood 
as the endless satisfaction of infinite desire), therefore sanctions the employment of any 
means required to maintain one's life, and a complete lack of scruple in the purely 
egoistic quest of those few who are strong enough to seize what they need to become 
happy. Callicles' position did not appeal to a defined order of things, but it did have an 
understanding of the way of things as striving for the indefinite increase of power. In 
that limited sense, Callicles did appeal to a kind of natural order and kosmos.59 
Socrates' reversal of Callicles, on the other hand, clearly appealed to an order of 
nature, and just as clearly viewed human beings as part of that order, so that living the 
· good life becomes a question of better understanding one's place in the natural order in 
terms of the fitting (to prepon). But it was left an open question in the Gorgias how the 
prepon is defined. We can see at this point how the Stranger's account of the cosmos and 
cosmic imitation begins to address thi.s question with its account of human need. The 
58 Ferrari (1995, 394 fn. 17) argues that "[t]he Stranger needs to avoid the suggestion that the arts 
are something we learn from our encounter with the environment and so could be said to owe to 
the natural world ... in order to maintain consistency with his larger claim that we are not simply a 
part of the natural world but are rather imitators of it, capable of taking care of ourselves in our own 
way as it takes care of itself in its way" [my italics]. But an encounter with the world is not the 
same thing as a slavish imitation of the world; rather it is the occasion that spurs on the 
development of the arts. 
59 One might note here that one of the oldest senses of Koa~- words in Greek is the order of battle, 
where enemies are arrayed against each other. The same goes for TU~Lc;. Mourelatos (1970 [2008], 
230f.) suggests that Parmenides plays ironically on this connotation at B8.60. It is not implausible 
that such connections were in the back of Plato's mind as well. 
. ..;, . ·. 
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hUJ.-nan being as part of nature is needy and cannot rely on his "natural" (more precisely, 
his physical) endowments for survival in the face of threats from the rest of nah1re. 
Further, as passively imitating (on the "first-order") nature as a whole, human beings 
are brought apart by divergent tendencies and individual natures, which is the cause of 
human injustice and political stmgg1e. Human need in the face of external nature is met 
by the · arts, which in their production of clothing and weapons make imitations of the 
hides, furs, and horns with which other animals are naturally endowed. The arts also 
allow us to herd other animals and practice agriculture, which have no direct natural 
analogue, but rather seem to imitate the activity of the shepherd daemones. Thus, with 
the arts, human beings imitate both directly and indirectly the other parts of nature that 
threaten them. It is not clear, however, what part of nature human beings are supposed 
to imitate in overcoming the threat that they pose to each other, so that like the cosmos 
as a whole they can become self-ruling. In the case of the whole cosmos, moreover, self-
rule declines more and more into disorder and dissimilarity until it must be rescued by 
the god and restored to order. The parallelism always maintained in the myth, then, 
suggests that the human constitution of order in political communities would 
correspond to the divine steersman resuming control of the rudder of the cosmos. The 
art of politics as bringing order to human dissimilarity, then, would not be imitation of 
the cosmos, but an imitation of the god who brought order (theos ho kosmesas ) to the 
cosmos (273d4). It would be a divine imitation.60 
60 lf this is the case, then the distinction between the daemonic shepherd, who directly cared for 
human beings in the age of Cronus, and the divine steersman, who cared for the cosmos as a 
whole, would take on a new importance. Statesmen, the Stranger might say, should be thought of 
not as shepherds, but as pilots. The lesson of the Stranger's discursus on paradeigma, however, 
should be that analogy does not imply identity, or that no analogy is perfectly precise. Thus, with 
due precautions, the shepherd metaphor could still be of some illustrative value in the 
investigation of the statesman. As Miller (1980 [2004], 95) writes, "the statesman is like the 
ultimate shepherd, the god" (italics in original). 
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The new possibility: imitation of god 
"To be always in the same respects and the same way, and to be the same, is appropriate 
for the most divine of all things alone, but the nature of body is not of this order" (taxis, 
269d5-7). The cos~os, si~ce it is embodied, cannot be entirely free of change, but "as 
much as is possible (kata dunamin)61 it moves in a single course in the same place in the 
same respects" (269d-e). The cosmos is a divine thing, and has received its share of 
intelligence from its maker (269dl), but it is not one of the most divine things . It is 
hindered by its corporeal nature, but it approximates as much as it can the self-sameness 
of the god who gave it form. "To turn oneself by oneself forever is quite impossible for 
anything but the one who leads all things that are moved," but when the cosmos is 
released, it "goes itself by itself, released at such a time that it goes in reverse for many 
myriads of revolutions on account of its being biggest and going with the greatest 
equilibrium, going on the smallest foot" (269d5f.; 270a6-9). In other words, the cosmos, 
when left to itself in its autonomy, moves as much like the god as possible, and for as 
long as possible, within the confines of its corporeal nature. The autonomous cosmos 
imitates the god.62 But unless the god is actually in circular movement himself, which is 
never suggested, then the cosmos' motion is not an exact or first-order imitation. Room 
is left for cosmic autonomy.63 
61 This echoes the kata to dunaton in Socrates' discussion of divine imitation quoted before from 
Theaetetus 176a5-bl. Cf. also Statesman 300c6. 
62 Cf. Miller (1980, 38); There seems to be an inconsistency here in the myth. When the god lets go 
of the cosmos, he withdraws to his "look-out'', but does he continue to move while there? The 
inconsistency would be resolved if we could identify his continuous self-turning with the 
circularity of Aristotle's divine nous. For the circular motions of the heavenly bodies imitating the 
ineffable motion of nous, cf. Laws 898a. Even if this solution is the "correct" one, however, it is still 
important that the Eleatic Stranger does not give us the resources to answer this question here. 
The m yth as it is presented is a completely inadequate cosmology. 
63 Since the cosmic god at times releases and at other times takes hold of the cosmic rotation, it 
does not seem that even he could be one of the. "most .divine things." For this problem, cf. Rosen 
(1979, 75) 
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This is not to say, however, that hwnan autonomy would have to be a first order 
imitation of cosmic autonomy. The original reason for accepting this distinction between 
different kinds of imitation was precisely that the manifestations of human autonomy in 
the arts and political life seemed to have no direct cosmic parallel. The option that 
remains, then, is that, just as the cosmos imitates the god in its autonomy, so does the 
political activity characteristic of human autonomy somehow imitate divine activity. To 
return to the more basic case, if the cycles of hwnan life and reproduction in the age of 
. . Zeus imitate the cosmic cycles, and these in tum imitate as best as possible the self-
sameness of the withdrawn steersman, then human beings, too, must imitate the god, if 
only at the second remove. There are certainly Platonic precedents for imitation of 
imitation. In Republic X, poets and painters are described as imitators of what are already 
imitations of the true originals, which are produced or generated by the god. They are, 
thus, at the third remove from truth. Translated back into the language of the Statesman, 
the cycle of hwnan birth and death is a more distant approximation to divine self-
sameness than are the gradually declining revolutions of the cosmos. Human access to 
the divine is indirect and mediated. Even in the age of Cronus it was a daemon, not the 
god himself but an intermediate of god, who took care of hwnan beings in imitation of 
the god's care of the whole. 
Some useful parallels, then, can be drawn between the Statesman and Republic on 
imitation, but they are still insufficient for understanding the second-order imitation that 
human beings engage in when they autonomously practice politics. Cosmic autonomy 
appears to be a kind of second-order imitation· of the god, for the cosmos takes care of 
itself as the god took care of it previously, though not in the same way, but the myth 
give no specific account of what that imitation looks like. So there is no help there for 
understanding what the hwnan imitation of god would look like. Another parallel from 
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the Republic, however, suggests a way forward. Using the analogy of painting to 
somewhat different effect, Socrates once compares philosopher-legislators to "painters 
of regimes."64 The philosopher who, "by keeping company with the divine and the 
orderly, become5 divine and orderly to the extent possible for a human being," becomes 
also a "craftsman (demiurge) of moderation, justice, and the entirety of demotic 
virtue."65 Their activity is likened to painting on the cleaned canvas of the human soul: 
working out [the picture] they would look frequently in both directions, toward 
that which is just by nature and beautiful and moderate and all such things, and _ 
to that, again, which is in human beings; and mixing and blending together 
from the practices they produce the image of man (andreikelon), 66 inferring from 
that very thing which Homer called the divine and godlike (theoeides te kai 
theoeikelon) that comes to be in human beings. 67 
The language of divine imitation could not be more clearly expressed here, and the 
parallels to the Statesman, while not exact, are nonetheless illustrative. Especially 
important for the political thought of the Statesman, it is stressed that legislators must 
look in both directions, not only off to the forms of justice and the other virtues, but to the 
human canvas. This double focus matches the double account of human nature in the 
present myth. Later in the Statesman, the statesman-legislator will be compared to a 
specific kind of craftsman, a weaver who weaves together bold and moderate natures, 
"fitting them together with a divine bond" of true opinions about the beautiful and just 
and good and their opposites (309c). The verb sunarmozesthai, translated as "fitting 
together," is the middle form of the same verb used to describe the god's composition of 
the cosm()s and is related to the harmonia (" attunement") that he appealed to in his own 
64 Republic SOlcSf. 
65 Ibid., 500c9-d8. 
66 'rO avbQELKEAOV is literally a flesh-colored pigment produced from a special blend of the 
grimary colors. 
7 Ibid., SOlbl-7. 
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formulation of natural law in the Gorgias (269dlf.).68 By using a divine bond, the 
statesman-legislator participates in divinity and imitates it. His role becomes analogous 
to the role of the god who brings order to the cosmos. The best regime, which is the 
direct rule of the wise statesman without the blunt instrument of law, is to be separated 
from the others "like a god from human beings" (303b4).69 Since regimes are 
distinguished by the number of rulers (one, few, many), the divine character of the best 
regime must come from its ruler, the statesman or "king" himself. The myth makes it 
quite explicit that all human beings somehow imitate the order and revolutions of the 
cosmos. What becomes clear only once the myth and the later exposition of 
statesmanship70 are compared, is that the Stranger means us to think of the statesman as 
somehow like a god.71 
This conclusion, though well-supported by the text, should strike the reader of 
the Statesman as deeply paradoxical. The Stranger had taken one of the explicit lessons of 
the myth to be that the paradigm of shepherding assumed in the first diaeresis, because 
it presumed a species-distinction between statesman and citizen or ruler and ruled, was 
inappropriate and "too grandiose a paradigm" (277b2-6). Many times in the Statesman, 
however, the Stranger will introduce an apparent digression, only later to say that it had 
missed the point or gone too far astray, and then again explain or show by his dialectical 
practice that in fact it was just as it should be. The best example of this is the diaeresis of 
weaving, which the Stranger explicitly introduced as a paradigm of the new kind of 
diaeresis by "cutting by the joints." At the end of the diaeresis he asks why they took so 
68 The same verb (q.v. LSJ) often applies to the binding of man and woman together in wedlock, 
which will be the primary "human bond" the statesman-legislator will use to reinforce the divine 
bond (310a-b) 
69 Cf. Benardete (1984, ITI.102). 
70 Before the myth, the Stranger had used the image of the statesman holding the reins of the city 
like a charioteer his te~m {266e9-ll), but the divine comparison would only become clear with the 
myth's image of the god holding the rudder of the cosmos. 
71 Miller {1980, 52£.) and Ferrari (1995, 393) both acknowledge the role of a deus mensura in the 
myth. 
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much time on so trifling a matter, only to answer his own question with a further 
digression on the nature of measur~ment (283bl-5). The reintroduction, at the end of the 
dialogue, of the weaving paradigm, not only as an example for the new kind of non-
bifurcatory diaeresis, but also as a direct model for the activity of the statesman is just as 
. . . . . ; . . . 
unexpected.72 The Statesman's concern with philosophical method is nowhere so evident 
as in its refusal adequately to spell out these connections and transitions. At every tum 
and new beginning the reader is left to puzzle out its significance alone.73 It should not 
be 1.mexpected, then, that the myth, which is certainly the most complex and opaque 
methodologically·motivated digression in the dialogue, should say more than the 
Stranger admits, or even contradict what at some points he seems to assert.74 
The way out of this impasse seems to be the following. Much evidence in the 
. later part of the dialogue points to a tacit analogy between the true statesman and the 
cosmic god, even though the stranger seemed to deny that such a divine paradigm was 
appropriate for statesmanship. But reading the Stranger's words with care suggests a 
slightly more nuanced reading that would resolve the contradiction. He had said that 
their major mistake in the myth was that "asking about the king and statesman of the 
current revolution and way of coming-to-be (genesis), we spoke of the shepherd of the 
human herd of the previous time, from the opposite period, and a god instead of a 
72 Cf. McCabe (1997, 97 n. 12): "In the sequel, of course, the model [of weaving] turns into an 
element of the definition of the statesman; some part of the work done here in the text is on the 
difference between the use of an analogy and the use of an image. naQabu::yfla, extensively 
discussed at 277dff., is here turned into a term of art." 
73 Cf. Griswold (1989, 163 n. 12): "A full interpretation of the Stsm. would have to explain not just 
the constant interruption of the diaireseis by the digressions, but also the many acknowledged 
errors which interrupt the diaireseis and force the ES and YS to retrace their steps or revise their 
results." 
74 Cf. White (2007, 1): "Some steps in the activity of dialectic are tlawed, but flaws introduced by 
intent since the dialogue explicitly seeks to rectify earlier missteps made by the Stranger and his 
respondent." I would add only that the dialogues do not explicitly attempt to rectify all missteps 
taken along the way. The central place of the myth in framing the entire discussion that follows it, 
which White too acknowledges (vii), is never explicitly acknowledged by the Stranger. 
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mortal at that" (274e9-275a2).75 He then continues to explain "why we employed the 
myth, so that it might be shown about herd-nurh1ring, not only that everyone disputes it 
with the one now sought for [sc. the statesman], but also that we might see more clearly 
that one himself [sc. the god], for whom alone it is fitting to have care of human nurture 
according to the paradigm of shepherds and cowherds and alone to be held deserving of 
this address" (275bl-7). First let us note how, here again, the Stranger confuses us by at 
first citing a "mistake" in the myth (hamartema, cf. 274e4), only to conclude that the 
correction of that mistake was precisely the point of the myth.76 
To turn then to the specifics of the "mistake" that the myth is first said to commit 
and then to correct, what precisely does the Stranger think it was? It was not, in the first 
instance, to confuse the statesman with a god, and certainly not to consider his activity 
as analogous to the god's. It was to think of the statesman as a kind of shepherd. 7'1 The 
god is introduced to show what a true shepherd of a human flock would have to be like. 
J£ there were anyone who could do all the things for human beings that a shepherd does 
for his flock (cf. 268a-b), it would have to be the daemon of the age of Cronus, who alone 
is worthy of that designation. The error, then, was strictly speaking not to identify the 
statesman with a god, but with a shepherding god. Even when he says that this paradigm 
75 Brisson (1995, 363), defending his three-period reading, is forced to deny the clear coordination 
between present and opposite revolution and divine and human shepherds. He imagines that in 
the opposite rotation (the intermediate stage of divine neglect) human beings tried to be divine 
shepherds, directly imitating the god's rule of the age of Cronus. This interpretation, it should be 
clear, is neither plausible nor backed by any textual support. 
76 As Klein (1977, 160) notices: "The Stranger admits two faults, but in doing so he is faulty in two 
other ways, without admitting it. First, he claims that a great and very important fault was 
committed when the statesman was declared to be the shepherd of the human herd, and a 
smaller fault when the manner of his rule was not described. It is, as w e shall see, the other way 
round: the latter "fault" is greater by far. Second, the dispute about the man who takes care of 
"herd nurture" was mentioned before the tale began and not in the tale itself." 
77 Even here it seems that the mistake was not comparing the statesman to a shepherd, but 
classifying him as one. For the inability of diaeresis to account for the difference between identity 
and analogy, d. Benardete (1967). Cf. also Carone (2005, 154) who distinguishes between defining 
the statesman in terms of divine care, and holding up that care as a kind of "paradigmatic example" 
(italics in original). 
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was "too big to be appropriate for the ki.ng," it is "the shape (schema) of the divine 
shepherd" -its divinity itself--that is claimed to be inappropriate. Further, the Stranger 
says that "the statesmen present here and now are much more like their subjects in their 
natures and have shared more closely [with them] in education and nurture [than the 
divine shepherd does]" (275b9-c4). But the statesmen here and now will later be 
described as a "band of centaurs and satyrs" who must be strictly distinguished as 
"faction leaders" (stasiastikous) from the 'knowing statesman (303c). And the rule of 
wisdom must be separated from the other spurious regimes "as a god from human 
beings" (303b4). The true statesman, the knower, is just as absent from the real city as 
the god is absent from the cosmos in the age of Zeus. 
The Stranger's comments at the conclusion of the myth, then, do not rule out 
analogies between the statesman and the god-and so an imitation of god-so much as 
a literal understanding of the shepherd metaphor, which would require the statesman to 
have literally divine power. Given the weight of later evidence, then, we can admit 
divine imitation alongside imitation of the cosmos as a structural component of the 
Stranger's mythical narrative. The task now is to untangle the web of imitative relations 
found in the myth and bring some sense and order to them. The statesman's divine 
imitation fills in the gap of content that was left by what we have been calling the 
second-order imitation of the cosmos that is the hallmark of human autonomy. Taken to 
the impossible extreme, the statesman's imitation of the god would override the 
. autonomy of the human community, as shown by the irr-elevance of the distinction 
between rule over the willing and urtwilling in the case of the epistemic statesman, 
which matches the absence of that distinction in the age of Cronus (292c5-8). One of the 
key insights to be taken from the Stranger's treatment of divine imitation is precisely 
that such imitation can never be perfect. The statesman' imitation of god, then, is not 
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wholly contrary to the fact of human autonomy; rather it gives content to what would 
otherwise be an empty assertion of freedom ~ 
Human imitation of the god: the statesman-lawgiver 
Herodotus records that at the time of Lydia's greatest flourishing under Croesus, "there 
arrived in Sardis ... all the other wise men (sophistai) from Hellas who happened to be at 
this time .. . and also Solon, a man of Athens, who having made laws for the Athenians 
at their bidding, spent ten years abroad, · sailing away on the pretext of sightseeing and 
study (kata theories prophasin), so that he would not be compelled to dissolve any of the 
laws that he set down.'m The motif of the absent or withdrawn lawgiver, then, is a 
common one in Greek thinking around the time of Plato.79 Solon reportedly left Athens 
after the Athenians had sworn an oath not to change the laws he had established for ten 
years, so as not to be forced to change them himself.80 In the Statesman, it is in the 
absence of the knowing ruler that the need for law first emerges, as reminders of his 
instructions to his charges, like that of the doctor or gymnastic trainer (295b10-c5). But 
unlike Solon, who refused absolute power, 81 the returning legislator would consider his 
written instructions not to be up to the standards of his art if the circumstances had 
changed in the meantime (295c7-e2). The absence and return of the legislator in the 
Statesman, then, modifies the familiar Solonian motif. But it is in exact structural 
correspondence to the role of the divine steersman in the Statesman's myth, who guides 
the cosmos directly in one period, and then withdraws to his point of observation to let 
78 Herodotus 1.29. 
79 Cf. Timaeus 2lc. 
80 Herodotus 1.29. The presence of the lawgiver would immediately belie the belief in the 
immutable character of law that the rule of law must foster, for he would be a constant reminder 
of the tin'le before the laying down of the law, and so of the laws contingency. Cf. Klein (1977, 
188f.). 
81 Solon fr. 33. 
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it govern itself according to his teaching and instruction. If in the myth the cosmos 
corresponds to the city, then the statesman-lawgiver is the political analogue of the 
cosmic deity.82 
How, then, does the god offer a positive paradigm for the activity of the 
statesman? He is described rather generically as the demiourgos, the craftsman, of the 
cosmos (273bl). He is its composer (sun.thentos, 273b7) and brings it into scale or 
attunement (sun.armosan.tos, 269dl). The latter description especially suggests the order 
that is supposed to be the result of the statesman's -and any craftsman's-activity, but . 
these analogies together do no more than point to its productive character. The god as 
steersman or pilot (kubern.etes) of the cosmos is perhaps the best evidence for the function 
of the myth as political allegory, given the fondness found at least in Plato and tragedy 
for the image of the ship of state. Bad politicians, that is, shoddy imitators of divine nile, 
are likened to "pilots and sailors with the greatest ignorance about the greatest things" 
(302a8-b1). The true, knowing, statesman, then, is a good pilot, like the god who 
carefully guides the cosmos in his period and keeps it from being wrecked in the sea of 
dissimilarity.83 In the Statesman. the image of sailing seems to stand for the preservation 
of the life of the polis, just as in the Gorgias the art of sailing was considered a vulgar art 
concerned only with survival, not with living well.84 The image, then, suggests 
statesmanship's first and minimal aim of providing safety and security for the political 
community, but neither its higher end nor the methods it employs. The analogy that 
proves most illuminating for the activity of statesmanship is weaving, but the god's 
82 Cf. Miller (1980, 102); also Benardete (1984, 111.102); Griswold (1989. 157): "the true god-like 
statesman" and "the true statesman . .. is, with respect to his superhumanly precise political 
science, the equivalent of Cronos." See also Rosen (1995, 62, 158); Ferrari (1995, 393); Lane (1998, 
10). Although all these scholars note the parallel and develop it to some extent, none thinks 
through its purpose and implications as exhaustively as they could. 
83 The good statesman is described as btaKv!3EQVWVTa n )bmf16vwc; 6q8i)v tXKQLI3wc; flOVov 
noALTELaV (301d5f.) and as TOV y Evvaiov Kui3EQvTJ1TJV (297ell). Cf. Clitophon 408a5-b4. 
84 Gorgias 511d-512e; also Republic 346a7. 
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activity is never explicitly described as such. The parallelism between the god's 
construction of the cosmos and the statesman's construction of the political order of the 
human · community seems to be formally correct but, at least from a superficial reading 
of the text, relatively unhelpful. 
If, however, we start again from the specific characterization of divine or 
daemonic activity that emerged from the narrative of the myth, a divine paradigm for 
the statesman's activity does suggest itself and turns out to bear a partial analogy to 
weaving and so illustrate the limited or distorting scope of second-order imitation in the 
Statesman. As we saw above, the daemonic herding of human beings and other animals 
was accomplished by the thorough suppression of their natures. Human beings were 
made homogeneous, with the result that there was no war or stasis among them. 
Similarly, carnivorous animals had their natures somehow suppressed and tamed or 
made gentle, so that there were no inter-species depredations. As a whole, the "innate 
desire" of the cosmos was suppressed and its rotation reversed, so that it would be 
impossible for it to eventually fall into the sea of dissimilarity. In each case, this daemonic 
activity amounts to a suppression of difference or an enforcement of a kind of static 
homogeneity, equivalent to the abstract equality of value discussed in our chapter on the 
Gorgias. This daemonic suppression of difference in the age of Cronus matches the 
diagnosis of difference as the cause of the evils present in the age of Zeus. Once more we 
see how the logic of the myth requires a correspondence between god and statesman, for 
the clearest task of politics within the Stranger's mythical context is the mitigation of the 
injustice to which human beings are drawn in the age of divine abandonment. The 
Stranger's first step in the definition of weaving was to class it among the arts whose 
products are not for the sake of doing something, but "defensive so as not to suffer 
something" (279c7ff.). The divine art of piloting and the human art of weaving turn out 
122 
to have in common the aim of ensuring survival. Neither seems to have anything to with 
the aims of philosophy or human happiness. 
What the statesman's web means to protect the city from suffering is stasis or 
internal discord and, where the pacific tendencies of the city have become too great, 
defeat at the hands of a foreign enemy . .Stasis, as we saw above, came about as the result 
not only of conventional class distinctions of rich and poor, but from the differences of 
temperament in the natures of the citizens of a given political community. Just as too 
great an inequality of wealth can be the cause of discord, 85 so the extreme division of 
bold and warlike natures, on the one hand, and moderate or pacific natures, on the 
other, will be the source of disagreement about policy and the resentment and enmity 
that follow from it. Unlike his daemonic counterparts, however, the statesman cannot 
completely suppress this difference in human natures, any more than they can rearrange 
the order of nature to make the world less hostile to basic human interests.86 He binds 
together warp and woof, but does not thereby make them one and the same. 
The statesman's imitation of god cannot be exact, either in the extent to which he 
can overcome the dissimiiarities of human natures or the means he employs to that end. 
His imitation must be something like the "second-order" imitation discussed above, 
adjusted to what is possible for, and fitting to, human nature and the human condition. 
The Stranger describes the statesman' s method of weaving together the social fabric (lS 
the employment of certain divine and human bonds. These bonds, which are applied to 
85 Cf. Laws 919b7-cl. 
86 White (2007, 6) makes a similar point: "the true statesman imitates in practicing statecraft what 
the demiurge has achieved within the cosmos as a whole by blending opposites with respect to 
humanity as the primary resident of the cosmos." White, however, does not emphasize enough 
the limited imitation of the statesman, who cannot, and must not, entirely suppress difference as 
the cosmic deity does in the reversed period. Cf. also Dixsaut (2004, 253): "Pour etre conforme a 
la nature, la politique doit tenir compte de ces deux especes de contradiction, naturelles au sens 
ou elles sont toutes deux irrationnelles et ou l'on ne peut qu'en prendre acte et non pas en donner 
le logos. Il revient a la pratique politique de les surmonter (elle n'a pas le pouvoir de les 
annuler)." 
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aspects of human nature that are either doubtfully present -or entirely suppressed in the 
age of Cronus, reveal the scope and limits of the analogy between god and legislator, 
letting us see at last how the Stranger means to employ this paradigm in his exhibition 
of the statesman. If the state.sman could, like the god, perfectly suppress the diversity of 
human 'fl.ature, then he would eliminate politics as such, for in the age of Cronus there 
\-vas no political life.87 The task of statesmanship, therefore, must be to unify the city to 
such an extent that it avoids .stasis and the threat of destruction, but not so much that it 
ceases to be a: city at all. The Statesman, then, anticipates Aristotle's objection to the 
-regime presented in the Republic that the _degree of unity Socrates demands for the city 
would actually cause the dtylo c;ease to exist as a city, "just as in the speeches about eros 
[sc. the Symposium] we know of Aristophanes saying how both of the lovers, because of 
their intense loving, desire to be fused together ~d from being two become one. Now 
consequently it would be necessary for both to perish, or [at least] the one."88 Just as two 
lovers literally become one would destroy the love between them, so a political 
community meant to bring people together in tl;leir differences would cease to be 
political if those differences were reduced to nothing. 
Statesmanship binds and weaves together disparate natures, "first, according to 
kinship, fitting together (sunarmosamene) with a divine bond the part of their soul that is 
eternal-in-genus, and-after the divine, the part that is animal-in-genus again with human 
bonds" (309cl-3}: The_ divine bond consists in "the opinion that is in its being true about 
the beautiful and j_~st and good things and their opposites, with confirmation, when it 
comes to be in souls" (309c5-9). The holding of true opinion is supposed to moderate the 
87 Cf. Griswold (1989, 151; also 145): "The phenomenon of disagreement, which so thoroughly 
pervades every asepct of life as we know it, signals a certain liberty of thinking and acting which 
seems distinctively human and which statesmen must know how to guide." Also (again) Dixsaut 
(1995, 253). 
88 Aristotle, Politics 1262all-14. Consider also his earlier statement (1261a22ff.): ov flOVov b ' EK 
ni\novwv CtV8Qc;mwv EO'HV TJ n oi\u;, Cti\-Aa KlXL £l;, d bH bux<f>EQOV'I:WV. 
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extremes of courage verging on bestiality and orderliness bordering on passive naivety 
(309d10-e8). It is aimed at the good conceived as the metrion, what is measured and 
appropriate to the situation according to the second of the Stranger's two kinds of 
measurement (cf 284d). The simple homogeneity of Cronian humanity is replaced by 
the scaled equality according to fitness for a certain role. True opinion will never make a 
bold nature timid or an orderly nature rash, but it will keep the two tendencies within 
their proper bounds. This diversity of temperament is in fact required by the division of 
arts in the city. One of the sciences that is "honored and akin" to political science is 
strategy, or the art of warfare (303e7ff.), and it will be the bolder natures who fill the 
ranks of the class warriors, who also practice a techne and so must follow the demands of 
specialization (304e5-9).89 Similarly, more pacific natures will be directed to practice the 
arts of peace. To find a fitting place for each nature, and to moderate that nature so that 
it does not follow its tendency to overstep the limits of its assigned place, is the task of 
the divine bond of true opinion. No clearer parallel can be found in the Statesman to 
Socrates' statement of his opinion about geometrical equality as the form in which his 
law of nahrre is expressed in the Gorgias. 
Divine bonds, however, are insufficient for the good ordering of the political 
89 A most apt illustration of this relation between natural tendencies and knowledge of the fitting 
can be found in Alasdair Macintyre's After Virtue (1984, Postscript to the 2nd Edition, 275): 
"Consider as an example such qualities as ruthlessness and relentlessness and distinguish them 
from the phrenetic quality of knowing when to be ruthless or relentless. Clearly there are 
practices-the exploration of the wilderness is one example-in which the ability to be ruthless 
and relentless in driving oneself and others may be a condition not just for achievement, but also 
for survival. Such an ability may require for its exercise a cultivation of a certain insensitivity .to 
the feelings of others; caring about their feelings may get in the way of caring for their survival. 
Transpose that complex of qualities into the participation of the practice of creating and 
sustaining the life of a family and you have a recipe for disaster. What seemed to be a virtue in 
one context became a vice in the other. But this quality in my account is neither a virtue nor a 
vice. It is not a virtue, because it cannot satisfy the conditions that it contribute to the good of that 
kind of whole human life in which the goods of particular practices are integrated into an overall 
pattern of goals which provides an answer to the question: 'What is the best kind of life for a 
human like me to lead?'" In light of considerations like this, the Stranger must hold, if he affirms 
the unity of virtue in the first place, that such a unity can only be realized in a vanishingly small 
number. 
- ------- -·---··· ··--- ·~·-· 
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community. They are effective only for "those who have partaken correctly of 
education" (309d3f.). 90 But the statesman's first task was to separate good, corrigible 
natures from the bad, like the weaver cards wool (308d). The worst sorts, who are "by a 
bad nature violently pushed off into godlessness, outrage and injustice," must be 
excluded entirely from the community (308e7-309a3). The best, who are "born with 
characters noble from the beginning and have been nurtured by laws to grow according 
to nature," are amenable to tl1e force of divine bonds (310alff.). 91 But between the best 
and the worst there is the middling, which must also be woven into the political fabric 
(cf. 309e10). For these, human bonds must also be employed, and these human bonds 
turn out to be nothing else but arranged marriages for proper procreation (310b2-5), the 
literal interbreeding of bold and tame natUres to avoid thoroughbred extremes (310d6-
e3).92 Human sexuality, which was entirely suppressed in the age of Cronus, is a 
symptom of human differentiation and a cause of its exacerbation. By the partial control 
of its actiVity, the statesman can moderate, though never entirely extinguish, human 
tendendes to immoderate extremes.93 
With the use of divine and human bonds, then, and especially with the purpose 
90 This proviso, never elaborated in the Statesman, becomes one of the dominating themes of the· 
Laws, on which see chapter 4 below. 
91 A fascinating parallel to the discussion of divine and human bonds is Solon fr. 36.15-20: 
'Iat]'[a j.lEV KQii'IEL 
Oj.lOU ~LTJV 'IE Kai. blKTJV ~vvaQj.l6aac; 
EQEE,a, Kai. bu'ji\8ov we; V7IWXOj.lTJV• 
8EaJ.Iovc; b' 6J.!oiWc; 'Ib:n 1caxwL n:: Kaya8wL 
Eu8Eiav de; i:Kaawv cXQj.lOaac; bLKTJ 
E.yQmpa. 
Note the pairing of force and right (6j.lOU ~LTJV 'IE Kai. bLKTJV) and the bad and good man (6j.loLwc; 
'IWL KaKWL 'IE Kaya8wL, though probably more in their social-economic sense than their strictly 
moral sense). The use of (E,uv)aQf..l6aac; is also paralled in the Statesman's language of divine and 
~olitical demiurgy (269dl, 309c2). 
2 With this activity the statesman as weaver comes to resemble very closely the original 
statesman as shepherd, who was also responsible for the proper breeding of his flocks (268a). 
93 Dixsaut (1995) is an extended meditation on this aspect of the statesman's activity, which cites 
illuminating parallels in Thucydides, among others. 
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for which they are employed, we can see how the statesman is supposed to imitate the 
god in the age of Cronus. This imitation is not slavish; it will necessarily fall short of 
perfect imitation insofar as the only perfect imitation would be the radical altering of 
human nature. It is perhaps with this literally impossible--not to say only questionably 
desirable--ideal that the Stranger tries to check the dangers of a more direct and 
potentially tyrannical imitation of god. The true statesman is not the same as the priest-
king of Egypt, who pretends to mediate between gods and men (290d5-291a4).94 The 
limited imitation of divine rule that the Stranger presents gives content to the otherwise 
empty "second-order" imitation of the cosmos that was the clearest political paradigm in 
the myth. The activity of the statesman-legislator is thus autonomous to the extent that it 
does not correspond exactly to cosmic self-rule, either in method or purpose. It is not, 
however, a mere law unto itself, but follows a standard based on the needs and 
. aspiration of human nature. 
Human imitation of the cosmos: the polis 
With our understanding of the ideally wise statesman's imitation of the cosmic god, we 
can now return to the myth's account of the human imitation of the cosmos with greater 
clarity and precision. If the statesman is like the god who pilots the cosmos, then the 
polis is the statesman's ship. The analogy with which the Stranger connects the cosmos in 
the age of Zeus and the polis or human community in the absence of a wise statesman, is 
one of a ship that has lost its captain. The denouement of the myth clearly explains the 
need for the polis, the community of artisans who produce defenses against the dangers 
·94 Consider Benardete (1984, III.102): 'The movement of the argument from [the introduction of 
divine bonds] seems to consist in restoring to the statesman the godlike status of which had just 
been deprived. If a non-Platonic expression may be used,. we can say that the dialogue's action 
represents the negation of a negation, which is in turn philosophical moderation at work." 
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of external nature. It is the imitative. aspect of the city, however, clearly hinted at in the 
myth, but only made clear in the later discussion of the polis itself, that will be our 
primary concern in this section. The Stranger's description of the nature and history of 
the cosmos in its current revolution illuminates the structure and activity of the city, and 
so brings to light the nature of the object of material of the statesman's activity.95 
After distinguishing the various false politeiai as corresponding to the various 
kinds of sham-statesmen (291b-c), which resulted in the elaboration of the true regime of 
the wlse statesman and the six defective regimes-three lawful and three without 
laws-and implies that all actual political communities fall far short of the ideal, the 
Stranger makes the following long remark: 
Do we wonder at all, Socrates, at how many evils come to be, and how many 
will come to be, in such regimes, when there is such a foundation underlying 
them, performing its actions according to writings [i.e., written laws] and habits 
without knowledge? If another art applied this procedure, it's clear to all how it 
would ruin everything that was done by it. Or is that not more to be wondered 
at how strong a thing the city is by nature? For the cities now have been suffering 
such things for a limitless time, but nevertheless some few of them are enduring 
and are not overturned. Many indeed are sometimes like ships sunk and 
ruined-and have been and still will be ruined-by the baseness of their pilots 
and sailors who have the greatest ignorance about the greatest things, and who, 
knowing nothing about the political things, believe they possess this, of all 
sciences, with the utmost clarity in every respect (301e6-302b3; my emphasis). 
Cities, the Stranger believes, are clearly in a sorry state. Even those that are governed 
according to a lawful constitution are put at a gross disadvantage in comparison to the 
rule of wisdom. Young Socrates had said that life would become unlivable if progress in 
the arts were brought to a halt (299e6-10), and how much worse if the development of 
the political and governing art could not develop and change to meet the vicissitudes of 
circumstance? Cities seem always to be on the brink of capsize and ruin. The Stranger 
here strikes his deepest note of political pessimism, and in his next address to Young 
9
" This parallel is noted mos t especially by Carone (2005, 156), who fails, however, to recognize 
the central role of law in the extended analogy between cosmic self-rule and political autonomy. 
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Socrates will argue that the question left to ask is only "which of these incorrect regimes 
is least difficult to live with-since they all are difficult-and which the most oppressive?" 
But he recognizes that cities do in fact survive, even if it is not always clear how they 
manage it. The question, then, of which kind of political community is easiest to live in, 
it might seem to be a digression from their current discussion, but, "on the whole, 
perhaps everything we all do is for the sake of something of the sort" (302b5-9). In the 
age of Zeus, it is no use striving for the ideal; it is difficult enough just to get by. 
The parallels to the description of the cosmos in the age of Zeus are immediately 
apparent, if not always exact. It is their shared nautical metaphor that immediately binds 
them together.96 Misgoverned cities are like ships tossed at sea and threatened with 
capsize, while the cosmos is almost "storm-tossed and dissolved by disturbance" 
(273d5f.). In both cases, moreover, what might at first seem to be a description of 
external danger turns out to be internal. The disturbance of the cosmos comes from its 
own corporeal nature, and the wreck of the ship of state occurs when incompetent pilots 
and sailors mishandle it in the belief that they know what they are doing. Filling in the 
accow1t from the Stranger's later description of statesmanship-and mixing his 
metaphors-these sham-statesman fail to weave together the contrary tendencies of the 
different natures of their citizens and so let their ship come apart at the seams as it is 
gripped by stasis (cf. 303c). A city conquered by a foreign invader might have withstood 
the assault if its internal constitution were sufficiently strong. 
These cities are without true statesmen, but this is not a call to utter despair. 
Rather one must do everything one can (eis dunamin) to "follow after the traces of the 
truest regime" (301e4f.). The ship of state is without a true pilot, as the cosmos in the age 
of Zeus revolves with its rudder unmanned. Both are left to rule themselves. In both 
96 Cf. Carone (2005, 155). 
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cases, there is need of a kind of imitation, and a following of teaching or instruction 
(300d).
97 
The cosmos possesses its innate intelligence bestowed upon it by its maker, and 
the city must resort to written laws, whether they are composed together or left behind 
by ill"l absent lawgiver (301e2f.; 295cl--5). The co~mos inevitably remembers its 
... -· ·,:; . . . -. . 
instruction less and less precisely, and comes eventually to the brink of total disorder 
before being rescued by the divine pilot. In the case of the city, the Stranger proposes 
two realistic possibilities. Either it will be governed strictly according to the letter of the 
iaw, and so could not act with the flexibility and intelligence needed to weather the 
storm of circumstance, or it will be ruled by those who pretend to be knowers and 
violate the written law, led by their mistaken conception of what is the best thing to do 
(301b10-c4). In neither case does the result come anywhere close to the ideal.98 The 
Stranger does not, however, claim that it is the fate of cities always to be in a state of 
decline. It must be the case, at any rate, that different cities would decline at different 
rates, and that those that are stable and endure may perhaps even improve their 
condition as regards rule. In this respect there is not a strict correlation between the 
Stranger's account of the self-ruling cosmos and the polis. That a whole becomes more 
and more disordered with the passing of time does not imply that all its parts must 
increase in disorder at the same rate, or even at all. Thus the Stranger leaves open the 
possibility, however remote, of political flourishing, even if his vision of the Jovian 
cosmos is ultimately pessimistic.99 In the case of the arts, at least, which are the 
97 Cf Lane (1998) 10£.: "Making use of the idea of imitation in the story, the dialogue develops a 
paradoxical account of just how such imperfect self-rule, can, by strict adherence to law, achieve 
some feature of the absent political ideal while remaining open to its eventual realisation·[ sic]." 
98 This summary of the imitation involved in the rule of law is excessively brief. For a much more 
extensive discussion, see the following chapter. 
99 This point, again, tells against those who object to the standard reading of the myth as 
eliminating the possibility of good politics, or the claim of El Murr (2009, 295), who does accept 
the standard reading, that true politics would be impossible in the age of Zeus. El Murr is correct 
to note, however, that the true art of statesmanship "has features in common both with the Age 
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precondition of the city and the sunergoi of statesmanship, progress is recognized as a 
fact (299c-e). The so--called gifts of the gods have become more sophisticated with time, 
and life would become tmbearable if they did not continue in their progress, and there is 
no reason in princ~ple why the same could not happen with the art of poJitics, at least in 
certain periods. This is perhaps the most striking example of the "partial detachment" of 
human beings from the whole, 100 even if in the absence of the knower the art of politics 
cannot be practiced with the same competence as the other arts. A further disanalogy 
that might be noted is the Stranger's assertion that cities have suffered misrule "for a 
limitless time" (khronon aperanton, 302a5). If we take this statement literally, and not as 
mere hyperbole, then there could have been no beginning to politics, and so no 
beginning of the age of Zeus. We would be left with a myth that revealed the human 
condition and the nature of political life through a non-literal account of the cosmos,101 
The city, then, as the assemblage of the human herd defending itself against a 
largely hostile nature with the innovations of the arts, and held together against internal 
turmoil by the uncompromising bonds of law, manages to stay afloat. Its aim in the age 
of Zeus can be nothing more than survival, to zen. As the Stranger had said, the question 
for him and Young Socrates-as philosophers, or perhaps merely as ordinary citizen&-
was one of getting by, managing to "live with" (suzen) a city with the least difficulty. He 
expresses the less exciting but more sensible part of Callicles' natural law, but his 
of Kronos and with the Age of Zeus." A more accurate view is expressed by Lane (1998, 10£.), 
a,uoted above. 
1 0 Rqsen (1979, 81-84). 
101 D1xsaut {1995, 271) notes with remarkable insight that the manly and temperate natures, which 
the statesman's weaving is meant to reconcile, will each tend to conceive of "nature in their own 
image," and that the description of the struggle for existence in the age of Zeus matches the 
inclination of the manly, while the peace and ease of the age of Cronus is a projection of the eros 
of the moderate. The statesman's judicious weaving of natures, then, would have to be based on a 
judicious understanding of nature as combining both of these tendencies. As Rosen (1979) 
suggests, we would have to read the Stranger's myth non-literally as describing two elements of 
a single but complex cosmic order in order to achieve an account of order that is neither too 
hawkish nor too dovish. 
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description of the city and of the six actual regimes gives no account of the possibility or 
nature of the good life. The good life, however, is only possible when life as such is 
possible, when there is safety; The city, therefore, imitates the cosmos in its fight to 
~aintaifl:jntemq~ order and hannony. This is Ultimately-achieved best by·the rule o.f law, 
which is the subject of the next chapter. The argument for the rule of law will amount to 
a kind of nah1ral law justification of positive law, even if as a second best or deute-ros 
plous.102 Before turning to that subject, however, we have to consider the Stranger's 
ambiguous description of living we11 and what we could call the first sailing of natural 
law in the rule of the wise statesman. 
Completing the political web:. living and living well again 
The Statesman does not present a fully positive account of the art of politics as directed 
towards the highest good. It is perhaps a symptom of this fact that justice as a virtue does 
not occur in the dialogue.103 Justice as participation in an order directed towards the 
good life, or happiness, never becomes a theme of discussion, and the Stranger says even 
of the weaving activity of the true statesman in possession of knowledge, that it will not 
fall short of "the extent to which it befits a city to become happy" (311c5f.). Although it 
cannot be precisely determined just what is the extent the Stranger has in mind to which 
cities can become happy, it is decisive that his only categorical statement about 
happiness elsewhere in the dialogue was that the presence or absence of philosophy in the 
102 Deuteros plous literally means a ship's relying on its own rowing power when there is no wind. 
The image of a ship moving under its own power .is perfectly in line with the account of cosmic 
self-rule when abandoned by the divine steersman . 
. 
103 Once in tl1e negative, abtKia (309al) several times as adjective, positive (e.g., 293d8, 301d2)) 
and negative (e.g., 273cl, 295a4, 296c6, 305b7). In the positive sense, it is most often used 
adverbial as referring to the kind of "dialectical justice" we discussed at the beginning of chapter 
one; which is quite in keeping with the dialogue' s emphasis on dialectical method (cf. 257b6, 
259b6, 260al, 276b2, 284c8, 288b5, etc.). 
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age of Cronus would detennine whether human beings were happy or not in that time. 
He never discusses the place of philosophy in cities or politicallife.104 Philosophy clearly 
exists for the Stranger, but he gives no account of how it fits into the division of arts in 
the · city.105 The statesman of the Stranger's account resembles in many ways the 
philosopher, but the Stranger was clear from the beginning that the two were distinct.106 
The Platonic natural law hypothesis sketched in the previous chapter (in 
common with later natural law thinkers in the Stoic and Thomist traditions) grounds its 
conception of justice in a conception of happiness or the good life for a human being. 
Insofar as living a good life presupposes living in the first place, the law of nature would 
also outline the fundamental needs of human life and security, as long as these did not 
make impossible the pursuit not merely of life, but of the good life. Thus Socrates argues 
in the Gorgias that it is better to die than to do wrong, but that he would rather remain 
just and alive.107 We should expect, then, that a robust account of the good life for a 
human being in a Platonic dialogue would be matched by an equally robust account of 
justice between human beings precisely as promoting that good life. On the other hand, 
a natural law standard detached entirely from the human good would admit only 
concerns of human life and s~curity, and would amount more or less to the 
unsentimental power politics· Thucydides represents the Athenians and others as 
espousing during the Peloponnesian War, or the version of natural law thinking found 
in Hobbes, the great student and translator of Thucydides. 
The Statesman~ however, does not cleave consistently to either variation of 
natural law thinking. It holds up the ideal of human happiness as a standard by which 
104 Cf. Brague (1981, 93£). 
105 Cf. Lane (1998, 110 fn. 20): "the progress of the technai and or urbanisation [sic] does not 
necessarily mean that philosophy will flourish." 
106 Sophist 217a-b. The Stranger presents that judgment as the opinion of the Eleatics in general, 
which he then sets out to give an account of in the Sophist and Statesman. The absence of a 
. dialogue Philosopher could be taken as indicating Plato's disagreement with the Eleatic position. 
107 Gorgias 473d·-e. 
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to judge the happiness of political and radically non-political life, but it refrains from 
giving an account of political practice that aims primarily at that happiness. In another 
Platonic discussion of the political art, Socrates had said that: 
the other work~ that someonemigh~ say be~ong to the political art-:-and they 
could be very many, such as rendering the citizens rich and free and without 
faction-all these were shown up as neither bad nor good, but [the political 
art] would need to make them wise and give a share of knowledge if it were 
going to be the art that benefits them and makes them happy.108 
Here his implied belief that the political art is the knowledge of properly employing and 
directing the services of the other arts matches well with the conception of the Eleatic 
Stranger, but Socrates' characterization includes the far more demanding challenge that 
the political art make the citizens of a political community wise and give them 
knowledge so that they may become happy. The farthest the Stranger will go in that 
direction is to insist that the better sort of citizen be instilled with "true opinion with 
conviction," which does not appear to be the same as knowledge. 109 If knowledge is to be 
disseminated, it would only be amongst a tiny minority, and certainly no multitude.U0 
The dissemination of knowledge and wisdom, then, are not the aims of the statesman on 
the Stranger's account.111 He is also almost entirely silent about the virtue of justice.112 
Admittedly, the content of the true opinions, the belief in which constitutes the divine 
bond, is the nature of what is good, beautiful, and just, and their opposites (309c5f.). But 
108 Euthydemus 292b4-cl. 
109 Statesman 309c6f.: MTJOiJ M~av f .. U::'ra ~E~aLwaEwc;. The phrase may suggest a conception of 
knowledge as "justified true belief," but I believe the more literal rendering of 
"steadfastness/ firmness of belief" is preferable. Cf. The distinction, made at Timaeus 37b8-c3, 
between M~m Kai. TI:LO"'[flc; ... ~E~aLOL Kai. aAT)8cic;, on the one hand, and vouc; £maTI)flT) '[ f £~ 
avayKT)c;, on the other. Dixsaut (1995, 267f.) is very much on the same page. 
110 Statesman 300e7, 292e. · 
111 As far as I can tell, the Stranger never once mentions aocp(a in the dialogue. He uses aocpoc; 
thrice: once (284ell) ironically of those who think they are doing something "clever" by applying 
measurement to all things; again (290b2) in the sense of "skilled" or "learned" of heralds skilled 
at writing; and once (296e3) in describing the "wise and good man" who establishes the truest 
limit of the correct ordering of a city. 
112 Cf. Griswold (1989, 153): "[T]he [Eleatic Stranger's] political science does not seem guided by 
'moral vi.rtue.' at least not in any sense .of 'virtue' more edified than that useful to a city and its 
citizens for their survival." 
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insofar as the content of justice is defined in the dialogue, it is in light of the second, 
minimal conception of natural law as commanding the mere preservation of the 
community. "For the characters of moderate rulers are very cautious and just and 
safeguarding."113 What is just is simply what is lawful as preserving the stability of the 
political order. The virtue of justice itself, insofar as it might point at some end higher 
than mere survival, is mentioned only negatively. Those who cannot have any share at 
all of courageous or moderate tendencies are said to be "pushed violently into 
godlessness, insolence, and injustice by a bad nature" (309alf.). Injustice is the defect of 
nature that renders one a threat to the social fabric. Dikaiosune, as noted above, is never 
mentioned in the Statesman. What justice iG discussed there corresponds to the demotic 
justice of the Republic, not the true justice possessed only by the philosopher.114 
Furthermore, while both boldness and moderation must be brought towards a common 
mean, the Stranger never suggests that they can be made to coincide. The Stranger most 
emphatically does not assert a unity of virtue.115 
The Statesman's dissatisfying and incomplete account of the human good as the 
highest guide for political activity is a function of its schematically divided cosmology. 
The dialogue shows us methodologically how to conceive of a natural order as such, and 
our participation in that order, but it does not present an account of a real natural order 
that is either plausible or desirable. As the Stranger twice asserts, the primary purpose of 
the conversation was to practice at becoming better dialecticians, not for the moment to 
give a complete and true account of the nature of things (285d6, 287a3). The Statesman 
113 bfKat.a KaL UW'LTJQLLl, 31la8. 
114 Republic 508d. Compare Benardete (1967, 211): "How justice and wisdom are the same as 
moderation and courage in their several perfections; how their underlying natures differ by one 
measure and are like by another; and finally how all four virtues and all good natures can be 
subject to the same two measures--these questions show how far we are from the discovery of a 
single eidos [of the human being]." 
115 Benardete (1984, ID.146), apparently alludes to this issue: "If we correctly identify the precise 
i tself with the idea of the good, then . the ultimate problem is the unresolved tension between .the 
doubleness of the beautiful and the oneness of the good." 
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does not try to reconcile the tension between mere living and living well that Socrates 
had identified in the Gorgias as the question whose answer is required in order to give a 
satisfying account of justice. Happiness or living well is impossible without the 
conditions for living, but a life devoted exclusively to securing those basic conditions is 
not worth living. Thus the age of Cronus, where the divine shepherding of the human 
herd remains in some way a metaphor for political rule amongst human beings, is an 
age of mere material comfort, without memory, the virtues (for there is no need for 
them) and, as all the evidence suggests, without philosophy. The perfect leisure enjoyed 
by Cronian humanity would seem the best possible circumstance to live a happy life, 
that is to philosophize, but it turns out that only the partial disorder of the Jovian age, 
with its differentiation of human and animal natures, is consistent with a plausible 
account of the good life for a human being. It does this, however, only in the sense that it 
does not rule out the possibility of the life devoted to philosophy, as the age of Cronus 
seems to do. The age of Zeus cannot be said to offer ideal conditions for that life or any 
life that aims at more than mere survival. 
The gains of the Stranger's myth, then, are methodological. By isolating the 
different appeals to nature as a norm and guide for political conduct, it shows more 
clearly the logic and structure of each. It pulls apart the good as the end or telos of life 
from the conditions of life in order to make clear that different aspects of human nature 
to which they respond and the different forms of imitation or participation they 
demand. It shows how the divisions of human nature, mimicking the divisions in 
animal nature, and perhaps nature as a whole, pose the problem that politics must solve. 
And by its mythical presentation of the unity of human nature under divine rule, it 
presents a regulative ideal to guide the actions of the statesman as he tries to reconcile 
'fA' . 
136 
those differences.11 6 Then, by following these different paths of imitation, it exaggerates 
the contrast between city and statesman, as passive object and active subject 
respectively, to put in greatest contrast the passive or defensive end of the former with 
the demiurgic or productive activity of the latter. Lastly, the myth lays the grm.md for 
the stranger's later distinction in the strictest terms between the living activity of the 
wise statesman and the rigor of law. The uncompromising presentation of the rule of 
law allows one to make an argument for the rule of law as such, which can then 
subsequently by strengthened by allowing for a certain relaxing of some of its strictures 
in order to partic>Jly correct for its admitted failings. It will be tl1e task of the following 
chapter to present the flow of this argument and to demonstrate how it advances the 
thesis that Plato is attempting to give a "natural law defense" of positive law. 
If with the myth, then, the Eleatic Stranger continues to practice a kind of 
diaeresis, his appeal to the paradigm of weaving suggests that we must try to restore to 
unity what he has pulled apart for the sake of greater analytical insight. It is the 
temptation of many commentators on the myth to argue that the mythologically 
separated cycles of Cronus and Zeus must be combined in order to arrive at a satisfying 
interpretation of a partial, but relatively stable, cosmic and human order.117 We noted 
above the Parmenidean character of the age of Cronus as an age where difference and 
change are suppressed, and at least one other commentator argued that the age of Ze-us 
presents a "Heraclitean image."118 Putting these two cycles together, then, would 
correspond to the Eleatic Stranger's admission that he must compromise the strictures of 
116 Cf. Dixsaut (1995, 272): "La politique ne realisara le bien politique que si elle se conforme, en ce 
double sens, a la nature: en en connaissant la contradiction interne et l' opacite, et en voulant 
croire qu' elle n' est pas desertee part le divine et par intelligence." 
117 Notably Rosen (1979), and in a different way Carone (2.010) 
118 Lane (1998, 199). 
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"father Pa1menides" by bringing being and non-being together.119 But whatever he 
suggests, the Eleatic Stranger does not himself reconcile the cosmic cycles in an account 
like Timaeus' of the combined rotation of 'the same' and that of 'the other.'120 Nor does 
he give the unified account of political conduct that wo1,1ld correspond to such a cosmos. 
That task is taken on by another Stranger, from Athens, and its presentation in the Laws 
will be the subject of the fourth chapter of this dissertation. 
119 Sophist 24ld. The Eleatic Stranger never mentions Heraclitus by name, but Socrates had 
identified him as the leader of the army (against which Parmenides stood alone) who argued £an 
~£v yaQ ovb£n01:' ovb£v, a£i. b£ yf.yv£'WL (Theaetetus 152d-e). 
20 Timaeus 27d6-28al, 36c-37a, 
CHAPTER THREE: THE RUI.E OF l.AW IN THE STATESMAN 
ea quae sunt artis, habent efficaciam ex sola ratione, et 
· .. .... ,. · · •' ideo ubicumque melior ratio occi.rrrat, est mutandum 
quod prius tenebahtr. Sed leges habent maximam virtutem 




The preceding chapters have sketched the general outlines of a Platonic approach to 
nalural law as the following of a complex purposive order that can be discovered from . 
an examination of human nahlre. The internal tension in Callicles' nahlrallaw position 
between his conception of the good life as the standard of justice, on the one hand, and 
his preoccupation with mere survival in the agonistic political scene of democratic 
Athens, on the other, is picked up by the Eleatic Stranger's insistence, first, · that 
philosophy is the sole criterion of human happiness but, second, that the art of politics 
can at best ensure the security of the political community-its life but not its happiness. 
The Stranger's art of politics, then, could only fully realize human happiness-and so be 
fully justified in the Stranger's own terms and in terms of nahlral law-if it were 
supplemented by Socrates' private practice of his own art of politics as education in 
philosophy. The Stranger's arguments for necessity of the nile of law and against 
political innovation and the revision of law, however, seem to forbid the kind of 
1 Summa Theologiae i-II 97.2. "Those things which are [the product] of art have their efficacy from 
reason alone, and therefore wherever a better reason occurs, what was previously accepted is to 
be changed .. But it is from habit that laws have their greatest power .... And hence they are not to 
be changed lightly." 
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openness to fundamental inquiry that the Socratic practice of politics demands. The 
present chapter, then, has a double aim. First, it argues that the Stranger's argument for 
the rule of law, which grows out of his recognition of the practical impossibility of the 
rule of wisdom and so seems to abandon the ideal of natural law, must in fact be 
understood as a defense of the rule of (human) law as the best possible approximation to 
the rule of wisdom. The single most important point in the Statesman's argument in 
favor of the rule of law is its recognition of the problem of political persuasion, or the 
problematic relation between the possessor of political knowledge and the non-knower. 
In general, however, the significance of this problem has been underestimated in the 
literature on law in the Statesman.2 By addressing this problem, it looks back to the 
centrally important theme of rhetorical and dialectical persuasion in the Gorgias, as well 
as forward to the Laws' attempt to inculcate persuasion and agreement with the law of a 
city by means of explanatory preludes. In the immediate context of the Statesman, the 
difficulty of political persuasion, or the impossibility of the general dissemination of 
political knowledge, justifies the rule of law by rendering the possibility of the direct 
rule of the wise statesman near non-existent. To the mass of non-knowers, the wise 
statesman will always appear a tyrant, or he will dilute his knowledge with rhetoric and 
thereby sink to the level of the impostor. While the Eleatic Stranger will maintain that 
the rule of wisdom would be ideal even when the ruled are ruled unwillingly, he is 
forced to admit that such rule would be as unstable as it is unlikely. Thus, for lack of 
better options, the deuteros plous of the rule of law, with all its failings, is the best and 
securest choice for preserving human life and the possibility of human happiness. 
2 Morrow (1953b) long ago recognized the importance of the problem of persuasion in Plato's 
political philosophy in general, especially in the Laws, which he calls "one vast system of total 
persuasion" (242). For the most part, however, Morrow fails to see how the Statesman poses the 
same problem in the starkest terms, thus preparing the student for better understanding what 
the task of the Laws is. 
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Second, this chapter argues that the Stranger's argument against legal innovation 
or revision is not as categorical as it appears, and therefore does leave room both for 
cautious legal reform and philosophical inquiry, though with a strong "conservative 
bias" towards stability based on his insight into the fragility of political institutions. 
While the argument is couched in the strictest of terms in order to demonstrate that even 
the most inflexible rule of law would be justified in the absence of an acknowledged wise 
statesman, because the impartiality of law is superior as such to the caprice of 
unchecked power in the hands of the unwise, there is nothing in the Stranger's 
conception of human law that can justify a categorical ban on the revision of law. Legal 
conservatism may be legitimate as a rule of prudence, but not as a universally valid 
imperative. Thus the Stranger's argument turns out to tacitly leave room for the cautious 
revision of laws, as well as the Socratic practice of politics. This tacit result in the 
Statesman is developed explicitly in the Laws, whose attempt to reconcile as much as 
possible human law with the rule of wisdom will be the subject of the last chapter of this 
dissertation. 
To state in summary form, then, the primary argument of the Statesman about 
law. (1) As assumed in the Gorgias and in the Statesman's myth, the ultimate aim of every 
human being is happiness or living the good life; but (2) pursuit of the good life 
presupposes first of all that one lives in safety. Therefore, (3) the first aim of every 
human being is to live a life of security without unduly compromising the pursuit of the 
good life. These three statements taken together could be considered as the general 
imperative of natural law. The understanding of human nature and its place in nature as 
a whole, however, demonstrates that (4) human beings can live securely only in political 
communities. Natural law, then, enjoins the formation of political communities for the 
preservation of human life and the pursuit of the good life. So far, all this should be clear 
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from the preceding chapter. The Statesman's argument about law will add that (5) the 
understanding of individual natures is sufficiently difficult that no large community 
could be governed according to the ideally precise understanding of natures that the 
natural law demands; and (6) that even if such understanding were present, it could not 
be recognized as such by the ignorant citizen body and so would destabilize the political 
community instead of protecting it. Therefore, (7) the best remaining alternative is to 
write down general rules (laws) for the governance of political communities, 
approximating as closely as possible the unattainable ideal. The chain of reasoning 
examined in this chapter, then, can justly be described as a natural-law defense of 
human (that is, positive) law. 
The Context of Law in the Statesman 
"What is unique about the Eleatic Su·anger's attitude to law and custom is that it leaps 
from the pole of utter radicalism to that of utter conservatism."3 The Stranger displays 
an ambivalence toward law that is based on his understanding both of its faults and its 
necessity. Because the living rule of wisdom is unviable practically, the constraint of 
firm legal tradition is the next best thing.4 But tradition itself-including legal 
tradition-is not always as stable as it might appear. According to the Stranger's 
presentation of our present age of Zeus, with its entropic trajectory, "the placid flow of 
time which ... constitutes the sense of tradition, is entirely absent as an assumption."5 
Though the Stranger does not acknowledge explicitly the mutability (and so the implied 
unreliability) of legal tradition (such as found in Laws ill), he gives a concrete example of 
3 Ferrari (1995, 395). 
4 Cf. Lane (1998, 146): "The Statesman treats laws ... in a Janus-faced way." 
5 Lane (1998, 199). 
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the discontinuity of tradition in the prelude to his myth. The traditions that speak of 
Zeus' reversal of the sun's rising and setting, the reign of Cronus, and of men born from 
the earth "are all from the same experience, and besides these ten thousand others still 
more wondrous than them, but through the magnitude of time some of them have been 
extinguished, and some are spoken scattered apart each from the others. And the 
experience that is the cause of all these no one has spoken of" (269b5-cl). The truth of 
things has been fragmented and partially extinguished by the dispersion of traditions 
over the course of time. Nevertheless, the Stranger insists that these fragmentary and so 
at best partially true stories should be believed. "Not rightly are they distrusted by the 
marty" (271b3), for they still point to a truth that can be recovered through an act of 
purification and recomposition. No one before has spoken of the cause behind these 
scattered myths, "but now it must be said" (269cl). The Sh·anger's composition of his 
myth, which poses as a recomposition of a forgotten truth, already displays the complex 
mediation that law enacts between ignorance and wisdom (phronesis).6 Law for the 
Stranger is the fractured, partially distorted, and ossified image of truth, but to cease to 
trust law would be to lose even that partial remembrance of the truth of things. If there 
were no stranger from Elea to tell the whole story, then half-truths would be better than 
no truths at all . And if Young Socrates were not familiar with these stories, the Stranger 
would not have the materials with which to construct his own account. Human law, in 
the broadest sense, is the only possible starting point for the inquiry into human nature. 
Because the retelling of myths is a kind of play (paidia), the Stranger can escape 
what he will formulate later as the fundamental dilemma of the rule of law and so of 
tradition in general.7 He will go on to advocate the absolute adherence to law without 
6 For a similar account of the fragmentation of ancient tradition, cf. Critias 109d4-110a6. 
7 The Stranger's admitted emphasis on written law in the dialogue might lead us to think that his 
statements about law cannot be taken as applying to nomos as such, which is broader in scope 
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amendment, even though the inflexible credence in law would result in any truly wise 
statesman being dismissed as an "idle stargazer" and a subversive (299b7f.).8 This on the 
eve of the trial of Socrates himself, who claimed that he alone, if anyone, tried to practice 
hue statesmanship in Athens. But in his telling of the myth the Stranger suggests the 
same problem. If Young Socrates really did put complete trust in the old myths about 
the reign of Cronus and Zeus' intercession iri the dispute between Atreus and Thyestes, 
then the Stranger's own myth, far from being a reconstruction of a forgotten truth, 
would appear to be a dangerous novelty.9 The Stranger's myth does not face this 
problem directly because the Greeks did not hold their myths up as sacred writ, but his 
own arguments do not allow such leniency. The medium through whi_~ :g1.yths are 
transmitted is not in the first place writing. The Stranger, however, will connect-law 
intimately to the permanence of the written word. In the Statesman, sungramma· (lit. 
'composed in writing') must often be translated as '[written] law.'10 But the Stranger's 
own myth telling suggests that his absolutism with regard to law is overstated. -In .q.ny 
case, he clearly believes that true political wisdom presupposes a partial mistrust of law 
. and tradition just as much as a familiarity with them. 
The argument about l.aw: the rule of the willing and unwilling 
than written law. His several mentions to "unwritten, ancestral customs," however, as well as his 
statement that law encodes an understanding of the just, the good, and the beautiful, show that 
he is always considering nomos in its broad sense, even if he turns to writing as its most 
authoritative expression (cf. 295e5, 298el). · 
• 
8 Compare Laws 685a5-7, where the Athenian Stranger defends the questioning of law and 
tradition by a similar appeal to play, but this time the "sober play of old men": bci y c T'Jfllic; 'rOt)'[O 
f.v 'rQ vuv .mcorrouv'rac; Kai. f.~c'rli(ov'rac;, n £Qi. VOflWV nai.(ov'rac; natbW:v ITQEa~vnKi]v 
awcpQov a . The young will not be allowed to engage in such play. 
9 Perhaps this explains the Stranger's reticence about discussing the exact-nature and role of the 
traditional deities Cronus and Zeus in his myth, and his failure to name the rotator and craftsman 
. of the cosmos. . · 
1° Cf. 297d6,299d7, 299e4, 300alf., 300b6, 300c:2, 301e3. 
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The them:e of law is first raised explicitly towards the end of the final definition by 
diaeresis of the statesman that follow the schema of weaving in terms of causes and co-
causes. Once the statesman has been distinguished from the other human servants of the 
city (slaves, wage-earners, heralds, oracles, and priests) but before he is distinguished 
from orators, generals and judges,11 the Stranger brings up the problem of multiple 
forms of rule. He has caught sight of "another most numerous crowd" that "must be 
examined" (29lal-4). It is a "genus of many tribes (pamphulon genos), as it appears to one 
who's just examined them. For many of the men resemble lions and centaurs and other 
such [animals], and very many [resemble] satyrs and the weak and cunning (polutropois) 
beasts" (291a8-b2). This is the genus of sham- or impostor-statesmen, who pretend to 
rule without the knowledge of true states~anship. Predatory lions, proverbially savage 
and brutal centaurs, and wanton satyrs could be made to correspond to tyrants, 
oligarchs, and the worse sort of democrats, but more likely they stand for all politicians 
who rule without the guide of knowledge.12 They must all, the Stranger claims, be set 
apart "from those who are in their being statesmen and kingly" (291c4-6)Y 
Monarchy is "one of the political [forms of] rule" but there are others, namely 
oligarchy and democracy. These three regimes are distinguished simply by the number 
of rulers, and it might not be a decisive objection to the unity of the statesman's art that 
11 These are the bronze and silver found mixed with gold ore (cf. 303dff.) 
12 Cf. Miller (1980, 86) for the basic point. In the Republic's myth of Er (620b-c), the soul of Ajax 
chooses the life of a lion, and Thersites the life of a monkey, a weak but cunning animal. In the 
Gorgias (525e), Thersites is described as a powerless idiotes, and so happier than the "kings and 
dynasts" who had the power to exercise their viciousness. But this is precisely how the Eleatic 
Stranger describes democracies, as being "in everything weak and unable to do anything great, 
good or bad" (303a). If Thersites stands for democracy, then, Ajax remains a more complicated 
figure. In the Apology (42b) Socrates describes him as one who died according to an unjust 
judgment, and in the passage already cited from the Republic his reason for choosing a lion's life 
is his indignation at the judgment of the arms of Achilles, The lion, then, may stand for lawful 
aristocracy, but only if we remember that the lion is liable to turn wild and butcher a whole flock 
of sheep, as Ajax did, thinking in his madness that he was slaughtering the false Achaeans who 
had sided with Odysseus against him. The turning from .a relatively virtuous aristocracy to a 
vicious oligarchy makes a very strong implicit argument in favor of the less risky democracy. 
13 ana 'rWV ovrwc; OV'rWV noALnKWV Kal. (3am.i\LKWV. 
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he sometimes rules by committee. But the Stranger goes on to say that these three forms 
of rule in a way turn into five, or even six. Here he re-introduces the distinction between 
willing and violent rule that had previously distinguished the forms of human rule, 
though not that of the divine shepherd (for whom . willing did not even apply as a 
category, due to the suppression of human nature and desire in the age of Cronus). It 
would seem that we are to think, then, that the two or three forms of violent, forceful, 
unwilling rule (tyranny, oligarchy, bad democracy) are not true forms of statesmanship, 
though there would seem to be nothing objectionable about willing forms. It is at this 
point (292a), however, that the distinction between law-preserving and law-breaking 
regimes is introduced, apparently as coextensive with that between willing and 
unwilling regimes. Furthermore, it will turn out that the distinction between lawful and 
lawless, or rule of the willing and unwilling, only divides the false kinds of 
statesmanship, but does not apply to the rule of the true statesman. All .of the slx 
regimes produced by this classification are therefore false and defective. The question of 
law, then, seems to contribute nothing to the understanding of true statesmanship. Yet if 
the presence of law was already implied from the Stranger's earlier distinction between 
willing and unwilling rule, then he seems to be backtracking on his earlier divisions. 
That the Stranger is of two minds about the importance of the willing-unwilling 
distinction indicates that his attitude to law will always remain ambivalent. 
· The Stranger had presented the distinction between rule of the willing and the 
unwilling as an important correction supplied by the myth to the initial diaeresis, but 
now he seems to argue that that and all the other previous distinctions are insignificant 
in comparison to the cut that puts the true statesman among the ranks of knowers, so 
that the most important and difficult part of his and Young Socrates' task is to identify 
not the king simply, but the wise (phronimou) king (292d6). The Stranger purposefully 
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emphasizes that .it is a king he and Young Socrates are looking for, because "surely no 
multitude in a city seems to be able to possess this knowledge." If even one man in 
twenty possessed it, the art of kingship would be "the easiest of all arts," and it is far 
from being so (292ef.). While it contains no logical impossibility, the rule of a wise 
multitude, or even of a few, is exceedingly improbable.14 
How does knowledge, then, override the distinction between willing and 
unwilling, and properly define the true statesman or king? The Stranger turns to the 
example of doctors, who-everyone agrees-are in possession of an art. Doctors are 
supposed to cure the sick, and as long as they act out of their knowledge "for the good 
of [their patients'] bodies, making them better from worse," and save them, they are 
considered real doctors. Treatment based on knowledge, and for the good of the patient, 
is "the only correct definition" of medicine" (293b5-c2). The doctor's knowledge, then, is 
of how to do good to bodies, how to heal them. It does not matter whether the doctor 
acts according to written instructions or a definitive written guide, or even whether his 
patients submitted willingly to their treatment or were compelled, so long as it is for the 
good (293a6-b4). We may admit that, if possible, it is better for the doctor to first 
persuade his patients, and it may often be necessary, but in other cases the doctor cannot 
wait on persuasion. If a patient is not of sound mind, or 1.mconscious and dying, there 
. could be no scruple about letting the doctors go about their business.15 The same, then, 
14 This concern with the problem of rule over non-knowers motivates the "increased interest in 
the nature and capacities of ordinary people, that is, non-philosophers" that has been noted in 
"Plato's late dialogues" (Bobonich (1995, 313)). To be more precise, I think one should say, "the 
interest shown in the Statesman and Laws," for other "late" dialogues such as the Philebus or 
Timaeus do not show similar concern with non-philosophers. It is the shared theme of nomothetike 
that explains this interest shown in the Statesman and Laws, not a fundamental change of 
attidude. 
15 Rosen (1995, 164-166) has an interesting discussion of this passage. He wants to separate the 
question of the doctor' s technical competence ftom the "moral or political" decision about its use, 
and to argue that techne is therefore "morally neutral." But the technical competence of the doctor 
could be affirmed in a morally neutral way by the use of poisons to harm unwilling patients, and 
no one outside a seminar room would be tempted to say that that was the action of a true doctor. 
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goes for political rule. The "only correct regime" is one whose rulers are "truly 
knowers," and all their actions whatsoever-even executions and banislunents-are 
within the bounds of the political art so long as they are "for the good" (293c5-d5).16 In 
the Stranger's reformulation, "as long as, by the application of knowledge and justice (to 
dikaion), they save [the city], making it better from worse, this then ... must be said. to be 
the only correct regime" (293d8-e2). All the other regimes are mere imitations, even if 
the lawful ones achieve finer results (epi ta kallio) than the lawless (293e3-6, cf. 297d9-
c4).17 
At this point, for once, Young Socrates voices a muted opposition: "The rest 
seems to have been said in measure," he admits, "but it's harder to hear it said that it's 
necessary to rule even without laws" (293e7-lO)Y Previously (292e), Young Socrates had 
enthusiastically anticipated the conclusion that only the possessor of the knowledge of 
kingship was a true king, even if he did not actually rule, and he had affirmed the 
correctness of the Stranger's analysis of doctors. What causes him, then, to hesitate over 
political rule without laws, when he had voiced no qualms about the doctor practicing 
Medicine is not just an art but a kind of "rule" (293c2f.), and no rule is morally neutral. The 
doctor qua doctor is supposed to work for the good of the patient, and .in certain cases at the very 
least, his acting contrary to the patient's wishes would be uncontroversially accepted. The doctor 
vows to "do no harm," and it would seem that any art must have an ethical code guiding its 
practice (the architect knows how to make houses that will collapse, and in some cases it might 
be in his interest to do so, but the aim of architecture is to build a good and lasting house). 
Rosen's distinction between technical competence and the "moral or political" decision about its 
right use is more relevant to the pure sciences that have immediate use or purpose, not to the arts 
of practice or production; it might apply to biology, but not to medicine. (In the Stranger's 
language, to the critical gnostic sciences, not the epitactic gnostic sciences, 260a9-b5.) All that 
said, the Stranger's faulty recollection that they had classed the science of kingly rule as "a certain 
critical and epitactic science" (292b6-10) could lend credence to Rosen's larger point that the art 
or science of politics hovers unstably between the purely theoretical and the applied. 
16 We saw in the previous chapter that the divine steersman's rescuing the cosmos from falling 
into the infinite sea of dissimilarity was against its "inborn desire" but not contrary to its interest. 
Thus the rule of the god in the age of Cronus is beyond the distinction of willing and unwilling, 
and prefigures the Stranger's argument about the wise statesman or king. 
17 Note the connection in this passage of justice, correctness, and even beauty to the good, which 
maintains the connections made in the Gorgias (and elsewhere) and characterized as a 
formulation of natural law. 
18 Miller (1980, 91) calls this Young Socrates' "sole substantive objection in the whole dialogue." 
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medicine without written manuals or the patient's consent? The difference must lie in 
the kind of good aimed at by the doctor and statesman respectively. The doctor who 
heals a.r:t unwilling patient can persuade the many that he acted as a good doctor because 
the result (a life saved, a body healed) is both clearly verified and clearly accepted as 
good. If a surgeon performs a lifesaving operation on an emergency-room patient, there 
is no disputing whether or not the patient makes a full recovery, and everyone agrees 
that the saving of a life or the restoration of health is a good thing, other things being 
equal .19 Things are much different in the case of the statesman, who acts for the good of 
the city, which need not be the same as the good of everyone in the city.20 To take only 
the m ost obvious case, the statesman will never convince those he executes or banishes 
tl1at he is acting correctly, though he might persuade the rest of the citizens by appealing 
to questions of state security. But if, as Socrates argued in the Gorgias, the true task of the 
statesman is to make the souls of his fellow citizens better and more just, then his task of 
persuasion will be even more challenging insofar as there is no uncontroversial account 
of ju stice and the goodness of a human beingY To produce as much agreement as 
possible by the use of the "divine bond" is, in the Stranger's account, the primary task of 
the statesman, but he recognizes that some natures will be recalcitrant to all persuasion 
and must be removed root and branch (308e-309a). Furthermore, human beings being 
what they are, a statesman who made such proposals without or contrary to existing 
laws would be immediately suspected of acting out of private interest (30lcl-5). It is 
relatively easy for a good doctor to win the trust of his patients, but the nature and scope 
of the statesman's aims make it much more difficult for him to do the same. 
It must be some inchoate understanding of this problem of political persuasion, 
19 Cf. Statesman 296b5-c3 . . 
2° CF Republic 466a. 
21 Cf. Gorgias 516b-c. 
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which will be discussed below, that motivates Young Socrates' objection, but the 
Stranger does not yet allow this train of thought to be developed. Instead he begins to 
thoroughly critique the failings of law (294a6-c4): 
Now in a certain way it's clear that lawgiving belongs to the art of kingship, but 
· the best is not for the laws but for the man who is kingly with wisdom to prevail 
in strength (iskhuein). Do you know how that is? 
-·· Hovv do you mean? 
-Because law would never be able, by grasping with precision what is best 
(ariston) and most just, to command what is best (epitattein to beltiston). For the 
dissimilarities of human beings and actions, and the fact that practically none of 
the human things stay still, do not allow any art at all to bring to light anyt.hing 
simple in any subject for all cases and for all time. Surely we'll agree to this? 
-Yes. 
-- But law, we see, tends towards this very thing, just like some stubborn and 
ignorant human being who never allows anyone to do anything contrary to his . 
own ordering (taxin), and never asks anyone a question, not even if something 
new turns out to be better for someone contrary to the speech that he himself 
ordered (epetaxen). 
The failure of law to meet the strictest demands of justice and goodness stems from its 
abstract generality. It is the irreconcilable difference of human beings and human affairs, 
and their constant motion and change, that are resistant to the blunt instrument of the 
law.22 The argument of the Stranger's myth had been that human differences are the 
cause of political dispute and injustice, and that, therefore, the task of the statesman is .to . 
reconcile these differences as far as possible. But in order to do that, the statesman must 
first recognize these differences as differences, which is something that law cannot do. · 
Secondly, the lesson of the myth was that human differences can never be totally 
suppressed except through the mythical agency of a god. The statesman's task is, 
therefore, to weave or blend these differences together, bringing them as much as 
possible towards a fitting mean, but without attempting to suppress them entirely. On 
both of these points, then, law fails to meet the strict demands of the aim of 
statesmanship. By applying one rule to every case it ignores the particularity of each 
22 Cf. Lane (1998, 150). 
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case, and must then treat the inevitable deviations from its rule as transgressions to be 
suppressed, instead of genuine exceptions to the rule (cf. 295dl-5). It is "stubborn and 
ignorant" because it fails to recognize difference for what it is and refuses to be 
corrected.23 "It is impossible for something that through it all proves simple to tum out 
well (eu ekhein) for things that are never simple" (294c7f.). 
One would expect that, after such a strident critique of law and corresponding 
praise of the flexible and wise rule of a single man, the Stranger would turn to consider 
how best to bring about such a rule.24 Instead, he makes an about face and admits the 
necessity of legislation and of rule according to law.25 "Why ever then is it necessary to 
lay down laws, since the law is not most correct? The cause of this must be discovered" 
(294c10-d2). Returning to the analogy of medicine, and adding that of gymnastic 
training,26 the Stranger proceeds to give two arguments for the necessity of law. First, he 
argues that not even a wise expert can meet the demands of precision for every 
individual and every case, so that law is a necessary, if imprecise, convenience. He 
23 Lane (1998, 151) notes a fascinating parallel from a fragment of Gorgias' Funeral Oration (DK 
B6) on preferring the precision of correct speech to points of law: noi\i\a f.lEV bi] 1:0 11QlXOV 
E71LELKE<; 'I:OU av8abov<; bLKa[ov 71QOKQLVOvn:<;, noMa b£ VOf.lOU tXKQL~ELa<; i\6ywv OQ801:T)1:a, 
wu1:ov VOf.lL(,ov'rE<; 8ncnawv Kal KOLV61:a1:ov VOf.lOV, 'to b£ov £v 1:~n b£ovn Kal i\£ynv Kal 
CJLyav Kal nOLc:iv <Kal £av>. I translate: "Preferring in many things gentle decency (equity) to 
stubborn justice, and the correctness of the spoken word to the exactitude of law, belleving this to 
be the most divine and common law, to speak what is needed in the needed time, or to remain 
silent, and to act or refrain from acting [in the same way]." The contrast between the 
stubbornness-of justice and the minute exactitude of law, on the one hand, and the divine law 
common to all that enjoins that we do what is necessary in the necessary circumstance matches 
_ closely the Eleatic Stranger's account of the rule of law and wisdom, as well as Socrates' account 
of natural law in the dialogue Gorgias. Gorgias might seem to have a valuation of aKQLf3d.a 
contrary to that of the Eleatic Stranger, but he is criticizing the precise observance of law, which is 
not precise in terms of 1:0 b£ov. It would be better if adherence to the law were "imprecise" or 
"vague." The Stranger mentions the precise observance of law in this sense at 292a2. 
-
24 Consider the Athenian Stranger's reflections on the convenience of a temporary tyrant (Laws 
709e6-710b10) and Socrates' similar statements in the Republic (540e5ff.). 
25 His new course of argumentation surprises and confuses Young Socrates, who after the first 
argument will agree that law is necessary "at least from what's been said just now" (£K 1:wv vuv 
_ youv dQTJf.l£vwv, 295b6). _ 
26 Remember that in the Gorgias Socrates had made gymnastic and medicine the two parts of the 
art directed to the good of the body as legislation and justice (the two parts of the political art) 
were directed toward the good of the soul. 
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argues, in the second case, that in the absence of such an expert, his written instructions, 
while unable to accmmt for every contingency are the best fallback. Together these two 
arguments will show that, while written laws are necessarily defective imitations of 
political wisdom based on natural law, they are nevertheless necessary and justified on 
practical grounds, even if there were a wise statesman with complete knowledge of the 
art of politics. The Stranger's position will be strengthened by a third argument, which 
turns on the relation between knowledge and persuasion, and could be called the 
problem ofpolitical persuasion. 
Two arguments for law: rules of thumb and business trips 
The Stranger's first argument (294d4-295b5) begins with the example of group athletic 
training for a footrace or some other competition. "Come now, let's take up in memory 
the instructions (epitaxeis) of those trainers who train according to art" (294d8f.). "They 
believe there is no room to work in detail with each [trainee] one on one, giving the 
instruction that' s appropriate to each body, but think they must 'thicker'-as for the 
most part and for most people-make an order (taxis ) of what is advantageous to their 
bodies" (294dll-e3). Thus they give "equal" exercises to everyone, having them all train 
for the same amount of time and in the same way. They recognize this is not the best 
procedure, but they have no time to do better. 
In recognizing the inappropriateness of giving equal labors to different bodies, 
the Stranger has in mind his understanding of measure according to the fitting that he 
had elaborated earlier (284e), which is the same as Socrates' principle of "geometrical 
equality" in the Gorgias. A concrete illustration of the Stranger's point is made by 
Aristotle in his discussion of the "mean according to us" in the Nicomachean Ethics. Diet 
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is part of any athletic regimen, but what is too much food for someone just beginning 
their training is too little for the great wrestler Milon.27 For this ideal of precise 
instruction to be realized, however, there would have to be a personal trainer for every 
citizen, which is infeasible. True statesmen, it was agreed earlier, are truly rare in 
number. The Stranger here could have further strengthened his argument by appealing 
to kinds of exercise where it is important for many people to act in a group. The tactic3 
of hoplite warfare, to say nothing of the rowing of triremes, requires exact coordination 
and movement in unison, which can only be attained by lengthy training and the 
suppression of the individual's instinct to act according to what he thinks is best for 
himsel£.28 In doing so, however, he might have weakened somewhat his argument for 
the superiority of the rule of wisdom. And with his example he has done enough to 
show that the use of general rules is necessary, but he does not want to argue that it is 
best. Like the gymnastic trainer, then, the legislator must "lay it on thick" and establish 
laws, "either in writings or unwritten but ancestral (patriois) customs" (295a5-8). But this 
is only a matter of convenience. "How could someone ever prove able .. . , throughout his 
life always sitting beside each [single case] and command with precision what is fitting? 
For if anyone at all of those who really possess the science of kingship were capable of 
this, I think he would hardly set down an impediment for himself by writing these so-
called laws" (295a10-b5). 
The Stranger turns to his second argument for the simultaneous necessity and 
faultiness of law (295b6-e2).29 Not only may there be too few wise statesmen to preside 
over every detail of political rule, but there may be times when there are simply none at 
27 Aristotle, EN 1106bl-4. 
28 The "martial art" of fighting alone in armor is the object of ridicule at the opening of the Laches 
(182a), because it is of no use when fighting in the "rank and file" of a real battle. Consider also 
the Athenian Stranger's praise of the martial benefits of choral dancing in the Laws (664a-c). 
29 Consider Benardete (1984, III.134): "The more the Stranger details the deficiencies of law, the 
more the necessity of law becomes clear, for the Jaw's deficiencies are part of the beliefs of the 
law-abiding." 
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all. If a doctor or athletic trainer were about to go out of town and be away from his 
charges for a long time, he would write down reminders for them, not trusting them to 
remember exactly his verbal instructions. The written word is more permanent than 
memory. In his myth the Stranger had dese1ibed the cosmos as gradually forgetting the 
details of the god's instructions~ and so falling into greater and greater disorder (273b ). 
Applying this analogy to the city, the use of written laws once the true statesman has left 
would at least slow down the forgetting of his ordinances. The inflexibility of written 
law is better than the vagaries of memory or the guesswork of inexperience. Again, the 
Stranger could have further strengthened his argument by underlining the importance 
of the impartiality of the law. He could appeal to Solon's decision to leave Athens for ten 
years to avoid the pressure to modify his laws to satisfy partisan interests.30 But he does 
not want to make his argument for law too strong. If the doctor should retum earlier 
than expected, he argues, he would immediately tear up his written instructions and go 
on as he had before. 
The returning doctor would have to do this because circumstances tend to 
change, and not even his own writing can keep up with the times (295c7-d2). Thus, 
turning back from the analogy to the case of political rule, the Stranger argues that not 
only should the original legislator "who with art wrote" the laws, be allowed to 
contravene them if he sees fit, but that the same right should be granted to another, if 
"someone else similar to him arrived" (295e4-296a3). It is not only the original author of 
laws, but anyone in possession of the knowledge of political rule, who may amend or 
contravene the established laws. Political wisdom as such, the Stranger argues, has 
greater validity than written law or unwritten custom. To admit that a perhaps semi-
mythical lawgiver would have the authority to change the laws he made is not a serious 
30 Discussed in ch. 2 above. 
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challenge to law because the legislator is made out to be a figure of the remote past.31 
(And if he is not, Solon's recourse to travel is always open to him.) But if anyone with a 
real claim to political wisdom is thereby permitted to amend or ignore the law, the 
authority of law is fundamentally shaken; it stands open to any appeal based on 
supposed understanding of what is best. Since law is a blunt instrument that cannot 
account for the particular case, it might even seem that any individual could plausibly 
claim expertise at least over the sphere of his own particular activities. Eve1yone would 
become his own athletic trainer. The questioning of law, then, raises the specter both of 
tyranny and of anarchy. 
"1he atgument of the many": the problem of pet·suasion and the rule of law 
The Stranger acknowledges this danger brought by the questioning of law by turning to 
consider a third argument (296a-301a), 32 which he calls "an argument spoken by the 
many ... and a fine and fitting one (euprepes)." The many "say that if someone comes to 
know better laws at variance with those of his predecessors, he must give laws to his city 
by persuading it, and not otherwise" (296a5-11). But before he examines the argument 
itself by means of an extended thought experiment, the Stranger repeats in the strongest 
terms the superior validity of the rule of ~achn unfettered by law. Turning back to the 
argument of the many, he will reject it~:'conclusion that law should be changed only by 
persuasion on the grounds that no multitude can possess political wisdom and, 
therefore, that their listening to persuasion is no reliable criterion of wise legal 
31 Cf. Laws 798a9-b4. "When the laws under which people are raised have by some divine good 
forhme remained unmoved over many long ages, so that no one has any memory or report of 
them ever being otherwise than they are now, the whole soul reveres them and is afraid to move 
anything that was established then." I owe the reference to Clark (1995, 249). 
32 If the many's logos is an argument, and not merely a statement, then it must be understood as 
being discussed over the course of these five Stephanus pages, for that is how long the Stranger 
takes to actually come to the question of appealing and revising written law. 
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amendment. The Stranger recognizes, however, that this argument is double-edged. If 
some clever imitator of a wise statesman were to persuade the many to give him power, 
the results would be worse than the inflexible rule of law. His conclusion, then, is also 
double-edged. On the one hand, the wise statesman is absolutely justified in revising 
any law as he sees fit, even without persuading the multitude (that is, everyone but the 
hypothetical true statesman). One the other hand, since from the perspective of the 
multitude there is no reliable criterion for distinguishing a wise and good statesman 
from a tyiant, law, though it is second best, is absolutely necessary, and must never be 
amended or contravened, not because no improvement is possible, but because no 
reliable mechanism of proper reforih can be found.33 The argument of the many is valid 
only if spoken by the wise statesman, while the many must accept for themselves the 
fetters with which they desire to hobble any presumptive reformer who does not speak 
to their liking. 
The Stranger's restatement of the superiority of the rule of wisdom to the rule of 
law need not be considered in detail. It is important to note that he underlines again not 
just the condition of technical expertise but the second condition that such rule always 
be for the sake of the governed, or for their good. The rule of the "wise and good man" 
is superior to law "just so long as they guard one great thing, always distributing 
(dianemontes) to those in the city that which, with intelligence and art, is most just, and 
[so long as] they are able to keep them safe and as far is possible bring them from a 
worse to a better state."34 Such rulers make techne their "law" (nomon, 297a2). They act 
with the unquestioned authority of a ship's captain, who cannot and does not need to 
33 Lane (1998, 155) misses this crucial lesson to be drawn from the Stranger's thought experiment, 
which she calls a "horror story" (154), though she does understand that it ultimately serves to 
· ~stify law as a second-best. 
297a7-b3: f.! I:'XQL71:EQ a v EV f.! l:'ya cpuAtinwat, '[(J f.!E'I:Ct vou Kal. 'I: I:'xvr}c; bLKaLO'I:a'LOV ad 
btavl:' flOVHc; mi:c; f.v 'D] n 6An ac}>C,ELV 'I:E a \novc; oio( 'I:E wmv Kal. liflELVouc; EK XELQ6vwv 
ano'I:E..\Eiv Ka'I:a 'I:O buva'I:OV. 
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persuade his sailors by teaching them his art (cf. 297b7f£.). They must "force through 
what is best."35 
The Stranger's response, then, is essentially along the lines of Socrates' repeated 
objections to the appeal to majority opinion in contrast to the authority of knowledge.36 
In the Gorgias, Socrates alone-and not the sovereign demos-practiced the true art of 
politics based on the understanding of human nature, and the law he followed was the 
necessity of logos, which, however, is expressed in the flexible form of dialogue. The 
Eleatic Stranger's wise statesman, then, would have to practice politics with as much 
finesse as Socrates questions his interlocutors, ever attuned to the particular natures of 
his citizens. The Stranger, however, has already admitted in his first two arguments for 
the necessity of law that the direct rule of wisdom is impossible, or at least 
impracticable. Law, then, is necessary, but the changing of law through persuasion is at 
best the false image of wisdom, since no crowd can reliably distinguish the arguments of 
a good statesman from those of an impostor.37 The argument of the many is only half 
right. There must be no room for persuasion, then, in the rule of law. Regimes governed 
by law must be thought of as static "imitations" of the correct regime (297c2) and "must 
preserve themselves by using [the correct regime's] written laws" (297d6ff.). In order to 
remain faithful imitations, they must act so that "no one in the city dares to do anything 
35 296bl: ~u.X(;rp:m TO ~ii\.nov. Compare this to the mss. Reading of Callicles' quotation of Pindar 
at Gorgias 484b7: [v611o<;] ~ta!Wv TO btKCUoTamv, "turning to violence what is most just." In the 
Laws, the line is quoted correctly at 715al: btKalli>v 't:O ~tat6'ramv. Cf. the discussion in Dodds ad 
Zoe. This partial parallel, unnoticed by Dodds, might lend some plausibility to the minority view 
that Plato intentionally has Callicles misquote Pindar. The majority of editors, however, 
including Dodds, restore the correct quotation. At any rate, both Callicles' law of nature and the 
Eleatic Stranger's law of art grounded in the understanding of natures run roughshod over 
conventional understandings of justice. 
36 Cf.Gorgias 474a-b. 
37 Cf. 298a. The inability of "those below" to recognize the true statesman, i.e., the possibility that 
they might take him for a kind of sophist or sham-statesman, echoes Socrates' suggestion at the 
beginning of the Sophist that the true philosophers will sometimes appear (plzantazontes) as 
worthless or invaluable, or as statesmen or sophists (Sophist 216c6-d2). This amounts to an 
admission on the Stranger's part that the statesman must willy-nilly operate within the confines 
of phantastike, "letting the truth go" (cf. Sophist 235e5-236c4). 
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contrary to the law, and punish with death and most extreme penalties anyone who 
does dare" (297e1£f.).38 This way of government is the second best, since the first has 
been "put aside." 
But the Stranger has not "completed the argument." To do so he turns to a 
;:, " , .. ·~ ' 
curious image or thought experiment "It is always necessary to liken kingly ruler:s" to 
the "images" of the "noble pilot and the doctor 'in worth to many others equal."' 
(297e).39 "Let us fashion a kind of picture in them and take a look at it," the Stranger 
says.40 The Stranger then paints a picture of doctors and pilots from the point of view of 
the many: 
As if we all thought about them that we suffered most terribly at their hands. 
Whomever of us either one of them [sc. the doctor and pilot] wished to save, they 
similarly save, but whomever they chose to maim, they maim by cutting and 
burning and charging expenses to bqng to them like tribute, of which they spend 
little or nothing on the sick man, while they and their domestics use the rest. And 
in the end, receiving some money as payment from relatives or certain enemies 
of the sick man, they kill him. And as for the pilots, they contrive countless other 
such things, leaving behind by some plot their passengers abandoned in their 
voyages, and contriving accidents on the waves they cast them out into the sea, 
and they do otl1er evil things. If, then, having thought these things, we devised a 
plan about them, no longer to allow either of these arts to rule autocratically over 
slaves or free, and to gather an assembly of ourselves, either the whole demos or 
the rich alone, and to allow laymen as well as the other craftsmen to contribute 
their judgment about sailing and about sickness, how we ought to use the 
medicines and other doctors' instruments on the sick, and the ships themselves 
and the nautical instruments for the use of the ships, and [to deliberate] about the 
dangers of the sailing itself from winds and sea, as well as encounters with 
pirates, and whether we ought to engage in sea battle with long ships against 
other such ships--and to write down on some tablets or pillars the opinions of 
the multitude about these things (whether it was some doctors and pilots or 
other laymen advising), and setting others down as unwritten ancestral 
customs-and then to sail and take care of the sick according to these [writings] 
for all the time to come (298al-e3)Y 
38 This is clearly the correction of the "mistake now occurring" that the Stranger mentions at 
297dl, i.e., that imitative regimes allow the revision of their laws in accord with the "argument of 
the many." Gill (297), therefore, misunderstands the nature of the error, thinking that it is the 
restriction on the practice of techne described in 298-299. 
39 As Benardete (1984, ad Zoe.) notes, the Stranger is paraphrasing Iliad XI.514. 
40 297e12f.: KaTLbCvj.!EV yaQ br) '[L oxfJfla EV TOl)'[Ol<; aumi <; TIAaoaflEVOL. 
41 The Stranger never gives an apodosis to his spraw ling protasis, which begins at 298b7 and 
continues to the end of the quotation. The subsequent conversation fills in the 'then .. . ' to the 
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The Stranger asks Young Socrates to take with him the perspective of the layman, who is 
ignorant of medicine and navigation, and by analogy of the average citizen who does 
not possess the knowledge of statesmanship.42 He imagines a kind of revolt from the . 
authority of self-proclaim·ed experts and the establishment of a social contract for the 
practice of medicine and navigation, which is meant to stand for the rule of law as such. 
Wit.h his image he demonstrates that, while laymen may not be able to distinguish 
between a true statesman and an impostor by their arguments, they can sometimes 
recognize the deeds of political misconduct. In the two examples of the doctor and ... 
pilots, laymen have engaged them in a kind of contract, giving payment for medical 
services or passage from one port to another. They do not know the how of the doctor~ s 
or pilot's art, but they know the desired result, health or safe arrival at their destination. 
If a ship's pilot maroons his passengers while making off with their possessions, or if a 
d octor is shown to accept bribes from the enemies of a sick men, then it is dear that 
. something is amiss (cf. 300a). This does not allow us to assess their knowledge, but jt 
does give us the probable LTUstwort.hiness of the doctor or pilot. This is clearly not an 
infallible measure for every case (we remember in the political context that no one will 
be convinced that he should be executed), but neither is it altogether unreliable. In lack 
of the knowledge that they by definition cannot possess, the citizenry of any city are left 
nothing but the element of trust.43 
Stranger's 'if ... ', though it does not make up for his strained syntax, which I have tried to 
reproduce faithfully. 
42 If the Stranger meant seriously his statement at the beginning of the Sophist that sophist, 
statesman, and philosopher were three (d. Statesman 257clf.), and assume his evident self-
identification as a philosopher, then on his own terms he will not be in possession of politike. The 
problems faced by the average citizen would then be the problem of the Stranger and Young 
Socrates. If this is the case, then Miller's (1980, 88£.) contention that the Stranger adopts the 
perspective of ordinary opinion merely for Young Socrates' sake would be called into question. 
Cf, Griswold (1989, 163, n. 13); also Stern (1997, 270£.). 
43 For Plato's recognition of the capacity of the ·non-expert and the un-vir tuous to nevertheless · 
correctly judge the expert and the virtuous, d. Laws 950b5-c2. 
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The establishment of trust, then, becomes a problem for any knower in his 
relation to non-knowers, be it a doctor, a pilot, or a statesman. Even if the doctor is to 
cure with brute force, or the statesman to rule by tyrannical means, he will require, at 
the ,v:eryl east, assistants or bodyguards to carry out his directives. At the very best, these 
assistants will be apprentices learning the art, and so partial or at least future knowers, 
but even the apprentice must trust before knowing. Later the Stranger will speak of the 
"honored and kindred" art of oratory (rhetoreia), "as far as it goes in common with the 
art of kingship." Instead of forcing through what is just, it "is a co-pilot of the actions in 
the cities, persuading the just" (303e9-304a2). Oratory persuades a "multitude and 
crowd with muthologia, not with inshuction," but does not possess the knowledge of 
when its own power should be used (304c-d).44 But how are we to imagine the statesman 
talking to the orator? Between the statesman's autepitaktike or autonomous generation of 
commands and the transmission of "alien thoughts" by his lieutenants and heralds lies 
the gap between knowledge and opinion, where opinion is recognized as the medium of 
politics.45 The statesman, then, would have to use a certain kind of rhetoric himself, if 
only with his direct servants. One might imagine the statesman as knowing how to 
perfectly express h is knowledge of the situation in rhetoric appropriate for persuading 
the multitude at any given time, but this would ignore Socrates' recognition in the 
Gorgias that rhetoric is essentially flattery, and therefore always compromises the 
position of the rhetorician as much or more than it sways the will of the people to him. If 
the wise statesman were to take the other option open to him, using the "tyrannical" 
means of violence, he would still not escape the problem of persuasion, for even the 
44 It must be the orator, then, and not the statesman, who in practice produces the divine bond of 
true opinion about what is just, good, and beautiful, since that bond itself cannot be one of 
knowledge. Compare the discussion of the divine bond in the previous chapter. 
45 Cf. Statesman 260d7ff., and again Laws 950b5-c2. Miller (1980 [2004], 94), already recognized the 
same limit on the dissemination of the Stranger's knowledge. 
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P;rant's use of brute force relies essentially on trust or fear, its mirror image.46 For the 
tyrant's power lies not in his own personm but in his ability to command a bodyguard 
or to direct by persuasion the power of the mob. This, again, is why Callicles studied 
rhetoric and not Stesileos' art of armed combat.47 
The gulf between knowledge and persuasion, then, cannot be overcome so as to 
bring about the true rule of knowledge.48 The statesman may at times succeed in 
persuading his citizens that what he does is right, but he could not consistently persuade 
them, nor persuade them with the true reasons for his course of action. Too often his 
actions would appear to be harmful to their interests. To say nothing of more extreme 
examples, and taking only the relatively moderate example suggested by the Stranger 
himself, the statesman's use of the "human bonds" by intermarrying bold and moderate 
families will surely offend the sensibilities of both families on many occasions, since by 
themselves they would necessarily make incorrect matches (310b). The citizens, then, are 
not wrong from their own perspective in refusing to grant unchecked power to supposed 
specialists. And since their perspective is inescapable unless they all become wise, the 
true statesman would have to recognize it as a fact of political life. One can even imagine 
that it is a certain recognition of their own ignorance that leads the multitude of citizens 
to favor the rule of law.49 The Stranger's account of tl1e establishment of law through a 
kind of social contract is thus similar, though not identical, to the accounts of Callicles 
and Glaucon that we considered in the first chapter. In both cases it is the fear of harm 
that motivates the establishment of an impersonal law, but in the Stranger's account it is 
46 Cf. Sophocles, Ajax 1075f.: Ol)'"[ ' av UTQaT6c;; yc: awcpQWVWc;; UQXOLT ' £n, I flllb£v ¢6~ou 
nQ6~i\T]fla flllb ' atbouc;; £xwv. 
47 Cf. Laches 183c-d. 
48 In the broader context of Plato's thought, Morrow (1953b, 244) remarks that "[t]he tragedy of 
Plato, we can see ... is the conflict between his desire for the moral health of his fellowmen and 
the love ofreasoi:l, critical reason, in human affairs. Plato never renounced either of these objects 
of his devotion; but they are not easy to reconcile." · 
49 Cf. Griswold (1989, 159): "Obedience to the law is possible on the basis of knowledge of 
ignorance." 
161 
not exactly the threat of tyranny as such that inspires fear, but the threat of false wise 
men or political impostors. It is the tyrant in his pre-tyrannical guise as demagogue 
whose threat the Stranger emphasizes, the class of sham-statesman who are really 
"sophists" and "seditionists" (stasiatikous, 303cl-6).50 Just as Callicles' rhetoric attacked 
the validity of conventional law, so the establishment of that very law is for the sake of 
checking the power of such rhetoric. This is the threat that any citizen body should · 
perceive in politicians claiming perfect wisdom. It is an even stronger argument for the 
impossibility of the rule of wisdom, or the direct application of natural law to political 
rule, than the Stranger's two previous arguments. Natural law must, then, be mediated 
through written laws, which only imperfectly reflect its precise commands. 
Granting the final say to law, instead of supposed experts, amounts to the 
community's establishment of a set of shared opinions that, from that point forward, 
will be authoritative. Laws are "the opinions of the multitude," formed from the 
deliberation of expert and non-expert alike (298d5ff). It is not that the citizens will 
exclude the expert from deliberation about his art, but they will not grant him special 
authority. Experts will only contribute to the formation of law insofar as they are able to 
persuade by tokens of trust, not by the arguments of knowledge. They could point to 
their inconuptibility, the number of patients they have cured, or the number of voyages 
they have completed safely, but they will be open to the gainsay of the rest of the 
assembly. In the immediate context of the thought experiment, it must be in this sense 
that the Stranger claims that such laws will be the product of "much experience" (polles 
50 It is more than a little surprising, then, to see Lane (1995, 290) claim that there is no reason to 
attribute "real fear" about the possibly harmful actions of statesmen to the Eleatic Stranger or to 
Plato, and that this passage "offers no evidence of Platonic pessimism about the impossibility of a 
true statesman." For while it is formally right to say that the Stranger never denies the possibility 
of a true statesman, that is not at all inconsistent with the recognition that statesmen in general 
(that is, sham-statesmen), may do a great deal of harm. It is then quite a risky business to play the 
game of identifying and granting total authority to any "true" statesman, as Plato, who lived 
through the turmoils of post-war Athens, and experienced his own Sicilian interlude, would 
surely have understood. 
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tribes, 301b2). One would normally expect such an expression to refer to the long process 
of trial and error that leads to the discovery of reliable practice, and which would 
suggest the constant revision of law in light of new experience.51 But the Stranger will 
want to exclude the possibility of revision to the laws as the invitation to the false 
imitation of the rule of wisdom (300d9-e2). In his imagined social contract about the arts, 
then, the Stranger must be thinking of the previous experience of the experts, but more 
especially of the laymen's experience of the experts. In the Gorgias (464b4, 465a5, 501a7), 
Socrates had contrasted techn€, which provides a logos or account of itself, and tribe, a 
kind of knack for hitting the mark without being able to explain how, and the latter fits 
better the tokens of trust and true opinion that will later be formalized in the scrutiny 
and review of entering and retiring magistrates (298e5-299bl). 
From his description of the non-technical act of lawgiving by consensus, the 
Stranger finally comes back to the "argument of the many" about the revision of law, 
describing along the way something like the actual functioning of the democracy in 
Athens.52 His description of the argument falls into roughly two phases, first a grim 
portrait of the requirements of a society governed according to inflexible law, then an 
even grimmer portrait of one that would constantly revise its laws. To illustrate his 
argument he continues to employ the metaphor of the arts, imagining how they would 
fare if they were practiced according to written codes that forbade any revision. This 
passage has confused some scholars into thinking that the Stranger believes that, in a 
city under the strict rule of law, even innovation in the arts will be forbidden, adding to 
51 Cf. Gill (1995, 296); Stern (1997, 273) actually translates the phrase as "on the basis of much trial 
and error." I will argue below that, in the case of the art of politics, this understanding of 
experience must in fact be the right one. 
52 Benardete (1984, III.154, n. 39); Miller (1980, 97f.). 
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the defects of the rule of law.53 But that is not the case. The Stranger is simply continuing 
his thought experiment about practicing medicine and navigation by democratic 
deliberation instead of technical expertise. If these arts were to be practiced according to 
invariable rules,_ without the ability to .adjust for change in circumstcrnce or increase in 
knowledge, they "would be completely ruined for us ... so that life, which is hard as it 
is, would in that time become completely unlivable" (299e6-10). But it would be even 
worse, the Stranger argues, if the arts were practiced by whoever was elected or chosen 
by lot, and who used their authority to do whatever they chose without regard even to 
the imperfect written code (300a). By analogy, therefore, in the absence of the political 
art, the governance of cities according to the strict rule of law is superior to the 
vacillating rule of the assembly. Practicing politics according to a written code is hardly 
ideal, but practicing it without any certain guideline is even worse (300d9-e2), and the 
fickleness of persuasion provides no such guideline. 
This last point reveals a significant disanalogy between the other arts and the 
sought-for political art. Non-experts cannot reliably distinguish a wise and good 
statesman from an impostor, but most are able to do so more or less reliably with the 
practitioners of the other arts. The most important reason for this is the ability of the 
non-expert to judge the product ofthe ordinary craftsmen's labor. One can judge the 
farmer by the quality of his produce and the shoemaker by wearing his shoes, or even 
the general by counting his victories. The quality of the products themselves is easy 
enough to judge because they all have an instrumental value. With_ the art of politics, 
however, there is raised the question, familiar to us from the Gorgias-how ought one to 
53 Miller (1980, 98£); also Griswold (1989, 161): "a system of laws which excluded progress in the 
arts would ultimately lead to the destruction of the city." Miller does not clearly distinguish the 
analogy of the arts from the restriction on inquiry as such in the "law state." He sees throughout 
· this passage a foreboding reference to Socrates' trial, which is surely intended; but fails to note 
that Socrates was condemned by a jury of citizens who accepted the revision . of laws and 
certainly accepted innovation in the arts. Lane (1995, 284-6) and (1998, 161) and White (2007, 112) , 
falls into the same confusion; also apparently Stern (1997, 272f.) 
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live?_;_and about this question there is the greatest disagreernent.54 At least one reason 
for the Stranger's emphasis on security and self-preservation in politics, at the expense 
of developing a more robust conception of the _ good life, is that it takes no special 
~xperti~~- to r:cog~1~ze _wl~ether or not one's person and p9litical community are secure 
' . . . ~. ., . . . 
or not. By limiting the aim of statesmanship to the instrumental end of security, it 
becomes easierto conceive of it as a techne like the others. Innovation in the arts can be 
tolerated because its failures might ruin the fortunes of the i1movator, but will rarely 
endanger the safety of the whole community. A failed iimovation in governance, 
however, could spell the collapse of the political community. The Stranger is therefore 
no advocate of experiments in living. He will later marvel that a city can manage to 
survive at all, "when it performs its actions according to writings and customs without 
knowledge, when if another art used that, it's clear to anyone how everything it did 
would be ruined" {301e9-302a2). Many cities do manage to sutvive, but the Stranger 
takes that as no indication that any one city should be so confident as to court 
iimovation in its fundan1ental form of governance. 
With that the Stranger completes his argument about law and returns to the task 
of completing his taxonomy of political regimes (301a-c), and then to the evaluation of 
which, the rule of wisdom excepted, is best, or least difficult to live with (302b5-9). His 
criterion seems to be the concentration of power in the various regimes and so their 
54 Roochnik (1996) argues this point extensively &om a reading of several "early" dialogues, but 
also in particular in the case of the Republic (122f.), where the idea of the Good, without which all 
other technical expertise lacks proper direction, is never presented in the manner of a techne. If 
Roochnik is right that the early dialogues ultimately cast doubt on the identification of moral 
knowledge (knowledge of the good) with the kind of knowledge found in the technai, then this 
same result in the case of the Statesman, where the Eleatic Stranger goes to such lengths to present 
the statesman· as the possessor of a techne of· the good, but which shows that ultimately this 
conclusioh is unteneble; would go a long way to showing the continuity of Plato's thought on the 
problematic: relation between techne and the virtues, even as he evidently found the analogy. quite 
tempting. 
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capacity to act decisively for good or ill.55 Thus democracy, which is "in everything 
weak and unable to do anything great, good or bad," is worse than lawful monarchy 
and aristocracy, while its lawless but homonymous counterpart is better than oligarchy 
and tyranny (303a-b). Thus the Stranger suggests that democracy is in fact the most 
secure regime, since a fall into lawlessness, though perhaps more common than in well-
governed aristocracies, would cause relatively less harm. 56 This line of thought would be 
in keeping with his earlier worries about the rule of wisdom. Since there is no sure 
criterion external to knowledge by which to judge knowledge, it is dangerous to put 
. power into the hands of any self-professed political savant. Safest, then, not to gather 
power into any single faction, and leave the whole citizen body to shift for itself as best it 
The rule of law, then, fosters political stability and security, and is the best 
recourse given this modest standard. "On this account, then, for those who are setting 
down laws and writings about anything at all, it is a second-best (deuteros pious) to allow 
no individual or multitude to do anything at all contrary to them" (300cl-3).58 The 
proverbial deuteros pious is literally a second sailing, when, in the absence of a favorable 
wind to fill their woven sails, sailors take to oars, moving their ship forward by their 
own efforts instead of relying on an external mover. The "first sailing" of written laws 
55 Cf. Laws 710e7-711al. 
56 Cf. Griswold (1989) for a somewhat more detailed account along these lines. Also Annas (1995, 
xviii-xix). Lane (1998, 160) counters that the Stranger's modest ptaise of law-abiding democracy is 
not at all like the democracy in Athens, but misses the point that a relatively lawless Athens is 
still better than any oligarchy or tyranny on the Stranger's account. 
57 .Cf. Clark (1995, 251). As Gill (1995, 293) notes, democracy had an especially close association 
· with the rule of law in Greek thinking. In Herodotus' account of the Persian debate over regimes, 
the "rule of the multitude" is called LooVOflLJl, or the "equality before law." 
58 For law as a second-best, cf. Laws 875c6-d5: E7UOvlflllc; yitQ oun: VOflOc; ol'rn:: 'l:lX~Lc; oub£flla 
KQEl'l:'l:WV, oub£ 8Ef1Lc; EO'l:LV vouv oub£voc; lJ7U'jKOOV oubi: bovi\ov ai\i\a nav'l:WV ii(>XOV'l:lX dvat. 
ECtV71:£Q MJ18Lvoc; l':i\n)8£QOc; '1:£ OV'l:Wc; l;j KlX'l:tX q>uow. vuv bi: ou yaQ l':onv oubaflOU ovblXflWc;, 
ai\i\' f) KlX'l:tX !3Qaxv· bLO bi) TO b£U'1:'£QOV aiQa£ov, 'l:a.;Lv '1:£ KlXL VOflOV, a bll '1:0 flEV we; l':nl. '1:0 
noAu OQ~ Kal.I3A£nn, '1:0 b' l':nl. niiv abvva1:£i. What is absent is a mortal nature capable both of 
knowing the common good of the city and of withstanding the temptation that unchecked and 
autocratic power would inevitably bring (875b-c). 
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would be their instrumental employment by the wise statesman, who can ignore or 
revise them as he pleases, and who imitates in his political weaving the god who rotated 
the cosmos in the age of Cronus, imparting motion to it from without. In the absence of 
the god, the c<;>smos begins to move from its own innate desire. The rule of law, as was 
already suggested by the conclusions of the previous chapter, is the political analogue to 
the mythical presentation of the age of Zeus. In the absence of a godlike statesman to 
guide us, we must guide the city ourselves with laws as our most reliable instrument. 
The next question to consider is how, if at all, it is possible to measure these imperfect 
laws against a natural standard, and if there is some way of making them better 
approximations to that standard. 
The origin or standard of law? Following the tracks of the truest regime 
If the mythical parallel between cosmic self-government and the rule of law gives a 
broad vision of the purpose and nature of law, there remains the question of its 
composition and evaluation. Law is always second best, but there can be better and 
worse laws. In the context of the Statesman, the question to be answered is, in what sense 
are we to understand the Stranger's statement that "the other [defective regimes] must 
be saved by so using the written laws of this [correct one]" (297d6f.)? Answering this 
question will enable us to weigh more carefully the Stranger's argument for the strict 
conservatism oflaw. If, as the quotation above suggests, a city's code of written law is 
literally left over from a now departed wise statesman, then any change to it by the 
ignorant would quite justly be forbidden. On the other hand, if that is not literally the 
case, and a code of law cannot trace its origin to a knower, then the Stranger's argument 
would beweakened significantly, at least to the point of allowing cautious reform in 
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light of new experience. There are strong reasons for thinking that the Strange intends us 
to understand that real legal codes are not the products of a wise man's legislation, and 
thus he leaves open the possibility, though only tacitly, of legal revision. This more 
flexible, though still "conservative" approach to the 1-ule of law will be developed at 
length in the Laws. 
It is helpful here to summarize the various employments of law mentioned by 
the Stranger in his discussion with Young Socrates. They are three: 
I. The use of law at the convenience of the knower: No one can attend to every 
circumstance, so written instructions are passed on from the knowers to 
delegates who execute thel.r commands (295b ). 
11. The use of law in the absence of the knower: When the doctor leaves town, he 
leaves behind instructions to follow in his absence (295c). 
III. Law as the decisions of the multitude based on persuasion. Experience, not 
knowledge, is the standard, because there is no acknowledged knower (298a-e). 
These three employments of law correspond to the Stranger's three arguments for the 
simultaneous defectiveness and necessity of law. It is important to note that the 
Stranger's remark about following the writings of the true regime occurs after the 
discussion of the first two uses of law but before the third, which is the only one not to 
consider law as being written by a wise legislator, and so as being authoritative in itself, 
instead of being a matter of convenience and practical necessity.59 The Stranger's third 
argument shows the great unlikelihood of there ever being a true regime whose writings 
we might follow, and he certainly does not think that any ever has existed. 
Since the Stranger acknowledges that there are now no acknowledged possessors 
of the science of politics, we can dismiss the first employment of law as being merely an 
illustration of his argument for the superiority of the rule of wisdom, not a statement 
about the source of the laws of any real city. We saw, however, how the motif of law left 
59 Despite Gill's (1995, 303) remarkable claim that, according to the Stranger, "a genuinely 
knowledge-based ruler should be subordinate to the laws" (my italics). Miller (1980 [2004], 92) has 
the right understanding when he says of the first two arguments that the Stranger "accepts law 
... only as instrumental for epistemic statesmanship." Cf. also Lane (1998, 153). 
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behind by an absent lawgiver would bring to mind-at least to the mind of 
contemporary Athenians--the figure of Solon, and so more generally the wise lawgivers 
of the past, such as L ycurgus or Minos. The Stranger's discussion, however, is 
conspicuous in lacking any concrete histodcal reference or mention of any historical 
figure. This silence would be enough to show that he does not believe there is any city in 
possession of a legal code of such a provenance. And if perhaps there had been one, it 
would have been inevitably corrupted or fragmented, as he claims the traditions about 
the quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes, the reign of Cronus, and the earthbom men are the 
corrupt fragments of a forgotten phase of cosmic history. But if law has already been so 
corrupted in the course of time, then the argument for its strict observance would be 
considerably weakened. Again, if there never was such a wise man, and laws were 
merely the artifacts of experience (as the Stranger elsewhere suggests), then there would 
be no principled reason to forbid reform absolutely. If it can be seen that a certain law 
brings consistently poor results, then even on the grounds of trust that fall short of 
knowledge of the art, there are good reasons for amending that law. 
Having dismissed, then, the illustrative fiction of the wise statesman, present or 
absent, as the source of law, we are left with the model of law as laid down by the 
consensus of a popular assembly based on trust and probability instead of knowledge.60 
It is on this model, we remember, that the Stranger explains his conception of the rule of 
law, not merely the rule of the wise statesman with the aid of law. Even on this 
understanding, however, the Stranger argues that "contrary to laws laid down out of 
60 The Laws treats the question of the origin of law in a similar fashion. From the "most just" 
answer (624a), that a god is the cause of Spartan and Cretan laws (Apollo and Zeus, respectively), 
the Athenian Stranger eventually leads his interlocutors to the conclusion that "hardly any 
human being has ever laid down laws, but fortunes and disasters of all kinds, falling upon us in 
all ways, legislate everything for us" (709alff.). What little legislation can accomplish, then, 
·would require that account be taken of the kinds of disaster and unexpected occurrances that 
might befall a human community. They are not the project of a wise man but the reaction to 
circumstance. 
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much experience, and when co-dellberators have given pleasing advise on each 
particular and have persuaded the multitude to set them down-the one who dared to 
act contrary to these, executing an error multiplied on error, would overturn every 
action to a still greater extent than the written laws" (300bl-6). But in the absence of a 
wise statesman, we have to ask what this source of long experience is. In the thought 
experiment of the revolt against doctors and ships' pilots, the Stranger was dealing with 
arts acknowledged already to exist at a sufficient state of development, even if the 
practitioners of those arts could not always be trusted. It was thus possible to 
. understand the laymen as having "long experience" in their dealings with specialists. 
But that cannot be the case with politics, since the Stranger never claims that a single 
true statesman has ever lived.61 In the myth, the other arts were the "so-called gifts of the 
gods," but of the political art, which in Protagoras' myth comes from Zeus, the Stranger 
is silent.62 The only possible source of political experience, then, on which to base the 
writing of laws, is the success and failure of previous attempts at establishing laws and 
conducting the affairs of the city according to them, which presupposes the ability to 
revise laws in light of past mistakes. Trial and error, then, can be the only basis of real 
political experience . Thus the Stranger could still plausibly argue that, once a relatively 
stable and just code of laws has been hit upon, it is better to forbid further experiments 
with them, but not that it is always better to forbid any modification to whatever legal 
code one happens to live under. If laws are derived from experience, then it would go 
contrary to the spirit of law to dam up the only source of its admittedly limited insight. 
61 C£. 300e7-9 (my italics): "If there is a royal art, the multitude of the rich, or the whole people 
together could never grasp this political science." 
62 Statesman 274dl-3. Ketl m:iv8' 6noaa n)v av8Qc;;J71LVOV [)(ov auyKa'l:EaKEUIXKEV EK 'l:OU'l:WV 
y£yovEv, might suggest that the art of politics, which secures human life, is included, but 
compare Protagoras 321d3-5: u'jv flEV ouv 71EQLn)v 13(ov ao<j:>(av aV8QW710c; 'l:IXU'LIJ £ax£v, u']v b£ 
noAmKi]vouK Elxt:v · ljv yaQ naQa 'fi;J t..d. 
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If the logic of the Stranger's argument about law forces him to accept the limited 
revision of law, then his other statements about the proper conduct of real politicians 
and legi slators further support his tacit conclusions, or at least do not contradict them. 
Following up his statement about following the laws of the best regime, the Stranger 
adds that "these [vlritten laws], in each case, would be imitations of the truth, written 
down as far as is possible from the knowers" (300c5-7). But since he had excluded the 
possibility of granting special status to knowers in the legislative process, we cannot 
imagine this to be a case of faithful scribes noting down the pronouncements of the wise. 
He must mean instead that these written laws should come as close as possible to what 
the knowers would say, if they were present and recognized as knowers. The Stranger's 
clearest statement of his practical position on lawgiving comes after he has reviewed the 
relative correctness and incorrectness of the imitative but faulty regimes. "But as it is 
now, when there is no king born, as we say, in the cities as there grows in beehives, one 
who's right from the start exceptional in body and soul, it is necessary to come together 
to write written laws, so it seems, pursuing the tracks of the truest regime."63 The rule of 
wisdom here is held out as an ideal that can be pursued only imperfectly. As the elusive 
sophist required dialectical pursuit, involving dead-ends and new beginnings from 
different premises, so the pursuit of the political ideal would require the same flexibility, 
though used with greater caution as the stakes are less forgiving. Laws would be 
considered to have been "written down from the knowers" to the extent that they 
approximate the ideal of the wise statesman, not because of their putative provenance.64 
63 301d8-e4: vuv bE. yc 6n6n: OUK £an YLYVOf1£VO~, w~ bi] ¢af1£V, EV TlXL~ n6A£aL (3amA£1J~ oio~ 
£v aflr'JVWLV Ef1<1>V£TaL, TO T£ awfla ~:u8u~ Kai. Tijv ljJuxl)v bLa<)> E.Qwv £~, bEi bl) auwA86vTa~ 
auyyQtXflfllXTlX YQt:i<)>av, w~ EOL1C£V, fl£Ta8EOVTlX~ Tit TIJ~ aAT)8WTtX'ITl~ noALT£tac; LXVT). 
Compare the Stranger's remark regarding the elusive nature of the sophist, who has slipped 
away from their repeated attempts at definition (Sophist 226blf.): XQll yitQ ouv, Kai. KaTa bUvaflLV 
y~: oihw TCOLT)Tf.ov, 'rOL6vb£ n f1ETa8 E.ovTa~ txvo~ auTou. 
64 This interpretation of the sources and evaluation of law differs substantially from that of Lane 
(1998, 157-160). Ignoring what I take to be the crucial problem of trust between knower and non-
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The Statesman has suggested a variety of political "morals" to commentators. 
Some find it to be an expression of political pessimism in a world of decadence. Rowe 
considers it a call to patiently await the coming of a new golden age of Cronus.65 Lane 
stresses the ope1mess to the possibility of tl1e coming of a truly wise statesman (which 
would amount to the coming of a secular Golden Age for a single city).66 Carone more 
accurately stresses the role of autonomy and civic deliberation in the Stranger's account 
of politics, though she is more optimistic than the text warrants about the prospects of 
politics understood on her reading.67 These various readings, however, all seem to miss 
the fundamental importance of law in the dialogue, as well as the only two explicit 
political recommendations made by the Stranger. First, that since there is no way for a 
city to clearly ascertain who is a true statesman, we must come together and make laws 
knower, Lane instead argues that the content of the knower's laws as memoranda will differ 
radically from those formed by the deliberation of the assembly, "given the radically different 
material shaped by presence or absence of knowledge" (159). But the distinction between 
knowledge and ignorance cannot be drawn on the basis of differing content, as the Stranger's 
appeal to the divine bond of true opinion shows (309c). For while it is a vexed question in Plato 
on what exactly the distinction between knowledge and true opinion turns, it is not in the first 
place one of content. There is nothing to stop an assembly from accidentally hitting on the truth, 
but the problem precisely resides in the fact that it cannot be relied upon to consistently get at the 
truth. 
65 Rowe (1995, 12f.). 
66 Lane (1998, 161ff.) notes the statement at 301d4ff. that if there came to be a wise statesman such 
as the Stranger has described, "he would be welcomed." But tl1e immediate sequel (301d7-e4) 
makes clear that the Stranger means that the wise statesman would be welcome only if he were 
immediately recognized as such, like a queen bee from drones, and he has already stressed that 
this is impossible. Lane drastically understates the problem when she submits that the solution to 
the seeming contradiction is that "these imperfect regimes need to overcome their squeamishness 
so that they would be sure to give the true statesman the welcome he deserves" (163; my 
emphasis). This shows that, while she did note the Stranger's adoption of the perspective of the 
layman in his thought experiment (154), she has completely failed to understand the significance 
of his sympathy for the non-knower. Stern (1997, 271) is closer when he speaks of "the partial 
truths expressed in the imperfectly reconcilable positions of the wise and the many." 
67 Carone (2005, 159): "[I]f our political rulers were themselves capable of using god as their 
model ... , then the human and even natural world would exhibit conditions more similar to that 
ideal age where each region of their Earth was under intelligent care and all care-takers were in 
cooperation with each other so that it was possible for us to have a more harmonious relation 
with our environment.'' 
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that pursue the ideal of the rule of wisdom.68 And second, that the question that we as 
· citizens o.f imperfect political communities must ask ourselves is: "which of these 
incorrect regimes is least hard to live with (since they are all hard), and which the most 
bt.rrdensome? Ought we to take a look here, even though it's spoken as an aside 
(parergon) to what's set before us now? Though on the whole, perhaps, everything we do 
is for the sake of such a question" (302b5-9). The Stranger does not call for utopian 
political reform, but neither does he call for total resignation, pessimism, or the passive 
waiting for the coming of a new god or divine statesman. Instead he calls for the careful 
writing of laws and doing one's best to get by, even suggesting the possibility of 
migration to another, more hospitable community if one's own is too burdensome.69 
These two statements are consistent both with cautious political reform and with the 
acknowledgement that sometimes successful reform is unlikely or impossible, in which 
case the individual citizen may take stock of his options. In the end, human beings do 
not simply constitute a docile herd. They are left the possibility of roaming in search of 
better pasturage and better laws?0 
The Str:anger thus recognizes that the nature of the human being is not exhausted 
by his citizenship or belonging to a specific community. The perfect statesman may 
make a city as happy as is fitting for a city (31lc5f.), but the single decisive criterion of 
human happiness remains philosophy, which has no place in the Stranger's division of 
68 This seems to be exactly the understanding of law suggested by Socrates' definition in the 
Minos (315a2f.): 0 VOf..LO~ tXQa ~ovi\aaL 't:OU OV't:O~ dvaL n;£UQ£Gl~. It does not always succeed in 
becoming a discovery of being. 
69 Several commentators have noted the Stranger's echoes of Socrates' indictment in his 
discussion of the rule of law. Miller (1980, 99) is especially insightful on this point. To my 
knowledge, however, none have noted the Stranger's implied suggestion that Socrates leave 
town in search of a more welcoming city, if such a one could be found. Though no reason is ever 
mentioned, the Stranger himself did see fit to leave his hometown of Elea. 
7° For the sustained language of herding even after the myth's apparent dismissal of the shepherd 
paradigm, as well as the pun on law and grazing, cf. 295e5-7: VO!J08£'[f]aavn '[at~ '[WV 
av8QW71WV ayti\aL~, (moaaL Ka'[a noi\Lv f.v EKaa'[aL~ VOf1£UOV'[CU Ka'[a '[QUe;; '[WV yQal)Jav'[WV 
VOflOV~. For a lively summary and defense of the sustained "naturalism" of the Statesman, cf. 
Clark (1995). 
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the works of the city and whose presence would make the age of Cronus happy even 
though all politics is absent from it. But if, even in its ideal presentation, the city is not a 
place of complete human happiness oi· fulfillment, then still less should we demand too 
much from real cities. The city, like law itself, is always primarily defensive. The 
Stranger 's account of natural law turns out to be a radical compromise of Socrates' in the 
Gorgias, whose only purpose was to attempt to make citizens better and happier. 
However, this compromise is justified in the Stranger's eyes because of the more basic 
needs of the city. Before living well, we must all be confident of living securely. As the 
next section will show, the Stranger's argument amounts to a justification of the rule of 
law based on a limited conception of the human good in terms of Socrates' fuller account 
of natural law and the human good. 
Nature, art, and the justification of positive law 
In the previous chapter, it was shown how the myth in the Statesman illusb·ated, in a 
schematic form by way of its polarities, the kind of imitation or participation in natural 
order to which Socrates had made his final appeal against the challenge of Callicles. 
Socrates had appealed to this natural order as the basis for the true art of politics, which 
he alone attempted to practice, and which enjoined the distribution of what is 
appropriate to each nature using the paradigm of geometrical or proportional equality. 
vVhile it might seem at first that Socrates' self-described political practice was essentially 
private, and while the Eleatic Stranger in the Statesman is concerned with politics on a 
properly political scale (that is, on the scale of the polis), the Stranger's ideal of a 
statesman attuned to all the particularities of individual nahu·es and circumstances 
would either demand that the statesman, like Socrates, avoid the assembly and practice 
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his politics in private, or that there be an army of Socrateses to give sufficient attention 
to each individual. Since the Stranger recogr'tizes that there can be no army of Socrateses 
(in his words, that if there are any true statesmen, they are exceedingly rare, and they 
would not be accepted by the generality of the population), and that cities must be 
governed as a whole, he has recourse to written law, but his political ideal is not quite as 
far from the Socratic example as might first appear. 
The true statesman, who understood the nature of human beings in its variation, 
would ideally make each of his decisions based on an adequate grasp of the 
particularities of the individual and the situation while aiming always at the good. Thus 
he would make "his art his law" (294e9),71 which is the same ideal of natural law that 
Socrates had expressed in the Gorgias, where he understood art in general as the 
construction of a purposively-conceived product by bringing its parts or components 
into a harmonious artd ordered whole, based on an understanding of their natures.72 The 
new insight that the Eleatic Stranger brings to modify Socrates' ideal is precisely that 
this ideal is unattainable on the scale of the polis, and that, therefore, recourse to less 
subtle and precise means is both necessary and justified. The Stranger's three arguments 
about the defects and necessity of written laws amount to a (qualified) defense of 
written law according to the standard of natural law. Along the same lines, it could be 
said that the Stranger also offers an (even more qualified) natural law defense of 
democracy, for the reasons discussed above, but we need not insist on this point here. 
The natural-law argument sketched so far might be stated more or less as 
follows. (1) The ultimate aim of every h1..1Illan being is happiness or living the good life; 
but (2) the good life presupposes, first of all, that one lives in safety. Therefore (3) the 
------·--
71 Thus Irwin (2010, 97) is wrong to argue that "[s]ince the expert does without law, but could not 
do withoutgeneral principles, Plato does not treat these general principles as a law." It is true 
that they are not a law in the same sense as the "second-best" positive law. 
72 cf. Gorgias 503d-504a. 
175 
first aim of every human being is to live a life of security without unduly compromising 
. the pursuit of the good. The tmderstanding of human nature and its place in nature as a 
whole, however, demonstrates that (4) human beings can live securely only in political 
communities. Natural law, then, enjoins the formation of political communities for the 
preservation of human life and the pursuit of the good life. But (5) the understanding of 
individual natures is sufficiently difficult that no large community could be governed 
according to the ideally precise understanding of natures that the natural law demands; 
and (6) even if such understanding were present, it could not be recognized by the 
ignorant citizen body and so would destabilize the political community instead of 
protecti__n.g it. Therefore (7) the best remaining alternative is to write down general rules 
(laws) for the governance of political commt.mities, approximating as closely as possible 
the unattainable ideal. This, then, is the Statesman's natural law argument for the rule of 
human law, even though human law will always be a compromise of the standard of 
natural law. 
Conclusion and transition to the Laws 
The entirety of the Stranger's exposition is stated in excessively schematic terms and in 
striking polarities, which sometimes obscure his true position and intent. The likely 
reason for this can be seen in the Stranger's repeated assertion that his intent is to offer 
dialectical practice so that Young Socrates and the rest of his audience may become more 
skilled at dialectic.73 But, as readers, presumably one great part of our dialectical practice 
is precisely to recognize where the Stranger's dichotomies are too stark or his 
characterizations too one-sided. Thus we have seen that his position on the revision of 
73 Cf. 285d6, 287a3. 
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law is in fact more flexible than he makes it out to be, and the previous chapter pointed 
to some evidence suggesting that this narrative of successively reversed cosmic cycles 
served more as illustrations of different relations of microcosmic imitation than as a 
literally true account of cosmic history. One possible dialectical reason for the Stranger's 
overstated argument against legal revision is that if law can be shown to be necessary 
and just even in this unappealingly strict form, then law as such would be justified, not 
just law in its most pleasing form. If it could be shown that there was a suitably reliable 
procedure for revising law while avoiding the pitfalls of ignorance and partisan interest, 
then the rule of law open to revision would be a fortiori justified as well. 
The Eleatic Stranger, however, does have genuine concerns with the revision of 
law, which stem from another of his strict dichotomies, that between the knower and the 
ignorant. In the political context of the Statesman, I have called this the problem of 
persuasion, which was already suggested by Socrates' distinction between true 
statesman and sophist-rhetoricians in the Gorgias. Even though a partial solution is 
suggested by the statesman's use of the divine bond of true opinion about the good, the 
beautiful, and the just, the Stranger must mean us to understand that this bond is the 
product of the activities of the statesman's lieutenant, the orator, who persuades the 
citizens with muthologia, as Socrates had finally attempted to persuade Callicles with a 
myth (cf. 303e-304a). The Stranger, however, had made recourse to muthologia himself 
when he tried to explain to Young Socrates the error of the first diaeresis in the story of 
the reversals of the cosmos. The Stranger's philosophical employment of myth, then, 
suggests that the distinction between rhetorical persuasion and philosophical instruction 
does not have to be drawn as sharply as he appears to draw it himself. Though he does 
not explore it in his conversation with Young Socrates, the possibility of a kind of public 
persuasion that shared some of the features of philosophical knowledge, or that was 
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even a propaedeutic to philosophy, would further strengthen the case for the limited 
revision of positive law in accordance with growing experience and growing 
knowledge. If philosophy, or something like philosophy, can be incorporated into thP-
political order of the city, then the tension between the demands of living securely and 
the ideal of living well could be at least partially reconciled, and the law of the city could 
be brought closer in line with Socrates' law of nature. Pursuing these suggestive 
possibilities, however, takes us beyond the scope of the Statesman. 
If we accept the Eleatic Stranger's suggestion that the Statesman is primarily an 
exercise in dialectic, but also that perhaps everything we do is for the sake of 
understanding what kind of political order is better or easier to live in, then its 
unresolved polarities and schematic presentation, instead of becoming a cause of 
dissatisfaction, should invite the reader to further reflect on the problems it poses so 
clearly by means of these very polarities. If there is another Platonic text that could be 
said to take up where the Statesman leaves off, it would have to be the Laws. Besides the 
--
now obvious comtection of the theme of law itself, which has been somewhat neglected 
in previous treatments of the Statesman, the Laws contains the most sustained attempt in 
any Platonic dialogue to present the order and harmony of the political community as a 
part of the natural order that also reflects the whole of the natural order. And with the 
innovation of preludes to the laws, or attempts to persuade the citizens of the general 
moral truths on which each particular law is based, the Athenian Stranger attempts to 
reconcile the divide opened by the Eleatic Stranger between the knower and those who 
are ignorant of political science.74 The Laws puts together into a comprehensive account 
what remains separate in the diaereses of the Statesman, and as such amounts to Plato's 
most complete presentation of, and critical reflection on, the idea of the law of nature. 
74 Cf. Morrison (1995, 275). 
Introduction 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE KOSMOS POLITIKOS OF THE LAWS 
In truth, and to speak withoutperverse affectation, all laws 
in general are originally equally antient. All were grounded 
upon nature, and no nation was, that out of it took not their 
grounds; and nature being the same in all, the beginning of 
all laws must be the same .... But the divers opinions of 
interpreters proceeding from the weakness of men's reason, 
and the several conveniences of divers states, have made 
those limitations, which the law of Nature hath suffered, 
very different. And hence it is, that those customs which 
have come all out of one fountain, nature, thus vary from 
and cross one another in several commonwealths. -John 
Selden1 
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In the last chapter of this dissertation I turn to Plato's Laws. Unlike the Statesman-and 
given its name, perhaps surprisingly, the Laws does not contain an investigation of the 
nature of law as such or of the rule of law. Instead it is a comprehensive view of laws 
and legislation (sunopsis ton nomon, 858a3)2 as it might be carried out by a real legislator. 
As in the Statesman, the chief interlocutor is not Socrates, who is here entirely absent, but 
an unnamed Athenian Stranger. Unlike in the Statesman, however, this Stranger does not 
follow the Socratic practice of philosophically questioning promising young men, but 
engages in a long discourse about laws with two other old men, a Spartan and a Cretan, 
who are unfamiliar with philosophy, and indeed with much of Greek learning. These 
initial dramatic features, as well as the level of the conversation throughout, have led 
some scholars to question the philosophical_ importance of the dialogue, or whether it is 
1 Quoted in Tuck (1979, 84). 
2 Unless otherwise specified, all references to Stephanus p ages in this chapter are to passages 
from the Laws. 
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meant to be understood philosophically ir1 the first place, and not rather as a practical 
manual comprehensible to the non-philosophicallegislator.3 While these doubts about 
the philosophical significance of the dialogue are based on important observations, this 
chapter will argue that they are unjustified and that interpreting the Laws in light of the 
~-...~· -~ ·~··· '· · ~ . . . . . . 
Platonic approach to natural law can help us to understand how its "non-philosophical" 
feahlres are themselves philosophically significant. 
In the Gorgias, we came to see the outline of a Socratic law of nature as a standard 
of justice based on a proper conception of the good life for a human being, based itself 
on an understanding of the nature and needs of a human being. The Statesman, in turn, 
developed a conception of politics as attempting to apply this standard not only to an 
individual life, but to the life of the political community as a whole. The two 
fundamental lessons of the Statesman were that, due to the diversity of human nature 
and the fact that precise knowledge is possible at most only for a few, the application of 
Socrates' law of nature standard could only be an imperfect imitation eis dunamin;4 and 
second, that even granted the presence of a statesman with precise knowledge of the 
political art, the gap between his knowledge and the ignorance of the citizen body 
·would both dilute the efficacy of his knowledge as well as make him appear a tyrant in 
the eyes of his subjects. Only the impersonal rule of law can foster trust between ruler 
and ruled, and thereby minimize the "problem of political persuasion." Partly for 
methodical reasons, however, the Statesman's presentation of law and the rule of law 
was schematic and overstated. Because the Eleatic Stranger was trying to justify the rule 
of law as such, instead of giving a detailed account of how it works in concreto, he 
argued that the rule of law must be absolute and permit no revisions . . Furthermore, his 
characterization of political knowledge itself was almost purely formal. He outlined the 
3 Schofield (2003, 2) states the problem with the greatest clarity. 
4 Cf Statesman 300c6. 
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aims of politics and the obstacles it must overcome, but while the Eleatic Stranger's 
emphasis on the due measure or lcairos implies the necessity of understanding the 
empirical side of politics, he had almost nothing concrete to say about empirical matters. 
His task was to definestatesmanship, ndt to teach it. Last of all, his stric~ distinction 
between philosophy and politics threatened to pull apart the two components of 
Socrates' natural law, to live in security but also to live well. This is just one more of the 
dichotomies left unresolved in the Statesrnan. 
If, then, we come to the Laws with these insights and questions taken from the 
Gorgias and especially from the Statesman, many of its puzzling and "non-philosophical" 
features become significant as contributing to the development of an account of natural 
law. The Laws presents, with concrete examples, how reflection on laws and the purpose 
of law necessarily raises questions about nature and what is natural. It presents a 
detailed account of human law's imitation eis dunamin of the general law of nature, and 
the partial compromise of the latter based on the exigencies of real legislation and the 
limitations of human nature. The Laws ' account of legislative preludes, meant to soften 
the diktat of positive law by the addition of persuasion, addresses and tries to partially 
solve the problem of political persuasion that was identified in the Statesman. The less 
than philosophically satisfying argumentation of some of the preludes comes to light as 
exactly the accommodation to the understanding of non-experts that is required for the 
rule of law to be accepted as legitimate and not merely the imposition of the stronger 
party.5 Finally, and in this same vein, the Laws attempts to articulate the connection 
between the political order and the cosmic order that Socrates appealed to in his 
statement of natural law to Callicles.6 Itself the longest prelude in the Laws, the 
theological cosmology of book X serves the same kind of argumentative function as 
5 This last point is suggested by Sauve Meyer (2006, 379£.) 
6 Gorgius 507 e4-508b2. 
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Callicles' appeal to animal nature in the Gorgias. Instead of demonstrating by rational 
argument the truth of the Laws' own natural law position, the cosmology is meant to 
offer analogical evidence or tokens of trust, on the level of true opinion, that the world is 
;i lawful place where both the just and unjust get what they deserve. Thus the theology, 
like the other preludes of the Laws, acts as a mediator between ignorance and 
philosophical understanding. Overcoming the static dichotomies of the Statesman, the 
Laws presents education as the movement from ignorance to understanding and law as 
itself a kind of education. The Laws is a dialogue in motion; the old men talk as they 
walk. In this way we can understand the Laws as bringing together and completing an 
argument about human happiness, justice, and law, ·that is threaded through several 
dialogues, and thereby as presenting a model of . natural law grounded in an 
understanding of human nature presented for both the philosophical and non-
philosophical reader alike. 
To compare the approach of the Laws to the Gorgias, in the latter Plato had 
Callides reject altogether the nomos of democratic Athens in order to show up in the 
highest contrast the difference between his and Socrates' natural law theories. Socrates, 
however, did not accept the rigorous opposition between nomos and phusis that was the 
basis of Callicles' position. Socratic natural law, then, as opposed to Callicles', would not 
be entirely at odds with conventional law inasmuch as it considers nomos itself as a 
partial expression of the nature of things. · As the Statesman suggested, while no human 
law is perfect according to the natural standard, some laws are better approximations 
than others. Part of the action of the Laws, especially in the first books, is the Athenian 
Stranger's gentle leading of Clinias and Megillus away from the attachment to their own 
laws as unconditionally valid towards the consideration of law in light of the nature of 
things. But he can only do this because the Cretan and the Spartan already believe 
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unreflectively that their laws are evidence of the nature of things. Implicitly they accept 
certain standards of consistency, fittingness, and rationality for law, even if they do not 
consistently apply them. The Athenian might not be able to turn them into philosophers, 
but he can turn them into believers in natural law, while Callicles was a hopeless case. 
Callicles could be thought of as a philosopher manque, whereas Clinias and Megillus are 
well-bred gentlemen: their understanding of things is less profound, but they are more 
amenable to the claims of morality. It is no accident that the Laws lays so much 
emphasis on the importance of moral habituation (ethos dia ethos, 792e2), and accepts that 
the passions always pull somewhat against reason, so that true opinion by itself is 
insufficient and must be supported by a prior training of desire. Plato recognizes that, 
while it is easy to argue against Callicles, the victory can only be acknowledged by the 
spectators. Like the worst tyrants in the Gorgias' myth, Callicles cannot be rehabilitated, 
but can only serve as an example and warning to others. Clinias and Megillus share 
refinement of conventional moral education that Callicles lacks. The Laws is what the 
Republic would have been if Socrates had been more patient with Cephal us. 
Three takes on the age of Cronus 
As noted in the introduction, the Gorgias, Statesman, and Laws are the only Platonic 
dialogues to make use of the myth of the age of Cronus.7 In each case the age of Cronus 
is described in contrast to the current way of things (the age of Zeus), and some 
importance is given to the nature of the transition from one period to the other. In 
Hesiod's account in the Theogony of the succession of Uranus, Cronus, and finally Zeus 
7 In the Hipparchus, whose authenticity is disputed, life under the tyrant Pisistratus is compared 
to life under the reign of Cronus, so much worse is the reign of Hippias. Cf. Hipparchus 229b2-7; 
also Aristotle, Athenian Constitution 16.7, which suggests that this comparison was proverbial in 
Athens 
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to supremacy among the gods, which was more or less canonical in Plato's time, the 
ascent of Zeus and the Olympians against the Titans is seen as the establishment of law 
and dike where once only brute force was decisive. Zeus becomes the source of authority 
and wisdom for just kings. While these stories are paradigmatic of the kind Socrates 
argues must be suppressed as impious in the Republic, the Gorgias, Statesman, and Laws 
are all in their own ways concerned with the establishment of law and justice, making 
that motif particularly appropriate to them. In this, as in many other ways, Plato seems 
to have had Hesiod often on his mind.8 It is convenient to begin our discussion of the 
Laws by considering how Plato's continued use of the Cronus-motif advances the 
concerns of the Gorgias and the Statesman. 
In the Gorgias, Socrates weaves together a myth of the judgment of souls with the 
reigns of Cronus and Zeus. It is the last major section of the dialogue, well after Callicles 
has ceased to be a willing interlocutor and beginning after his very last utterance. It is 
Socrates' final word to Callicles and it goes imanswered. Socrates had just finished 
defending in the strongest terms his thesis that the question of living well trumped all 
considerations of mere living or survival, or that death is to be feared less than doing 
injustice (cf. Gorgias 522d-e). He proceeds to describe the judgment of the dead: 
there was the following law concerning human beings in the age of Cronus-and 
it still is now among the gods-that of human beings the one who has passed his 
life justly and piously, when he dies, would depart for the isles of the blessed 
and dwell there in all happiness, free of evils, but for the one who lived unjustly 
and godlessly to go to the prison of retribution and justice (dike), which they call 
Tartarus. Their judges in the age of .Cronus, and still when first Zeus held 
empire, were living of living, judging them on that very day on which they 
would die. The cases (dikai), therefore, were judged badly. So Pluto and the 
caretakers from the isles of the blessed cru:ne and ·said to Zeus that human beings 
were coming to them in both cases undeserving. Zeus, therefore, said, "I then 
shall stop this happening. For now the cases are being judged badly. For," he 
said, "the judged are judged covered up, since they are judged while alive. 
Many, therefore," said he, "have wicked souls but are covered with beautiful 
bodies and families and wealth, and whenever their judgment takes place, there 
8 Cf. the contents of Boys-Stones (2009). 
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come many witnesses for them, testifying that they have lived justly. The judges, 
therefore, are confused by them, and at the same time they Judge whe'l_~.be}L ~te. 
covered up themselves, having put on the veils of eyes and ears and the whole 
body over their soul. All these things have come to be in their way, both their 
own ~overings _and those of the judged. First, then," he said, "they are to stop 
knowmg of the1r death beforehand. For now they do have foreknowledge. And 
as for this, it has been spoken of to Prometheus so that he will stop them. Then, 
they are to be judged stripped of all these things, for it is necessary that they be 
judged dead. It is necessary that the judge, too, be stripped, dead, with his soul 
itself beholding (theorounta) the soul itself immediately upon the death of each 
one, deserted by all family relations and leaving all that order (kosmon) on earth, 
so that the judgment might be just. Now I, having come to know this before you, 
have made judges of my own sons, two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthys, 
and one from Europe, Aeacus. When these men die, therefore, they shall judge 
on the plain, at the junction from which extend the two roads, the one of the isles 
of the blessed, and other to Tartarus. And those from Asia Rhadamanthys shall 
judge, and those from Europe, Aeacus, but to Minos I shall grant the final 
judgment, if the other two are at a loss about something, so that the judgment 
about the journey should be as just as possible for human beings ( Gorgias 523a3-
.524a7). 
Socrates continues to repeat his claim, made earlier (Gorgias 507cl-6), that the souls of 
the unjust will be deformed by their licentiousness and disorder, and which he will-later 
say are signs of psychic disfigurement, just as the poor condition of a corpse is evidence-
of how a man was in life (Gorgias 524cl-5). The souls of the unjust, especially of the . · 
. tyrants atl.d the powerful, will face punishment, corrective if they are redeemable. If 
their souls are beyond redemption, however, they will be punished forever as examples 
(paradeigmata) to the rest of the wages of iniquity. 
If Socrates means to frighten Callicles with tales of the afterlife, then he has 
contradicted his prior claim that it would be better to suffer the worst injustice-
~ induding the tortures of blinding, castration, etc.- than to do injustice, for in that case, 
what is meted out in Tartarus even to the worst tyrants would be but a reprieve from 
their true unhappiness on earth.9 Socrates seems to acknowledge this when he says that 
9 C£. Gorgias 5lla. One might object that the punishments of the unjust, being just themselves, 
would not violate Socrates' thesis. But Socrates equates injustice with doing harm; and 
accordingly punishment is just only insofar as it improves the punished. The on ly just 
punishment, then, is corrective punishment, and the punishment of the incurably wicked cannot 
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"it wouldn't be at all surprising to despise these things [sc. the myth] if by searching in 
: ~~ -·:: '·, ' 
some way one were able to find th.ings better and truer than them" (527a5-8). 
Nevertheless, Socrates did see fit to recount the myth. 
Socrates' account of the myth, however, gives more attention to the judgment of 
souls than to their punishment, and the question of which human soul is just (ai"1d 
therefore, Socrates would say, which one is happy), is the fundamental ground of his 
disagreement with Callicles about justice. The difficulty of judging the justice and 
happiness of human beings on appearances alone goes all the way back to his 
disagreement with Polus about the happiness of Archelaus (Gorgias 470d-471d) and 
looks forward to the theological question of providence in the Laws X.10 Polus had 
thought that the mere mention of the tyrant, who committed acts of ruthless injustice but 
whose power and wealth were the envy even of the Athenians, was a sufficient 
refutation of Socrates' claim that the unjust man was for that reason unhappyY It is the 
great spectacle of an Archelaus or similar tyrants, Socrates believes, that deceives us as 
to their happiness, when the only relevant question is how they stand in terms of 
education and justice (cf. Gorgias 470e4f.). But it is difficult to come to know such things 
even after long contact with a man. 
It is this problem that Socrates transposes into his account of the judgment of 
souls in the age of Cronus. Under his reign, and in the early stages of the reign of Zeus, 
it was a nomos that human beings were judged on the very day they were to die, and by 
living judges.12 Since human beings could foresee the time of their own death, they 
be just, since the theory has no room for motives of retribution of deterrent examples, even if it is 
not so unjust as the actions of those wicked men themselves. Cf. Gorgias 476d-478a. 
1° Cf. the discussion below. 
11 For the esteem Archelaus enjoyed in Athens, see the evidence mentioned in Dodds (241). 
Aristotle reports .(Rhetoric 1398a24) that Socrates declined the invitation of the Macedonian king, 
who had welcomed Euripides, Agathon, and perhaps Thucydides (all in Dodds, ibid.). 
12 In the reign of Zeus, these living judges should be the same Minos, Rhadarnanthys, and Aeacus .· 
before their deaths, but it it unclear who we are to understand as the judges in the age of Cronus. 
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could therefore prepare for their own defense, .and had their beautiful bodies, families, 
and wealth to conceal their injustice. Since the god Pluto also complains about incorrect 
judgments, it must be the case that just men, who do not have the benefit of beautiful 
bodies, familles and wealth, were unjustly condemned to the punishments of Tartants. 
The distinction between the inside and the outside of the just and unjust, between their 
being and their appearance, and the consequent difficulty in judging them, brings to 
mind Glaucon' s challenge to Socrates in the Republic that he demonstrate the happiness 
of the just man who is punished as unjust, and is an implicit rebuke of the error of Polus 
as well as of Callicles. For they judge, Socrates clearly implies, according to the old 
nomos of the age of Cronus. The reforms instituted by Zeus, then, would correspond to 
Socrates' attempts to examine the condition of the soul as much as possible 
independently of the distractions of its external accoutrements, suggested by the image 
of the statue of Glaucus in the Republic, where the soul is finally to be seen "in its true 
nature," which would show that "one must do what is just, even if he had the ring of 
Gyges" (61ld-612b). This aim of Socrates is clearly expressed in the Phaedo, where he 
says that lovers of knowledge ought "to separate as much as possible the soul from the 
body and habituate it to gather and collect itself together by itself out of the body and to 
dwell as far as possible, both in the present and the hereafter, alone by itself" (67c6-dl)Y 
By transposing the diachronic structure of the Gorgias' myth, then, on to the 
contemporaneous judgments of Polus and Callicles, on the one hand, and Socrates, on 
the other, we see that the former judge according to the old nomos of the age of Cronus, 
while .Socrates is a would-be Zeus, attempting to found a new law based on the true 
understanding of the nature of the human soul seen in itself, and according to which the 
just and unjust are correctly judged to be happy or unhappy even before they are 
13 · Italics mine. ·cf. 64b3-9, where Socrates claims that philosophers are "moribund" or "the 
walking dead" (8avaTWaL, cf. Burnet (1911) ad lac.) 
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punished. As the first chapter has argued, the law that Socrates brings is his 
reformulation of Callicles' law of nature. 
Socrates' practice of philosophy as bringing a new law is easily assimilated into 
his practice of the political art, which was itself composed of the two arts of legislation 
and justice, as discussed in the first chapter. The myth, in fact, can be divided neatly 
along these lines, with the section on judgment corresponding to legislation, and that on 
punishment to justice, whose spurious imitator is rhetoric. The myth also reflects 
Socrates' appeal to order and orderliness as a normative concept, preparing for, though 
not itself initiating, the explicitly cosmological concerns of the Statesman and Laws. Zeus 
says that when the dead are judged "stripped" of their bodies, they will leave behind on 
earth "their kinsmen and all that kosmos" (523e5f.), where he must be referring to the 
adornments of wealth, a fine body, and noble families (523c5-7)Y This is the kind of 
kosmos found in the false beauty of kommotike (cosmetics), which is again the correlate to 
sophistic, the false imitator of legislation (465c). Socrates' legislation is the bringing of a 
new kosmos to supplant the old, the true beauty or adornment of soul in the place of the 
counterfeit. In the Gorgias, however, Socrates gives no account of the kosmos to which he 
appeals beyond connecting it to the important concept of geometrical equality. 
The employment of the Cronus-motif in the Statesman is explicitly and 
overriding! y cosmic in theme, so much so that its full political meaning has often been 
ignored or obscured by commentators. Even once its political significance is 
acknowledged, however, its connection to the Eleatic Stranger's attempt to define politike 
as the weaving together of disparate human natures in cities seems far removed from 
Socrates' politike in the Gorgias, which appears to limit itself to the private examination of 
the opinions about justice and virtue of individual citizens, even when those citizens are 
14 For the same play on kosmos, cf. Phaedo 114£. 
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themselves statesmen. These two Platonic approaches to the art of politics, however, are 
not as far separated as they might appear. When the Eleatic Stranger refers to the current 
crop of politicians as a chorus of Satyrs and sophistical imitators, he seems to be basing 
his judgment on just the kinds of elenctic examinations that Socrates conducted. And 
just as Socrates is vexed by the difficulty of disceming the soul within the man, so the 
Eleatic Stranger recognizes the perhaps insurmountable obstacle to the rule of wisdom, 
namely that "there is no king coming to be, as we said, in the cities like there grows in 
beehives, one who's right from the start exceptional in body and soul," so that if one 
came claiming to know the true political art, he would suffer the same fate as the true 
pilot before the ignorant sailors, called a "star-gazer, a garrulous sophist" (Statesman 
301d8-e2, 299b)Y If the possessor of the royal art were as clearly distinct in body and 
soul from ordinary citizens as the queen bee is from her drones, then there would be no 
problem, but "no multitude is capable of grasping any art at all" (300e5), so that the soul 
of the king is inscrutable to them. The body alone is left as the criterion of distinction, 
and it is no reliable indicator of the knowledge within.16 It might not be obvious how the 
Statesman's own myth of Cronus is connected to the question of determining the inner 
nature of the human being, but the Eleatic Stranger's initial contention was that it was 
necessary for completing the "exhibition of the statesman," that is, for bringing to light 
the political knowledge that cannot be discerned by the senses (cf. 301d8). The myth 
accomplishes this by giving an account of human nature in its need and potential for 
conflict, thus laying out the problem that statesmanship must solve, as well as a vision of 
divine control, which suggests an ideal for human statesmen to imitate, but not in the 
---------------
15 Cf. Republic 488e-489c. 
16 Cf. Aristotle, Politics 1255a39-b4, where he complains that natural slaves often look noble, and 
vice versa. Also Symposium 215a6-10, for Alcibiades' comment on Socrates' silenus appearance 
and his beauties within. 
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manner of a slavish imitationY However, while the myth's excessive polarities bring out 
the various moinents of the relation between human and cosmos in helpful contrast, 
they would be dangerous and inaccurate if taken literally. The Eleatic Stranger gives 
sufficient indications that he does not mean for the myth to be so understood, but he can 
hardly claim that he has provided as clear and helpful a guide for the concrete work of 
the statesman or legislator. To speak in somewhat anachronistic terms, the Eleatic 
Stranger provides a theory of statesmanship, but only the broadest hints of its 
application in practice. 
In contrast, the conversation of the Athenian Stranger with the senior statesmen 
Clinias and Megillus18 takes a more concrete and practical course, discussing the 
minutiae of zoning laws and election procedures, but also considering the fundamental 
principles upon which all iaw is to be based. The twin purposes that law is meant to 
serve are the human ends of living securely and living well, and the Athenian Stranger 
accordingly separates two aspects of the Cronus myth, familiar from tradition and now 
also from the Statesman, and presents them afresh in order to show his own 
understanding of the origins of the political community and how law based on nature 
can best of all serve its needs. 
The Athenian gives his account of the age of Cronus at 713a9-714bl, after Clinias 
and Megillus have stumbled in trying to determine what politeia they should use in the 
city Clinias is going to help found in Magnesia. Both would naturally choose the regimes 
of their native cities, but the Spartan and Cretan regimes do not seem to fit any of the 
· traditional classifications, containing elements of democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny. 
17 Thus Strauss (1950, 162) argues that for Plato "[t]here is a universally valid hierarchy of ends, 
but there are no universally valid rules of action." 
18 Clinias has been selected, along with nine other Cnossians, to establish the laws of a new 
Cretan colony (702b-d); Megillus is proxenos to Athens (642b), and so from an important Spartan 
political family. It is natural, then, to identify him with the Spartan ambassador to Athens of the 
. same name mentioned in Xenophon's Hellenica 3.4.6, which would make him a statesman of som~ 
experience. See his entry in Nails (2002). 
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The Athenian's myth of Cronus, then, is meant to help answer the question, what is the 
best regime, but first to discern just what kind of regime there is in Sparta and Crete. 
Like the Gorgias and Statesman, then, the myth of Cronus in the Laws is meant to clarify a 
confusion and correct a judgment, this time not directly about just and unjust souls, or 
true and false statesmen, but about better and worse political orders. Even before that, 
however, after concluding his discussion of the uses of drunkenness and drinking 
parties, the Athenian had turned to the question of the source (archen) of the politeia, the 
spring out of which cities increase in virtue and in vice (676al-6). He avers that over the 
incomprehensibly long course of time, tens of thousands of cities have come to be and 
passed away, grown great and small, and become better and worse, and wishes to 
inquire into the "cause of the change" (metabole, 676c6f.). A singular cause can be 
identified beci,iuse the human race has been subject to periodic extinctions from floods 
and plagues, which leave behind only mountaineers and shepherds, who live in the safe 
isolation of the mountains, so that, while political life apparently had no absolute 
beginning, any one of these points can be taken as a beginning for the purposes of 
inquiry (677al--b3). These mountain shepherds have no experience of the arts that thrive 
in cities, and do not know the political art or any kind of wisdom, so that must develop 
again and again from the beginning (677b5-c6).19 
The Athenian thus sets ottt in quasi-historical or "secularized" terms much the 
same picture of human development presented mythically in the Statesman, and he still 
refers to his account as a myth (682b8).2° His secularization of the Eleatic Stranger's 
account does include some important changes. The Athenian molds together elements 
19 Only after many ages would such inventors as Palamedes, Orpheus, and Epimenides discover 
the various arts (677d). 
2° For direct echoes in language, d. Statesman 269al, 270cll-dl; for thematic echoes, 271e8, 274c5-
d3. One further sign that the Athenian Stranger is secularizing the Eleatic's account is his 
replacement of the gods who traditionally gave the arts to .mankind with the human inventors . 
themselves. A god, however, is said to have provided the arts of weaving and pottery (679a6-bl). 
191 
from the Statesman's description of life in the age of Cronus with its description of the 
beginnings of the age of Zeus. Thus human beings in the immediately post-diluvian age 
lived scattered and apart from each other, and since there was no lack of pasture and 
game, they did not want for food (678e9-679a4). Without money there was no way to 
accumulate great wealth, but neither was there poverty, and therefore no envy to breed 
outrage and injustice (cf. 919b7-cl). There was a naive simplicity about the fair and the 
foul (679b3-c4). They were much less advanced in the arts than the men of today, and 
they understood less, but they excelled in courage, moderation, and justice (679d2-e5). 
Therefore they had no need of laws or legislators, nor had they the art of writing to give 
permanence to law (680a). Instead they lived as families and tribes, nued by the father, 
which is the most just form of kingship (680d7-e4). Such rule seems to be most just 
because fathers consider their children to be the extension of themselves, a guarantee of 
their own immortality, so that they wish the good for them as much as for themselves, 
even if their children will not always see it that way (721b, 687d). Rule by families and 
tribes, which the Athenian Stranger calls "dynasty" and considers to be the first shape of 
politeia (c£. 6810.4-9), is grounded at least partially in natural affection, which is absent 
from larger political associations. The Athenian thus suggests that if truly political 
communities are to be just, they must foster something like the bonds of familial love. 
He had already claimed that philophrosune, fellow-feeling, was a higher end of politics 
than war (628cll). 
Gradually these small communities grew and spread from the highlands to the 
rivers and plains, taking up agriculture and the sedentary life (680e6-681a2). But the 
small tribes that gradually merged into larger communities had already developed their 
own ancestral customs and beliefs about their gods and themselves according to their 
-~ 
character and tendencies. Some grew more peaceful and orderly (kosmiotera), others 
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bolder and manlier (andrikotera, 681a7-b4). Different tribes come together, then, each 
with their own customs and laws, which are naturally more pleasing to them than the 
customs of others (681b6f.). The growth and intermingling of tribes first raised the 
practical problem of law, since it was no loi1ger simply a matter of sirtgular tradition. 
Faced with the fact of difference, these emerging communities for the first time had to 
establish laws instead of letting them emerge, so to speak, naturally. This was the 
begiruling of legislation (nomothesia, 681c4). Laws are chosen from among the customs 
(nomima) of the various peoples, and rulers are established according to these. Thus from 
dynasty the second shape of constitution emerged, aristocracy or kingship (681c7-d5) 
With this piece of ideal history, then, the Athenian Stranger presents what is 
essentially the same analysis of the human need for politics as the Eleatic Stranger did in 
the Statesman. Injustice arises from distinctions between the wealthy and the poor, 
between the peaceful and the warlike, and the task of politics is to somehow reconcile 
those differences. Only instead of starting from a mythical account of primitive human 
unity, where eros is suppressed by a divine shepherd, the Athenian depicts a secularized 
version of the golden age, quoting Homer's description of the Cyclopes (680b).21 
Moreover, the Athenian Stranger, unlike the Eleatic, makes the purpose of his ideal 
history quite clear. While in a way this primitive rule of fathers was the most just, and 
humar't beings in that time most brave and moderate, he explicitly denies that they had 
any wisdom (677c6f., 679e3). If wisdom were possible for the men of such a political 
order, then perhaps they would have contrived a way of preserving their way of life, 
but as it is, their way is not a viable political option for those who are considering the 
best form of legislation, even as a regulative ideal. Only a literal catastrophe could bring 
21 Cf. Od. ix, 112-115. Aristotle, Politics 1252b19-27, uses this Homeric passage to the same effect. 
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it back. The Stranger's ideal history reveals the arche of legislation as the problems that 
legislation must overcome, but not its telos . 
Later, as he begins his discussion of the best regime, the Stranger returns to the 
Cronus-motif, this time naming the god and telling a true myth. The regimes they have 
just discussed, kingship, oligarchy, and democracy, are not truly forms of political rule, 
but are "orderings of cities ruled despotically and enslaved to certain parts of 
themselves, and each takes its name from the power of the master. But if it were 
necessary for a city to be so named, its name ought to be that of the god who is the true 
master (despozontos) of those who possess intelligence" (712e8- 713a5). The Stranger goes 
on to indicate that what he had in mind was a "Cronocracy," or rule of the god Cronus. 
"Muc:h further back still than the cities whose founding we went through before, there is 
said to have been a rule and founding in the time of Cronus that was quite happy, the 
imitation of which is possessed by the regime that, of the current ones, is best ordered" 
(713a9-b4). The Stranger continues to narrate how the god recognized that "no human 
nature was sufficiently able to autonomously (autokrator) direct human affairs without 
being filled with outrage and injustice" (713c6f.). Thus he appointed daemones as kings 
and rulers over the various cities, so that a "better genus" would rule over a worse, as 
human beings tend herds of cattle or flocks of sheep (713c8-d7). Human beings, 
therefore, lived in peace, reverent modesty, lawfulness, and justice, and this was the 
cause of their being said to have lived a blessed life where everything came to them in 
abundance and spontaneously (713el-3, c2-4). 
The partial overlap and contrasts between this myth of Cronus and the version in 
the Statesman should be immediately apparent. While in the Statesman's version, the rule 
of daemones reduced humanity to the status of a herd and suppressed their political 
nature, daemonic rule as described in the Laws is like that of kings over cities, only these 
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kings are of a different genus and manifestly better, like the queen bee in her hive. In the 
Statesman, human happiness in the age of Cronus was dependent on whether or not they 
philosophized, but in the Laws they are said to have been happy without particular 
specification as to why (713blf.). Since human beings still remain in their normal nature, 
the task of the daemon--kings is the same as that of any human statesman, to rule by 
reconciling to the extent possible the differences of human nature. They govern in the 
h1:1man way, only better. The human attitude toward the daemones was one of religious 
awe (aida), because they recognized them to be of a better nature and so fit to rule. The 
rule of daemon-kings in the Laws, then, corresponds as much to the rule of the wise 
statesman as it does to the rule in the age of Cronus in the Statesman. Only it solves the 
problem of political persuasion-that statesman could not persuade by knowledge, and 
had no external marks to prove their superiority and fitness for rule-by replacing the 
wise human statesman with his superhuman counterpartY 
The Athenian makes it clear from the beginning that he is reporting a fiction 
(muthos, 713a6) and that human beings are not supposed to directly imitate daemonic rule 
(713b3f.). The lesson of this tale is that "for all those cities that are ruled not by a god but 
by a mortal, there is no refuge for them of evils and labors." Therefore we must imitate 
divine rule by "in public and private managing our administrations and cities in 
obedience to the quantity of immortality there is in us, naming the distribution of mind 
'law'" (ten tou nomou dianomen onomazontas nomon, 713e8-714a2). The proper human 
imitation of divine rule is the rule of law, which allows the immortal element within us, 
nous, to distribute and direct things according to its understanding. Thus, where the 
Statesman has maintained a vigorous distinction · between nous and nomos, likening the 
22 Rowe (2010) thinks that the discussion of daemon-kings, and the whole passage in general is 
meant to bring to mind the Republic's i·ule of philosopher-kings~ which he argues is still 
maintained as an ideal in the Laws. This question will be discussed at greater length below. 
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latter to a "stubborn and ignorant man," the Laws goes so far as to identify them.23 The 
Athenian Stranger thinks of law as something ration~l , an_d .· ~~refore as something 
natural. We have seen that the Statesman's dichotomies are not as strict as they first 
appear, but the Eleatic Stranger falls short of giving a positive account of the relation of 
law and intellect. The Athenian, in contrast, suggests that he will present just such a 
positive account. The success of his account will rest on how well he is able to address 
the problem of persuasion identified in the Statesman, in order to turn the insight of 
mind into the persuasive injunction of law. It is no surprise, then, that the Athenian 
spends the rest of book N discussing persuasion and presents the first "prelude" in a 
kind of exhortatory speech to the new citizens of their colony about their obedience to 
god. What the citizens must be persuaded of most fundamentally is that Pindar was 
wrong to say that, according to nature, law justifies the most violent (715alf., cf. 690b7-
c3). The greatest task of the legislator will be to persuade his citizens to believe that "god 
is the measure of all things," not man, and in the identity of the just life and the good or 
truly pleasant life (716c4, 662d). It is precisely when god or nous is recognized as the 
standard of value according to which the virtues of soul are understood to be better than 
the goods of the body, that the identity of the just and the good life becomes most 
plausible. What the Stranger counsels, then, is in effect the widest possible dissemination 
of Socrates' account of natural law in the Gorgias. 
Pindar, the law of force, and the titles to rule 
After the Athenian has proceeded from his speculative history of the origins of the city 
to the development of the Spartan politeia, he remarks that the Dorian Greeks never 
23 Cf. 674b7:· vouv Kai. v61-1ov £xouaLv. 
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realized how good they had it. If they had managed to make the league of Sparta, Argos, 
and Mesi;ene succeed, they would have lived in freedom and ruled whomever they 
}~leased, doing whatever they wanted without hindrance (687a-b). Such power would 
have been the finest of possessions be('ause "it is the common desire of all human beings 
... for all things to turn out according to the order (epitaxin) of [each one's] own soul-
everything at all, or if not, then at least the human things" (687cl-7). Such was the desire 
of Callicles, but the Stranger immediately complicates this apparent statement of pure 
egoism. We desire to have everything go our way, but we also pray for the same thing to 
happen with our friends, as fathers do for their sons. Egoism is diluted or expanded by 
friendship. Fathers and sons, however, do not always agree what is good for the son: 
sometimes a son is young and foolish, or a father old and senile (687c9-e4). The Athenian 
thus manages to introduce simultaneously the problem of competing claims of authority 
and the question of knowing which is best. He lists seven competing claims or titles 
(axiomata) to rule, the first four of which are conventionally accepted: parents have title 
to rule their children; the noble, the ignoble; the elder, the younger; the master, the slave 
(690al-b2). Fifth, he says, is for the stronger to rule the weaker, which Clinias calls a 
"very necessary rule" (690b4f). The Athenian elaborates: "And it is the most widespread 
among all the animals and according to nature (kata phusin), as Pindar the Theban once 
said." But the Athenian believes that the sixth title to rule is greatest, which "commands 
the non-knower to follow, and the wise (ton phronounta) to lead and rule. And this, 
wisest (soph6tatef 4 Pindar, I would scarcely say happens contrary to nature, but 
according to nature, the rule of law that in its nature (pephuke) is over the willing and not 
violent" (690b4-c3). The seventh and last title to rule is "divinely favored and fortunate" 
election by lottery, which "we say is the most just" (690c5-8). 
24 For the Athenian Stranger's ambivalent use of crocp(a in the Laws, see the discussion of preludes 
below. 
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The last three titles seem to serve as various explanations (or rationalizations) for 
the first four. Parents, and the old in general, would at least like to think that they have 
more experience of life and know best, but witl1 parents at least, superiority of strength 
is just as plausible an explanation of their authority. Masters and nobility no doubt 
recognize the element of force in their rule. The slave surely sees it that way, and with 
but little reflection might come to see that fate could have apportioned things 
differently. This is why rule according to lottery can be thought of as the most just or 
fairest, because it disregards (and so "corrects for") differences of birth, status, or even 
natural endowments. Choice of magistracies by lottery was thus considered the most 
democratic (that is, egalitarian) mode of election.25 Politics conducted in such a way 
could be thought of as denying any appeal to human nature as a standard for political 
justice, appealing instead to absh·act equality. On the other hand, both the rule of the 
wise and the rule of the strong (at least Callicles' version of it) appeal to natural human 
endowments and are the only titles to rule said to be kata phusin. They conceive of nature 
differently, but justify themselves with the same argumentative structure. These seven 
titles, then, while often overlapping, are "naturally opposed to each other" and "a spring 
of civil conflicts, ... which must be tended" (690d3f.). 
By tending to this source of conflict, the Stranger does not have in mind the 
ranking of these titles according to their relative merit. The rule of parents was "correct 
everywhere;" that of the strong was "widespread among all the animals and according 
to nature," and at least according to Clinias, "quite necessary;" that of the wise was also 
"according to nature;" and lottery was "the most just" (690a4, b6-8, c2, c7). The Athenian 
makes no immediate attempt to sort out which of these recommendations is most 
authoritative. He had already asserted that nous should guide all things, so we can easily 
25 Cf. Statesman 298e7, 291al, Republic 557a5; Aristotle, Politics 1294b8. In the A thenian Constitution 
8.1-3, Aristotle says that Solon was responsible for the innovation of electing archons by lottery. 
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discem. his preference, but he does not dismiss the other titles as irrelevant or spurious. 
Instead he turns to the question of how Argos and Messene (which began with 
constitutions similar to Sparta's, but did not enjoy its lasting political success) failed to 
manage the competition of these titles. (690d5ff.). His answer, in brief, is that by a 
combination of bad luck and bad management, these two cities did not restrain the 
monarchical power as the Spartans did (691d9-e2). In explaining how the Spartans 
succeeded where their early allies failed, the Athenian gives perhaps the first account of 
the mixed constitution. Starting with the good fortune to have a dual monarchy on 
account of the accident of a twin birth, the Spartans further tempered the monarchical 
element by introducing the gerousia (which also appeals to the claims of age, as the 
Roman senatus) and the democratic ephorate (692a). What the Stranger recommends, 
then, is not to refute certain claims to rule as false, but to reconcile as much as possible 
all the titles to rule in a system of balanced powers, which he will later identify as the 
rule of law properly speaking.26 That said, the proper reconciliation of these competing 
claims to rule is a matter of intelligent understanding. If only in a compromised form, 
the Athenian Stranger still affirms the supremacy of the rule of wisdom. 
The Laws' own presentation of the Cronus myth, then, shows how the dialogue 
adopts the same understanding as the Statesman of the human need for politics, arising 
out of disparate natures and characters. It appeals in the same way to human happiness 
as the ultimate staridard of evaluation, but its description of a (mythical) political state as 
happy suggests a greater accommodation to the practical point of view than did the 
Statesman, which (at least by the Eleatic Stranger's explicit avowal) distinguishes 
J
6 Cf. Morrow (1941b) for a detailed working out of how the Stranger conceives an institutional 
balance of powers and a division of sovereign power, which helps to ensure the impartial rule of 
law. For this reason I think that Irwin (2010, 94) is clearly wrong to say that Plato "does not 
explicitly consider" a conception of politics wherein "[j]ustice achieves an appropriate balance 
between the interests of individuals and groups." 
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philosophy from politics to the detriment of the latter. By its description of the rule of 
Cronus as a political rule, it replaces the Statesman's mythical ideal of a uniform human 
nature with that of a mediated unity, which we are explicit! y told can only be imitated 
through the rule of law. Thus the Laws leaves no room for the utopian hopes that the 
Statesman inspires in some readers at the same time that it avoids that stark pessimism 
that the Statesman could with equal-equally litHe-justice be said to preach. The rule of 
law is meant to balance and partially reconcile, but not eliminate, the competing interests 
of non-knowers. It does so by approximating the "measure" of god or nous. One of the 
chief tasks of the Laws, then, must be to show how a non-philosopher could be led to 
accept this standard, or equivalently, how the consideration of conventional law as such 
necessarily leads one to inquiry into the natural basis for law. 
Law as the "discovery of what is": the sussition 
From almost the first page of the Laws, Plato illustrates concretely the understanding of 
law that can be put together from the suggestions of the Statesman, and so illustrates the 
general conclusion of the Laws' version myth of Cronus about the rule of law. The 
generality of law forces the particular case to fit a general and inexact rule, and even 
though there are many different laws in acmrdance with the more moderate or bolder 
characters of men, they all present themselves to their adherents as impartial and 
comprehensive. Thus, when Clinias is asked to explain the Cretan law about the 
common messes (sussitia), and gymnastic exercise and their bearing of arms, he 
responds without hesitation: "It is easy for anyone to understand our ways" (625c9f.). 
Anyone can see the nature of the land in Crete, which is uneven (an6malos) and so better 
fitted tor, or commensurate with, (summetros) running on foot than riding on horseback; 
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and "the lightness of bows and arrows seems attuned" to this as well (harmottein, 625d). 
All these customs, Clinias asserts, have been arranged with a view to victory in war, and 
in his opinion everything the lawgiver did was with this in mind. "Since he's likely also 
to have brought together the sussitia because he saw how, when they are on campaign, 
everyone is compelled by the matter itself, for the sake of guarding themselves, to mess 
together for that time" (62631-5). As a historical explanation of why the Cretans use 
sussitia, Clinias' account is plausible, but it justifies the use of sussitia in wartime, while 
the Cretans have made it a permanent institution. But he continues: "Indeed, in my 
opinion, it convicts the many of folly that they don't understand that for all people there 
is ever a continuous war throughout life against all the cities." Therefore there must 
always be sussitia, even in peacetime, "for what most human beings call peace is a mere 
name, while in deed for all against all cities there is always an undeclared war according 
to nature" (625e5-626a5). 
To test the intransigence of his thesis of universal war, the Athenian leads Clinias 
to accept that there is also a permanent war between the villages within cities, between 
different households, and between man and man (626c6-13). When the Athenian asks 
further whether Clinias believes that everyone is even an enemy to himself, he responds 
with admiration: "0 Athenian Sb:anger-for I wouldn't want to call you 'Attic,' since 
you seem to me to be more worthy of b~ing addressed with the name of the goddess., 
for you have brought the argument correctly back to its principle and made it clearer" 
(626d3-6). Clinias is impressed because the Athenian has stated his own belief better and 
more universally than he could have said it himself. Clinias was already predisposed to 
believe that war was present everywhere and accounted for all things, though he has 
surely not read Heraclitus.27 He has been raised under warlike laws and sees that the 
27 Cf. frs. B53, 80. 
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most obvious explanation for the sussition is the necessity of war, so faced with the 
puzzle that the sussitia remain even when there is no apparent war, his strong 
attachment to custom brings him to reason that there must in fact be a non-apparent war. 
Law wants to be the discovery of what is, and Clinias thinks that the Cretan law, as 
opposed to many others, actually has discovered that war is what is most natural. 
Aristotle says .that "in Sparta and Crete their education and the majority of their laws 
have been ordered with a view to wars."28 Clinias takes this majority for a totality. 
Clinias' error, then, is transparent to anyone who has read the Statesman. Law 
cannot account for every exception or disparity, and so provides a general rule that, like 
a "stubborn and ignorant man," cannot apply to all cases. It may be true that the sussitia 
were instituted with a view to war, but they became permanent not because war is 
permanent but because it was simpler to make it a law for all times than for some. Much 
later the Athenian will suggest his own account of the origin of sussitia (780b2-9). Some 
war or other emergency legislated them by necessity (c£. 709a), but once forced to do it, 
men realized that it was an advantageous practice not only for preparedness for war, but 
also to promote lawfulness and fellow-feeling. Thus the Athenian recommends that 
women, too, should partake of the sussitia, not for war, but for the sake of law and order 
(781a). It is part of the Athenian's argument that in fact even the Spartan and Cretan 
regimes look to more than simply war, even if most Spartans and Cretans fail to 
recognize this. War breeds virtues that are useful also in peacetime, but it does not breed 
awareness of those virtues. Thus the presence of the sussition leads Clinias to believe that 
there is nothing but war, when the institution itself, when properly understood, is 
evidence of the value of community and friendship. Thinking back to the Gorgias, this 
insight is also instructive for understanding the case of Callicles, whose thesis of the 
28 Politics 1324b7f. 
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right of the stronger could be seen to be, not a special insight into the nature of things, 
but a hasty generalization based on the agonistic politics of imperial Athens. The 
stubbornness of law consists in its posing its own partiality as true of all cases, so that it 
distorts the truth of things.29 All the failings of law as identified in the Statesman can be 
recognized in Clinias' account of the iussition. 
It is remarkable, then, to see Clinias twice appeal to nature in his explanation of 
Cretan law. And in less than a page he manages to employ a great number of the terms 
identifiable from the Gorgias as typical of Plato's discussion of natural law. Clinias' two 
appeals to nature work in slightly different ways. His first is to the nature of the land of 
Crete, which everyone can see. Its rough and broken terrain demands a mode of warfare 
suitable to it. Here Clinias explains a particularity of Cretan laws about warfare-they 
do not use cavalry or heavily armed hoplites, but archers and skirmishers-by the 
evident features of the land. In the plains of Thessaly, he admits, it is appropriate to 
have different laws (625dl). Nature, then, provides the measure of appropriate laws and 
customs, but since nature, like Cretan terrain, is uneven or anomalous, customs and 
laws should vary accordingly.30 
Clinias, however, limits this judicious account of the justified variability of law, 
based on the standard of nature, to secondary and instrumental laws. Variations of 
topography account for various modes of warfare, but war itself is invariable. 
Everywhere there is a struggle for power and superiority (kratein, cf. 626b3) in order to 
enjoy the goods of the vanquished, and so everywhere there is war "according to 
29 Cf., again, Dixsaut (1995, 271). 
30 lXVW!-lAAO<; recalls the lXVO!-lOLOTij'rcc; of human COnditions that leave law inevitably imprecise in 
the Statesman (294b2ff.), and looks forward to the Athenians suggestion that law is meant to 
partially resolve such differences or unevenness (Laws 918b). Consider also Aristotle, Politics 
1330b20-25), who connects variations of topography with the choice of regime: 71cQl b£ n 'mwv 
EQV!-lVWV ov naaaLc; 0!-lOLW<; EXCL '[Q OU!-lc):> EQOV 'raic; noi\L'I:ctaLc;· oiov lXKQOnoi\Lc; OALyaQXLKOV 
Kat !-1-0VaQXLKOV, bTl!-lOKQaUKOV b' 0!-lMCYtT)<;, lXQLO'rOKQaUKOV b£ ovbhcQOV, aAAa 1-lli/\A.ov 
LaxvQol 'I:0710L nA.c(ouc;. He would consider it unsurprising that Crete was ruled as a traditional 
aristocracy. 
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nature" (626a5). But this fact of nature is not evident: it is not evident to most people that 
peace is only a word. Clinias' argument that, since war is the final end of legislation, war 
is by nature, tries to make manifest the fundamental nature of things from the evidence 
of Cretan nomos. But if nomos can be evidence of the nature of things, then it must be a 
part of the nature of things. Clinias, then, does not subscribe to the dichotomy of nomos 
and phusis, at least in the case of the Cretan laws. A radical disjunction between nomos 
and phusis amounts to a questioning of the validity of any nomos as such, which is not 
something Clinias is willing to entertain. The arbitrariness of nomos is invisible to those 
who live within it. Pre-reflectively at least, everyone thinks that their ways are natural: 
everyone takes natural law as a given. 
Accordingly, the Athenian's tactic with Clinias is not to . challenge his 
understanding of things directly, but to have him consider the virtues of other, foreign 
customs. To the Dorian sussition he contrasts the Ionian sumposion, which brings to light 
social virtues besides those geared simply to war. Only much later, as said above, does 
he revise Clinias' understanding of the sussition itself. For the moment, he tries to show 
Clinias not that he is wrong about the sussition, but that he is not entirely right about 
nature. Clinias admits later that he has been given the care of founding a new Cretan 
colony, and ordered "to set down laws from among the ones found here, if some are to 
our satisfaction, but also if there are any from abroad, if they appear better, making no 
account of their foreignness" (702c5-8). Clinias is not so much a champion of his own 
laws as to deny outright the possibility of finding good laws elsewhere. The Stranger's 
task, then, is not so much to malce Clinias doubt the validity or naturalness of his 
ancestral laws, but to define a comprehensive standard of good law that transcends the 
distinction of familiar and alien. As his combining of the sumposion and sussition 
suggests, he approaches natural standard of law by considering the diversity of actual 
-
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laws, and the various goods they might aim for, as clues for understanding a 
comprehensiVe . good . His aim is not to radically alter Clinias' perspective, but to 
gradually deepen and complicate it, slowly opening him to that which is genuinely 
·foreign. 
Law as reconciling difference 
Ihe Stranger's first aim is to bring Clinias arid Megill us to understand that war is only a 
partial and secondary aim of political life. Much more important is harmony within the 
political community itself. After Clinias explained his understanding of the sussition as 
indicating a state of perpetual war between all men and even within all men, and 
claimed that the conquest of oneself was the first and best of all victories (626el-5), the 
·-
Athenian has him reascend the ladder, asking what such victory looks like in a 
household, neighborhood, and city. Clinias claims that when "the better conquer the 
multitude cu1.d the worse, the city would be said to be itself better (kreitton) than itself, 
and would most justly be praised for such a conquest."31 The Athenian lets go the 
difficulty of explaining what it means for the ''worse" part of a city to prevail over the 
"better" if better and worse are understood solely in terms of power-for that would be 
"too long an argument"32_:_and chooses to understand Clinias as saying that a city is 
"worse than itself" when the majority is unjust and violently enslaves the just minority, 
and better when the just minority prevails (627b). He thus gracefully ignores Clinias' 
clearly conventional and ~istocratic tmderstanding of the better and worse, replacing 
31 627a5-9. 
32 We have considered this argument at length in the discussion of Callicles' law of the stronger in 
the first chapter. Following that discussion through in the Laws would amount to showing that 
the true measure of power is the ability to live the good life of virtue and promote it as much as 
· possible in the city. The Athenian Stranger's refusal to entertain this question is one of the first · 
indications of the kind of "compromise" he believes must be made -of the ideal of natural law if it 
is to have any influence in the sphere of political action . . 
{:. 
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the distinction of political status with that of justice, which no good aristocrat could 
object to. Clinias recognizes the bind he has been put in: "it's quite unusual, Stranger, 
what's just been said, but all the same there's the greatest necessity to agree that it is so" 
(627clf.). The Athenian leads him then to consider the case of a family. If there were 
. ., - . . 
many sons of the same father and mother, and the majority of them unjustly prevailed 
over the minority who were better, then the family would be "worse" than itself but also 
"stronger" than itself. The Stranger insists that he is not making verbal quibbles, but a 
point about the natural correctness and error about laws (627c3-d4). The Stranger 
continues: if these brothers were to come under the authority of a judge, what kind of 
judge would be best? The one who killed the unjust and left the good to rule themselves, 
the one who made the good rule, but allowed the worse to live and be ruled willingly, or 
a third one who "taking one family that is at variance with itself, would kill no one, but 
would be able, by reconciling them for the rest of time and laying down laws for them, 
to secur~ their friendship for each other" (627cll-628a3)? 
· Clinias answers that the last judge would be "far better" (628a4£.), though the 
Stranger is not necessarily in agreement.33 The mention of kinship seems to have 
33 The Stranger inh·oduces the third judge with the phrase: TQLTOV bf. nov bLKaaU]v nQoc; UQ£TI]v . 
dnwwv (627e3f.), which naturally reads as "let us speak of a judge third in point of virtue" (cf. 
England ad lac.). But that is clearly not how Clinias understands the phrase, for his response does. 
not suggest any disagreement with the Stranger, and later (708d7) the Stranger will say that 
legislation, whose task is both to make men live under common laws and also to make them 
"breathe together as one like a team of horses" is a "perfect test" nQOc; lXQETI]v avbQWV. England 
therefore suggests that TQLTOV be read in an ascending order as "third and best," but as Benardete 
(2002, 15) notes, this is forced. I believe that the flow of the entire passage suggests a different 
interpretation. The Stranger begins by asking which of two kinds of judge is better (m'n£QOc; ouv 
Uf.LELVwv), then introduces a third judge for consideration, who Clinias immediately asserts is far 
better (f.WKQQ lif.Ldvwv). Clinias, then, understands nQoc; UQETI]vas correlate to IXf.Ldvwv and the 
whole sentence as an expansion of the Stranger's first question. I would therefore suggest 
punctuating the whole sentence introduced by TQLTOV bf. nov bLKaaTI]v as a question and 
understanding nQoc; UQ£TI]v as predicative with bLKaaTI]v (for a parallel cf. Republic 54%3: 
f.LMAOV a£i. aami(OLTO av Tcf.> T£ f.1£Tf-X£LV Tijc; TOU q>LAOXQTJf.llXTOV <j>va£Wt; Kai. f.LTJ dvaL 
£ii\LKQLvTJI, nQoc; tXQEn')v). I would then translate the first clause as: ~'But shall we say that 
somehow a third judge [is] virtuous, if there were someone of the kind to ... ?" This reading would . 
preserve the Stranger's possible reservations about the third judge without unduly straining the 
evident flow of question and answer. For the implied 'friendship of better and worse, consider the 
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reminded Clinias that love and friendship are also thi.ngs to be sought, for that can be 
the only reason for him preferring the third 't o the second judge. The second judge 
would have made the better rule and the worse be ruled willingly, which especially in 
light of the Statesman would seem to be the true rule directed at virtue, though the 
Athenian already compromises that ideal somewhat by saying that the worse would be 
ruled willingly, while the Eleatic Stranger had considered that distinction irrelevant.31 
The Eleatic had done that in part because he recognized that the worse could never be 
genuinely persuaded to be ruled on the basis of kflowledge precisely because that 
knowledge was opaque to them. Socrates had already suggested that persuasion, even 
by flattery, could succeed only on the basis of some genuine affinity-everyone would 
see through Callicles' political flattery of the demos (Gorgias 513b). Only if the good and 
the bad live according to the same law, then, can they find a kind of reconciliation and 
fellow-feeling that would keep the tendencies of the worse in check without alienating 
them from their rulers.35 In the Crito, Socrates argues that there can be no common moral 
or political deliberation except on the basis of fundamental agreement about moral 
premises (49d), and since he could not persuade Crito dialectically according to his own 
firm conviction that one must never to do harm, he anticipates the Athenian Stranger's 
use of legislative preludes by resorting to an argument in the persona of the Laws of 
Athens, based on different premises (including the title ·of the parent to rule the child) 
which Ciitocan accept. The Athenian Stranger's third judge apparently acts in just the 
. same way, reconciling the better and worse through the common agreement of law. Just 
crucial passage at Gorgias 507e4-508b2, where Socrates' appeal to the order of the cosmos and 
"geometrical equality" is supposed to result in the friendship and community of all things 
according to their station, just as he and Callicles are supposed to become friends. 
34 Socrates in the Gorgias would also prefer the second judge. Cf. Gorgias 490?6-8. 
35 Cf. England ad lac. 
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as Socrates accommodated his friend Crito's failure to understand, so the Stranger's 
proposed accommodation will cause the better and worse to live as friends.36 
The laws proposed by the Athenian, then, will not be unmediated expressions of 
the natural law standard of value, but copies eis dunamin, as the legislator is supposed to 
imitate the rule in the age of Cronus eis dunamin, not to consider himself to be the 
embodiment of reason. He illustrates most generally the nature of this compromise in 
his discussion of the serious concern, or lack thereof, that human beings merit. The 
Athenian was beginning to discuss the need for the equal education of women, which he 
will resume after the digression, and perhaps sensing the incredulity of his interlocutors, 
advises them not to take it too seriously. Like a shipwright preparing to lay the keel of a 
new vessel, the Stranger is "trying to set out the shapes of [human] ways of life (bioi) 
according to the characteristics of souls ... and to consider correctly by what means and 
in joining with which characteristics we can guide our way of life (bios) best of all along 
this voyage of life" (zoe, 803a5-b3). Addressing directly, then, the question of Socrates 
ahd Callicles-how ought one best to live?-the Stranger continues to say that "the 
affairs of human beings are unworthy of great seriousness, but it is still necessary to take 
them seriously. This is unfortunate, but since we are here in this condition, if we 
somehow do it in some fitting way (prosekhontos), perhaps it would be commensurate 
(summetron) to us" (803b3-7). Only god is by nature worthy of "all blessed seriousness," 
while the human being has been fashioned as a mere plaything of god, so that it is most 
appropriate for men and women to spend their lives at play (803c). But most fail to 
recognize this. They believe that we do what is serious in order to enjoy the playful, as 
we wage war in order to enjoy peace. But by considering war more serious than peace, 
they tend to give all their attention to war and neglect the art of peace, like the Dorians. 
36 For an interpretation of the Crito in line with this insight, cf. Miller (1996/. 
208 
Thus Clinias at the beginning of the dialogue had said that war allowed the victor to 
enjoy the goods of the vanquished, but that all the laws of Crete and Sparta were 
directed towards war, and not the proper use of the spoils of war. War, then, is not a 
kind of play, nor a proper education for play, but it is play that "we assert to the most 
serious thing for us" (803d). 
Human beings are mistaken, in other words, in taking seriously what is neither 
serious nor properly playful, and in not taking the playful seriously enough. Human 
beings ought to devote their serious concern to the god or what is divine, but according 
to the yardstick of divinity, which the Stranger had said was the only proper measure 
(716c4), all human activity, even the human activity toward or in imitation of divinity, 
can be taken no more seriously than the game of a child. According to this standard, the 
"moderate play of old men" (685a7f.) in which the three interlocutors of the Laws are 
engaged, is more serious than the activity of lawgiving itself, which would seem to be 
the most serious of activities. "Vain philosophy" would be more worthy of serious 
concern than the sober administration of cities. But even philosophy cannot be taken too 
seriously, since even at their best, human beings "live out their lives according to the 
way of nature, being puppets for the most part, but sharing in a small portion of truth" 
(804b2f.). While stated in rather ecstatic terms more reminiscent of the playful Ph.aedrus 
than the moralizing Gorgias, the Athenian Stranger's own statement of the law of nature, 
which expresses a rank of value descending from the divine itself to the divine in us, to 
our body and external possessions (728b-c), lets us see how concerning oneself with the 
legislation of cities, · which must inevitably give more concern to what is lower, will 
always be a compromise of this order. It need not, however, be a complete denial of that 
order and of natural law. To legislate everything with a view to war, however, is to turn 
that order upside down. The Stranger's argument in the Laws could be characterized as 
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explaining how natural law must be bent, but not broken, in accordance with the 
exigencies of human life, but also how our nlisplaced seriousness can be devoted to 
more appropriate concerns. 
Anomaly 
From the Athenian's perspective, the ridiculousness of the human predicament is that 
even if we are, like him, aware of what is most valuable in the world and in us, we are 
still compelled by our own needirtess to neglect this divine standard in order to take care 
of merely human concerns. Like the Eleatic Stranger, he recognizes that political reality 
is something that must be "lived with" (cf. Statesman 302b). He had already 
reformulated Socrates' law of geomeb.ical equality as giving equal shares to the equal, 
and unequal to the unequal in accord with a set standard of value (757b-c), but it turns 
out that most of the time we do the opposite. Even if we set this reversal right, however, 
our situation is still ridiculous, for as possessors of only a "small portion of truth" we are 
still nothing serious according to the measure of god. If we imitate god in the life of 
philosophy, as the Eleatic Stranger and Socrates had suggested, 37 then we give to 
ourselves more than is due, and if we do not, then we are selling ourselves short.38 There 
seems to be no measure according to which we can do precisely what is appropriate, 
fitting, and so serious. Thus, with a second-best appropriateness, the Athenian suggests 
that, while we are always forced to engage in such "serious" matters, we give up such 
seriousness as much as possible and live our.lives at play. 
37 For Socrates, cf. esp. Theaetetus 176a-b. 
38 According the Athenian Stranger, human beings become "divine" by the study of arithmetic 
and astronomy (818c). 
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This unstable hovering between proportional equality and inequality is 
illustrated by the Athenian Stranger's account of eros, which he understands to be a 
compound of two different kinds of love (philia). The first "friendship" is of "like for like 
in virtue, and equal for equal," while the second philia is of "the lacking for the wealthy 
and opposite in kind," and each one of these, when it is especially intense, is called eros 
(837a6-9). This second kind of love is not based on anything shared, but on the desire of 
the lover to obtain what he wants from the beloved. What is more particularly called eros 
is mixed of these two elements and is pulled in contrary directions, esteeming the 
virh1es of the beloved's soul, desiring to use the beloved's body for its own enjoyment, 
but recognizing that "the satiation of the body on [another] body is degradation" (hubris, 
837c5f).39 It is hubris because one cannot respect the manly and other virhles of the 
beloved while having him to imitate the female (836elf.).40 The complexity of this "third 
eros," w hich makes it "not easy to comprehend," is its simultaneous adherence to, and 
violation of, an equality according to a standard of valueY In this case the Athenian 
Stranger considers what he takes to be the degradation of mere sexual desire, which 
39 Cf. Follon (2003, 188f.), who notes the mixed nature of eros, and the Stranger's opposition to "la 
foederastie charnelle," but does not attempt to explain the logic behind the Stranger's opposition. 
0 It is clear, then, that the Athenian has particularly in mind homosexual desire, and his proposal 
to discourage all homosexual acts (he has no problem with homosexual love) as reducing the 
passive partner to the status of a woman is somewhat at odds with his argument that women 
should be educated equally, and so are not of decidedly inferior status. It should be noted that 
the Stranger wants to discourage all sexual activity, even heterosexual, that is outs.ide of 
procreation, which suggests that the real reason for avoiding sex is not the degradation of one 
partner to a woman's status, but the tendency in both partners toward immoderate indulgence in 
pleasure. His appeal to more traditional, misogynistic views might, then, be seen as an attempt to 
persuade the conventional Clinias and Megillus that their enjoyment of paederasty is 
inconsonant with their devotion to the manly virtues of war. But it is clearly not the case that "in 
his old age" Plato came to "oppose homosexuality," since the Athenian Stranger's 
recommendations to avoid sex with either men or women is no more strongly worded than 
Socrates' in the Phaedrus. For a sensible discussion of Plato's attitude toward homosexuality, see 
Dover (1978). 
41 A much more concrete example of how eros tends to "mix the orders" is the problem of 
illegitimate offspring. The Stranger proposes a law that all children born from the intercourse of a 
free-born with a slave are to be considered slaves (930d-e), which, as Morrow (1939, 196) notes is 
more prejudicial to the child than the corresponding Athenian law of the time, and is dearly 
intended, along with a variety of other laws, to keep the line between free men and slaves as 
clearly drawn as possible. 
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makes us "worse than beasts" (840d4), but a similar blurring of measures is also present 
in Socrates' accounts of philosophical eros, which aims at something higher and more 
valuable than the human. From our ordinary human perspective, then, this eros also 
devalues the human, precisely becaus~ it wishes to transcend the merely human. Thus, 
even though the Athecian Stranger fails to explicitly mention philosophy and speaks 
only of the playfulness of songs and religious festivals, Clinias still faults him for 
"altogether-helittling (diaphaulizeis) the human race" (804b6). 
Plato's name for this kind of disparity or failure to properly stand in relation to 
the measure is anomalotes, literally 'unevenness'. The natural roughness (anomalos) of the 
Cretan terrain explained why their custom was to fight as skirmishers instead of 
heavily-armed hoplites, which are suitable to flatter terrain, but the term has a far 
broader significance in the Laws. From the Athenian Stranger's account of the origin of 
political communi. ties, we know that he accepts the view of the Statesman that the task of 
law and politics in general is to keep in check the human tendencies to excessive 
irascibility or quietude, that is, to limit or di.rect certain kinds of motions inherent in 
human nature, which can lead to an excessive interest in war and piracy or vulgar 
commercialism (831e). In the Timaeus, all rest is a result of evenness or levelness, while 
the cause of all motion is inequality or unevenness.47 This remark comes from Timaeus' 
account of the origin of body and motion .from the ideal geometrical bodies, but it is 
clear that .it is supposed to have a more general significance. Thus the Athenian Stranger 
stresses the importance of maintaining an evenness of wealth in their city, putting limits 
on its acquisition, and forbidding the sale of a citizen's original allotment of land 
42 Timaeus 57e6-8: OlJ'luJ bi] o •rcicnv ~d:v f.v Of.W.i\6uyn, KLVT)<JLV bf de; avw!-la.i\O'l.TJ'IU oc:i. n8WflcV· 
Ul'Ila ()£ CtVLUO'IT)c; au 'Lijc; CtVWflCti\OU <j>uacwc;. 
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(741a7f.), that is, not to "move the immovable" (kinein ta akineta, 684el, 843a1).43 
Inequality of wealtl1 is a force that can destabilize a political order. Elsewhere he 
encourages marriages between wealthy and poor families lest, as a result of growing 
class distinctions, "the whole city becomes uneven (anomalos) in wealth and the 
dispositions of characters" (773b6-c1).44 All such differences are to be avoided because 
they may lead to unwanted innovations or revolutions motivated by the uncontrolled 
desires of the rich or poor (736e4-737a2).45 Therefore the laws of a good and stable 
regime must be kept as much as possible unaltered (akinetoi, 798bl). 
Unevenness or anomaly, then, is the most general name in Plato's vocabulary for 
the obstacle that nomos faces and that it must at least partially overcome.46 Law 
establishes a measure or limit that can properly regulate the irregularity of human 
43 At 684d-e the Athenian notes the good luck of the Dorians, who could fo~nd their community 
based on equal allotments of land without redistribution, which would inevitably cause disputes. 
Cf. Aristotle's discussion in the Politics of the proper distribution of property, which he once 
refers to as '[a vuv QTJ8EV'ra wic; 71EQL n')v aVWf1MlaV 'rfic; nr1acwc; (1270a16). At 1266a40ff., he . 
notes the suggestion of the legislator Phaleus of Chalcedon that the fastest way to equalize 
property would be to compel rich families to pay out dowries while not receiving them: Of1Cvc; bi: 
'rlXXlU'r' av Ofla/\La8fivaL 'rcfJ 'rae; TI:QOLKac; wuc; flEV rr/\ova(ovc; OLOOVaL flEV /\afl~lXV£LV bi: flrl, 
44 In the same vein, the Athenian also (less plausibly) argues that citizens should refrain from the 
enjoyments of the marriage bed while drunk, lest any offspring turn out worse than otherwise 
(775d1-4): am(Qnv ouv rraQa<j:>OQOc; afla Kai. KaKoc; 6 f1£8uwv, Wa'r' aVWflAAa Kal ama'ra Kal 
ovbi:v £U8U7lOQOV ij8oc; ovbi: miJfla EK 'l:WV ELKO'l:WV ycvV<fJTJ 7"(0'[' av. 
45 For the identification of "evenness" with virtuous living and a just political arrangement, cf. 
Menexenus 239a3ff., quoted in chapter 1; also !socrates, Panegt;ricus 151: Ol b' £v 'raic; flcyta'ratc; 
b6l;atc; 6vn:c; atnwv Ofla/\w~ flEv ovbe lCOLVW~ ovbe 7l0AL'tl1CW~ OU0£7lW7lO'r' £~(waav, 
anavnx bi: '(QV XQOVOV blliyovaLV de; flEV wuc; U~Ql(OV'r£c;, 'rOLe; bE OOVA£VOV'r£c;, we; av 
aV8QW7lOL fllXALG'ra 'rae; <j:>uanc; 0La<j:>8aQ£L£V. 
46 Plato was not the only Greek author to see a serious connection beneath the wordplay. Cf. 
Demosthenes, In Aristogeitona I 15: i] flEV <j:>umc; EO"'[ LV lhatc'tOV tcai. aVWJ.iaAOV Kal Ka'r ' avbQ' 
[btov wu £xovwc;, ol VOflOL xo(vov xai. 'r£'rayf1£vov xal 'l:au'ro m:Xmv; and ibid., 16: rrliatv taov 
xal O!J.OLOV, Kal mum £anv VO!J.Oc;. !socrates, Areopagiticus 29f., is more restrained in his 
wordplay, though the thought is the same : Kal TCQWWV flEV '!:a 7l£QL 'roue; 8couc;, - EVT£u8£v 
yaQ lXQX£a8aL bbcaLOV, - OVK aVWJ.Lai\.w~ ovb' a'taK'fWc; o{n' Ee£QlXTC£VOV o{n' WQyia(,ov· ovb' 
OTCO'r£ fl EV bol;w:v avwic;, 'rQLaKoa(ovc; ~ouc; ETCEflTCOV, 6n6n bi: 'l:UXOL£V, 'rite; na'rQLOVc; 8vaiac; 
£~£/\c mov· ovb£ 'rae; flEV £m8E'l:OVc; EOQ'rac;, ale; EU'l:Laa(c; nc; TCQOUclTJ, fl£YM07lQ£nWc; ijyov, EV 
b£ wic; ayLW'rlX'rOLc; '(c;:JV L£QWV ana f1LU8Wf1lX'rWV £8vov· a/\/\' EK£LVO flOVOV E~QOVV, onwc; 
flTJbf:v flrl'r £ 'rWV na'rQLwV Ka'ra/\vaovmv flrl'r' £l;w 'twv VO!J.Ll;:O!J.EVwv TCQoa8r1aovmv. More 
recently, Donald Davidson's theory of anomalous monism (which with strict propriety should be 
called "anomie monism") also plays on the similarity of 'lawless' and 'uneven' in Greek, as 
Davidson, no mean classicist, certainly knew. 
213 
desires. 47 Money and the market are the Athenian Stranger's most extreme examples of 
how the conventional can even out the anomalies of human nature, and so of how 
human conventions can themselves be sanctioned according to a natural standard. 
Money (nomisma) is paradigmatically conventional, and therefore apparently lacking the 
universality of nature. But even if there are different systems of currency, they may all 
fulfill a similar natural function. At any rate, the Strangers argues that 
all trade in the city, insofar as it's according to nature, has come into being not 
for the worse, but quite the opposite. For how could someone not be a benefactor 
who renders the being of things (possession of goods) of any kind, when it is 
incommensurate and uneven, even and commensurate? And we must say, that it 
is the power of money to accomplish this rendering. And it ought to be said that 
the h~ader is appointed to this task .... All are capable of just this, to discover 
assistance for all needs and an evenness for beings (equal distribution for 
properties). 48 
The bracketed text in the translation translates the more immediate commercial sense of 
ousian khrematon and homaloteta tais ousias, and the whole passage seems to be aiming at 
the same point made more clearly by Aristotle in the Ethics, that money provides a 
common measure of the values of things as well as a medium of exchange.49 But the talk 
of bringing a common measure to all things can only recall the Athenian's statement that 
god, and not, as Protagoras thought, man, was the measure of all things (718c4). Law, 
which imitates the god and nous as much as it can, tries to bring all things under it into a 
47 That this is the most basic task of politics was made clear in our analysis of the Statesman, as 
well as from the contrast between Callicles' law of infinite desire and Socrates proportional 
equality in the Gorgias. For this general understanding of law as putting a limit on transgressive 
desire, cf. Philebus 26b7-10: vf3QLV yaQ nov KaL mJt-maaav 7ttXVTC.UV 7tOVT]QlaV av'IT] Ka·dbovaa TJ 
8£6<;; [sc. AcpQobm'J] . .. rr£Qa<;; o{rr£ Tjbovwv ouu nATJa1-1ovwv f.v at)'[OL<;;, v61-1ov Kai 'ta~Lv 
TtEQW:; EXOV'r , £8 ETO. 
48 Laws 918a8-c3: KamJAEia yaQ Ka'l:a rr6Alv rraaa y£yov£V ou f3At:if3TJ<;; EVEK.a '1:0 Y£ Ka'I:a cpumv, 
rriiv bi:. 'l:OUVaV'l:LOV· rrw<;; yaQ OUK EUEQYE'ITJ<;; ?tii<;; 0<;; av oualav XQTJt-ltX'l:WV wvnvwvouv, 
claU!-1t-l£'rQOV ovaav KaL tXVWt-lMOV, Ot-laAr1v '[£ KaL aU!-1!-lE'rQOV cX7IEQylil:T]'l:aL; TOU'l:O TJt-lLV XQTJ 
cpavaL KaL Tijv 'l:ou vo1-1i.a~Lam<;; arr£Qyat:~:a8m buvat-lLV, K.ai 'l:Ov £1-1rroQov f.rrL TOUT<fJ T£Tax8m 
bEL A£ynv.. .. mu'l:6 yc nav'l:a buva'l:aL, rriimv f. mKOUQLaV TaL<; XQELaL<;; f.~wrroQELv KaL 
6!-lMO'l:TJ'l:a mi<;; oualaL<;;. · . 
49 NE 1133a18-31; compare Politics 1257b10-12. Cf. Statesman 289d4-290a2. Socrates had punned on 
the double sense of ovala at Gorgias 472b6. 
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commensurate relation.50 In the sh·ictly commercial context, it is only the apparently 
most unnatural convention of assigning an · arbitrary value to pieces of metal that, by 
removing the inconveniences of barter, makes a community of artisans possible.51 
Without the medium of money, the principle of justice that no one should practice more 
than one art would be impracticable (cf. 846d).52 This, according to the Athenian 
Stranger, must be the function of money "as far as it's according to nature," and he 
forbids the hoarding of currency beyond what is required for regular needs or the use of 
interest (742a-c). 
The Athenian Stranger thinks, then, that nomos in general works in the same way 
as the particular nomisma of money.53 To take only the example of eros considered above, 
he believes that the same power of taboo that restrains incest could be extended to 
suppress all non-procreative sex, thus bringing the hubristic and irregular aspects of eros 
closer to proper order and measure (838c-d, 839a8). Another more general example of 
proper legislation reconciling disparities in standards of value is the very discussion 
between the Athenian and Clinias and Megillus, which reconciles Dorian with Ionian 
5° For a similar thought, cf. Phaedo 69a6-10: D f.llXKtXQL£ LLf.lf.lla, f.lTJ yaQ oux aUTT) 1J i] 6Q8i] rrQ6<; 
liQPn'jv MAayr'), ~bovac; rrQ<'>c; i]bovac; Kai. Aurra<; rrQ<'>c; Aurrac; Kai. <j:>6~ov rrQ<'>c; <j:>6~ov 
KaTaAAanw8m, f.lcil;,w rrQoc; iAanw W(JTt£Q VOf.lLOf.laTa, ai\.A' t;1 iKeivo f.lOVov To VOf.lLOf.la 
6Q86v, avTi ou bei navTa TavTa KaTaAAa'tTE<J8aL, <j:>QOVT]<JL<;, 
51 The example in the passage from Aristotle cited above is the "equalizing" of the products of the 
shoemaker and the house-builder: one house will be worth more shoes than the house-builder 
will ever need, but if the shoemaker has money saved from other sales of shoes, a fair and 
convenient exchange can be made. 
52 In the Laws, the definition of justice "one man, one job" is taken over from the Republic and 
again given an explicit grounding in nature: "hardly any human nature is sufficient to labor in 
two occupations or two arts" (846d7f.). 
·
53 Benardete (2002) 314£. notes that bk. XI of the Laws, which appears to be a hodge-podge of 
private laws, can be seen as providing laws to manage irregularities or things that are out of their 
proper place. Thus in addition to the regularization of retail trade, there are laws to deal with the 
unexpected discovery of buried treasure, the senility of parents, whose authority is otherwise to 
be respected, the status of orphans and the disowned, and laws of divorce, which all in their 
various ways involve departures from "regular" familial relations. Bk. XI has the most concrete 
examples of laws meant to reconcile, as well as of institutions to soften, the blunt force of the Law 
that was found so oppressive in the Statesman. 
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practices and forces Clinias to admit that a city must not only be measured by its success 
in war, but also its suitability for the activities of peace and friendship. 
In all of these examples, law straightens out the anomalous irregularity of things 
by influencing human beliefs and actions. In the Athenian's view, this influence comes 
from the combination of rational and less than fully rational persuasion and threats that 
constitute legal preludes, as well as the simple prohibition and punishment that attends 
all law as such. He had noted how easy it was, in a tyrannically ruled city, to quickly 
change the characters and attitudes of citizens by changing the laws (710b4-10). While 
law in the Statesman was a blunt and static instrument that could not properly take 
account of the variety of human natures and circumstances, law in the Laws is 
understood dynamically, as being able to actually mold and influence human characters 
and attitudes, and so, if used properly, to bring them closer to knowledge. It is thus able 
to at least partially overcome or reconcile the conflicting tendencies in human nature 
that are identified in both dialogues as the source of political conflict and injustice. This 
dynamic understanding of law is perhaps one of the Laws' most important additions to 
the explicit account of law in the Statesman. 54 Conventional nomoi can, at their best, bring 
us closer to understanding natural law. 
Two concrete examples of how the Stranger's conciliatory approach to law works 
are his accounts of spec:ial adjudication to soften the blunt impact of law, and his 
provision for the limited revision of law in contrast to the Eleatic Stranger's (apparent) 
forbidding of any reform of the legal code. First, following the proposal of a variety of 
laws concerning marriage that are intended to keep the number of original land 
54 In the Statesman, this more dynamic understanding of law is suggested by the Eleatic Stranger's 
talk of divine and human bonds, but these are said first of all to be the methods of the statesman 
who rules without law, and it is only after we see that this description of the statesman is meant 
to be a regulative ideal for the piecemeal work of lawgivers and reformers that can we begin to 
understand the rule of law as working by similar means. 
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allotments as much as possible the same, the Stranger notes that these laws will 
naturally go against the inclination of many citizens, who might be forced to marry 
someone much older or of an incompatible disposition. In such a situation, one might 
resent the legislator for having given no thought to one's plight, but that is not the case . 
. :· . ., .. ' . ' . 
Rather, the legislator, in caring for the common good, cannot account for every 
particular misfortune and should be forgiven. But facing such a plight, one should also 
be forgiven oneself for not wanting to cede to the command of the law (925d5-926a3). 
The Athenian, then, recognizes the same failing of law as the Eleatic Stranger, that it 
cannot account sufficiently for all particular cases, and he goes even further to make 
allowance for individual inclination and ambition, not merely what is in the "best 
interests" of the individual.55 In such cases, recalling the Statesman's trope of the 
legislator or doctor gone out of town, he argues that arbitrators should be appointed to 
make an equitable ruling, on the understanding that if the lawgiver were alive and 
present (paronta kai zi5nta), he would not compel such alliances in all cases (926b7-c4). 
A second example is the Stranger's position on the revision of law. On this 
subject very little needs to be added to Bobonich's judicious discussion.56 The only point 
necessary to make here is how the Athenian Stranger's limited allowance for legal 
revision answers the concerns the Eleatic Stranger voiced in the Statesman about the risks 
55 One of the examples is of a young man compelled to marry his cousin, but who is set on 
making a better marriage (926a8-b2). Thus the Stranger even makes allowance for the kind o 
pursuit of wealth and social climbing that he tries as much as possible to discourage. In other 
cases, however, such as when the law would force one to marry an insane person (926b2-6), it is a 
clear case of equity trumping the letter of the law. 
56 Bobonich (2004) 395-409. He shows that the passages where the Stranger seems to forbid 
innovation are concerned only with dances and religious sacrifices (772a6-d4), and the childhood 
education of pleasure through correct play (797a7-798d5), and that there is no warrant to expand 
the ban on innovation in these matters to law in general. (In fact, at the end of the second passage, 
it is not even clear that innovation is banned absolutely: such changes require the most tactful 
care--nAd a'IT)£; c:vAa~£ia£; b£C)f1Eva-which need not imply rigid inflexibility.) Bobonich collects 
passages that show that the content of the Laws is meant not as a literal blueprint, but merely as 
an outline, of a legal code (769a7-e2, 828b3-7), Thus the guardians of the laws (nomophulakes) will 
also be lawgivers (nomothetai, 770a8).Bobonich also notes the Stranger's discussion of the theoroi 
that we discuss below. 
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of permitting change in a legal code. Most generally, the Eleatic Stranger's objection to 
the revision of law was that law was the faute de mieux alternative in the absence of a true 
knower of the political art, and thus that any revision of the law would be done through 
ignorcm~e and so at least as likely to make things worse as improve them. The 
Athenian's answer to these concerns is, first, not to grant the power of legal revision to a 
large assembly, but to the nomophulakes, who are chosen for their uprightness and sound 
understanding.57 Further, as will be shown in the next section, the Athenian draws a 
continuum from the empirical understanding based on the study of particular cases to 
the ideal of unified knowledge based on forms. This continuum bridges the strict 
dichotomy that the Eleatic Stranger had explicitly established between episteme and 
empeiria, bringing law in principle closer to the flexibility of precise knowledge. 
Furthermore, if law, as the Athenian Stranger's account of the origin of the political 
community argues, does not consist of the writings left behind by a departed wise man 
but is the product of ad hoc conciliation between different tribal groups coming together 
in society, then the act of composing law for the first time is not categorically different 
from the act of revising law. The Athenian is no proponent of change for its own sake, 
and wishes to instill a "conservative bias" in the laws that would discourage change 
unless it is clearly needed, 58 but he recognizes that law can be revised on the basis of the 
same imperfectly rational understanding that guided original legislation. If law is 
always a compromise, then it is not irrational to suppose that the terms of the 
compromise will from time to time have to be altered. 
57 Cf. the references in the footnote immediately above. Recall also that in the Statesman, the 
argument for revision was called the "argument of the many" and presupposed a democratic 
constitution reminiscent of that in Athens. Obviously no such assumption is present in the 
Athenian Stranger's argument. 
58 The phrase is Bobonich's (2004, 402). 
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Persuasion and reason in the preludes 
The two themes of mediation and compromise that we have been considering in the 
Laws come together i.n the Athenian Stranger's introduction of preludes into his account 
of lawgiving. It is by means of the persuasive argument of the preludes that willing 
subservience to the laws can be best achieved, and thereby irregular desires at least 
partially kept within the measure of the good, but persuasion requires that the lawgiver 
adopt at least to some extent the perspective and opinions of the ruled. Persuasion 
provides the dynamic element of law that the Eleatic Stranger had at best hinted at. The 
purity of rational knowledge that was extolled in the Statesman is abandoned in the 
preludes, which-the Athenian Stranger admits-falls short of purely rational 
argumentation. Perhaps · the most extreme example of this is the Stranger's mention of 
the "Sidonian myth" of the sown-men and autochthony, which is quite unbelievable 
(apithanon) but proved easy to persuade people of (663e-664a). He brought up this 
example after he had said that even if it were untrue that the just way of life is more . 
pleasant than the unjust, it would be the most profitable of lies for the lawgiver to tell. 
When the Stranger comes to the question of laws concerning the telling of falsehoods 
and the selling of adulterated goods, he says that lying will only be proscribed when the 
liar has sworn an oath on the gods, or when an inferior attempts to deceive a superior, 
such as a subject to a ruler (916e-917a). No similar injunction is made against the ruler's 
telling a lie. 
The at least partially rational persuasion of non-knowers implies that these non-
knowers are at least partially rational themselves, and in the best case capable of 
becoming knowers. The Laws' extensive interest in education, in contrast to the 
Statesman 's cursory attention to the subject, underscores this point. The Athenian 
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Stranger mentions the capacities of people inferior in knowledge and virtue to 
nevertheless recognize their superiors in his discussion of laws concerning travel abroad 
and the welcome of foreigners. A "decent respect for the opinions of mankind" demands 
that foreigners. be given reasonable access to Magnesia, so as to cultivate a good 
reputation amongst them (950a-b). "For most people haven't fallen so farshort in being 
able to judge who of other people are bad and good as they have of the being of virtue, 
and there is something divine and insightful (eustokhon) even in bad people, so that very 
many even of the especially bad distinguish well the better human beings from the 
worse by their words and reputations" (950b5-c2).59 The Athenian is clear that the many 
do not have knowledge of virtue, but a kind of doxa that is reliably based on external 
tokens of trust, which must be the same as those discussed in the Statesman's "argument 
of the many" in Chapter Three.60 The many are good at guessing and conjecture 
(stokhazein). Thus, the Spartan's illiberal practice of periodical xenelasiai, or expulsion of 
all foreigners, while not being demonstrative proof of a deficiency in Spartan 
institutions, suggests an unbecoming arbitrariness and disrespect of others (950bl-3).61 
It is such insights as these, moreover, that the Stranger must consider to be the 
beginnings of all knowledge about laws and statecraft. Laws must be preserved not only 
with good habits and customs (ethe), which are the main object of the Stranger's law 
about education, but with understanding (gnome), and to that end observers (theoroi) are 
59 England (1921) ad Zoe. thinks that m)afac; tXQE'rfic; must be understood in the sense of "really 
being a good man" and not that of "misunderstanding the true nature of virtue," but the 
Athenian Stranger has argued that the misunderstanding of virtue, such as the Spartan error that 
courage is the only true virtue, causes men to be less than perfectly virtuous (628a-629e), and if 
we supposed that there was no unlikelihood in bad people understanding fully the essence of 
virtue, then their would be need of their "divine shrewdness," for they would have knowledge of 
virtue, and so a sure criterion of who was virtuous and who was not. "Falling short of the being 
of virtue," then, must refer both to their knowledge and to their character. 
60 In this vein, the Stranger argues at 921b-c that all craftsmen must be scrupulously truthful in 
their dealings with laymen, in order to promote the reputation of their trade. 
61 Cf. Mesch (2003) 62: "zielt die Rhetorik [through preludes] des Gesetzgebers darauf, 
Unverniinftiges .in Dbereinstimmung mit Verniinftigem zu bringen." 
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to be sent out to report back on the laws and custom of other cities, which are then to be 
discussed in the Nocturnal Cotmcil (95la4-b4) The Spartan practice of xenelasia would be 
just the kind of empirical datum to draw their interest and reflection. The movement 
from mere opinion to understanding would presumably be accomplished by the kind of 
discussion the Stranger had with Clinias and Megillus about the respective merits of 
Ionian sumposia and Dorian sussitia, where the Dorians' impressions were deepened and 
corrected by rational reflection on the uses and abuses of these institutions. And while 
this mode of increasing w1derstanding inevitably begins with doxa (what we might call 
anecdote), it can be broadened by empirical observation to the point of discovering 
general truths. In the discussion of the symposium the Strange!' argued that he had 
never seen one performed correctly and goes on to suggest a different model of 
symposium guided by a sober symposiarch to curb its excesses (639dff.). Thus the 
reflection on experience leads to recommendations that, while informed by experience, 
are not slavishly based on any prior experience. The reflection on tradition can lead to 
conclusions that lie beyond tradition. Nomos, again, points beyond itself to what is 
naturally or simply good. 
The Athenian Stranger later argues that the culmination of this process of inquiry 
is "being able to look from many, dissimilar things to a single idea" (965cl-3)62 and that 
the Nocturnal Council will concern itself with the tmity of virtues and the identity of the 
beautiful and the good (965dl-7, 966a5-7), preceding by question and answer (cf. 
963d9£.). But while the problematic unity of virtue came up even at the very beginning 
of the dialogue (633a), the preludes are not meant to take the citizens to the point of 
62 Thus Stailey (1983, 181) is wrong to say that there is an ambivalence about the Stranger's 
characterization of the Nocturnal Council. He thinks that it is "not clear whether their 
qualifications to [study law] will rest on experience ... or on philosophical training." But it is 
clearly meant to be both experience and practice in the philosophical reflection on experience that 
the Stranger recommends-this is exactly his own procedure in his study of law with Clinias and 
Megill us. 
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dialectical investigations of the forms. In his first sample discourse to Clinias (cf. 
631a8f.), the Stranger said that the lawgiver will set up guardianr; for his institutions, 
some of whom proceeding by "intelligence" (phronesis) artd others through "true 
opinion" (632c4-6). Thus from the beginning of the dialogue the Athenian accepted the 
same distinction between the knower and the non-knower as the Eleatic Stranger, 
though not in so radical a form. The former clearly must be educated by the Nocturnal 
Council when their primary education is complete, but for the latter preludes are 
evidently enough. 
Preludes are first discussed explicitly at the end of book IV, where the Stranger 
remarks that while they have been talking about laws from dawn till high noon, they 
h ave only just now started considering laws as such, while the previous discussions 
were "preludes to laws" (722c6-d2). All speeches and everything partaking of voice use 
p relu des as a sort of warm up (anakinesis) and they are beneficial for bringing the speech 
to completion (722d2-5). The 'nomes' of songs played to the kithara have their preludes, 
but no one has ever composed or published a prelude for political laws "as if it were not 
by nature" (722d6-e3). But the Stranger suggests that preludes are naturally fitted to 
political laws and useful for "completing" the law in the following way. He 
distinguishes the law proper, "the tyrannical command likened ... to the commands of 
those doctors we called illiberal," from the prelude, which is "persuasive" and so 
renders the subject better-disposed to the law's command by making it easier to 
tmderstand (722e7-723b6). 
The persuasion of preludes complements and softens the law's implicit threat of 
violent enforcement (722a-b ), but the preludes themselves are not altogether free from 
threats. The prelude meant to inculcate belief in the existence and providence of the 
gods, includes the threats of Hades in the afterlife and the "justice of the gods who dwell 
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on Olympus" (904d-e),63 filial piety is sU:pposed to be reinforced by propagating the 
belief in the efficacy of curse laid upon children by their parents (like the one Oedipus 
laid upon his two sons, 931b ), and the power of the incest taboo is attributed to the 
stories of the shameful consequences of the deed, where again the case of Oedipus is 
mentioned (838c).64 Thus the stuff of tragedy will be part of the preludes even while 
tragedy itself will be all but banned from the city, which is itself already the best of 
tragedies (cf. 817a-b). On the whole, though, preludes are to consist of arguments for the 
superiority of virtuous living, and the civic poetry that will replace tragedy is to be 
based on the very conversation the three old men have had in the first six books (811c-
d). 
Persuasion is possible because even the bad person or the non-expert can reliably 
identify the good person or the expert in a techne. Preludes are to work like "liberal 
doctors" and not like their slavish attendants who go by the same name (720a5-8). The 
slavish doctor gives no rational account (logos) of the sickness, but prescribes "his 
opinions on the basis of experience as if he had precise knowledge, like a stubborn 
(authados) tyrant" (720c3-6). In other words, the slavish doctor is like law as 
characterized in the Statesman., applying one rule to all cases without a scientific account. 
The liberal doctor, on the other hand, investigates sicknesses "from the beginning and 
according to nature, spending time with the sick man himself and with his friends, and 
learns something himself from the sick at the same time as he teaches the ailing man as 
much as he can, and doesn't give his order until he by some means persuades him" 
(720dl-7). Later the Stranger argues that, if a slavish doctor observed the practice of a 
liberal doctor "conversing with a ~ree man who is sick and using arguments in a way 
close to philosophizing, considering the sickness from the beginning and referring back 
63 The passage is obscure. For detailed discussion, see below. 
64 For this aspect of the preludes, cf. Helmig (2003, 79). 
223 
to the whole nature of bodies," the slavish doctor would laugh at him for educating the 
sick man instead of treating him (857c7-e1). Preludes, then, which correspond to the 
practice of the liberal doctor, are almost like philosophical arguments, though the 
conviction they produce cannot be qualified as knowledge. The slavish doctor, however, 
misunderstands the liberal doctor, for the latter is not trying to make a doctor of his 
patient, but to teach him just enough so that he will more readily follow his course of 
treatment. The doctor will refer in general terms to the nature of bodies, but the patient 
will not come away with a completely accurate understanding of physiology or 
anatomy. The patient, then, will have a true opinion about his illness, but this true 
opinion will differ from the doctor's knowledge, both in its lack of sufficient 
demonstrations and in its simplified and less precise formulation.65 
Preludes thus constitute a kind of education intermediate to the primary 
education in good habits through musical and gymnastic exercises and the advanced 
education made available only to the most promising in the Nocturnal Council. 
Persuasion for the Athenian Stranger is not the all-powerful force that Gorgias thought it 
was, but requires the non-rational parts of the soul to have already been made amenable 
to its influence through training (cf. 645a-b).66 But these preliminaries granted, the 
preludes must develop the innate "shrewdness" of human beings, or their ability to 
distinguish good and bad men, into moi·e or less coherent true opinions. A model of 
how this is supposed to take place is suggested by the Meno's account of Socrates 
teaching the slave boy to double the area of the square. By a series of leading questions 
and false starts, Socrates leads the slave boy, who, besides the minimal requirement of 
speaking Greek, knows no more than to count and identify a square, first to discover 
that he does not know how to double the square, and then that the square of the 
65 For this "deformation of true opinion," cf. Bobonich (1995, 328). 
66 For discussion of this role of education in the Laws, cf. Cleary (2003, 166-169). 
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diagonal will have twice the area of the miginal square, trusting, so to speak, in the 
boy's eustokhon ability to recogruze what is going on even if he does not fully ~derstand 
it.67 At the end, Socrates does not claim that the boy has obtained knowledge about the 
doubling of the square, .but a true opinion, and that by further practice and study this 
true opinion could eventually become knowledge.68 The slave boy falls short of 
knowledge because he still does rtot understand the axioms or theorems of geometry. He 
has drawn lines, ·but is ignorant of the definition of a line; he has applied the 
· Pythagorean Theorem, but he does not know that he has done so and could not 
formulate that theorem or give a demonstration.of it for all cases. The slave boy cannot 
give a logos of the doubling of the square, though he could .follow a memorized 
algorithm to obtain the desired result.69 
In the Laws, two preludes in particular display the relation between knowledge 
and true opinion suggested by the Meno's case of the slave boy, and so illustrate the 
· compromise that the Athenian Stranger believes is necessary in real legislation .and for 
the application of Socrates' natural law to real leg'!~ c:odes. They are the. preludes about 
the necessity of sophrosune for proper political rule and the superiority of the life of 
justice to that of injustice. In the passage leading up to his version of the myth of Cronus, 
the Su·anger claims that "when the greatest power is joined with intelligence and 
· moderation (phronein kai sophronein) in human nature, then there grows the coming-to-be 
of the best regime and laws of ·the same kind, and they will never come to be in any 
other way" (711e8-712a3). And a few pages later, arguing that no human nature is able 
to resist the temptations of ~utocratic power (713c6f.)/0 he repeats the thought in slightly 
67 Meno 84a, 85b. 
68 Meno 85c6-d 1. 
69 For the criterion of kno.wledge as being able to give an account, cf. the account of recollection in 
the Phaedo (esp. 76b5f.) · 
7° Cf. 875a-b. 
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. modified form: "for all cities that are not ruled by a god but by some mortal, there is no 
refuge for their citizens from evils and labors" (713e4-·6). For any reader of Plato, these 
lines immediately bring to mind Socrates' statement in the Republic that "unless ... these 
are joined, political power and philosophy ... cities will have no respite from evils."71 
Stribngly, the Stranger replaces the union of philosophy and political power with the 
more modest combination of power with phronein and sophronein, which are consistent 
with, but hardly imply, the rule of philosophy,72 and he argues that the closest human 
beings can come to being ruled by a god is the rule of law (714a2}?3 Nevertheless, the 
Stranger does hold at least partly to the ideal of the Republic, for at 739b8-dl he argues 
that the best city would have its women and children in common as well as all 
possessions-and if it were possible, even the eyes and ears of every citizen would be 
held in common, but here again he conspicuously fails to mention the rule of philosophy 
71 Republic 473cll-d6. Note the repetition at Laws 712alf. of the de; TauTov OlJj.lTIEm;] from 
Republic 473d2f. 
72 Though at 658e-659b the Stranger defines ignorance (aj.la81a) as letting true opinion be 
overpowered by desire, so that the lawgiver must try hardest of all to instill <j:>QOVllULs in his city, 
which suggests that the Stranger takes the latter concept as almost synonymous with aw<j:>QOOlJvrl 
in the sense of self-control. The Athenian Stranger uses ao<j:>la quite ambivalently in the Laws. Six 
of his nine mentions of it (644a4, 679c5, 691a7, 701a6, 732a6, 863c5) are of "sham-wisdom," and at 
631a he calls the cardinal virtue <j:>QOVllULc;, not ao<j:>la. Stailey {2003, 176) notes this last 
substitution (cf: also ibid., 178). That the Epinomis (974b) begins with Clinias asking the Stranger 
"1:fva TQOTIOV ao<j:>oi yEv11UOj.lE8a;" is perhaps a sufficient argument that that dialogue is not tl1e 
work of Plato. 
73 Rowe (2010, 42) notes this parallel as part of his argument about the relation of the Laws to 
other dialogues. He argues that this echo, and others like it, are meant to bring readers to recall 
the arguments of other dialogues, providing an argument that would go over the heads of the 
non-philosophical Clinias and Megillus (34). This "subterranean" level of argument invites the 
reader to "import into our reading of the Laws whatever parts of the . .. argument of the Republic 
will appear to fit" (43). Thus Rowe argues that "for the practiced reader" the Athenian Stranger's 
support of the rule of law guided by intelligence and moderation should be understood as 
amounting to Plato's continued support of the ideal of the philosopher-king. This conclusion, 
however-to say nothing of the reservations of the Republic-ignores the arguments of the 
Statesman for the impracticability of that ideal as well as the Laws apparent agreement with that 
perspective. (Rowe (40££.) acknowledges similar echoes of the Statesman in Laws IV). I think Rowe 
is correct that the textual echoes he notes are intentional, and also correct in saying that many 
arguments of the Laws will say more to the reader than they do to Clinias and Megillus, but his 
wholesale importing of (what he takes to be) arguments of other dialogues shows a lack of 
nuance in understanding the dialectic of the Laws. 
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and argues that such a city is beyond the capacities of human nature, so that we must 
settle for a second-best (729d5£.) . . 
The situation of Clinias and Megillus, then, in relation to the Athenian Stranger is 
analogous to the slave boy's toward Socrates. They are as unfamiliar with philosophy as 
the slave boy is ignorant of geometry. When the Stranger later broaches the subject of 
philosophical theology and the nature of soul, he likens himself to a younger man who 
will test the strength of the current before iri.viting his older companions to ford the 
slTeam (892d-e). And even further on, Clinias meets the Stranger's somewhat abrupt 
recommendation of the method of investigation through ideas with a no doubt 
bewildered "perhaps" (965cl-4). The old Cretan and Spartan can learn the true opinion 
that complete virtue-not just courage-ought to be the aim of a good legislator, but 
they cannot fully understand the true character of virtue, as the Stranger's mention of 
the lingering need to consider the unity of virtue at the end of book XII shows.74 
A second example shows more clearly this relation of true opinion to knowledge 
in the Laws, and explains how the aims of legislation according to natural law must be 
tempered accordingly. The Sh·anger repeats several times his preludes about the 
superiority of the just life to the unjust life in point of happiness and even in point of 
pleasure. This is another echo of Socrates' arguments in the Gorgias, but the Stranger's 
advocacy of justice falls short of Socrates' uncompromising position. The Stranger had 
said that the greatest accomplishment of a legislator would be to persuade the citizens of 
his city tl~at the just life is the most pleasant and desirable, even if he must lie to 
persuade them (663b-c), thus suggesting that he was not entirely confident that any 
legislator could succeed by mere rational argument. Discussing the necessity of 
74 Mayhew (2010, 214) underscores the relative silence of Clinias in this section (as well as the 
total silence of Megillus) as evidence of the non-philosophical audience to which these arguments . 
are addressed, for whom "understanding takes the form of mere assent." 
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preparing for war even while living in peace, the Stranger argues that "for those who 
live happily it: is necessary first to never do injustice to themselves (heautous adikein) nor 
to have injustice done to them by others" (/mph' hett?ron autous adikeisthai, 829al-3), but he 
conspicuously fails to say that they must never do injustice to another.75 The primary goal 
of the education in the Laws is, of course, to produce citizens who will as much as 
possible avoid doing injustice, but the Stranger does not seem to think that justice and 
happiness can be persuasively identified on the level of true opinion. To minimize the 
frequency of unjust acts, he argues, law will use "any means at all to make one hate 
injustice and love-or not hate-the nature of the just, which is the task of the finest 
laws" (862d6-el). The Stranger, then, still holds the Socratic thesis that justice is its own 
reward, but due to the weakness of human nature, he will settle for disseminating the 
opinion that justice is not something unpleasant.76 This compromise is correlate to his 
other concessions to human desire, such as his relaxation of the demands of communism 
and allowance for a limited disparity of wealth, and his willingness not to inquire too far 
into extra-marital or non-procreative sexual activity as long as such activity remains in 
the shadows. Later in Laws XII, discussing the rights of burial, the Stranger speaks of the 
man who "grows old in observance of the laws and meets his appointed end according 
to nature." Such a man will have "paid penalties if he had wronged someone" (959c7-
cl2). Thus a lawbreaker, provided he has paid his dues, can be considered a just and 
75 Bobonich (2004, 91) is then overhasty in arguing that to "aim at the good of others for their own 
sake" is "expected of the citizens generally," because Plato now believes that non-philosophers 
can have genuine virtue. Most citizens will not be expected to live up to that ideal. Also, 
Bobonich does not seem to notice that the fact that "[c]itizenship is restricted to those capable of 
sharing in the end of the city's laws and thus of living a virtuous and happy life" (92) thereby 
excludes all foreigners, resident aliens, and slaves (i.e., most non-philosophers) from any share in 
happiness or virtue. 
76 These examples go some way to answering the question of Bobonich (1995) as to how the 
virtues of the non-philosopher are made defective by true opinion. Their virtues will not be 
genuine virtues because they are not based on a complete and accurate understanding of the 
good, and therefore will not always motivate actions that are good. Another of the Athenian 
Stranger's compromises in light of this fact is to call all actions just, regardless of their outcome, 
so long as they are done with good intent (863e5-864a8). 
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lawful individual. For the citizens of Magnesia, Cephalus' definition of justice in the 
Republic as paying one's debts will be a sufficient standard. 
This recognition of a second-best justice and the need to accommodate human 
weakness seems to motivate the Stranger's legal distinction between harm (blabe) and 
injustice (adikia), which is equivalent to the distinction in Roman law between damage 
and injury (damnum absque injuria). The Stranger grounds the distinction in the 
difference between willing and unwilling acts (861e7ff.). Unwilling acts are done in 
ignorance and should be met with leniency and understanding (863cl-d4), because they 
were performed from a genuine opinion about what is best (ten tou aristou doxan, 864al). 
In these cases the damage is to be repaid as far as possible and the attempt made to 
"reestablish friendship out of disagreement" (ek diaphoriis eis philian, 862c3f.), which 
recalls th~ . third kind of judge in book I, who stands as the paradigm of the Laws' 
legislation. Injustice or injury, on the other hand, is caused by the "tyranny of thumos ... 
or desires in the soul" (863e6ff.). This runs somewhat counter to the Stranger's earlier 
position that to let anger or desire overcome true opinion was itself the "greatest 
ignorance" (689a.5-8), for if even crimes of passion were done "in ignorance," then the 
category of injuries as opposed to harms would be emptied, or every harm would 
become an injury. The Stranger's compromise of his initial quasi-Socratic position that 
all wrong is done in ignorance seems to stem from the necessities of drafting a penal 
code that must balance the two aims of giving "fair punishment"77 and reconciliation. 
His accmmt of the voluntary and involuntary is not aimed at solving metaphysical 
paradoxes of agency, but at sorting out f:he real exigencies of crime and punishment.78 
Last of all, while the Stranger hopes that punishment will discourage criminals from 
77 Cf. 870e1-3 for the concept of U]v K£n:a cpuaLv bi.KT]V which is equivalent to the lex talionis. 
78 For the practical necessity of doing so, cf. Stailey (1983, 151). 
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repeating their crimes, he never attempts to argue that all punishment should be 
remedial or ameliorative. 
These two examples of the compromised rule of wisdom and the intrinsic 
goodness of the just life in the Laws show the limits of non-philosophical persuasion 
through true opinion. The Laws' more complex and sympathetic account of the relation 
between the knower and the non-knower shows that the rule of law need not have the 
grim sh·ictness presented in the Statesman. Because one of the tasks of law is to educate 
about the general aim of the law, its severity is softened by persuasion. The Athenian 
Stranger recognizes, however, that the ideal of natural law that he holds will never be 
entirely persuasive to the majority, so instead he attempts to persuade them of 
imitations eis dunamin of that ideal. Not to hate justice, after all, while it does not live up 
to Socrates' exacting standard, is evidently better than loving injustice. The preludes 
constitute the Stranger' s attempt to reconcile as far as possible the differences between 
knowers and non-knowers and bring them both into a state of mutual friendship. 
Natural law and the kosmos politikos 
The Stranger's most ambitious effort to bring the citizens of Magnesia as close as 
possible to a belief in the law of nature is his account of the nature of soul and of a 
cosmological theology. The purpose of this section is not to examine the validity of the 
Stranger's arguments for self-moving soul's priority to body or for the divine concern 
for human affairs that the later tradition would call "special providence," but to 
examine what these arguments are meant to accomplish as preludes. It is the political and 
ethical dimensions of the Stranger's cosmology that are of concern here. The Athenian 
Stranger's theology amounts to an exposition of what Socrcites merely alluded to in the . 
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Gorgias when he claimed that Callicles had failed to consider what the wise call the 
kosmos/9 and shares the same purpose of producing the conviction that the just life is the 
best life, not by dialectical argument, but by presenting a vision of a ~orld order that is 
beautiful and good. Thus, like the other preludes we have examined, it is a second-best 
: ·"" ..... "l..... ~ ..... ·. "· ... :· . .-. 
form of argument aimed at producing true opinion about the just life, one that is not the 
perfect fulfillment of but nonetheless is guided by natural law. 80 
Laws X begins with the "single legal ordinance for every case ... that no one take 
or pillage the property of another, nor again use anything of his neighbor's, unless he 
persuade the owner, for from such behavior comes the source of everything called evil 
that has been, 1s and will be" (884al-5). This universal statement shows that the Stranger 
has more in mind here than mere property rights. Rather he is effectively restating 
·r.r. Socrates' law of nature, which he had himself earlier referred to with his doctrine 
"equals shares to equals, unequal to unequals" (757b-c). Thus crimes of hubris, which 
amount to upsetting an established order of value or rank, and are not understood to 
have anything to do with property in the specific sense, are included under this heading 
(884a7, 885a3, b2). Chief among these are the crimes of temple-robbing and other 
impiety, which the Stranger argues no one who believed in the gods would ever 
commit. Those who commit crimes of impiety, then, must believe either a) that there are 
no gods; b) that gods do exist, but have no concern (au phrontizein) for human beings; or 
c) that they do give heed, but are easily propitiated by prayer and sacrifice (885b4-9). 
The Stranger argues, then, that the surest way to discourage impiety is to refute these 
79 Gorgias 507e6-508a2. 
80 Stalley (1983, 167) makes more or less the same point: "In the Republic Adeimantus calls on 
Socrates to show that there are other reasons for being just besides the fear of divine retribution, 
In the present passage, by contrast, the Athenian assumes that people cannot be expected to 
behave themselves without this fear. So although the Laws officially agrees with the Republic in 
maintaining that virtue is the greatest good, it concedes that, in practice, sanctions are still 
necessary." Thus the cosmology contains a muted eschatology implying the punishment of evil 
man according to their deserts (904e5-905a1), corresponding to those in the m yth Socrates tells to 
Callicles at the end of the Gorgias. For this last point, d. Vorwerk (2003, 81). 
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three opinions, to which end he devotes a prelude far longer than the actual law against 
impiety (887a3). 
Of these three positions--which for convenience's sake we may call atheism, 
deism, and vulgar religion81--the Stranger believes that the third is the most common as 
. . ~. - . . ·,. . . . 
well as the worst form of impiety (948c4-7), while the complete denial of the existence of 
gods is the rarest, such that hardly anyone remains firm in this conviction throughout 
his whole life (888cl-5). He is also clear that belief in the gods and in divine providence 
is not a necessar,y condition for being a good and just person. He addresses an imaginary 
young man who, though believing in the gods, denies that they have concern for human 
affairs because of the "fortunes in public and private of evil and unjust men, who while 
not happy in truth, by their reputations are inappropriately considered very happy" 
(899d4-e2). The apparent happiness of the wicked brings the thoughtful but ignorant 
young man to doubt the beneficence of the gods. But if he were sufficiently convinced of 
Socrates' and the Athenian Stranger's position that a good and just life is a sufficient 
condition of happiness, and that vice is its own punishment, then the problem of 
providence would never arise for him, and there would be no need to raise the issue in 
the first place (cf. 891b2f.).82 In general, the Stranger recognizes that believers in any of 
the three impious doctrines may be otherwise good or bad (908el-5). If an honest atheist 
is convicted, he is to be confined to a sophronisterion for five years, where he will be 
schooled in correct belief in the gods by the members of the Nocturnal Council. If after 
that time he seems to have "come to his senses" (sophronein), then he will be released, 
81 Except for the last, these are Mayhew's (2010, 204) labels. He labels the last kind of impiety 
"traditional theism," which I find insufficiently descriptive. 
82 Van Harten (2003, 135) acknowledges that "the Laws' case for virtue certainly does not 
exclusively rely on the theological arguments," but argues all the same that those arguments "are 
nevertheless essential for acquiring and sustaining a virtuous life." Later (137£.) she admits that 
the theology offers no reason for the unjust to become just, but only reassurance to the just that 
the god is on his side. Throughout she fails to recognize the "second-best" level of argumentation 
the Athenian Stranger employs. 
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but if he is convicted again of the same offense, he will be put to death (909al-8). It is 
certainly odd that the Stranger uses the ambiguous sophronein (which could refer to 
eith~r a genuine change of opinion or a judicious silence about one's opinion), when it 
was possible to use an exp. ression unambiguously denoting belief. But since the Stranger ., 
seems to think that the chief danger of these "good atheists" is that their open contempt 
of traditional piety might set a corrupting example for others (908c7-dl}, this ambiguity 
does not trouble his position.83 While he disapproves of it, atheism, like illicit sexual 
activity, might be tolerated as long as it kept to the shadows. 84 
The Stranger, then, recognizes no intrinsic harm in these impious beliefs, but 
considers them socially deleterious when combined with other false opinions about the 
good life or with a bad character. His recognition of the danger that comes even and 
especially from "vulgar religion" leads him to attempt a new way of speaking about the 
gods. He begins by identifying the causes of impiety, which are not, as Clinias might 
think, moral depravity, but mistaken beliefs about nature (886a8-b8). First, some believe 
that the heavenly bodies are mere earth and stones, but second and more 
fundamentally, they hold a false opinion about the causes of all things in general. They 
"believe that of all things, ... some come to be by nature, others by art, and others by 
chance .... The greatest and most beautiful of them are produced by nature and chance, 
83 Ritter (1896b) ad Zoe. interprets the passage to mean that if the young man promises to keep his 
views to himself he will be released, and certainly the provision for repeat offenders, to say 
nothing of common sense, acknowledges that there can be no sure test of another's inner 
convictions. Ritter cites the parallel (952c-d) of the theoros, who returning corrupted by his time 
abroad, is allowed to retire to private life without further penalty on the condition that he make 
no public show of his "wisdom." Against Ritter's reading one might cite the Stranger's fear of the 
"dissimulating atheist" (eironikon, 908dl-e2), but it is difficult to settle the matter. Perhaps it isbest 
to assume that Plalo was intentionally vague on this point. 
84 Again, on the more concrete level, the Stranger wishes to ban the swearing of oaths upon the 
gods in courts of law, lest citizens come to believe that half of all plaintiffs and defendants are 
perjurers and impious towards the gods (916e6-917a2). But the Stranger does not take the step of 
proposing the same penalty for those who take the gods' names in vain as for those convicted of 
impiety (cf. 917b7-c7). In effect, then, he relaxes the strict application of his law of piety in an 
accommodation to human weakness. For this observation, cf. Benardete (2002, 313). 
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while the lesser are produced by art, which takes the great, first products when they 
have come to be so as to mold and construct all the lesser things that we all call 
artificial" (888e4-889a8). In the theory the Stranger proceeds to outline, the four elements 
are the products of "nature and chance," while all composite bodies, the heavenly 
bodies as well as all plants and animals, are the result of the rnance mixings of these 
elements (889bl-c6). Art comes after all this, "itself mortal and born posterior from 
mortals [as] certain kinds of play, having no great share of truth" (889c7-d2).85 Some arts, 
like painting and music, produce mere images of things. Others, like medicine, farming, 
and gymnastic training, presumably because of their immediate concern with the body, 
"share their power with nature," while the art of politics "has a small part in common 
with nature, but is mostly by art. And thus all lawgiving (nomoth.esia), whose 
assumptions are not true, is not by nature but by art" (889c6-el). The gods are not by 
nature but a product of legislation, with different gods for different laws (889e3f.). 
The small part of politics that is natural on this account is to be the rule of the 
strongest, which is the only criterion of right accepted by the materialists and firmly 
grounded in the nature of body (890a4f., cf. 690b8). The position the Stranger describes 
closely resembles that of Callicles: it distinguishes what is beautiful or noble by nature 
from what is so by nomos (889e6) and proclaims a "correct life (orth.os bios) according to 
nature, which isin truth to live ruling over (kratounta) others instead of being their slave 
according to the law" (890a8f.). The chief cause of atheism, then, according to the 
85 Compare the language of this passage to the Stranger's description of the human being as a 
plaything of god (803b-c), and the ranking of nature, chance, art in terms of importance and 
causal power to the Stranger's earlier ranking of god, chance, art (709a-c). The Stranger, then, 
would not dispute the materialist that human contrivence is relatively powerless against the 
forces of chance and nature (or god), only he would argue that human endeavor does not go 
directly against the forces of nature, which the materialist does not so much argue for as assume. 
Thus, while Clinias enjoins the Stranger to prove that nomos and art are "by nature-or no 
weaker than nature" (hetton, 890d5), the Stranger would only try to prove the first point, for he 
knows that human art is decidedly weaker than nature. Like Socrates, the Athenian recognizes 
the distinction between nomos and phusis (humanity's "partial detachment" from nature, in 
Rosen's words), but not their radical opposition. 
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Stranger, is the distinction between nomos (or, more generally, all human techne) and 
phusis, and the relativistic denial of any objective standard for conventional or artificial 
things that goes hand in hand with that distinction. The defender of piety, then, would 
have to show that nomos and ph.usis are not so radically opposed, or that law (and human 
activity in general) can appeal to non--arbitrary standards analogous to the apparent 
fixity of nature.86 Socrates' initial approach to this question was to examine the premises 
behind the antinomian's assertion of a "correct life according to nature" and show that 
they were incoherent, and only when Callicles refused to continue the discussion after 
he was shown the incoherence of his premises did Socrates appeal to the order of the 
cosmos and the gods as a new dialectic tactic. The Stranger, on the other hand, assumes 
from the outset that the arguments that the good life according to nature is the life of 
virtue have failed to persuade, because they are the basis of the whole education in 
Magnesia, 87 and if they had worked there would be no despisers of religion in the first 
place.88 Therefore he argues by a different route, claiming that soul is prior89 to body and 
the cause of its change and reordering (892a2-7).90 
86 Thus Stailey (1983, 29) correctly argues that "the great heresy is the distinction ... between 
nomos ... and physis," and that "one way of interpreting not only book X, but the whole of the 
Laws, would be to see it as a systematic attack on the nomos-physis distinction." 
87 At 663b-c the Stranger had argued that belief in the identity of the pleasant life and the good 
life was the most beneficial thing any legislator could accomplish, and that any means, even lies, 
were justified so long as they brought that about. 
88 Bobonich (2002, 214): "We do not need to invoke this theological claim [that god apportions 
happiness to justice] to show that the virtuous person is always better off than the unvirtuous one 
(if we did, we could not meet the challenge of the Republic) but it does give virtuous people 
added reason to be content with their lives." As Carone (2005, 254 fn. 7) notes, the "proemium in 
book X is addressed even to the person 'of little intelligence', (891a)." She notes the "apologetic 
and exoteric character" ofthe whole book, and that the prelude of bk. X is "addressed to the 
immoralist" (163, cf. 184: "exoteric and protreptic"). With the last claim, however, I believe 
Carone goes a bit too far. 1.'he prelude is meant for a variety of skeptics and doubters, from the 
"good atheist" to the one troubled by the problem of evil to the skeptic and true immoralist. 
Given these admissions, it is disappointing to see Carone state (ibid.) that demonstrating that 
"normative principles are not just a matter of relativistic convention [is] tantamount, in [Plato's] 
eyes, to proving the existence of the gods and their providence." In general, it is hard to see how 
Carone incorporates her insight into bk. X's exoteric character into her interpretation of its 
cosmology. 
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If the soul is prior to body, then the properties of soul (opinion, care, intellect, art, 
and law) are also prior to the properties of body (892b3-8). By claiming that these 
properties of soul are prior to body, the Stranger reveals that he was foremost concerned 
with the reduct-ionism that goes hand in hand with a materialist conception of nature 
based on the four elements that he had described. He believes that an eliminative 
materialist worldview of this stripe necessarily undermines the validity of human 
experience and so renders the reflection on human experience in its own terms 
impossible. He does not think that supposedly "unscientific" talk of opinion and 
intention is made more rigorous or scientific by a theoretical translation into the 
language of material forces or elements. His point, then, would be something like 
Socrates' in the Phaedo, where the latter explains his dissatisfaction with the cosmological 
views of his day for their failure to give an account of purposiveness. Socrates expresses 
his disappointment, upon attending a reading from Anaxagoras' book, to find that 
although Anaxagoras postulated that 110us was the cause of all things, he did not 
attribute purposiveness to nous. Socrates thought he had found a teacher who would 
"tell me first whether the earth is flat or round, and when he had told me, would explain 
. additionally the cause and necessity, giving an account of what is better and that it was 
better for the earth to be such."91 Instead he found that Anaxagoras offered materialist 
explanations without any account of the good. His nous was nothing more than the 
distribution of elements in various proportions throughout the universe, not a genuinely 
directive intelligence. Socrates' motivation for demanding causal accounts in terms of 
purposiveness and the good seem to come from his reflection on human action. He 
89 The soul came to be £flnAoa8£v to body (892a5) and is nqwj3tn£qa (892b1), which naturally 
suggests that it existed before body. However I have used the more modest 'prior' (which need 
only imply logical or causal priority, which is sufficient for the Stranger's purposes). Carone 
(2005, 167-170) argues for this reading, bringing parallels from the Timaeus and Phaedrus. 
9° Cf. Zuckert (2010, 124). 
91 Phaedo 97b8-e3. 
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imagines that Anaxagoras would say that the cause of Socrates' sitting in jail was the 
composition of his body, but he denies that such explanations are sufficient. It was an 
opinion about the good that caused the Athenians to condemn Socrates, and Socrates to 
remain to face his punishment-otherwise "these sinews and bones would long ago 
have been in Megara or Boeotia."92 Finditi.g no cosmology, then, that could account for 
human purposiveness, Socrates attempted the deuteros plous of examining questions 
through rational argument instead of the search for ultimate physical principles.93 In 
doing so, he could consider the pwposiveness of human activity in separation from the 
question of design, which seems to be confused in the robustly teleological physics he 
originally hoped to find. 
It does not go too far to say that the cosmology of the Laws ' attempts to meet the 
requirements according to which Socrates found previous cosmologies lacking, for as we 
have seen, its chief purpose is the make clear the goodness of things in terms of the 
artful activity of nous.94 How well, then, does the Athenian Stranger's cosmology 
measure up to its promises and to the standard that Socrates set? First of all, it does 
propose itself as an explanation of things in terms of the good, and not merely in terms 
of mechanical causation, and to that extent strives to meet Socrates' demand. The 
cosmos is fitted together, we must believe, so that the good of the parts is subordinate to 
the good of the whole, so that the best thing for the part is its contribution to the whole, 
even if it does not appear so from a partial perspective (903b-d). The rotations of the 
celestial bodies, which are assumed to be circular, imitate the motion of nous with 
"beautiful likenesses" and are one great cause of belief in the existence of gods (898a8-
b3, 966d8-967al). The whole thrust of the Stranger's cosmology is, broadly speaking, 
92 Phaedo 98b6-99a2. 
93 Phaedo 99d4-100a8. 
94 Laws 967b4-c5 is a clear reference to Anaxagoras, suggesting that Plato still has the argument of 
the Phaedo in mind in the composition of Laws X. 
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ethical.95 What the Stranger's cosmology does not do, however, even in outline, is give 
explanations of specific phenomena of the kind that Socrates was looking for. The 
Stranger does not explain why, for instance, the beautiful circular motions of the 
heavenly bodies are good or conhibute to the good of the whole. 96 The Stranger argues a 
priori that the gods are good and thus that their products are well-crafted (902e4-903a3), 
but does not explain the goodness of any one of the things they have made. This kind of 
argumentation has as much in common with Socrates' own turn to the logoi as with the 
cosmology that Socrates gave up hope of finding. 97 
The Athenian Stranger's cosmology, then, does not meet the exacting 
philosophical standard set in the Phaedo, is addressed primarily to a non-philosophical 
audience, and aims not at a true account of the cosmos but at reinforcing the belief that 
the just and w1just get what they deserve.98 This is not to say that the Stranger thinks the 
cosmology is false, only that the teaching of cosmology is meant to serve this ethico-
95 Thus Zuckert (2009, 124f.) has no ground for her assertion that the Athenian Stranger's 
cosmology is "pre-Socratic." She fails to see that the Stranger's modification of the Anaxagorean 
p,asition is exactly in line with Socrates' demand in the Phaedo, She writes that the Stranger 
"avoids [my emphasis] the objection Socrates makes to Anaxagoras .. . that he does not show how 
nous intends and effects the good," (124) which suggests that this move is a dodge instead of 
doing exactly what Socrates required. Zuckert also takes this reference to Anaxagoras (or to his 
student Archelaus) as further evidence for her dramatic date of c. 460-450, but she fails to note the 
reference to Anaxagoras at Laws 967b4-c5, cited above, which speaks throughout in the past tense 
and repeatedly contrasts the past with the present time (ih.£/ '[Q'[f. and vuv, 967a7, b5, c6, dlf.). 
The reference to the resulting abuse of philosophers from the poets, furthermore, suggests a 
reference to Aristophanes' Clouds, which was first staged in 423 BC. Rather then supporting her 
dating, then, this passage can only support a dramatic date at least a generation later. 
96 That the celestial bodies in their imitation of nous are Kai\oi. dK6v£c; is not sufficient to 
demonstrate that their imitation itself is good, unless the beautiful is identified with the good, 
This identity, then, would be a missing but essential premise to the Stranger's argument for the 
goodness of the cosmos, and I suspect that is the reason why he proposes that question, along 
with the problem of the unity of the virtues, as a topic of further study in the Nocturnal Council 
(966a5f.). 
97 Cf. Benardete (2002, 292). 
98 Evidence that the Stranger is not primarily concerned with giving a theoretically satisfact01y or 
complete account of the gods and the cosmos lies in his seeming indifference to the question of 
how exactly self-moving soul is supposed to move the cosmos. He lists three possibilities, 
remarks that in each case soul would be superior to body, which is the point he is trying to 
establish, and therefore dismisses the answering of the question as unimportant (898e5-899a10). 
Cf. Mayhew (2010, 209). Mayhew also notes the Stranger's relative indifference to the question of 
how many gods there are. Cf. Laws 896c. 
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political purpose, not in the first place the ends of pure speculation.99 The Stranger says 
that "we shall persuade the young man with arguments that all parts of the whole have 
been ananged by the one who cares for the all for their preservation and virtue," but he 
does not say what. these arguments will be (903b4f.).100 He calls these exhortations 
epo(i)doi muthoi, stories meant to enchant (903blf.).101 These muthoi, which are the 
Stranger's answer to the denier of divine providence, are the best example of the Laws' 
accommodation of the law of nature to non-philosophical understanding, and of how 
the Laws is able to speak to two or more audiences at once, thus reconciling the ideal of 
political rule through knowledge with the rule of law that was demanded by the 
Statesman's recogrution ofthe problem of political persuasion. 
The young doubter of providence must be brought to see that the good of 
everything contributes first of all to the good of the whole. The Stranger, then, abruptly 
introduces a doctrine of reincarnation or metempsychosis.102 
Since a soul is always positioned along with a body-now one, now another--
and undergoes all kinds of changes on its own account or because of another 
· soul, there's no work left for the draughts player except to move the character 
(ethos) that becomes better to a better place, and the worse into a worse place, 
according to what is fitting for each of them, so that it might receive its 
appropriate allotment (903d3-el).103 
99 Cf. Helmig's (2003, 80) comment, which can be applied to preludes in general: "Bei dieser 
Rhetorik . .. kommt es nicht so sehr derauf an, die W ahrheit zu sagen, als den inneren Frieden in 
Magnesia zu sichern." 
100 TI:QOc; TI]v aW'IT]QLaV Kai. aq~:TI]v. Note the continuity with the Socratic doublet of living and 
living well. 
101 On this subject, cf. Helmig (2003) and Vorwerk (2003). Helmig wishes to distinguish 
philosophical from political em pbai. in the Laws, taking the argument of bk. X as an example of 
the philosophical and the Laws' preludes as example of the latter, but this distinction fails as soon 
as it is recognized that the whole discourse of bk. X is itself a prelude with a political intent. 
Helmig is closest to the truth when he says of the £nCf]bai. that "llu-e Aufgabe ist es, dem, was 
rational nicht mehr bewiesen werden kann, weil es nicht dem menschlichen Erkenntnisvermogen 
entzieht, annehmbarer zu machen" (79), except that it is not the power of human understanding 
as such that falls short, but the young atheist's understanding. Helmig argues that the prelude of 
bk. X is addressed "nur an Intellektuelle" (79), but surely that is no compliment in the Platonic 
lexicon. Vorwerk, by contrast, sees that the young man's "Weisheit sich jedoch schlimme 
I~noranz verbirgt" (82). 
1 Vorwerk (2003, 84f.) notes the parallels to the myths in the Phaedo and Republic. 
103 What is fitting for each (Ka'Ia 'IO nq£nov ainwv i:Kaa't:ov) recalls Socrates' language at Gorgias 
506e2f. 
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It is wry easy, then, for the caretaker of the cosmos to do his work (904a3f.). All that .is . 
required is to produce a mechanism whereby everyone comes to dwell in the station .and 
regions appropriate to his character, and then to leave the responsibility for character 
formation up to "the wishes of each of us."104 Each soul, then, is responsible for its. own 
change of station, and is "carried along according to the ordering and law (taxin kai 
nornon) of fate." 105 The degree of its change of station depends on the greatness of its 
change of character. A soul that has become more and more unjust eventually falls. "into 
the depth of the so-called lower regions, which people name Hades and other related 
names, afraid and troubled by dreams both alive and when separated from their bodies" 
(904c10-d4). Thus, both in life and death, good and bad souls get what they deserve artd 
are brought together with their similars, which is the "justice of the gods" (904e5~905a2). 
This should be enough to convince the doubter of the reality of divine providence. 
It is not hard to see how this passage could be the source of scholarly 
disagreement. On what level are we to understand these argurnents?106 The mention of 
Hades and its attendant visions of punishments in the afterlife suggests a religious or 
mythical account of divine punishments that falls far short of Socrates' strict natural law 
position that justice is its own reward and injustice its own punishment, echoed by the 
Stranger at 899d-e. But the lower regions of Hades are only "so-called," and since their 
mention would not be likely to trouble a confident materialist, they would be unhelpful 
as preludes.107 Thus, while this part of the cosmology serves the same function as other 
Platonic eschatological myths, it is not presented as a myth, but rather as a quasi-
scientific or "intellectual" theory of the migration of souls according to the arrangement 
104 904b6-c4. 
105 904c3f. 
106 Cf. the title of Vorwerk's (2003) piece: "Zauber oder Argument.. .. " 
107 And as Benardete (2002, 287) notes, in a spherical universe, such as the Stranger describes, 
there can be no "lower region." 
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of the god · or gods.108 It can be read as a doctrine of karma instead of a myth of 
punishment, although it does not preclude the latter reading.109 On this level, it should 
be compared to the myth Socrates tells in the Phaedo, which shares the motif of higher 
and lower cosmic regions and is tailored to the Pythagorean sympathies of his chief 
interlocutors. 110 
If the "intellectual" reading is taken far enough, however, it becomes entirely 
consistent with Socrates' natural law position. Such a reading of the passage is given by 
Carone, who finds the "obscurantism" of the passage "a little off-putting" and wishes to 
avoid a reading where "Plato is trying to scare us with a vision of hell."111 Carone notes 
that in this passage the god takes on the role of a legislator who does not control our 
actions but determines the "consequences that will follow inevitably from certain 
actions." Correctly emphasizing the Stranger's affirmation of human beings' 
responsibility for their own fate, she argues that the doctrine that those who choose to 
become bad end up in a worse place "can be seen as a law operating in human life, and 
in this (rather than another) world, as relentlessly as the natural law that a flame 
burns."112 But if this is the case, Carone recognizes, then "there is not even a need to 
hypothesize a god over and above the interconnected and organic universe to explain 
108 Cf. Vorwerk (2003, 86): "Die Besprechung mit dem Mythos kann allerdings nur Erfolg haben, 
w enn sie die geistigen Voraussetzungen des "Patienten" beriicksichtigt, d.h. die Form des 
Mythos an sein intellektuelles Niveau anpaBt, so daB ein Widerspruch zwischen Vernunft und 
Mythos vermieden wird." For the appeal of this kind of theory to the "intellectuals" of classical 
Athens cf. Meno 76a-b . 
. . 
109 The phrase "so-called lower regions" (ni 'r£ Klhw i\£y6f.1£Va 'rWV 'ronwv) might suggest a 
· dismissiveness to the idea, but it need not. The passive participle of i\£y£iv may carry the 
skeptical sense of "so-called" but also the neutral sense of "what is called." I think Plato intends 
here to play on this ambiguity in order to appeal to as many levels of understanding as possible. 
11° Cf. Phaedo 107c-115a. Burnet (1911, lv) notes the Pythagorean and Orphic elements in the 
narrative. An intellectual position like that of the Pythagoreans could be considered by the 
Athenian Stranger as an acceptable compromise between materialism and Socratic philosophy 
because it recognizes nonmaterial principles of harmony and proportion, even if it views them 
only as embodied in the material world. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1090a20-24: "The 
Pythagoreans ... made the beings be numbers, not separate (kh6ristous), but [they made] the 
beings out of numbers." • 
111 Carone (2005, 180£.). 
112 Ibid. (my emphasis). 
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the way its parts operate .... [Thus] it is clear that in ach1al practice the god is none other 
than ... the cosmic god or, more concretely, the organic universe itsel£."113 What Carone 
does not recognize is that this natural law operating in human life does not have to be 
supported even by an independent conception of an ordered universe. Instead it could 
itself be taken as evidence for such an ordered universe that includes human beings as 
one part among many. Such a recognition, however, would bring us back to the 
dialectical arguments of Socrates in the Gorgias, whose persuasive power is limited. For 
the same reason, then, Carone's own reading weakens the persuasive power of the 
prelude for the non-philosopher. She does not seem to grasp the significance of what she 
properly recognizes as the "exoteric" character of the preludes of boo. X.114 
If the previous exposition is correct, then the Stranger's argument for divine 
providence can be read on three levels; the traditionally religious, the "intellectual," and 
the philosophical. Furthermore, the requirements of its role as prelude suggest that it is 
meant to be understandable on all three levels.115 This complex pedagogical demand 
would account for the "obscurantist'' tone of the passage.116 It is the Stranger's best 
attempt to convince as many as possible that justice is not separate from pleasure and 
the good, which he said was the most important task of any legislator (cf. 663b). The 
113 Ibid., 181£. Carone's claim is made in context of a reading of the Laws along with the Timaeus as 
not literally positing the existence of a seperate demiurge, but as giving an account of the 
universe's own immanent rationality. It would take us too far astray to consider her arguments 
for this point, but it can be said without hesitation that such a cosmology would fit much better 
with Socrates' natural law than any myth of rewards and punishments in the afterlife. Carone 
does everything but explicitly call the position she is describing here a natural law theory. 
114 Cf. Ibid., 163, 184. 
115 For the idea that the Laws addresses readers of different levels of philosophical 
comprehension, cf. again Schofield (2003) and Rowe (2010). 
116 Mayhew (2010, 214) calls the "theology of the Laws ... vague and under-specified," and 
attributes this both to the fact that the subject is hard and that it is potentially dangerous 
politically. Benardete (2002, 307) notes that in stating the problem of divine providence (that the 
unjust seem to be happy) the Stranger is initially unclear whether the gods punish them in a way 
manifest to the common understanding ("to bring the proud low") or whether their falsely happy 
life is its own punishment, which can only be recognized by someone who has been convinced of 
the unity of the just and happy life, and so is without need of these preludes. Again, I argue that 
this lack of clarity is intentional. 
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belief that the just life is identical with the happy life will foster justice among the 
citizens of Magnesia, and will in turn make their city secure and happy (cf. 903b). In 
answer, then, to opposition of the arbitrariness of art and law, on the one hand, and the 
muversality of nature, on the other, the Atheni.:m Stranger argues for Socrates' account 
of natural law as found in the Gorgias. Only instead of proceeding from the nature of 
human happiness to show how it implies, and so justifies, a more or less conventional 
account of justir.e, the Stranger takes the other path suggested by Socrates and argues on 
the level of true opinion, affirming the orderliness of the universe and the existence and 
justice of the gods as tokens of trust for the "non-expert," that is, the majority of the 
citizens of any political community who are not habituated to the practice of dialectical 
investigation. If Socrates spoke in a "dialect and manner" foreign to the non-
philosopher,117 then the Athenian Stranger acts as a kind of interpreter, tran.slating his 
thought into the common dialect, and, like any good translator, he realizes just how 
much is lost in the transmission. 
Concluding the Laws 
In the Gorgias and Statesman-to say nothing of other Platonic dialogues-the best and 
happiest life is identified as the life of philosophy, which Socrates further identifies with 
the true political art, a part of whlch is the true art of legislation. Before it is subjected to 
modification and compromise, then, the strict command of Socrates' natural law would 
be the command to philosophize, and a strong objection to understanding the Laws as 
continuing a Platonic argument about natural law would be the apparent absence of the 
phllosophical life as the model of human excellence and happiness. But the almost 
111 Cf. A pologtj of Socrates 17d-18a. 
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complete silence about philosophy in any regard in t..lte Laws can be explained by the 
same considerations of audience whose influence we have identified in so many of the 
arguments in the dialogue. It would do little to promote civic virtue among non-
philosophers to foster the belief that the life of philosophy-which is ex hypothesi beyond 
them-is the only truly happy life. If anything, it might have deleterious consequences. 
However, the Laws has shown sufficient indications that the Athenian Stranger does in 
fact subscribe to this ideal, and it is useful to present those indications again in 
summarizing the dialogue's approach to natural law and its reflection on the task of real 
legislation in light of the standard of natural law. 
In his discussion of the education in astronomy, the Stranger remarks that "we 
say that we must not investigate or busy ourselves with the greatest god and the whole 
cosmos, searching for their causes-for it is not at all pious-but it seems that if the 
whole thing were done in the opposite wa:y, it would be done correctly" (821a2-7). 
Traditional Greek piety discouraged investigation into the heavens and the things below 
the earth, but the Stranger thinks that, contrary to this opinion, such investigations can 
in fact be beneficial (821a7-b2)Y8 The investigations typically associated with 
philosophy, then, and with which Socrates was associated in popular opinion, are 
defended by the Stranger, even though he is concerned with fostering more or less 
traditional piety. While these questions are to be discussed in detail only by the 
Nocturnal Council, the Stranger is in a limited way making room for scientific and 
philosophical research in his "closed" society.119 Without this knowledge of causes, he 
118 Mayhew (2010, 212, 214), then, misunderstands this passage. He takes the "we say" as the 
Stranger's real assertion that such investigations are impious, but below at 821 bS-9 he will say 
that "currently almost all of us Greeks tell falsehoods about the great gods," and goes on to 
propose a correction to common Greek opinion. Both instances of 'we,' then, must be understood 
as reporting common opinion and not the Stranger's considered opinion. 
119 That the Stranger classifies this kind of inquiry as philosophy can be seen from 967b4-c5, 
where the materialists bring censure upon all who philosophize from the poets. Consider 951b4-
c4, where it is said that no city can remain perfect that is not constantly on the look-out for 
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later claims, the possession of the civiC virtues would only qualify a man to serve, but 
never to lead (967d6-968a5).120 Again, the Stranger's assertion that god alone is worth 
ta~g seriously, while human things are worthy of little concern (though it is necessary 
to take them seriously (802b-c)) is reminiscent of the Republic~s account of the 
philosopher's desire to remain outside-the cave and his obligation to descend back into 
it. The Stranger considers the supposedly serious business of war to be in fact less 
serious and fitting than a life devoted to play, which is the correct life according to the 
measure of god(803d2-e3). Callicles, touting the conventional superiority of the life 
devoted to the serious business of politics and war, had said that he felt the same 
contempt for those who philosophize past childhood as for those who have a lisp or play 
games,121 while for the Athenian Stranger the contemplation of the gods is the best 
sport.122 
The Stranger, then, does not directly play the advocate of philosophy, -but he 
gently carves out a place for it in his proposed constitution of Magnesia, to the point of 
stipulating that the true guardians will need to investigate things by means of single 
forrris over against the multiplicity of experience (965cl-4, 966cl-d3). As we have seen, 
the Athenian recognizes the same defects in law as did the Eleatic Stranger and does his 
best to reconcile inflexible law with precis~ knowledge. In the same way, he respects as 
much as possible the perspective of the non-knower, giving an account of politics and 
the best kind of life that is agreeabl~r not disagreeable-to the non-philosopher and 
philosopher alike. While his approach is quite different, the aims of his inqUiry into laws 
are identical to Socrates' true legislation and true art ofpolitics. 
foreign wise men,· who spring up even in non-virtuous cities, to confirm or correct its laws. The 
Stranger must consider himself to be one of these men. 
12° For wisdom as true·vittuejn contrast to "demotic virtue" d. Republic 500d8. 
121 Gorgias 485a4-b2. . . 
122 Bobonich (2004, 477ff.), basing himself on what he simply reads as the "eschatology"·of Laws X, 
reluctantly concedes thatthe Laws maintains the trar'lspolitical ideal of intellectual understanding. 
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In light of this understated but lingering philosophical ideal, the pessimism that 
many scholars123 have purported to find in the Laws might seem jarring. Tradition has it 
that Laws was the last work of Plato, and many interpreters have taken it as a certain 
compromise of the loftier political ideals of the Republic, pointing to the general 
pessimism of old age and in particular Plato's presumed disillusionment after his 
involvements in Sicily as causes. The Statesman, also usually considered to have been 
written late, is often viewed as transitional to this later, pessimistic view. But ignoring 
the rather simplistic reading of the Republic this interpretation assumes, it should be 
clear by now that the central insight of the Statesman and Laws upon which Plato's 
"pessimism" is founded-the problem of political persuasion-was already recognized 
in all essential points in the Gorgias, which is generally reckoned to have come before the 
supposed idealism of the Republic. In fact, this central insight can be traced to other 
dialogues generally considered to be among the first that Plato wrote. Socrates' shift 
from purely dialectical argument to an impersonation of the Laws of Athens in his 
argument with Crito, mentioned above, and especially Socrates' remark that between 
those who do not share the basic premise that one must never do wrong-and so 
between the philosophical few and the many- there can be no common deliberation 
(Crito 49d), shows exactly the same awareness of the limits of philosophical argument in 
a conventional context. In the first lines of the Apology, too, Socrates recognizes that his 
mariner of argument will seem strange and unpersuasive to his citizen-judges, and that 
their two perspectives cannot be fully reconciled.124 If there is a pessimism in the Laws, 
then, it is one that can be found throughout the entire Platonic corpus, though expressed 
123 But not all scholars. Bobonich (2004), for one, actually considers the Laws to be a more 
optimistic work than the Republic, insofar as it is more sanguine about the happiness of non-
philosophers and more attuned to non-philosophical concerns. Thus the same evidence that 
many have taken as indicating pessimism Bobonich interprets in the opposite way. I would argue 
for a reading of the Laws that is not decidedly more or less pessimistic than presumably earlier 
Platonic dialogues: This approach seems to be shared by Schofield (2003) and Rowe (2010). 
124 Apology 17d. 
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with varying emphasis. But the persistent distinction, drawn sometimes more strictly, at 
others with less severity, between the philosopher and non-philosopher need not be 
understood as expressing a strong pessimism, only a recognition that with philosophy-
as with all specialized disciplines-communication between experts and non-experts 
will always be difficult. 
More than any other dialogue, the Laws occupies itself with this problem. 
Following the Statesman, it identifies the distinction between knower and non-knower as 
perhaps the primary differences inherent in human nature that the true art of politics 
must attempt to overcome. It is one of the chief anomalies in human nature that law 
must face. The Laws' chief contribution to handling this problem is its account of law not 
merely as the stubborn application of an inadequate and static rule to the infinite variety 
of circumstances, but as itself a dynamic force that by persuasion and force of habit can 
bring human difference into a more or less harmonious balance through a kind of 
reconciliation. This reconciliation takes the form of an imperfect and improvising 
imitation based not only on an understanding of the ideal of natural law, but also of the 
real conditions that must be faced in practice. The Laws, then, could be seen as an 
extended attempt to solve the political equivalent of the methexis problem. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
At this point it should have become clear that it is justified, and even fnritful, to take the 
apparently anomalous appearance of the phrase 'law of nature' in the mouth of the 
Platonic antagonist Calli des as a guiding thread for following some of Plato's deepest 
concerns in political philosophy and his investigation into human nature. However, 
while I have sought a relatively high level of coherence between the dialogues and 
sought to identify a single underlying purpose (though not a unique purpose) in the 
approach to the question of natural law, I have tried to refrain from describing Plato as 
expounding a theory-let alone a system-of natural law. This is in part because Plato in 
general does not seem to be in the business of expounding theories. Considering various 
attempts to reconcile the statements found in various "late" dialogues, it was once 
concluded that "(t]here is no entity that we can call 'Plato's theology,"ri and I believe this 
statement would be soundly made for other aspects of Plato's thought as well. Besides 
the polyvalence implied by the dialogue form, however, I believe that there are reasons 
specific to Plato's treatment of natural law for not taking it as a fully-fledged theory or 
system, even as it suggests the outlines of a theory. 
The primary reason for the lingering aporetic character of Plato's presentation of 
natural law is the same divergent tendencies in human nature that natural law is 
supposed to bring into a harmonious ordering. The difference of intellectual capacities 
and appetitive inclinations, Plato believes, makes it almost impossible for any 
satisfactory account of the good life to be universally accepted, especially when, in 
Plato's case, the good life in the highest sense is the life of philosophy. This generalized 
form of the problem of political persuasion recognizes that such an account of the good 
1 Meldrum (1950, 74), quoted in Mayhew (2010, 216). 
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life will almost never be plausible to non-philosophers, so that the general dissemination 
of a theory of the natural law of human life could only be achieved by compromise of 
the terms of the theory itself. That a doctrine can never become universally accepted 
need not be a damning critique of that doctrine, just as Aristotle did not take Cratylus' 
refusal to speak to be a refutation of the principle of non-contradiction.2 Similarly, 
Socrates' failure to persuade Callicles need not be taken as pointing to intemal 
weaknesses in Socrates' position. Under the regime iinagined in the Laws, Callicles 
would simply be executed if the sophronisterion failed to sober him up. But for a doctrine 
of justice and human happiness to ground itself in an idea of the fulfillment of human 
nature, only to argue that human nature itself is variable to the point of disunity and 
that its fulfillment can be achieved only by a few does not set itself good chances of 
meeting wide acceptance even among the conventionally moral. Such a failure of 
persuasive power is a practical problem for Platonic natural law as a proposed standard 
for the art of politics, which must deal with all people as they are. This is perhaps one 
consideration for Plato's failure to turn his account of the law of nature into any kind of 
moral or political manifesto.3 
The same problem, viewed from the other side, so to speak is the famous issue of 
compelling philosophers to engage in politics in the Republic. If the highest human 
happiness is attainable only by the philosopher, and philosophers are happiest only in 
the life of contemplation, not the govemance of cities, then the condition of obtaining 
justice in the political community would come at the cost of doing the greatest injustice 
z Cf. Metaphysics 1010a10-15. 
3 Strauss (1950, 163£.) suggests that Aquinas, for instance, was able to present natural law without 
reservation because for him it concerned only the .human being's practical perfection, in 
Aristotle's sense, where the higher human perfection was reserved not for the philosophical life 
but the blessedness vouchsafed to whose who accepted the divine law. But even if this is the case, 
we must admit that Plato is more skeptical than Aquinas that even the practical or "demotic" 
virtues can be universally accepted. 
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to the only people capable of true happiness.4 It is perhaps for this reason that the Eleatic 
Stranger in the Statesman presents the philosopher and the statesman as distinct figures 
in possession of distinct arts, for the statesman as such seems to be drawn to the political 
where the philosopher does not. If we adopt the perspective ultimately taken in the 
Statesman and the Laws, that of the non-philosopher or the philosopher-in-training, this 
gap need not be practically troubling, since pursuit of the philosophical life as an 
ultimately unattainable ideal can be compatible with the practical recognition for 
engagement with politics and practical affairs. But as a potentially irresolvable 
theoretical puzzle at the heart of a would-be Platonic natural law, it would seem to 
prevent any non-aporetic presentation of natural law as a doctrine. 
Natural law in Plato, as it has been presented in this dissertation, is not so much 
a system as a kind of approach to a certain set of problems. Its basic formulation, that 
one should seek the good, and its ranking of goods does not result in a system of duties 
or specific moral or political imperatives. Natural law, then, is more a reference point for 
political reflection than a rule-generating algoritlim. The Eleatic Stranger's wise 
statesman must know the measure of the fitting, but he must have an exhaustive 
knowledge of the particulars in order to be able to apply it correctly. It is not, therefore, a 
deductive but a regulative principle for thinking about political action. For this reason, 
failure to recognize Plato's political philosophy as intimately connected to natural law 
does not imply' a radical misunderstanding of it, nor does the recognition of its presence 
radically alter one's understanding of it, though it deepens that understanding 
considerably. A fortiori, actual statesmen and lawgivers need not be avowed natural law 
4 For this problem, cf. Irwin (1995, 299££.). Irwin attempts to solve this problem by assuming that 
philosophers, as just, would have a sense of other-directed obligation to do what is just for the 
city, for if philosophers preferrd not to rule, he argues, than Socrates would not have met 
Glaucon's challenge to show that justice is the greatest good for the soul in itself. But Irwin does 
not recognize the problem that if the philosopher is to rule, then the basic principle of justice, that . 
of "one man, one job" seems to be violated. Either way, then, the demands of justice will 
somehow be thwarted. 
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theorists in order to, within the realm of human possibility, succeed at their task. Thus 
the Laws . has programmatic statements about the superiority of virtue to the bodily 
goods, which is in accord with natural law, but it does not contain programmatic 
statements about natural law itself Depending on the strictness of one's terms, it does no 
harm to refer to a Platonic theory of natural law, but it cannot at all be described as 
systematic. 
While throughout this dissertation I have focused on natural law as a normative 
principle of ethico-political action, a more general concern about the unity of human 
nature has always loomed in the background. To bring this theme to the forefront would 
amount to writing a different dissertation with a different emphasis, but in closing some 
brief remarks may suffice. Ignoring its practical consequences, the strict opposition of 
nomos and phusis (or a correspondingly strict distinction between nature and culture) 
threatens to irreparably divide our understanding of the human being as a being that is 
obviously a part of nature and just as obviously lives by conventions. This divide could 
only be resolved by a one-sided reductionism of the conventional to the natural (the 
apparent tendency of Thucydides, as well as of modern 'Thucydideans') or the complete 
disregard for nilture and embrace of convention as such (which no Greek thinker seems 
to have entertained) . . 
Plato's solution, on the other hand, was to deny the strict opposition between 
nomos and phusis in the first place. He accomplishes this in part by arguing that (human) 
nature is itself less uniform than the naturalists claim, so that the variety of human nomoi 
is no longer evidence of their unnaturalness but a reflection of the complexity of human 
nature itself. From the other side, he argues that all nomoi are meant to serve a purpose, 
and that these purposes can only be understood as responding to natural human needs 
or desires, though some will do this better than others. Thp.s Socrates' inquiry into the 
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divine simplicity or bestial complexity of his soul took the form of an analysis of eros, 
which stands for the human tendency to bestial license as well as to divine simplicity.5 
Only once this question was answered by an_ unprejudiced approach to the human being 
as a whole could one attribute its complexity to convention, its simplicity to nature, or 
vice versa, but that would not be enough to show that nature an_d convention are opposed, 
merely that they are not identicaL If they are understood in terms of their purposes or 
objectives, then, instead of as efficient causes, the gap between human law and human 
nature can be understood as the gap between human endeavor and its satisfaction. 
Natural law would be the bridging of that gap. 
5 Cf. Phaedrus 229e-230a. 
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APPENDIX: THE TWO COSMIC PERIODS OF THE STATESMAN'S MYTH 
Despite the initial impression given by the myth of cosmic reversal in the Statesman, that 
it presents a cosmic history in two periods, several important scholars, responding to 
vvhat they take to be interpretative problems with this reading of the myth, have 
proposed an alternative reading that posits three cosmic periods: the age of Cronus, an 
urmamed,. intermediate age of opposite rotation, and then the age of Zeus, which 
features a second reversal so that the cosmos then rotates again in the same direction as it 
had in the age of Cronus.1 This reading is incorrect both in its philosophical motivations2 
and in its strained reading of the text, but its arguments merit detailed consideration 
because they are motivated by ambiguities or obscurities in the text.3 While I will not 
ignore the earlier versions of this reading, I will addr~ss primarily Carone's 
--- ·----·-------
1 Brisson (1995), Rowe (1995, 2009), Carone (2005). 
~ Put Briefly, Carone (127) thinks it inappropriate to imagine our stage of cosmic history as 
onewhere the cosmos has been abandoned by the god because it is unduly pessimistic, while 
Brisson (350) considers it inappropriate because it would "valorise" an age without god at the 
expence of an age of divine rule. But their solution of introducing a third cosmic period between 
the ages of Cronus and Zeus, where the god does let go, would still be a period of divine neglect . 
that cannot be avoided. And while, on the standard reading, divine neglect has at least · the 
indirect good of ensuring human autonomy, in their reading the god's letting go the cosmos is 
completely unmotivated and so all the more capricious. In trying to take seriously the Platonic 
stricture that god is good and unchanging (Brisson (1995, 356)), they introduce even more 
moments of turning in the Stranger's god. 
3 Zuckert (2009) also appears to favor a three-stage reading, though apparently not for the same 
reasons. Noting the scholarly debate, she diplomatically writes that the "Eleatic sketches a two-
or three-part development that culminates in a godforsaken universe" (715). However, she then 
seems to lean towards the three-stage view: "Rather than perpetuate a cycle of divine rule 
followed by threatened chaos when the gods had to depart, the god made the motions of the 
cosmos self-regulating," apparently identifying the god's making the cosmos autokratora with the 
god's rescue of the cosmos from complete disorder (716). Here she fails to note the narrative 
d isruption at 274e5f. Zuckert seems to be maintain (uniquely, I believe) that these three stages do 
not repeat in an endless cycle, but rather come to an end. Zuckert's account is brief and her 
failure to regularly cite specific passages often makes it unclear which passage she is basing her 
claims on. She also (717 fn. 30) appears to confuse her preference for a three-stage reading with 
Rosen's (1979, 74) very different claim that the "two cycles of cosmic change are ... in my reading 
contrary aspects of human existence in one and the same cosmos" (my italics). It is one thing to say 
that the interpreter must combine the two periods of the myth, and another to say the myth itself 
combines them into a third. Zuckert confuses her idiosyncretic diachronic reading with Rosen's 
synchronic interpretation of the myth. 
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presentation, which seems to me the most thorough and well argued, and which she 
puts to use in a larger philosophical reading of the myth, many of whose insights remain 
valid even when detached from her inaccurate portrayal of its structure.4 Carone is very 
much on the right track in understanding the political importance of the myth, even if 
she is incorrect on a nmnber of details. 
Carone finds the traditional reading of the myth- one of two cosmic cycles, 
where .. in the "age of Zeus," the cosmos is not supervised by a god but left to itself-
problematic on two grounds: first, that it is internally (i.e., textually) inconsistent, and 
second because of its problematic take on larger cosmological issues.5 On the one hand, 
"the traditional interpretation fails to preserve the consistency of the text on a literal 
reading,"6 and on the other, it gives a cosmological picture at odds with what we find in 
other "late" Platonic dialogues such as the Philebus, Timaeus, and Laws.7 But Carone 
admits herself that, even on her own reading, the myth remains inconsistent on certain 
points with the cosmology of the Timaeus and Laws, and argues that "we may wonder 
4 Carone (2005) ch. 6. 
5 Ibid.,.125. 
6 Ibid., 128. 
7 Ibid., 126. Th!s seems to be Brisson's fundamental "textual" objection to the standard reading. 
Brisson states (1995, 349) that the recourse to myth in the Statesman can only be efficacious if we 
assume i) that the Eleatic Stranger is Plato's mouthpiece (because otherwise we could not know 
where the Statesman stood in Plato's development); ii) that we must take the myth told by the 
Stranger as literally true (at the risk of rendering the argument of the whole dialogue 
unintelligible); and iii) that therefore the myth must be considered alongside a number of other 
dialogues (the Timaeus, Ct:itias, Laws, Protagoras, Gorgias, and Phaedrus) in order to understand the 
evolution of Plato' s political thought. To i) and iii) it must be responded that, if one wants to 
understand the m yth's place in Plato's development, one has first to understand it on its own 
terms. To the first point in particular, it should not have to be argued at this point that there is in 
principle a difference between the meaning of a Platonic dialogue and the statements of persons 
in that dialogue. To to the third, again, while it is certainly instructive to compare the myth to 
other Platonic myths (and especially to other mentions of the age of Cronus), it does not follow 
this this myth must be assimilated into the others, as Brisson believes in the case of the "late" 
myths especially. To the second, the Stranger' s calling the myth a paidia (268e5) should never be 
forgotten. We must take all the details of the myth seriously (as significant ), but that does not 
.mean that the Stranger means for Young Socrates (or Plato for us) to believe in them. 
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whether Plato meant to present such a unique description of the universe seriously."8 If 
no literal reading ·of the myth can reconcile it completely with Plato's other cosmological 
accounts, then to determine just to what extent we are to partially reconcile it is left as a 
matter of philosophical taste, and there is no need to argue de gustibus. Since Carone 
admits that a literaJ. reading of the text must be decisive in grounding the interpretation 
of the m yth, it is only those concerns which will be addressed here. What she identifies 
as the "basic points against the standard reading," 9 based on her "rather close exegesis 
.... ·~·,·.~: .. 
of the text,'r1o is in fact not close enough, and her objections can be rather easily met. 
Carone identifies three basic objections against the standard reading, which 
ground all of her subsequent deviations therefrom. Her first objection is that the 
Stranger introduces the myth as an integration of various existing myths told among the 
Greeks, including the story of Zeus changing the direction of the sun's rising and setting 
(269al -5). She argues that since the Stranger means to incorporate this and other myths 
il1.to his complete account of the cosmos, the reference to Zeus actively "changing" 
(metebalen) the direction of the cosmos' rotation, instead of merely "letting go" (aphesen), 
means that the age of Zeus cannot be a period of divine neglect, but that Zeus is in fact 
still ruling the cosmos.n In this connection she notes that later on the cosmos is 
described as "being turned" (strephthentos), which as a passive verb suggests an active 
turner (strepsas)Y To address the active--passive argument first, a consultation of the LSJ 
will show that the passive forms of strephein very often carry a middle sense ("turning 
itself," or better, · simply "turning"), whete an external agent is clearly ruled out. So 
------- - ----------
8 Ibid., 147, where she notes that the Stranger describes the myth as a kind of "childish play" or 
paidia. Later the Stranger will say of the class of playthings (na(yvLov) that they are not worth 
taking seriously. 288c9f: ou yitQ anoubij~ ovb£v QU'rWV XUQLV, aMa nmbui~ EVf:Ka 'ITlXV'(a 
bQii'raL. It would have helped her interpretation to take this mention of play more seriously. 
9 Ibid., 132. 
10 Ibid., 125. 
11 Ibid., 12.9. 
12 Ibid., 130. Cf. Statesman 273e. 
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while the passive form at 273e6 is not inconsistent with Carone's reading, neither is it 
inconsistent with the standard interpretation, and so cannot be taken as evidence against 
it. Furthermore, at 273d5f we read of the entropic cosmos being "storm-tossed" and 
"dissolved by disturbance" (kheimastheis, dialutheis), and while these two verbs are 
grammatically passive, they must be middle in sense, since in this period of cosmic 
abandonment there is no external mover at all (cf. 270alf.). If these passive verbs, then, 
must refer to the cosmos' internal action on itself, then there can be no objection to also 
using the grammatically passive st1·ephesthai as equivalent to the reflexive strephein 
heauton (269e9, cf., 270a6). Finally, returning to Carone's initial point, one might also 
argue that there is no conceptual inconsistency to begin with between "letting go" and 
"changing the course" of the cosmos. For if it is only the divine steersman's hand on the 
rudder that keeps the cosmos rotating in the direction it is, against its innate tendency 
(cf. 272e5f.), then his release would be the proximate cause of the change. Thus the initial 
contention that 'changing' implies the continued active direction from the god is not 
even conceptually necessary. 
Even if her supporting grammatical argument can be dispensed with, the explicit 
reference to Zeus changing the course of the sun and stars could still tell in favor of 
Carone' s reading. Let us look at the passage in full. The Stranger refers to the story 
"about the changing of the setting and rising of the sw1 and the other stars, that it now 
rises from the same place that it then used to set, and used to rise from the opposite 
place, and that the god changed it to its current form as bearing witness for Atreus" 
(269al-5). Carone argues that the St~anger intends this myth to be taken as true, because 
he is "incorporating" it into his true account of the cosmos, and because the Stranger 
later says, apropos of the "earthborn race," that the human beings living just after this 
time "became heralds to us of these logoi, which are now incorrectly disbelieved by the 
2.56 
many" (271b2f.)Y Even if we disregard the fact that the admonition "this tale is true" is 
a common trope of all storytelling and need not be taken as anything more than part of 
the paidia, and take the Stranger as integrating this myth wholesale into his account of 
the cosmos, the resulting picture will be even less coherent than the standard reading. 
The myth reports that the god (whom Carone correctly identifies as Zeus, but who is not 
named in the text) changed the course of the heavens, as bearing witness for Atreus' 
cause in a dynastic disputeY On Carone's reading of the myth, this would make the 
twins Atreus and Thyestes men of the reversed revolution, where the human beings are 
born from the earth and age backwards.15 But this makes nonsense of the myth as the 
Stranger alludes to it, for without sexual generation there could be no sons of Pelops to 
dispute their right to the inheritance of the Peloponnesus.16 If Carone would actually 
incorporate the myth as the Stranger tells it, instead of merely selecting its reference to 
Zeus, the Stranger's account of the cosmos would become not less but more confused 
and contradictory. Better to follow the indications of the Stranger's statement that these 
stories have been "scattered apart from each other" and that "no one has spoken of the 
experience that is the cause of them" (269b5-9). If he believed that the myth of Zeus were 
literally true, then the cause would have been stated: Zeus was settling a dynastic 
13 Cf. Ibid., 130f. 
14 As Benardete (1986, III.151) notes, the story is related twice in Euripides, once briefly (Orestes 
988-1006) and again at greater length (Electra 699-745). The Stranger's 6 8c:oc; ... f.l C:'rE ~aAc:v is a 
direct verbal echo of Orestes 1006: Zc:uc; f.lC:'ra~liAAn and close to Electra 728f.: aa'l:QWV f.lE'rE~aa' 
above;/ Zc:uc; Kai. <:ptyyoc; ac:Mou. In connection to Brisson's and Carone's sense of Platonic piety 
and her emphasis on the Stranger's supposed insistence that we believe these tales, the chorus' 
last words in the Electra are quite poignant (737-743): 
Atyc:'rm <'!:abc:>, 'l:av bE: n(-
anv Gf.lLKQaV naQ' Ef.lmy' £xc: t. 
G'rQ£1paL8C:Qf.llXV aEALOV 
xQvawm'lv £bQav aA.Aa~av ­
'l:a bua'l:UXlal ~QO'rc:lWL 
8va'riic; £vc:Kc:v b(Kac;. 
15 Cf. Carone (2005, 134£.) for her description of this unnamed age of reversaL 
16 Even if the earthborn men have a kind of ancestry (born from the seeds of the previously 
withered away) they would have no memory of that ancestry. Cf. Ferrari (1995, 393). 
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dispute. But that is not what the Stranger believes. He must, then, take these stories as 
distorted fragments based on the unreliable m~mory of the true experience (pathos), and 
he indicates that so far "no sufficient infonnant has appeared to us" to tell of that time 
(272d2f.).17 The same considerations are enough, I think, to cast serious doubt on 
Carone's contention that the Stranger's mention of "this [life] which, it is said, is in the 
time of Zeus"18 must be interpreted as a literal assertion that Zeus rules in that period.19 
Another problem Carone finds in the standard reading is the account of reverse 
aging that is supposed to take place in the age of Cronus. But "in the age of Cronus it is 
said that souls fall into the earth as seed (272e3), with the implication that they follow 
the normal process of growth and death."20 Thus the age of Cronus, where human 
beings are born from seeds, must be distinguished from the age of cosmic decay, where 
they age backwards. Ignoring the difficulty of construing the Greek text, 21 the 
implication Carone would find here is simply absent. To infer from a single mention of 
17 With Lane (1998, 114). 
18 Carone and Brisson repeatedly refer to Zeus' "rule" or "reign," but the Stranger never uses 
those terms in the exposition of the myth itself, using instead the phrase bd. Moe;;, which does not 
imply rule at all. A consultation of the LSJ shows that £rd. + gen. most often has a spatial or · 
temporal sense ("in the presence/ time of"). It can denote a relation of authority, but then in the 
reverse direction, with the subject, not the holder of authority in the genitive. But surely we do 
not want to imagine an age of rule over Zeus. Never in his narrative does the Stranger speak of 
Zeus or Cronus in an active sense, referring only to "the god." In his prelude to the myth, he has 
spoken of the ~am.i\dav f)v TjQE,E KQ6voc;; (269a7), but he is speaking of the fragmented and 
inaccurate later tradition, not in his own voice .. Zeus is mentioned once later in the dialogue, as 
the source of unexpected, though possibly good, outcomes (295c9-d2). 
19 If Cronus rules one period, and Zeus another, then one of two conclusions must be drawn, 
either of which Carone could not accept. Either Cronus and Zeus are two gods, in which case the 
Stranger's stipulation against two different gods rotating the cosmos is violated and the 
consistency of the myth as well (d. 270a2); or Zeus and Cronus are two names for the same god 
(so Brisson (1995, 350)), in which case human myths or logoi about the gods are so confused that 
they can lead to naturally drawing impious conclusions like the one above, and so cannot 
possibly be trusted-in which case Carone's evidence is gone. Carone later (150) acknowledges 
that Cronus and Zeus must be different names for the same god, but does not realize how this 
undercuts her earlier interpretative procedure. 
2° Carone (2005, 131), italics mine. 
21 The text is oaa Tjv EKlXGTIJ nqom:axetv '!:OGCtl)'[C{ de;; y~v GTI:EQfl.Ct'CCt 7CEGOUOT)c;;, which 
Benardete (1986) translates "once [the soul] had let fall into the earth as many seeds ... " and in a 
footnote (fn, 26, IIL153) remarks: "Either the text is corrupt or Plato has extended the intransitive 
verb "fall" to take some kind of internal accusative, as in the translation." 
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seeds in an admittedly strange mythical narrative that human beings must in the age of 
Cronus follow the usual course of vegetable growth is far too much.22 Furthermore, the 
story of men growing fully-formed from seeds is not at all foreign to Greek myths, but 
is, on the contrary, the norm. The spartoi or "sown men" from the myths of Cadmus and 
Jason lend weight to the standard reading, and the Stranger had them on his mind 
earlier.23 Carone also objects to putting the birth of grey-haired human beings in the age 
of Cronus, because it suggests "a state of degradation that seems far removed from what 
is otherwise descTibed as the ideal conditions of the age of Cronus."24 But the Stranger is 
at best ambivalent about the age of Cronus.25 He will not answer definitely that human 
beings were in that age happier. They would only be happier, he says, if they turned to 
philosophy, but he is not at all sure that they would (272b-d). Contrary to Carone, 
philosophy is not "stated as a possibility even for the nurslings of Cronus" in the sense 
that she understands.26 Carone evidently thinks that they are "given the possibility of 
philosophy" in the sense of being given a choice to philosophize or not, because 
"autonomy is something that god would not want to eliminate altogether from humans 
22 Carone also argues (132) that the statement that backwards-aging human beings will 
eventually "disappear into the earth" is inconsistent with their becoming seeds for the new 
generation, because if they disappear then there is nothing left. But this is again to read too much 
into a word. · U;TJcpav(l;ao (270e8f.) can mean "be obliterated" but it can also simply mean 
disappear, become lost to sight, just as a seed is when planted in the earth. It can also denote 
simple burial (d. LSJ for examples). H.osen (1979, 77) considers the possible meanings of the word 
more cautiously. 
23 Sophist 247c4f.: o'l yE al.11:wv arraq·w( n Kat at)'[6x8ovEc;. Cf. Timaeus 23e. On the point of 
autochthony, cf. also Republic 414d-e, on the noble lie that the citizens sprang fully formed from 
their mother earth, which makes mention of autochthony though not explicitly seeds. Another 
reference to the "Phoenician" or "Sidonian" myth is found in the Laws (663e5-9): 1:0 arraq£v1:wv 
7W'IE ob6v1:wv cmi\l'Im; 0:, al.nwv cpuvaL It is significant for the question of the possibility of 
philosophy in the age of Cronus that the reference in the Sophist is to materialists, who are 
contrasted to the "friends of the forms." 
24 Carone (2005, 132). 
25 The god Cronus, of course, was quite an ambivalent figure in Greek mythology in general, and 
often associated with cannibalism. Vidal-Naquet (1978) provides an excellent survey of the 
various employments of the age of Cronus in Greek literature before and after Plato, and is 
refreshing in: his acceptance of the possibility of Platonic ambiguity and ambivalence. Cf. also 
Erler (1995, 377). 
26 Carone (2005, 143). White (2007, 59) is similarly wrong to say that the "myth also explicitly tells 
us that philosophy is a real possibility in the era of Cronus." 
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even in that idyllic age."27 But for this assertion Carone adduces no textual support 
whatsoever. The only sense in which the Stranger leaves open the possibility of 
philosophy ln the age of Cronus is an epistemic one: We do not have reliable informants, 
so we cannot say for sure whether or not there was philosophy in that time.28 Such statements 
are no hallmarks of an idyll. 
Last, Carone cites the following passage as evidence for her view: "For then first 
the god ruled the circling caring for it as a whole, as now it's the same place by place, all 
the pa1ts of the cosmos had been distributed tmder ruling gods."29 Again I quote the 
entire passage because Carone does not. She quotes only the first clause and the "as 
now" as indicating that divine rule continues in our present age of Zeus. Carone here 
follows the manuscript reading of we; vuv, read by Hermann and Dies but variously 
amended by Apelt, Burnet, and Robinson, all more or less to the effect of the we; b' au 
quoted in the last footnote.30 That the majority of modern scholars have chosen to 
amend, however, would to Carone be just another indication that the standard reading 
is sci entrenched that even the manuscripts have been altered to make it fit. Can we, 
then, make . sense of the manuscript reading as it is transmitted in a way that fits her 
reading? Carone is forced to admit that if the age of Zeus is one of divine rule, then it 
must be a different kind of rule than the care (epimeleia) of the divine shepherd, since it 
27 Carone (2005, 143). Carone will later (158£.) acknowledge that "Plato rejects the most salient 
feature of the Hesiodic Golden Age, namely happiness as something unquestionably enjoyed by 
the human race," and that happiness and the life of philosophy become an "ethical challenge for 
humans to undertake." 
28 Cf. Roochnik (2005, 9). 
29 Statesman 27id3-6: '[('YU: yitQ aurijc; 1lQW'WV rijc; KUKAT]m::wc; i)QX£V E7llfl£Aouwvoc; OAT]c; 6 
El t:6c;, (:Oc; b' av Ka'l:a 'L07lOUc; 'l:aU'I:OV 'WV'W, vno El£WV lXQXOV'LWV T{QV'L' ijv 'l:Gt 'LOU KOCJflOU flEQT] 
bLElAT]flflEVa .. The italics in the translation are mine. 
3° Carone (2005, 243) fn. 25. Cf. the apparatus in Duke et al. (1995). For a summary of the 
arguments of all the editors before Robinson (and Robinson essentially follows these editors), and 
especially how difficult it is to construe we; vuv with the words that go before it, as opposed to 
what follows, cf. Brague (1981, 74-80). Although there is no room to consider it here at length, it 
should be noted that Brague, while accepting the strength of the case for emendation, proposes 
his own interpretation of the passage based on the mss. reading without resorting to the 
implausible postulation of a third cosmic period. · 
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must make room for human autonomy, but she is hard pressed to describe it positively 
given the lack of evidence in the text. She appeals to the arts as "gifts of the gods" (cf. 
274c-d) as an example of a different kind of divine rule through instruction.31 For the 
sake of argument, one may grant her the interpretation of that obscure passage.32 But 
returning to the original passage that apparently describes the god's rule in the age of 
Cmnus "as now," can it be made to harmonize with the idea of two kinds of divine rule? 
Again; the entire passage reads: "For then first the god ruled the circling [of the cosmos] 
caring for it as a whole, as now" (my italics). The mss. reading, then, cannot support the 
idea of two kinds of divine rule and divine care, but explicitly asserts that the god cares 
now for the cosmos in the same way he did then. If it would stand, then both the age of 
Cronus and the current age of Zeus would be periods of divine rule through care, which 
Carone knows will not fit the Stranger's later interpretation of the myth (cf. 276b).33 The 
case for emendation, then, even on her reading, would be quite strong. 
31 Ibid., 140. Here she seems to develop the suggestion of Brisson (1995, 350ff.). 
32 The apparent contradiction of which seems to be the sole directly textual support taken by 
Brisson (1995, 350). Vidal-Naquet (1978, 139) shows a judicious reserve on this point, noting that 
Plato always stood somewhat apart from the humanism of the sophists. Cf. also Ferrari (1995, 
394). For the Platonic ambivalence both toward traditional myths and to their possible 
rationalization, consider Phaedrus 229c-230a. 
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